

## RAJPUTANA AGENCY 1832-1858





# **RAJPUTANA AGENCY**

## **1832 - 1858**

**A Study of British Relations with the States of  
Rajputana during the period with special  
emphasis on the role of Rajputana Agency**

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## PREFACE

The British historians have paid much attention to the contributions of the Governor-Generals to the formation of the British policy towards the Indian States and have ignored the role of their subordinate officers. In fact, the subordinate officers — the Agents to the Governor-General, the Residents and the Political Agents accredited to the Indian States — were the diplomatic representatives of the East India Company. By virtue of their long stay and experience in this country, they acquired a knowledge of the Indian Courts and the Indian people which no Governor-General, however great his ability, could possibly obtain during his short tenure. These British functionaries not only worked for the expansion of their government's influence in the Princely States, but also considerably influenced the policy of their government towards the States. This is applicable to the Rajputana Agency also, established in 1832 under the supervision of an Agent to the Governor-General at Ajmer both for conducting British relations with the Rajputana States and for exercising greater control over their interstate relations. It was only after the institution of the Rajputana Agency that, except for the small British territory of Ajmer, all the Rajputana States came under the authority of one political agency.

This book is the first attempt of its kind to study the role of the Rajputana Agency in the formation of a uniform British policy towards the States. It also attempts to examine the *modus operandi* of British relations with the States during the period 1832–1858, which forms a complete phase in itself, right from the institution of the Rajputana Agency in 1832 to its transfer in 1858 from the East India Company to the British Crown.



In seeking to study the evolution of the British policy towards the Rajputana States, it has been found convenient to select one premier State from each of the Political Agencies working under the Rajputana Agency, so as to perceive the general drift of the British policy in the region. This line of approach, it is hoped, has helped to build up a total picture of British relations with the Rajputana States.

This book was originally a doctoral thesis which was completed under the supervision of Dr. G.N. Sharma, Professor, Department of History and Indian Culture, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur. I take this opportunity to record my deep sense of gratitude to my supervisor for his invaluable guidance and help in completing this work.

I am grateful to the authorities of the University of Rajasthan for having awarded the scholarship without which I would have found it difficult to complete this study in time. I also wish to thank the Director of the National Archives of India, New Delhi, for permitting me to consult the records under his custody. I owe many thanks to the staff of the Rajasthan University library, Jaipur for the kind assistance and co-operation extended to me when I was engaged in this investigation.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

A.G.G.	Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana
COD.	Court of Directors
d.n.	no date
F&P.	Political Consultations of the Foreign Department, <i>National Archives of India</i>
F&Sc.	Secret Consultations of the Foreign Department <i>National Archives of India</i>
IHRC.	Proceedings of Indian Historical Record Commission
JIH	Journal of Indian History
JRIHR.	Journal of the Rajasthan Institute of Historical Research
KW.	Keep with
N.W.P.	North-Western Provinces
PRHC.	Proceedings of the Rajasthan History Congress
RAR.	Rajputana Agency Records, National Archives of India, New Delhi.
RPARS.	Report on the Political Administration of the Rajputana States.
Tr.	Translation
URS ( <i>History</i> )	The University of Rajasthan Studies ( <i>History</i> )



# Introduction

## I

### Conclusion of Treaties with Rajputana States

The States of Rajputana were situated to the south-west of Delhi, and surrounded by the frontiers of the Punjab, Sind, Gujarat and Malwa. Ever since 1734, mercenary Maratha bands had begun entering into the feuds of these States.<sup>1</sup> However, when Mahadji Sindhia, the ruler of Gwalior, and a strong member of the Maratha Confederacy was appointed as the Regent of Delhi (*Vakil-i-Mutlaq*) by the Mughal Emperor in December 1784, a complete change came about in the status of the Marathas in Rajputana. Subsequently, Mahadji along with his Generals started collecting annual tributes from the Rajputana States.<sup>2</sup> To these encroachments, the rulers showed repugnance.<sup>3</sup> One of them, Sawai Pratap Singh of Jaipur sought British military aid to withstand the tribute-collecting expeditions of the Marathas in May, 1786.<sup>4</sup> His efforts proved abortive, for Cornwallis, the Governor-General declined to extend the desired aid in pursuance of the British policy of non-interference in the quarrels of the Indian States.<sup>5</sup> This gave Mahadji Sindhia free scope to deal with the rulers of Rajputana. In March 1791, Mahadji

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1. Jadunath Sarkar, "A proposal for a subsidiary alliance in Rajputana in 1794," *IHRC*, Vol. XVI, 1939, p. 1.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*, Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of The Mughal Empire*, Vol. III, p. 247.

5. Sarkar, *IHRC*, loc. cit; Calcutta Council to Earl Cornwallis, G. G. (on tour) d. 28 August 1787, *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. I, letter No. 158.



wrested Ajmer from the Raja of Jodhpur,<sup>1</sup> which served as the base for the Marathas to lead tribute-collecting expeditions into the States of Rajputana.<sup>2</sup>

In view of the rulers being tired of these tribute-exacting expeditions, Mons. J. Pillet, a French Captain in Jaipur service, appealed to Sir John Shore, the successor of Cornwallis for the Company's protection to the Rajputana States, or at least to Jaipur in June, 1794.<sup>3</sup> This suggestion was not acceptable to Sir John who kept to the beaten track of non-interference in the affairs of Indian States. As a result, the Marathas continued to exact tribute from the rulers of Rajputana.<sup>4</sup>

However, to make the British power paramount in India, Wellesley, the successor of Shore resorted to the policy of aggression and aggrandisement.<sup>5</sup> He had already wiped out the power of Tipu Sultan of Mysore (1799). Further, he waged the Second Anglo-Maratha War to extinguish the power of the Marathas and the French from the Northern provinces of India, and to establish British power and influence instead.<sup>6</sup> For building up an effectual resistance against the revival of these powers, Wellesley vested Lord Lake, the Commander-in-Chief, with plenary powers to conclude treaties with all the States of that region.<sup>7</sup>

Accordingly, during the course of war with the Marathas, Lord Lake made treaties in 1803 with the Rajput States of Alwar and Jaipur, and with the Jat ruler of Bharatpur.<sup>8</sup> However, when the Raja of Bharatpur joined with the Holkar of Indore during the battle of Deeg, Lord

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1. Sarkar, *Fall of The Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV, pp. 59-60.

2. Adam, Secretary to Government to Ochterlory, Resident in Rajputana and Commissioner d. 27 March, Cons. 24 April 1818, No. 13, F & P.

3. Sarkar, *IHRC*, op. cit., pp. 1-3.

4. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol IV, pp. 158 f

5. C. H. Philips, *The East India Company, 1784-1834*, p. 102.

6. Wellesley to Lake d. 27 July 1803, *Selections from Wellesley's Despatches*, S. J. Owen, Ed., p. 316.

7. Ibid.

8. C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 66, 389 and 400.



Lake<sup>1</sup> was left with no alternative but to lay siege to Bharatpur (1805) both as a punishment to the Raja and to overcome Holkar.<sup>2</sup> In this siege, the British arms sustained heavy losses.<sup>3</sup> Eventually, Bharatpur signed a treaty with the British Government in April, 1805.<sup>4</sup> It re-established British relations with Bharatpur.

### Barlow's Settlement

Before Wellesley could bring all the States of Rajputana under British protection, and the war with the Marathas to a successful end, he was recalled by the authorities at London. Lord Cornwallis was again appointed in his stead. On the demise of Cornwallis, the task of making final settlement with the Marathas devolved on George Barlow. He dissolved the treaty with the State of Jaipur on the ground that this State had espoused the cause of Holkar during the Second Anglo-Maratha War.<sup>5</sup> Besides, in the settlement of 1805-6 with Sindhia and Holkar, Barlow guaranteed that the Company would abstain from all political activity to the west of the Chambal,<sup>6</sup> save the Rajputana States of Alwar, Bharatpur and Dholpur,<sup>7</sup> which were under the British protection. This was a reversal of the Wellesley policy.<sup>8</sup>

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1. Lake to G. G. d. 21 October 1804, Cons. 7 March 1805, No. 32, F & Sc.
  2. Lake to G. G. d. 21 November 1804, Cons. 7 March 1805, No. 56, F & Sc.
  3. W. Stratton, *Two Sieges of Bharatpur in 1805 and 1826*, pp. 17 ff.
  4. Ibid., pp. 38-39; Colonel Hugh Pearse, *Memoir of the Life and Military Services of Viscount Lake*, p. 338 f.
  5. George Barlow to Lord Lake d. 14 December 1805, D. C. Ganguly (ed.) : *Select Documents of the British Period of Indian History*, pp. 187-88.
  6. P. E. Roberts, *India Under Wellesley*, p. 262.
  7. On the transfer of Gwalior and Gohud (in Malwa) in 1806 to Daulat Rao Sindhia, the Parganas of Dholpur-Bari and Rajakhara were assigned to Rana Kirat Singh and since then they formed the territories of the Jat State of Dholpur. *Report on the Political Administration of Rajpootana, For the Years 1865-66 and 1866-67*, Part I, p. 42; Aitchison, *op. cit.*, 1892, p. 268.
  8. John William Kaye, (Ed.) : *Selections From the Papers of Lord Metcalfe*, p. 7.



### Rajputana States placed under the Delhi Resident

Lord Lake resented the dissolution of alliance with Jaipur. In protest, he relinquished the political authority in Northern India in January, 1806.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, the charge of superintending British relations with the three Protected States of Rajputana, was transferred to Lieutenant Colonel David Ochterlony (afterwards Sir David), the then Resident at Delhi.<sup>2</sup> On June 25, 1806, Archibald Seton took over the charge of the Delhi Residency from Ochterlony.<sup>3</sup>

### Lord Minto and Rajputana States

Barlow's Settlement left the unprotected states of Rajputana to the tender mercies of the Maratha rulers and their associate, Amir Khan, the Pindari leader.<sup>4</sup> The repeated ravages of the Marathas in these States, and their policy of alienating territories of the Rajput rulers as security for their tribute, made them unpopular among the peasantry, the Chiefs and the rulers.<sup>5</sup> Once famed for their heroism, the rulers of Rajputana because of their mutual dissensions, failed to unite against the Marathas.<sup>6</sup> In these circumstances, the rulers of Mewar, Jaipur and Kota appealed to the British Government for protection against the Maratha and the Pindari menace.<sup>7</sup>

1. Mill and Wilson, *History of British India*, Vol. VI, p. 168n.

2. Lake to Wellesly d. 23 September 1803, Cons. 2 March 1804, No. 119, F & Sc

3. Seton to Edmonstone d. 26 June, Cons. 17 July 1806, No. 21, F & P.

4. Mohan Sinha Mehta, *Lord Hastings and the Indian States*, p. 126.

5. Thomas Duer Broughton, *Letters From a Maratha Camp During the Year 1809*, pp. 138, 178, 246-47.

6. For instance the Ten Years War between Jaipur and Jodhpur for the hand of the fair princess Krishna Kumari of Mewar, the support given by the rulers of Jaipur and Bikaner to Dhonkal Singh, a pretender to the Jodhpur throne against Maharaja Man Singh of Jodhpur, the attack of Jodhpur on Bikaner, etc. Seton, Resident Delhi to N B Edmonstone, Chief Secretary to Government d. 4 August, Cons 25 August 1810, No. 50, F & P; S N. Sen "Princess Krishna Kumari and the conflict amongst the Princes of Rajasthan—A New Study", *Modern Review*, April 1942, pp. 369-73; B. N. Reu, "Maharaja Man Singh of Jodhpur and Maharaja Surat Singh of Bikaner," *IHRC*, Vol. XIX, 1942, pp. 146-48.

7. Tr. of the requests of the Rajas of Hindustan d n. Cons. 21 January 1810, No. 40, F & P.



These appeals proved of no avail, as Seton considered it unwise to antagonise the Maratha rulers who were in alliance with the British.<sup>1</sup>

The succession of Charles Metcalfe, a staunch critic of Barlow's policy<sup>2</sup> to the Delhi Residency in place of Seton in 1811, led to a change in the British attitude towards the unprotected States of Rajputana. Metcalfe found that the call for British protection against Maratha oppression was loud in all these States, from the Rajas down to the ryots.<sup>3</sup> They claimed it as their right, for, the British now occupied the place of the Mughals.<sup>4</sup> On considerations both of 'policy and humanity', Metcalfe advocated to his Government for preventing the overthrow of the Rajputana States at the hands of the Marathas, the 'vagabond armies' of Amir Khan, and to form 'a confederation of the Rajpoot States' under the British protection.<sup>5</sup> Lord Minto, the then Governor General, disapproved the suggestions as interference in the internal affairs of Rajputana States was contrary to the restrictive clause of the British treaty with the Marathas.<sup>6</sup>

### Treaties with Rajputana States

Like Metcalfe, Lord Moira, the successor of Minto considered the reversal of the Wellesley policy detrimental to the general peace of India, and desired to establish British Paramountcy in the country.<sup>7</sup> After having the full appraisal of Metcalfe's views,<sup>8</sup> he therefore, decided to exterminate the Pindari menace<sup>9</sup> and to form political alliances with the

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1. Seton to Rao Chaturbhuj, Vakil of Raja of Jaipur d. 17 August, Cons. 12 September 1808, No 29-C, F & P.

2. Kaye, op. cit, pp. 1ff.

3. Metcalfe, Resident Delhi to Edmonstone d. 20 June, Cons. 12 July, 1811, No. 1, F & Sc.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Edmonstone to Metcalfe d. 12 July, Cons. 12 July 1811, No 2, F& Sc.

7. G.G.'s minute d. 3 April, Cons. 21 June 1814, No. 4; F & Sc.

8. Metcalfe's Memorandum on Central India, John William Kaye, *Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. I, pp. 317-19.

9. Resolution of G. G. in Council, Cons. 21 December 1816, No. 16, F & P.



unprotected States of Rajputana in continuation of the Wellesley policy of 1803.<sup>1</sup> To carry out his plan, he compelled Sindhia to sign the Treaty of Gwalior, which released the Company from the obligation of abstaining from political activity to the west of Chambal (November 1817).<sup>2</sup> Metcalfe<sup>3</sup> and Sir John Malcolm were assigned the task of concluding separate treaties<sup>4</sup> with the unprotected States of Rajputana, on behalf of the British Government. Accordingly, Metcalfe concluded treaties with the States of Kota, Jodhpur (Marwar), Udaipur (Mewar), Bikaner, Jaisalmer, Karauli, Kishangarh, Jaipur (Dhundar) and Bundi, whereas Malcolm, the Malwa Resident signed treaties with the Rajput States of Partabgarh, Banswara and Dungarpur.<sup>5</sup> This apart, Amir Khan was separated from the predatory confederacy. The territory of Tonk was given to him and his heirs and successors in perpetuity.<sup>6</sup>

### Clauses in the treaties

The treaties with the States mostly embodied those principles according to which Lord Moira, now the Marquis of Hastings, embarked upon making the British Power paramount in the States of Rajputana. According to the general terms of the treaties, the British Government on its part, promised non-interference in the internal affairs of these States, and offered to protect their interests and those of their

1. G G.'s Minute d. 10 October, Cons. 28 October 1817, No.1, F & Sc., G.G. to Vice-President in Council d. 10 October, Cons. 28 October 1817, No. 1, F & Sc.
2. Philips, op. cit., pp. 217-18.
3. Kaye, *Life of Metcalfe*, pp. 459-60.
4. The idea of Confederacy was abandoned because Metcalfe and Hastings both agreed that it would create a feeling of jealousy among the States. Metcalfe to Adam d. 18 October, Cons. 14 November 1817, No. 50, F & Sc.
5. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, Kota pp. 357-58; Jodhpur pp. 128-29; Udaipur p. 22; Bundi p. 229; Bikaner pp. 288-89; Jaisalmer pp. 212-13; Karauli pp. 384-85; Kishangarh pp. 104-5; Dungarpur pp. 450-51; Banswara pp. 466f.; Partabgarh, pp. 450-52.
6. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, Vol. III, pp. 220, and 244; Kaye, *Life of Metcalfe*, pp. 331-34.



heirs and successors.<sup>1</sup> The rulers on their part acknowledged British Supremacy. They submitted the maintenance of their foreign relations to the British Government, and pledged to lay all their military resources at its command.<sup>2</sup> Besides, they promised that they would not commit aggression against any State, and in case of a dispute among themselves they would submit to 'the arbitration and award of the British Government.'<sup>3</sup> On the desire of Zalim Singh, the Rajrana of Kota, Metcalfe, as a mark of gratitude to the former's loyal services to the British in the extermination of the Pindaris, inserted a supplementary article in the treaty with Kota.<sup>4</sup> The British Government consented to this supplementary article which vested the entire administration of that State in Rajrana Zalim Singh, and after him in his heirs, in regular succession and perpetuity.<sup>5</sup> According to the treaties, only the States of Kota, Bundi, Jaipur, Udaipur, Jodhpur, Banswara, Dungarpur and Partabgarh were to pay tribute to the British Government as they were paying to the Marathas.

Thus by the end of 1818, the Pindaris were scattered and destroyed, the Maratha rulers, defeated one by one, ceased to exist as a political force;<sup>6</sup> and the Rajputana States, having been brought under British protection felt free and secure from any external danger.

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1. For instance see Treaty with Jaipur, Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, pp. 68f.
  2. Apart from the general clause of military assistance to the British Government as was stipulated in every treaty with the States of Rajputana, the Ruler of Jodhpur also engaged to furnish 1,500 horse to the British Government for general service when it was necessary. Aitchison, op. cit., 1892, p. 146.
  3. For instance see treaty with Jaipur State. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, pp. 68f.
  4. Metcalfe to Adam d. 8 January, Cons. 30 January 1818, No. 69, F & Sc; Aitchison, op. cit., 1892, p. 326.
  5. Aitchison, op. cit., 1892, p. 326.
  6. Philips, op. cit., p. 218.



## II

## British Policy and System of Superintending Relations with Rajputana States (1818-25)

The treaties of 1817-18 made it expedient for the British Government to make provisions for the military protection and political control of the allied Rajput States.<sup>1</sup> According to the arrangements, the States of Bharatpur, Alwar and Dholpur continued to remain under the political charge of the Delhi Residency. Later on, the Rajput States of Bikaner and Jaisalmer were also annexed to the political charge of this Residency for the reason of administrative convenience.<sup>2</sup> Further, the superintendence of British relations with the States of Dungarpur, Banswara and Partabgarh was entrusted to the Resident in Malwa.<sup>3</sup> Likewise, the States of Udaipur, Jodhpur, Kota, Bundi, Karauli, Kishangarh, Jaipur,<sup>4</sup> and Tonk<sup>5</sup> were assigned to the charge of Major General Sir David Ochterlony designated as the 'Resident in Rajputana and Commissioner' from April 1, 1818.<sup>6</sup> On Daulat Rao Sindhia ceding Ajmer to the British according to the treaty of 1818, F. Wilder, the Assistant to the Resident at Delhi was appointed as the Superintendent at Ajmer.<sup>7</sup> He was to work under the control of Ochterlony.

Not much time had elapsed since Ochterlony's appointment in Rajputana when he was appointed Resident at Delhi

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1. Adam to Ochterlony d. 27 March, Cons. 24 April 1818, No. 13, F & P.
  2. Adam to Ochterlony d. 27 March, Cons. 24 April 1818, No. 13, F & P; Adam to Metcalfe d. 27 March, Cons. 24 April 1818, No. 16, F & P.
  3. J. Sutherland, *Sketches of the Relations Subsisting between the British Government and the Different Native States*, p. 117; Borthwick, Political Agent Mahidpur to Martin d. 30 July, Cons. 1 October 1832, No. 83, F & P.
  4. Adam to Ochterlony d. 27 March, Cons. 24 April 1818, No. 13, F&P.
  5. Adam to Ochterlony d. 19 December, Cons. 26 December 1818, No. 49, F & P.
  6. Adam to Ochterlony d. 27 March, Cons. 24 April 1818, No. 13, F & P.
  7. Adam to Ochterlony d. 8 June, Cons. 26 June 1818, No. 21, F & P.



in December 1818, on the transfer of Metcalfe to Calcutta.<sup>1</sup> Along with his charge of the Delhi Residency, Ochterlony conducted British relations with the States of Jaipur, Tonk, Karauli, Kishangarh, Jaisalmer, Bikaner, Alwar, Bharatpur and Dholpur and supervised the administration of Ajmer.<sup>2</sup> This apart, he commanded the Third Division of the Field Army and the Rajputana Field Force.<sup>3</sup>

### **Tod As Political Agent of Mewar and Harauti**

In the meanwhile, the British Government appointed Captain James Tod at Udaipur<sup>4</sup> to assist the Maharana to re-establish his authority and power in the State, to recover his alienated territories, and to repair his dilapidated resources in consonance with the Article seven of the Treaty.<sup>5</sup> In the improvement of the resources of Mewar, the British Government itself felt directly interested, as the Mewar returning to prosperity meant increase in the tribute which it was to pay to the British Government in ratio to its general revenue.<sup>6</sup> This also prompted Tod's appointment at the Court of Mewar.<sup>7</sup> The Harauti States of Bundi and Kota because of their proximity to Mewar, were also placed under Tod's political charge. Consequently, he was designated as the 'Political Agent at Mewar and Harauti'.<sup>8</sup> Tod reached Udaipur on March 8, 1818.<sup>9</sup> This marked the institution of the Political Agency for the Western States of

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1. Adam to Metcalfe, Resident at Delhi d. 14 November, Cons. 14 November 1818, No. 1, F & P.
  2. Adam to Ochterlony d. 14 November, Cons. 14 November 1818, No. 2, F & P.
  3. Ibid.
  4. Adam to Tod d. 3 February, Cons. 6 March 1818, No. 7, F & P.
  5. Adam to Metcalfe d. 8 October, Cons. 28 October 1817, No. 26, F & Sc; Aitchison, *op cit*; Vol. III, p. 23, Article 7.
  6. Adam to Metcalfe d. 2 February, Cons. 6 March 1818, No. 5, F&Sc. According to the Sixth Article of the Treaty the Maharana was to pay annually to the British Government one-fourth of the revenues as tribute for five years, and thereafter three-eighth in perpetuity. Aitchison *op, cit*, (1932), p. 23.
  7. Adam to Tod d. 3 February, Cons. 6 March 1818, No. 7, F & Sc.
  8. Ibid.
  9. Tod to Adam d. 11 March, Cons 15 May 1818, No. 23, F & Sc.



Rajputana. Tod remained in independent charge of these States for about a month till Ochterlony was appointed as the Resident in Rajputana in April 1818.<sup>1</sup>

Again, on the transfer of Ochterlony to the Delhi Residency in December 1818, Tod resumed the independent charge of the Mewar-Harauti Agency.<sup>2</sup> Besides, Ochterlony, on the orders of the Government, also placed Jodhpur under the political charge of Tod.<sup>3</sup>

However, the British Government soon after directed Tod to transfer the State of Jodhpur to the Resident at Delhi,<sup>4</sup> and enjoined him to apprise Maharaja Man Singh of Jodhpur of the change.<sup>5</sup>

This Tod did, when he visited Jodhpur.<sup>6</sup> In his meeting with the Maharaja he found that the ministerial faction at Jodhpur effectively exercised restraint on his authority. Further, to enhance its power and influence in the State, the faction wanted the seat of British supervision over Jodhpur to be as distant as Delhi. To disconnect Tod from the charge of Jodhpur was the clever manipulation of the Jodhpur *Vakil* at Delhi, according to the wishes of the Minister of Jodhpur.<sup>7</sup> Ochterlony who was unhappy over the transfer of Jodhpur to the political charge of Tod,<sup>8</sup> must have given his avowed support to the *Vakil* for its reversion to his charge.

Tod lost in one way, but gained in another. In May 1821, the work of conducting British relations with the State of Jaisalmer was transferred from the Delhi Residency to Tod.<sup>9</sup>

1. Adam to Ochterlony d. 27 March 1818, loc. cit.
2. Adam to Ochterlony d. 14 November, Cons. 14 November 1818, No. 2, F & P.
3. Ochterlony to Metcalfe, Secretary to Government, d. 8 July, Cons. 7 August 1819, No. 39, F & P.
4. Metcalfe to Tod d. 7 August, Cons. 7 August 1819, No. 41, F & P.
5. Metcalfe to Tod d. 9 October, Cons. 9 October 1819, No. 31, F & P.
6. Tod to Metcalfe d. 25 November 1819, Cons. 22 January 1820, No. 65, F & P.
7. Ibid.
8. Ochterlony to Metcalfe d. 8 July 1819, loc. cit.
9. Tod, Political Agent to Western Rajputana States to H.T. Prinsep, Secretary to Government d. 10 May, Cons. 16 June 1821, No. 58, F & P.



*Tod lost his independent charge in Harauti* : The anomaly which the supplementary article of the treaty of Kota<sup>1</sup> was tantamount to create, became evident when Kishore Singh succeeded to the *gaddi* of Kota on the demise of his father Umed Singh.<sup>2</sup> Maharao Kishore Singh had sufficient pride of his position, and was not ready to leave the Rajrana with unfettered powers to rule over the State. This latent desire of Kishore Singh gained momentum, when Madho Singh acted as the Rajrana on the sudden attack of paralysis on his father Zalim Singh.<sup>3</sup> This ultimately brought Rajrana Zalim Singh and Maharao Kishore Singh in clash with each other,<sup>4</sup> resulting in the flight of the latter for life from Kota to Delhi.<sup>5</sup> The appeals of the Maharao to the Governor General bore no fruits. His total behaviour was considered a violation of the authority of the Rajrana, and his flight was treated as an act of abdication of the *gaddi*.<sup>6</sup> However, Tod's sympathetic attitude towards the Maharao came in the way. The standing orders of the Government that he should give his avowed support to maintain the power of the Rajrana against the Maharao,<sup>7</sup> did not impress him. He permitted the Maharao to recross the Chambal and even delayed attack on him. However, the Rajrana defeated the Maharao in the battle of Mangrol (October 1, 1821). This, again, compelled the Maharao to flee from Kota.<sup>8</sup> The British Government censured Tod for the delay, as it had helped the Maharao in strengthening his position with the help of the *Thakurs* of the State.<sup>9</sup> As a result of an agreement (1821) concluded

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1. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, p. 361.

2. Maharao Umed Singh breathed his last on November 21, 1819.

3. Mehta, op. cit., p. 152.

4. Tod to Metcalfe, d. 12 March, Cons. 22 April 1820, Nos. 15-20, F&P.

5. Ochterlony to Swinton d.31 January, Cons. 24 February 1821, No.15, F & P; Tr. of a letter from Maharao Kishore Singh to David Ochterlony Recd. 18 May, Cons. 16 June 1821, No. 15, F & P., Mehta, op. cit., pp. 153-54.

6. Mehta, op. cit., p. 154.

7. Metcalfe to Tod, d. 22 April, Cons. 22 April 1820, No. 20, F & P.

8. Tod to Swinton d. 2 October, Cons. 20 October 1821, No. 4 F & P.

9. Swinton to Tod, d. 20 October, Cons. 20 October 1821, No. 5, F & P, Swinton to Ochterlony d. 31 October, Cons. 31 October 1821, No. 27, F & P.



between the Rajrana and the Maharao, through British mediation, the Maharao was restored to the *gaddi*.<sup>1</sup> However, Tod was punished for not conducting the Kota affairs in accordance with the wishes of the Government. In October 1821, he was deprived of his independent charge of the State of Kota and was instructed to seek instructions on its affairs from David Ochterlony, the then Resident in Malwa and Rajputana.<sup>2</sup>

*Tod left only with the political charge of Mewar* : The predilections of Tod for the Rajput rulers, and the fear of the Maharao attempting to avenge himself on the Rajrana made the British Government feel constrained to bring about further changes in the political superintendence of the Rajputana States in 1822.<sup>3</sup> The State of Jaisalmer was transferred from the charge of Tod, and placed under Wilder, the Superintendent and Political Agent at Ajmer.<sup>4</sup> Besides, the jurisdiction of Wilder also included the States of Jodhpur and Kishangarh. Wilder was to work under the guidance of the Resident in Malwa and Rajputana.<sup>5</sup> Captain James Caulfield was appointed as the Harauti Political Agent with headquarters at Kota, in subordination to the Resident in Malwa and Rajputana.<sup>6</sup> In this capacity Caulfield was to conduct British relations with the States of Kota and Bundi. Thus, Tod was left only with the work of conducting British relations with the State of Mewar. Even in this capacity, he was placed in subordination to David Ochterlony, the highest British functionary in Malwa and Rajputana.<sup>7</sup> He considered the narrowing down of his political jurisdiction, injurious to his reputation, authority and influence, as it was liable to impress the rulers around that his Government was dissatisfied with his services.<sup>8</sup>

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1. Aitchison, *op cit*, pp 362-64.
  2. Swinton to Tod d. 20 October, Cons. 20 October, 1821, No. 5, F & P.
  3. G.G's. Minute d. 30 March, Cons. 11 April 18 No. 1, F & P.
  4. Swinton to Wilder d. 11 April, Cons. 11 April 1822, No. 6, F & P.
  5. Swinton to Wilder d. 11 April, Cons. 11 April 1822, No. 6, F & P.
  6. Swinton to Ochterlony d. 11 April, Cons. 11 April 1822, No. 7, F & P; Swinton to Caulfield, First Assistant to the Resident at Indore d. 11 April, Cons. 11 April 1822, No. 10, F & P.
  7. Swinton to Tod d. 11 April, Cons. 11 April 1822, No. 5, F & P.
  8. Tod to Swinton d. 12 April, Cons. 4 May 1922, No. 57, F & P.



In the pangs of self-mortification he, therefore, resigned from the post of the Mewar Political Agent on the pretext of ill-health in 1822.<sup>1</sup>

*Tod and Mewar* : Tod's achievement as the Mewar Political Agent lay in the fact that he put the State on the road to political, financial and administrative stability, and restored the Maharana's authority in the State. He placed effective checks on the predatory tribes of Bhils, Minas and Grasias residing in the Mewar Hill Tract near Neemuch and to the south-west of Udaipur. In order to encourage trade and commerce, he abolished taxes like *Bolavi* and *Rakhwali* collected by the Bhil tribe.<sup>2</sup> The first impression of the British Government in Rajputana was so formidable and imposing that these predatory tribes were overawed, and suspended their nefarious activities for a short while.<sup>3</sup> However, finding no permanent checks imposed, they resumed plundering operations in the villages. The State did not have sufficient force to subdue these tribes. Before his departure from Udaipur, Tod had, therefore, recommended to his Government that the assistance of the British troops should be made available to the Maharana for keeping these tribes in subjection.<sup>4</sup>

Tod had established a chain of *thanas* along the eastern foot of the Aravalis to protect the State from the menace of the Mers of Merwara, who frequently made incursions into the territory of Mewar.<sup>5</sup> The Maharana's indifference to these attacks culminated in the massacre of the British police at Jhak, by the Mers in November 1820.<sup>6</sup> This Mer revolt was widespread over the territory of Merwara which included portions of the territories of the rulers of Mewar, Marwar and the British Government. It was only in January 1821, that a British force

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1. Tod to Swinton, Cons. 11 April 1822, Nos. 14-15, F & P.

2. J. C. Brooke, *History of Mewar*, p. 72.

3. Cobbe to Metcalfe d 15 January, Cons. 15 June 1827, Nos. 66-7, F & P.

4. Brooke, *loc. cit.*

5. Tod to Adam d. 20 February, Cons. 17 April 1819, No. 38, F & P.

6. Tod to Metcalfe d. 29 November 1820, Cons. 6 January 1821, No. 9, F & P.



under Lieutenant-Colonel W.G. Maxwell overpowered the revolting Mers and established peace and order in Merwara.<sup>1</sup>

Another outstanding achievement of Tod was that he made the Maharana to reconcile with his disaffected *jagirdars*. Accordingly, the *Khalsa* lands which the *jagirdars* had usurped, were returned to the State. Besides, the State regained its territories alienated by the Marathas during their supremacy in Rajputana.<sup>2</sup>

In fact, Tod ran the whole administration.<sup>3</sup> In order to control the Maharana's expenditure he allowed him<sup>4</sup> a daily allowance of Rs. 1,000. When Tod arrived in Mewar in 1818, the Maharana's land revenue did not exceed Rs. 30,000 and the commercial duties were nominal. When he left in 1822, the former was raised to Rs. 9,36,640 and the latter<sup>5</sup> to Rs. 2,17,000.

In the apathy and indifference of the Maharana and his servants towards his administration, Tod read a mark of silent opposition to British interference in Mewar.<sup>6</sup> From July 1821, he, therefore, began to recede in his enthusiasm to manage the internal affairs of the State.<sup>7</sup> Before he was able to entrust to the Maharana the complete responsibility of the administration,<sup>8</sup> he left for Europe in June 1822, making over charge of the Mewar Political Agency to his Assistant, Captain Waugh.<sup>9</sup>

### Ochterlony and Rajputana States

Like Tod, Ochterlony also took a considerable initiative in conducting British relations with the States of Rajputana.

1. Maxwell, Commanding Detachment Merwara to F. Wilder, Superintendent, Ajmer d. 27 January, Cons. 14 April 1821, No. 18, F & P.
2. For details see, Mehta, *op cit.*, pp. 144-45.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Tod to Metcalfe d. 26 April, Cons. 12 June 1819, No. 33, F & P.
5. James Tod, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, Vol. I, p. 534.
6. Tod to Swinton d. 16 July, Cons. 6 October 1821, Nos. 19-20, F & P.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Tod to Ochterlony d. 26 May, Cons. 2 August 1822, No. 6, F & P.
9. Brooke, *op. cit.*, p. 28. Tod retired from the services of the East India Company on the 28th June, 1825. For details see, James Tod, *Travels In Western India*, First Indian Reprint, Oriental Publishers, Delhi, 1971, p. 1.



The treaties did not permit British interference in their internal affairs. In view of the long period of misrule, misery and anarchy in these States during the Maratha supremacy, Lord Hastings considered it essential to help them to improve their affairs.<sup>1</sup> As such he permitted Ochterlony to interfere in these States to the extent of 'advice' and 'partial assistance'.<sup>2</sup>

*British policy in Mewar* : Ochterlony was against Tod's withdrawing his interference in the internal affairs of Mewar in view of its deplorable condition.<sup>3</sup> Captain Cobbe, the successor of Waugh at the Mewar Political Agency<sup>4</sup> exposed the errors of his predecessors. In this he had the moral support of Ochterlony. He pointed out to his Government that the profuse liberality of Tod's arrangement for the personal expenditure of the Maharana, increased his influence, but this had much embarrassed the finances of the State, and thereby impeded the payment of the tribute.<sup>5</sup> The British Government considered these past affairs in Mewar mortifying, and far from encouraging in times to come.<sup>6</sup> Consequently, the British interference in its internal affairs which had been withdrawn a year ago, was reintroduced with the sanction of the British Government.<sup>7</sup> A British force under Colonel Lumely was also stationed in the Mewar Hill Tract in December 1823, to keep its turbulent inhabitants in check.<sup>8</sup>

In a couple of years Cobbe was able to restore the finances of Mewar satisfactorily.<sup>9</sup> A sum of Rs. 4,00,000 was

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1. Adam to Ochterlony d. 27 March, Cons. 24 April 1818, No. 13, F & P.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Ochterlony to Secretary to Government d. 16 June, Cons. 2 August 1822, No. 5, F & P.
  4. He took charge on 15 April 1823. Brooke, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
  5. Cobbe to Ochterlony d. 18 September, Cons. 21 November 1823, No. 9, F & P.
  6. Swinton to Ochterlony d. 21 November. Cons. 21 November, 1823, No. 10, F & P.
  7. Ibid; Brooke, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
  8. Cobbe to Metcalfe d. 15 January, Cons. 16 March 1827, No. 7-A, F & P; Brooke, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
  9. Cobbe to Ochterlony d. 20 February, Cons. 29 April 1825, No. 11, F & P.



paid in lieu of the tribute of 1823-24 and the arrears.<sup>1</sup> Cobbe in fact, managed the affairs of Mewar for three years as its administrator rather than as a Political Agent.

*Merwara brought under British Protection* : While Cobbe attempted to improve the administration of Mewar, Wilder, the Superintendent and Political Agent, Ajmer gave his attention to the problem of the Mers. Wilder considered the divided jurisdiction of the three Governments viz., Marwar, Mewar and British over Merwara worse than ineffectual. He proposed that the States of Marwar and Mewar should be induced to make over their portions in Merwara to the British management for some years. Besides, he was in favour of raising a local corps in Merwara for keeping the predatory Mers in check.<sup>2</sup> Convinced of the efficacy of this plan, Ochterlony recommended the proposal to his Government.<sup>3</sup> The British Government, viewing its advantages in context of maintaining peace in the neighbourhood of its own territory of Ajmer, agreed to the measure.<sup>4</sup> But it desired that the rulers of Udaipur and Jodhpur should also contribute to the maintenance of the regiment, as they would draw equal benefits from the suppression of the lawless Mers.<sup>5</sup>

Owing to the efforts of Cobbe, the Maharana of Mewar in 1823,<sup>6</sup> and to those of Wilder, the Maharaja of Jodhpur in 1824,<sup>7</sup> reluctantly transferred their portions in Merwara to the British superintendence for a period of ten and eight years respectively. Both the rulers also agreed to contribute Rs. 15,000 each for raising a corps in Merwara for suppressing the Mers.<sup>8</sup>

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1. Brooke, *op cit.*, p. 31.

2. F. Wilder to Ochterlony d. 5 February, Cons. 14 April 1821, No. 18, F & P.

3. Ochterlony to Swinton d. 6 November, Cons. 24 November 1821, No. 31, F & P.

4. Swinton to Ochterlony d. 24 November, Cons. 24 November 1821, No. 33, F & P.

5. Ibid., Also see, Swinton to Ochterlony d. 11 April, Cons. 11 April 1822, No. 50, F & P.

6. Ochterlony to Swinton d. 5 July, Cons. 31 July 1823, No. 21, F & P.

7. Wilder to Swinton d. 6 March, Cons. 30 April 1824, No. 19, F & P.

8. Aitchison, *op. cit.*, 1932, pp. 131-32 and 480.



The British Government appointed Captain Hall as the Superintendent of the joint tract of Merwara, and Commanding Officer of the newly raised Merwara Battalion with full authority in civil and criminal matters in the tract.<sup>1</sup> His charge was independent of the Superintendent of Ajmer, but he was placed under the control of the Resident in Malwa and Rajputana.<sup>2</sup>

*Institution of the Sirohi Political Agency* : Besides the institution of the Merwara Battalion, the new development which took place during the tenure of Ochterlony, was the treaty concluded between the British Government and the State of Sirohi. Even after the ardent desire of the Rao of Sirohi<sup>3</sup>, the British Government could not bring his State within the pale of its protection in 1817-18 owing to the Maharaja of Jodhpur laying claim to the tribute and the allegiance of Sirohi.<sup>4</sup> In July 1822, Captain Waugh, the successor of Tod at the Mewar Political Agency, brought to the notice of Ochterlony that due to the incapability of the Rao general disorder prevailed in Sirohi, and its Mina subjects committed depredation in the neighbouring States of Marwar and Palanpur.<sup>5</sup> Thereupon, Ochterlony recommended to his Government to bring the State of Sirohi under British protection without reference to the real or pretended claims of Jodhpur.<sup>6</sup> The British Government, in appreciation of the situation, authorized Ochterlony to form a separate engagement with Sirohi for maintaining tranquillity in that quarter.<sup>7</sup> To carry out this measure, Ochterlony deputed Captain Alexander Spiers, the Brigade Major at Neemuch, to Sirohi.<sup>8</sup>

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1. Swinton to Ochterlony d. 30 July, Cons. 30 July 1824, No. 4, F & P.

2. Ibid.

3. Captain Carnac, Resident at Baroda to Warden, Chief Secretary Bombay d. 28 August, Cons. 7 November 1817, No. 19, F & Sc.

4. Metcalfe to Adam d. 20 January, Cons. 6 February 1818, No. 102, F & Sc.

5. Waugh, Assistant Mewar Political Agent to Ochterlony d. 20 July, Cons. 2 November 1822, No. 10, F & P.

6. Ochterlony to Secretary d. 25 November 1822, Cons. 14 February 1823, No. 18, F & P.

7. Swinton to Ochterlony d. 14 February, Cons. 14 February 1823, No. 20, F & P.

8. Ochterlony to Secretary to Government Cons. 5 May 1823, Nos. 21-33, F & P.



At Sirohi, Speirs concluded a treaty on September 11, 1823 with Rao Shiva Singh, the Regent, similar to the treaties with other States of Rajputana.<sup>1</sup> The State of Sirohi pledged to pay tribute to the British Government. Rao Shiva Singh who had been the Regent, since the deposition of his brother, Rao Udai Bhan in 1818 was recognized as the Regent for life by the British Government.<sup>2</sup>

The wretched internal condition of Sirohi was to be improved. Its turbulent Minas were to be brought to submission. Besides, the illegal exactions of Jodhpur troops on it needed to be checked.<sup>3</sup> On the recommendation of Ochterlony,<sup>4</sup> Speirs was, therefore, appointed as the Sirohi Political Agent with effect from May 1, 1823.<sup>5</sup> Thus, the British Government interfered to set right the internal affairs of the State.

*British policy in Jodhpur :* After the visit of Tod to Jodhpur, Maharaja Man Singh ousted his Minister, Akhay Raj and his party<sup>6</sup> from power in April 1820, and appointed Fateh Raj Singh as his Dewan.<sup>7</sup> Thus relieved of the thraldom of the ministerial clique, he decided to punish those *jagirdars* who opposed him.<sup>8</sup> He demanded military assistance from the British Government for the purpose.<sup>9</sup> Ochterlony thought it

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1. Alexander Speirs to Ochterlony, Resident in Malwa and Rajputana d. 12 September, Cons. 31 October 1823, Nos. 2-3, F & P; Swinton to Ochterlony d. 31 October, Cons. 31 October 1823, No. 4, F & P.
  2. Secretary to Government to Ochterlony d. 11 July, Cons. 11 July 1823, No. 19, F & P.
  3. Swinton to Ochterlony d. 11 June, Cons. 11 June 1824, No. 40, F & P.
  4. Ochterlony to Swinton d. 18 May, Cons. 11 June 1824, No. 37, F & P.
  5. Swinton to Ochterlony d. 11 June, Cons. 11 June 1824, No. 40, F & P.
  6. Tr. of a communication from Khushal Chand Mehta to Deo Singh and Shiva Singh d. 23 April 1820, list No. 1, p. 44. Vol. I, p. 26. *RAR*.
  7. Tod to Metcalfe d. 7 May 1820, list No. 1, p. 44, Vol. I, p. 29, *RAR*.
  8. Wilder to Ochterlony d. 18 January, Cons. 20 March 1822, No. 32, F & P; Wilder to Ochterlony d. 22 February, Cons. 31 March 1821, No. 14, F & P.
  9. Man Singh to Ochterlony recd. 27 August, Cons. 23 September 1820, No. 6, F & P.



to be the right opportunity to interfere in Jodhpur affairs. He therefore, recommended to his Government to provide the Maharaja with the desired<sup>1</sup> military aid. But the British Government declined to give any aid to the Maharaja without knowing the purpose behind it.<sup>2</sup>

In the meanwhile, Man Singh proceeded on his own to subdue the *jagirdars*.<sup>3</sup> The *jagirdars* of Asop, Chandawal, Abhore, Ahawa, Ras and Budsoo feeling guilty of their disloyalty to the Maharaja, fled to the other States of Rajputana.<sup>4</sup> The fugitive *jagirdars* sought British mediation in their dispute with the Maharaja.<sup>5</sup> This was again an opportunity for Ochterlony to interfere in the affairs of the State. He proposed to his Government for the deputation of Wilder to Jodhpur to mediate in the affair.<sup>6</sup> The British Government agreed to the proposal.<sup>7</sup>

The Maharaja pointed out to Wilder at Jodhpur that if the *jagirdars* were reinstated through British interference, they would never submit to his authority, and would always expect similar interposition by the British.<sup>8</sup> However, on the assurance of Wilder that the British Government would not make similar recommendation in future, an agreement was executed in 1824 to reinstate the fugitive *jagirdars*.<sup>9</sup>

Wilder's mission to Jodhpur was disappointing to

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1. Ochterlony to Metcalfe d. 2 September, Cons. 23 September 1820, No. 5, F & P.
  2. Metcalfe to Ochterlony d. 23 September, Cons. 23 September 1820, No. 8, F & P.
  3. Ochterlony to Metcalfe d. 2 September, Cons. 23 September 1820, No. 5, F & P.
  4. Wilder to Ochterlony d. 18 January, Cons. 20 March 1822, No. 32, F & P.
  5. Ibid.
  6. Ochterlony to Swinton d. 13 December 1823, Cons. 9 January 1824, No. 8, F & P.
  7. Swinton to Ochterlony d. 9 January, Cons. 9 January 1824, No. 9, F & P; G. G. to Man Singh d. 5 March, Cons. 12 March 1824, No. 64, F & P.
  8. Wilder to Swinton d. 6 March, Cons. 13 April 1824, No. 20, F & P.
  9. Text of the engagement d. 5 February, Cons. 13 April 1824, No. 20, F & P.



Ochterlony as the Maharaja could not be dealt with severely,<sup>1</sup> and the British interference could not be introduced in the State effectively. However, the settlement prevented an explosion, especially at a time when the British Government was entangled in the Burmese war.

*Institution of a Political Agency at Jaipur* : It was not only the Maharaja of Jodhpur, but also the authorities at Jaipur who showed repugnance to the Ochterlony policy of interference. After the demise of Maharaja Jagat Singh, the ruler of Jaipur on December 21, 1818, his posthumous son, Jai Singh III succeeded him<sup>2</sup> in April 1819. Rani Bhattianiji was appointed as the Regent; and Rawal Berisal, the Nathawat Chief was appointed as the *Mukhtiar* by her on the advice of Ochterlony.<sup>3</sup> In view of its policy of non-interference, the British Government enjoined Ochterlony to give only the requisite advice to the Regency, and also forbade him to give undue support to the Minister lest the latter should become a tyrant in the State.<sup>4</sup>

In view of the dismal conditions in the State, Ochterlony was not hopeful of any improvement in its prosperity which could secure greater payments of tribute to the British Government.<sup>5</sup> To help Rawal Berisal in improving the revenues of the State, he desired to appoint a European officer with the authority to improve the affairs there. Again the British Government did not show favour to the proposal, as interference in the internal affairs of a State often demoralised its administrative machinery.<sup>6</sup> But in view of the minority

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1. Ochterlony to Swinton d. 19 March, Cons. 30 April 1824, No. 23, F & P.
  2. J. C. Brooke, *Political History of the State of Jaipur*, pp 19-20. After the death of Jagat Singh, his distant relative Mohan Singh was placed on the *gaddi* of Jaipur. On the birth of Jai Singh III, Mohan Singh had to abdicate.
  3. Ochterlony to Metcalfe d. 25 May, Cons. 11 September 1819, No. 19, F & P.
  4. Metcalfe to Ochterlony d. 3 June, Cons. 3 June 1819, No. 24, F & P.
  5. Ochterlony to Metcalfe d. 10 October, Cons. 29 October 1820, No. 18, F & P.
  6. Metcalfe to Ochterlony, Resident at Delhi d. 28 October, Cons. 28 October 1820, No. 20, F & P.



of the ruler, and its interest in tribute from Jaipur, the British Government instructed Ochterlony to advise Rawal Berisal to take necessary measures to improve the revenues of the State.<sup>1</sup>

Factions, feuds and jealousies which were common at the Court, led to the outbreak of a disturbance on December 14, 1820 at Jaipur.<sup>2</sup> It resulted in the murder of Fauji Ram, the favourite of the Regent Rani, and brought Jhota Ram,<sup>3</sup> his Deputy to the fore. The lack of cordiality between Berisal and the Regent Rani (who had begun to exercise power through Jhota Ram, while still allowing Berisal to retain the post of *Mukhtiar*), and the impossibility of judging the developments in Jaipur from the 'disjoined reports' of the News-Writers gave an opportunity to Ochterlony to press his Government again for appointing a European Officer at Jaipur. The appointment of a Political Agent, he considered the best mode of ascertaining the real state of affairs at the Jaipur Darbar, and as a sure measure of preventing the recurrence of atrocious deeds.<sup>4</sup> To preserve peace and tranquillity there and to give protection to the minor Raja was the obligation of the British Government. Besides, the revenues of the State needed to be improved. As such, in spite of its best of motives in avoiding British interference in the affairs of the State, the British Government was left with no alternative but to accept Ochterlony's proposal.<sup>5</sup> Captain Stewart was appointed Political Agent at Jaipur under the control of Ochterlony.<sup>6</sup> Stewart reached Jaipur on April 17, 1821.<sup>7</sup> This marked the institution of the Jaipur Political Agency.

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1. Metcalfe to Ochterlony d. 28 October, Cons. 28 October 1820, No. 20, F & P.

2. Extract from Newspaper d. 14 December 1820, Cons. 13 January 1821, No. 5, F & P.

3. Brooke, *Political History of the State of Jaipur*, pp. 19-20.

4. Ochterlony to Swinton d. 19 January, Cons. 10 February 1821, No. 7, F & P.

5. Swinton to Ochterlony d. 10 February, Cons. 10 February 1821, No. 12, F & P.

6. Swinton to Stewart, Acting Resident at Gwalior d. 10 February, Cons. 10 February 1821, No. 11, F & P.

7. Stewart to Swinton d. 18 May, Cons. 23 June 1821, No. 15, F & P.



Stewart's appointment was strongly resented by all the parties at Jaipur as there was no provision for such an appointment in the treaty. Stewart did not consider such a stipulation necessary, as at the other Indian Courts also his Government had posted Political Agents likewise. He reported to his Government that the real cause of opposition was that the people in power considered the presence of a British Officer at Jaipur, an obstruction in their gross peculation of the State revenues.<sup>1</sup> This gave Ochterlony an opportunity to recommend to his Government to direct the Political Agent to improve the revenue administration of the State.<sup>2</sup>

The report of Ochterlony had its due effect on the British Government.<sup>3</sup> As the Protecting power, it was not ready to witness in silence the impoverishment of the State of the minor ruler and the consequent loss of tribute to itself, which also involved a direct violation of the obligation (Article 6) of the Treaty on the part of the State. In view of this, the Maharaja and the Rawal were enjoined by Lord Hastings to give all attention to the measures suggested by Stewart for the improvement of the revenues of the State.<sup>4</sup> This changed the position of Stewart at the Jaipur Court, from a passive spectator of the corrupt system to that of the establisher of an efficient administration.

Once the British Government allowed interference in the internal affairs of a State, it was difficult to specify and limit the extent of such an interference. The year 1821, saw the beginning of the British interference in the State of Jaipur. In 1823, the British Government openly supported the Rawal against the Regent Rani and expelled her favourite adviser, Jhota Ram from Jaipur, to give a free hand to the Rawal to run the administration.<sup>5</sup> This British support to the Rawal made him unpopular with the Regent Rani, and the *jagirdars*

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1. Stewart to Swinton d. 18 May, Cons. 23 June 1821, No. 15, F & P.
  2. Ochterlony to Swinton d. 21 May, Cons. 23 June 1821, No. 14, F&P.
  3. Swinton to Ochterlony d. 30 June, Cons. 30 June 1821, No. 8, F & P.
  4. G. G. to Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh and Rawal Berisal d. 30 June, Cons. 30 June 1821, No. 9, F & P.
  5. H. C. Batra, *The Relations of Jaipur State with East India Company* (1803-1858), pp. 77-78.



who supported her cause.<sup>1</sup> Further in 1824, the revolt by a part of the Jaipur State forces followed by the refusal of the Regent Rani to accept the Rawal as *Mukhtiar* any more, led Ochterlony to recognize her authority in the State.<sup>2</sup> As a consequence, he acquiesced in her selection of Thakur Megh Singh of Diggi as *Mukhtiar* in place of the Rawal. Convinced of the efficacy of this measure, the British Government also agreed to give it a trial.<sup>3</sup> However, the British interference in Jaipur still continued in many other ways. Raper, who succeeded Stewart to the Jaipur Political Agency on April 24, 1824 promised British protection to the Rawal. The British Government did not allow the Rani to recall Jhota Ram to Jaipur, while she insisted on his return.<sup>4</sup> This antagonised her and created a strong party opposed to the extension of British influence in Jaipur. Thus the Ochterlony policy of interference failed to establish cordial relations between the British Government and the State of Jaipur,<sup>5</sup> while his desire to interfere in the Bharatpur succession dispute led to his downfall.

*Succession Dispute in Bharatpur* : After the demise of Raja Ranjit Singh of Bharatpur who had established relations with the British Government, Randhir Singh and Baldeo Singh succeeded him in rapid succession to the *gaddi*. Baldeo Singh desired that his illegitimate son, Balwant Singh should be recognized by the British Government as the heir-apparent, as he feared his nephew Durjan Sal to lay claim to the *gaddi*. In compliance with the wishes of the Raja, Ochterlony invested Balwant Singh with a dress of honour, and acknowledged him as the heir-apparent, without the permission of his Government.<sup>6</sup>

Soon after Raja Baldeo Singh died. On March 25, 1825, Durjan Sal seized Balwant Singh and took the direction

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1. Reginald Heber, *Narrative of a Journey Through the Upper Provinces of India*, Vol. II, pp. 411 ff.

2. Batra, *op cit.* pp. 85 ff.

3. Ibid., pp 93-4.

4. Ibid.

5. Heber, *op. cit* , pp 409 ff.

6. K N Panikkar, *British Diplomacy In North India—A Study of the Delhi Residency 1803-1857*, p. 77.



of the affair of the State in his own hands.<sup>1</sup> On this precipitate action of Durjan Sal, Ochterlony with his characteristic spirit of a military officer, proclaimed to the people of Bharatpur the determination of the British Government to support the rightful claimant and to dislodge Durjan Sal, the pretender to the *gaddi* of Bharatpur by force.<sup>2</sup>

Specially at a time when the British were busy in the war with the Burmese, the Supreme Government at Calcutta did not appreciate discontentment in any of the States of Rajputana. It considered the Bharatpur succession dispute an internal affair. Ochterlony was instructed accordingly, to stop the march of the British troops to Bharatpur and withdraw the proclamation issued by him.<sup>3</sup> The high-spirited old General received this outright condemnation of his policy with the feelings of 'surprise, mortification and regret'.<sup>4</sup> He felt dishonoured, and sent in his resignation in protest to the British Government in April 1825.<sup>5</sup> On July 15, 1825 he died in harness at Meerut.<sup>6</sup>

After the demise of Ochterlony, the office of the 'Resident in Malwa and Rajputana' was abolished.<sup>7</sup> In October 1825, Charles Metcalfe, an authority on the affairs of the Rajputana States took over the charge of the Delhi Residency embracing the superintendence of the Rajputana States<sup>8</sup> except

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1. MacSween, Magistrate of Agra to Ochterlony d. 14 March, Cons. 15 April 1825, No. 7, F & P.
  2. Proclamation of Ochterlony Cons. 5 April 1825, No. 44, F & P; See also, Panikkar, *op. cit*, p. 77.
  3. Swinton to Ochterlony d. 3 April, Cons. 5 April 1825, No. 46, F & P.
  4. Ochterlony to Swinton d. 14 April, Cons. 15 July 1825, No. 12, F & P.
  5. Ochterlony to Swinton d. 25 April, Cons. 15 July 1825, No. 23, F & P.
  6. Captain A. Gerard, Assistant to the Resident Malwa d. 15 July, Cons. 29 July 1825, No. 19, F & P.
  7. Swinton to Raper, Jaipur Political Agent, Cobbe, Mewar Political Agent, Caulfield, Harauti Political Agent, Spiers, Sirohi Political Agent, Middleton, Superintendent Ajmer and Political Agent for Kishangarh, Jodhpur and Jaisalmer d. 29 July, Cons. 29 July 18-5, No. 22, F & P.
  8. Metcalfe to Swinton d. 21 October, Cons. 11 November 1825, No. 5, F & P.



the States of Banswara, Partabgarh and Dungarpur which were retained under the Malwa Residency. All the Political Agents in Rajputana viz., the Jaipur Political Agent, Harauti Political Agent and the 'Superintendent and Political Agent, Ajmer', were placed in subordination to the Resident at Delhi.

### III

## Delhi Residency and the Rajputana States (1825-31)

### Metcalfe and Rajputana States

Charles Metcalfe, despite being a staunch protagonist of the British policy of non-interference, never hesitated to interfere in the internal affairs of a State which showed signs of disturbing the general peace and tranquillity of its neighbouring States or compromised the paramount authority of the British Government.<sup>1</sup> In the succession dispute of Bharatpur, he, therefore, suggested to his Government to support the rightful claim of Balwant Singh to the *gaddi*.<sup>2</sup> The British Government agreed to his proposal, and authorized him to settle the issue by negotiations or war.<sup>3</sup>

*Appointment of a Political Agent at Bharatpur* : Metcalfe's efforts to dissuade Durjan Sal to renounce his claim to the *gaddi* proved futile. Consequently, the British forces attacked Bharatpur. Durjan Sal was captured and deported to Allahabad<sup>4</sup> and Balwant Singh was installed as the ruler on February 5, 1826.<sup>5</sup>

After establishing the lawful sovereign at Bharatpur, Metcalfe according to the local usages, appointed Rani Amrit Kunwar, the eldest Rani of the late Raja Baldeo Singh as the

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1. Memorandum of Metcalfe d. 29 August, Cons. 16 September 1825, No. 21, F & Sc.
  2. Ibid , See also, Panikkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81
  3. Minute by Lord Amherst, G.G. d. 3 September, Cons. 16 September 1825, No. 22, F & Sc. Resolution of the G. G. in Council d. 16 September, Cons. 17 September 1825, No. 25, F & Sc.
  4. Panikkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-82.
  5. Metcalfe to Swinton d. 10 February, Cons. 24 February 1826, No.16, F & P.



Regent with a team of ministers to help her to administer the State.<sup>1</sup> Further, on February 5, 1826, Metcalfe appointed his Assistant, Major A. Lockett (later Lieutenant-Colonel) as the Political Agent at Bharatpur for giving support to the measures of this newly-formed administration.<sup>2</sup> The Rani proved a failure in conducting the administration of the State and was, therefore, deprived of her position as Regent. Subsequently, a new Council of Regency was formed comprising the local officers of Bharatpur.<sup>3</sup> Metcalfe felt satisfied with the new administrative set-up at Bharatpur. He found any further interference in its internal affairs undesirable. He, therefore, receded from it himself, and also instructed Lockett accordingly.<sup>4</sup>

In the Bharatpur affair, Metcalfe vindicated the policy of Ochterlony in giving support to the legal succession of Balwant Singh. He was justified in his action, because to accept a usurper on the *gaddi* was tantamount to dissolving British treaty with the State.

*British interference withdrawn from Jaipur* : Metcalfe also succeeded in improving the relations of his Government with Jaipur. As a matter of policy he considered it "undesirable" on the part of his Government to prevent the Regent Rani to recall Jhota Ram to Jaipur. The expulsion of individuals from a State brought them into importance and made the British Government unpopular there.<sup>5</sup> The British Government was only connected with the State and not with its subjects. The State alone, was responsible for their conduct.<sup>6</sup> This view of Metcalfe appealed to the British Government which allowed Jhota Ram to return to Jaipur in 1826.<sup>7</sup>

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1. Pannikar, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-85.

2. Metcalfe to Swinton d. 9 February, Cons. 24 February 1826, No. 17, F & P.

3. Panikkar, *op. cit.* pp. 86-89.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Metcalfe to Raper 12 November 1825, Cons. 17 February 1826, No. 11, F & P.

6. *Ibid.*, See also, Metcalfe to Swinton d. 19 December 1825, Cons. 17 February 1826, No. 22, F & P.

7. Swinton to Metcalfe d. 17 February, Cons. 17 February 1826, No. 27, F & P.



Besides, Metcalfe also forbade Captain Low,<sup>1</sup> the successor of Raper to the Jaipur Political Agency to interfere in the internal matters of the State. Further, he left the Regent Rani with all powers to run the administration of the State on behalf of her young son.<sup>2</sup> She had the right as well as the capability to manage the affairs of the State.

Thus Metcalfe succeeded in introducing the British policy of non-interference in Jaipur. However, it was not possible for him to remove the hatred and malice between the coterie of the Regent Rani, and that of the Rawal who had the British protection. As such, in spite of all good intentions of the British Government, and of its Political Officers, the harm caused lately by Ochterlony's policy of interference was irreparable and proved an obstacle in the establishment of cordial relations between the East India Company and the State of Jaipur.<sup>3</sup> However, Metcalfe did establish the relations of the British Government with the State on a comparatively better footing than at the time of Ochterlony.

*British interference withdrawn from Mewar except the Mewar Hill Tract* : Metcalfe also endeavoured to implement the policy of non-interference in the State of Mewar. He considered British interference there inconsistent with the independent position of the Maharana in his State.<sup>4</sup> He observed that the proportionate<sup>5</sup> demand of the tribute from the revenues of Mewar was the sole pretence of Cobbe to interfere in its administration. So he strongly recommended to his Government that Rupees three lakhs be fixed as annual tribute from Mewar.<sup>6</sup> In view of the deplorable financial condition of the State, the

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1. Low succeeded Raper on 12 November 1825.

2. For details see, Panikkar, *op. cit.* pp. 94-96.

3. Metcalfe to Stirling d. 17 January 1826, Cons. 23 February 1827, No. 10, F & P.

4. Metcalfe to Sutherland d. 8 December 1826, Cons. 20 January 1827, No. 47, F & P.

5. For details about the proportionate demand of the tribute from the revenues of Mewar see, Aitchison, *op. cit.*, 1932, pp. 11, 22.

6. Metcalfe to Stirling d. 29 December 1826, Cons. 2 February 1827, No. 22, F & P.



British Government considered the proposal 'extremely desirable.' Therefore, it was sanctioned as a temporary measure and British interference in the affairs of the State was withdrawn.<sup>1</sup> This left the Maharana with complete authority in his State.

However, Metcalfe failed to withdraw British interference from the Mewar Hill tract. On the departure of Colonel Lumley's force from there in February 1826, the Bhils rose in insurrection. The Maharana did not possess the power to suppress them. Therefore, Metcalfe authorized the deputation of Captain Black, the Assistant to the Mewar Political Agent to deal with the situation in the tract.<sup>2</sup> But before Black could establish peace<sup>3</sup> and withdraw British interference there,<sup>4</sup> Metcalfe was appointed to the post of member of the Supreme Council at Calcutta in 1827.<sup>5</sup>

Metcalfe's appointment to the Delhi Residency in 1825 had introduced a new era in the relations of the British Government with the States of Rajputana. Before his appointment, the British relations with the Rajputana States were not directed on the recognized principles of the treaties, but every case of policy towards a State was decided on practical expediency.<sup>6</sup> In this vacillating attitude, Metcalfe effected a change by establishing these relations on the accepted principles of the treaties of 1817-18.

### **Colebrooke and the Rajputana States**

Edward Colebrooke, who succeeded Metcalfe to the Delhi Residency on July 31, 1827<sup>7</sup> tried to accomplish the incomplete task of his predecessor. He deputed Captain Speirs, the Sirohi

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1. Swinton to Metcalfe d. 19 February, Cons. 16 March 1827, No. 5, F. & P.
  2. Metcalfe to Cobbe d. 31 December 1826, Cons. 9 February 1827, No. 17-18, F & P.
  3. Captain Black to Metcalfe Cons. 8 June 1827, No. 26, F & P.
  4. Metcalfe to Secretary to Government d. 15 May, Cons. 8 June 1827, No. 10, F. & P; Secretary to Government to Metcalfe d. 26 May, Cons. 8 June 1827, No. 10, F & P.
  5. Vice-President's Minute, d. 24 August 1826, Cons. 24 August 1827, No. 44, F & P.
  6. Colebrooke to Swinton d. 20 May, Cons. 5 June 1829, No. 23, F & P.
  7. Colebrooke to Swinton d. 31 July, Cons. 17 August 1827, No. 25, F & P.



Political Agent to establish peace in the disturbed Mewar Hill tract as Black, before his death, could do so only in one of its parts, Chappan lying to the south of Udaipur.<sup>1</sup> With the assistance of a force under Colonel Burgh, Speirs could bring under control the Grassia districts of Ogha, Panrwa, Jura and Jawas.<sup>2</sup> Thereafter, the British Government forbade Speirs from carrying out any further operations in the Mewar Hill tract. For the better superintendence over the Grassias, the Bhils and the Minas, it placed the tract and the State of Dungarpur which were mainly inhabited by these tribes, under the charge of the Sirohi Political Agent in 1828.<sup>3</sup>

The complete withdrawal of British interference from the internal affairs of Mewar gave an evidence of the desire of the British Government as well as of its Political officers in Rajputana, to adhere to the declared policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of the States. For instance, in 1826 the Regent Rani of Jaipur desired to appoint Jhota Ram as the *Mukhtiar* of the State for the smooth and better management of the administration. Captain Low, the Jaipur Political Agent opposed the proposal,<sup>4</sup> but Colebrooke supported the Regent Rani's contention for he considered Low's opposition contrary to the British policy.<sup>5</sup> On Colebrooke's recommendation, the British Government approved the appointment of Jhota Ram, and forbade Low to side with any faction in the State.<sup>6</sup>

*Efforts to improve system of British superintendence over Rajputana :* Colebrooke also undertook to draw the attention of his Government towards the failure of the Political Agents in preventing incidents of interstate aggressions in Rajputana, and to persuade the States to submit their mutual disputes for

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1. Brooke, *History of Meywar*, pp. 80-81.

2. Speirs to Colebrooke, d. 29 June, Cons. 8 August 1828, No. 11, F&P.

3. A. Stirling, Acting Secretary to Government to Colebrooke d. 8 August, Cons. 8 August 1828, No. 14, F & P.

4. Low to Colebrooke d. 22 February, Cons. 25 April 1828, No. 33, F & P.

5. A. Stirling to Colebrooke d. 25 April, Cons. 25 April 1828, No. 38, F & P.

6. Colebrooke to Swinton d. 1 March, Cons. 25 April 1828, No. 32, F & P.



settlement to British arbitration.<sup>1</sup> His predecessor, Metcalfe could not pay attention to this aspect of British relations during his tenure of office.

According to the treaties, the Rajputana States were to submit their mutual differences for settlement to the British Government; but they did not follow the sanctity of this obligation.<sup>2</sup> In 1829, the State of Jaipur attacked a reservoir of sweet water in Sambhar (in the territory of Jodhpur) and demolished it.<sup>3</sup> The same year, the State of Bikaner committed plunder in its neighbouring State of Jaisalmer.<sup>4</sup>

The mere remonstrance of the British Government to the rulers from time to time rarely proved successful in desisting them from their mutual hostility. Cavendish, the Superintendent and Political Agent, Ajmer pleaded for taking some decisive measures to prevent the States from doing so, lest the disregard for the treaties should spread far and wide.<sup>5</sup> The Resident appreciated the idea. Realising the gravity of the situation, he suggested to the British Government to appoint a 'high controlling officer' at Ajmer, as Delhi was too distant, and was, therefore, not a proper seat for controlling British relations with the States of Rajputana.<sup>6</sup> The plan was shelved by the British Government,<sup>7</sup> as it was itself considering an alternative plan of John Malcolm, the then Governor of Bombay.

John Malcolm had suggested that the work of conducting the British relations with the States of Malwa and Rajputana should be entrusted to a 'Lieutenant—Governor or Commissioner General' with a number of British functionaries

1. Colebrooke to Swinton d. 8 May, Cons. 12 June 1829, No. 19, F&P.

2. Ibid.

3. Colebrooke to G. B. Clerk, Political Agent Jaipur d. 7 May, Cons. 12 June 1829, No. 19-B, F & P.

4. Colebrooke to Swinton d. 8 May, Cons. 12 June 1829, No. 19, F & P.

5. Cavendish to Colebrooke d. 16 May 1829, loc. cit.

6. Colebrooke to Swinton d. 26 May, Cons. 12 June 1829, No. 2, F & P.

7. Swinton to Colebrooke d. 12 June, Cons. 12 June 1829, No. 21, F&P.



to assist him.<sup>1</sup> Further, he showed his readiness to keep this officer under his control in the capacity of the Governor of Bombay, with no other check on him than the one which was "constitutionally exercised by the Governor-General in Council on the affairs of Subordinate Presidencies".<sup>2</sup> The plan did not materialise as Malcolm declined to assume the charge of Central India and Rajputana; for contrary to the accepted British policy of non-interference he was an advocate of exercising a moderate and salutary interference in the affairs of the dependent States.<sup>3</sup> This prompted Lord William Bentinck, the Governor-General to propose the temporary removal of the seat of British Government from Calcutta to Agra, or Delhi to know personally, the exact state of British relations with the States of Central India and Rajputana, and the benefits and defects of British superintendence over them.<sup>4</sup> At this time, the possibility of a Russian attack was haunting the minds of the authorities in England to such an extent, that they forbade the removal of the seat of the Council from Calcutta.<sup>5</sup> Thus disappointed, Bentinck resolved to make a tour of the Upper Provinces himself, leaving behind his Council at Calcutta, so that he might be able to decide about the question of exercising better British control over the Rajputana States.<sup>6</sup>

During the tenure of Colebrooke, no change was brought about in the British superintendence over the States of Rajputana. Colebrooke had adhered to the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of the States but at the same time

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1. Political letter from COD d. 21 March 1828, No. 27. Malcolm had submitted this plan to the Court of Directors at London, before leaving England for joining his appointment as the Governor of Bombay.
  2. Political letter from COD d. 21 March 1828, No. 27.
  3. Malcolm's Minute, Governor of Bombay d. 26 December 1828, Cons. 13 February 1829, No. 1, F. & P.
  4. Bentinck's Minute d. 10 February, Cons. 13 February 1829, No. 1, F & P.
  5. Political letter from COD d. 6 July 1829, No. 6; See also, Md. Anwar Khan "The Russophobia of Lord Ellenborough 1828-30", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Pakistan*, Vol. VIII, No. 1, June 1963, pp.73-81.
  6. Bentinck's Minute d. 22 February, Cons. 5 March 1830, No. 1, F. & P.



emphasized the British responsibility in exercising control over the interstate relations in Rajputana. However, he could not carry on the work at the Residency with integrity and honesty. He accepted gratification from the various rulers of Rajputana. On a charge of corruption, the British Government dismissed him.<sup>1</sup>

### Hawkins and Rajputana States

The suggestion of Colebrooke for the better British control over Rajputana States, however, did not fail to influence the British Government. This became visible during the time of Francis Hawkins who took charge of the Delhi Residency on September 18, 1829.<sup>2</sup> As a result of the British policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of the States of Jaipur and Udaipur the British Government ordered the abolition of the Political Agencies in those States on October 14, 1830.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly these Political Agencies were closed, and the work of conducting British relations with Mewar and Jaipur instead of reverting to the direct supervision of the Resident at Delhi, was entrusted to the 'Superintendent and Political Agent, Ajmer'.<sup>4</sup> This showed that the British Government had accepted in principle the suggestion of Colebrooke of governing the British relations with the Rajputana States from Ajmer rather than from Delhi, and had started implementing it.

The other Political Agencies at Kota, Bharatpur and Sirohi, which were also in subordination to the Resident at Delhi, could not be abolished because the British Government could not afford to introduce the policy of non-interference in these States which still needed the presence of Political Agents to resolve their respective peculiar problems.

In the meanwhile, on the request of the Raja of Bikaner, Hawkins ordered the mobilisation of British troops from Nasirabad for the suppression of the recalcitrant *jagirdars* of Bikaner

1. Percival Speir, *Twilight of the Mughals*, pp. 167-81.

2. Hawkins to Swinton d. 18 September, Cons. 14 October 1829. No. 22, F. & P.

3. Resolution of G. G. in Council d. 14 October, Cons. 14 October 1830, Nos. 1-2, F & P.

4. Brooke, *History of Meywar*, p.36; Low to Hawkins d. 17 November, Cons. 10 December 1830, No. 63, F & P.



in 1830.<sup>1</sup> However, the British Government did not agree to it and issued orders for the cancellation of their march to Bikaner in pursuance of its policy of non-interference.<sup>2</sup> Ultimately, Hawkins was removed from the Residency for mishandling the affairs of Bikaner.<sup>3</sup>

### **Martin and Rajputana States**

W. B. Martin succeeded Hawkins at the Residency on November 25, 1830.<sup>4</sup> He successfully conducted British relations with the States of Rajputana on the recognized principles of the treaties. For instance, in the revolt of Jaipur troops at Sawai Madhopur (in Jaipur), he maintained the neutrality of his Government in the affair.<sup>5</sup>

*Bentinck invited Princes of Rajputana at Ajmer :* The policy of non-interference resulted in the British Government developing harmonious relations with the Rajputana States. By 1831, it also began to pay attention to its responsibility of preventing these States from committing aggressions on the neighbouring States. The prevalence of the system of plundering raids of the subjects of one State on another, and their fleecing the innocent merchants and travellers, intently attracted the attention of Bentinck in 1831.<sup>6</sup> He deputed Lieutenant Colonel A. Lockett, the Bharatpur Political Agent to make a tour of the disturbed tract of Shekhawati (in Jaipur) for collecting information about the plundering bands and their haunts in that tract.<sup>7</sup> Bentinck also wanted to take measures in

1. Sutherland, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 101.

3. Swinton to Hawkins d. 18 June, Cons. 18 July 1830, No. 7, F & P.

4. Martin to Swinton d. 25 November, Cons. 10 December 1830, No. 7, F & P.

5. Political letter to COD d. 15 December 1831, No. 23.

6. Prinsep to Martin d. 10 October, Cons. 4 November 1831, No. 9, F & P.

7. Prinsep to Martin d. 13 March, Cons. 2 April 1831, No. 44, F & P.



co-operation with the Bombay Presidency for establishing peace and tranquillity on the frontiers of Kutch (Bombay Presidency), Sind and Malani (Jodhpur State) which were infested by the armed *Khosa* plunderers of Parkur.<sup>1</sup> But before taking any final decision in the matter, Bentinck desired to hold consultations in person with the rulers of Rajputana, and therefore, he invited them to meet him at Ajmer in January 1832.<sup>2</sup>



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1. Bentinck to Lord Clare d. 25 August, Cons. 7 October 1831, No. 16, F. & Sc; Prinsep to Martin d. 24 October, Cons. 18 November 1831, No. 21, F & P.
  2. Prinsep to Martin d. 15 December 1831, Cons. 2 April 1832, No. 15, F & P.



## CHAPTER I

# *Institution and Development of the Rajputana Agency*

The British Government concluded treaties with the Rajputana States of Alwar and Bharatpur in 1803, and with Dholpur in 1806. It then conducted its relations with them through the Resident at Delhi. The remaining States of Rajputana were brought into the vortex of British alliances in 1817-18. Instead of assigning the charge of all the States of Rajputana to the Delhi Resident alone, the British Government in April 1818 divided the work between the three principal authorities viz., the Residents in Malwa, Rajputana and Delhi. The office of the Resident in Rajputana was abolished in December 1818, and the States under his charge were transferred to the Resident at Delhi for administrative convenience. To give Central India 'a superiority in rank and public estimation over that of Delhi', the British Government in 1821 transferred all the States of Rajputana, except Bikaner,<sup>1</sup> from the Resident at Delhi to the charge of the 'Resident in Malwa and Rajputana.'<sup>2</sup> When Charles Metcalfe, an authority on the affairs of Rajputana, was appointed as the Resident at Delhi in 1825, the office of the 'Resident in Malwa and Rajputana' was abolished. Consequently, most of the States of Rajputana were placed under the Resident at Delhi while a few of them continued to be under the control of the Malwa Residency. Whatever advantages might have accrued from this system,

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1. Bikaner was in close proximity to Hissar which was under the Delhi Residency.

2. G. G's. Minute d. 13 October, Cons. 13 October 1821, No. 4 F & P.



it was in contradiction to the arrangement of 1821 which had aimed at relegating the position of Delhi in the eyes of the rulers and the people of India. Besides, the Delhi Residency, being far off, had failed to prevent occurrences of marauding raids, dacoities and frontier depredations in Rajputana. The paramount position of the British Government thus ceased to be effective in the region. However, it made the British Government and its officers critical of the existing British system of exercising control over the States of Rajputana. Colebrooke suggested that the 'high controlling officer' for these States should be stationed at Ajmer rather than at Delhi. To ascertain the lapses of British superintendence over Rajputana States in particular, Lord William Bentinck, the Governor-General wanted to remove the seat of the Supreme Government to the Upper Provinces so that he might get an opportunity of direct communication with the Political officers and the princes in that quarter. When he was forbidden by the Court of Directors from doing so, he undertook a tour of Rajputana and some other places in Northern India to fulfil his purpose.

# I

## Institution of the Rajputana Agency

### Bentinck's tour of Rajputana

Bentinck reached Ajmer on January 18, 1832.<sup>1</sup> Nawab Amir Khan of Tonk, Maharana Jawan Singh of Mewar, Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh III of Jaipur, Maharao Ram Singh of Kota, Maharaja Kalyan Singh of Kishangarh and Maharao Ram Singh of Bundi, along with their cavalcades, had assembled there to meet the Governor-General. The Maharaja of Bikaner<sup>2</sup> and the Maharawal of Jaisalmer were not invited, for their territories were far away from Ajmer; and both of them were represented by their respective *Vakils*. Rao Shiva Singh, the Regent of Sirohi, who was also not invited on this occasion

1. J Baillie Fraser. (Ed ), *The Military Memoirs of Lieutenant Colonel James Skinner*, Vol II. p. 218. Quoted from Har Bilas Sarda, *Ajmer Historical and Descriptive*, p. 209.

2. Tr. of a *Kharita* from G.G. to the Raja of Bikaner d. 9 January, Cons. 2 April 1832, No. 2, F & P.



to Ajmer<sup>1</sup> sent his *Vakils* to wait upon the Governor-General.<sup>2</sup> Maharaja Man Singh of Jodhpur, one of the principal rulers of Rajputana, despite his eagerness to attend the Darbar, failed to do so due to the unrest among his troops at that time.<sup>3</sup> Lieutenant-Colonel A. Lockett, the then Superintendent and Political Agent, Ajmer was entrusted with the duty of arranging meetings of the Princes with the Governor-General.<sup>4</sup>

### **Requests and Complaints of the rulers**

In consonance with the treaties, Bentinck met the rulers at Ajmer on a footing of subordination on their side and of supremacy on his own.<sup>5</sup> He received them individually at his camp and paid return visits to them.<sup>6</sup> The most interesting meeting Bentinck had, was on January 30, 1832 with Nawab Amir Khan of Tonk who was in perfect contrast to the hereditary princes of Rajputana, 'the slaves of forms and ceremonious etiquette.'<sup>7</sup> Amir Khan was frank, affable, lively, fond of anecdote and ready in repartee.<sup>8</sup> He did not ventilate any grievances, nor did he ask for any help while the others had requests and complaints to make to the Governor-General.

The Maharaja of Jaipur in his meeting with the Governor-General solicited British military aid to suppress the highway robberies in the Shekhawati tract, which caused inconvenience to travellers and other persons.<sup>9</sup> The Maharana of Mewar also requested him for military assistance to maintain peace in the

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1. Tr. of a Kharita from Rao Shiva Singh of Sirohi to G. G. recd. 25 January, Cons. 9 July 1832, No 38, F & P.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Tr. of a Kharita from Maharaja Man Singh of Jodhpur to Bentinck recd. 16 April, Cons. 7 May 1832, No. 32, F & P.
  4. Propositions submitted to G. G. on the part of Maharana Jawan Singh of Udaipur and replies ( No. 1 ), d. n. February, Cons. 3 December 1832, No. 26, F & P.
  5. Ibid.
  6. W.H. Macnaghten, Secretary to the G. G. d. 9 April, Cons. 21 May 1832, No 73, F & P; Sarda, *loc. cit*
  7. Busawan Lal, *Memoirs of Amir Khan*, p. iii.
  8. Ibid.
  9. Requests of Jaipur State to G. G. d. n., Cons. 9 July 1832, No. F & P.



Mewar Hill tract.<sup>1</sup> The Governor-General refused military assistance to both the rulers for the reason that it could not be made available to deal with the internal affairs of a State.<sup>2</sup>

The Bikaner *Vakil* reported that the Shekhawats of Jaipur and Jodhpur, and the subjects of Jaisalmer had been making predatory incursions into the territory of Bikaner.<sup>3</sup> He even held the Maharawal of Jaisalmer responsible for instigating his subjects to commit depredations in Bikaner and, therefore, requested the Governor-General to restrain the Maharawal from his evil pursuit.<sup>4</sup>

The Jaisalmer *Vakil* submitted a list of plundering raids, allegedly organized by the Maharaja of Bikaner into Jaisalmer territory. He requested the Governor-General to take measures for their prevention in future, and the early restoration of the plundered property to his State. He held that at the root of these plundering raids was a personal grudge of the Maharaja of Bikaner against the Maharawal.<sup>5</sup>

The Sirohi *Vakils* complained of the frequent raids and robberies by the subjects of Udaipur and Jodhpur in the Sirohi territory.<sup>6</sup> These raiders also induced the Minas and the Bhils of Sirohi to join them in plundering. The Rao's *Vakils*, therefore, requested the Governor-General to adopt measures to check these excesses.<sup>7</sup>

The holding of a Darbar or calling upon the rulers for a meeting was the regal prerogative enjoyed by the Mughal Emperors. The Governor-General meeting a number of rulers

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1. Requests of the Maharana to G.G. (No. 2) d. 7 February, Cons. 3 December 1832, No. 26, F & P.
  2. Ibid; Requests of Jaipur State to G.G. d. n., Cons. 9 July 1832, No. 5, F & P.
  3. Statement of the agressions of Jodhpur and Jaipur subjects on Bikaner, Cons. 9 July 1832, No. 6, F & P.
  4. Statement of disputes between Bikaner and Jaisalmer, Cons. 9 July 1832, No. 6, F & P.
  5. *Arzi* from Jumiyat Rao, *Vakil* of Jaisalmer State recd. 10 March, Cons. 9 July 1832. No. 13, F & P.
  6. Tr. of a representation from the State of Sirohi recd. 25 January, Cons. 9 July 1832, No. 38, F & P.
  7. Ibid.



and receiving their representations, therefore, demonstrated that in practice he had begun to enjoy the regal privilege of a Mughal Emperor. The visit of the rulers of Rajputana to Bentinck at Ajmer belittled them, generally, in the estimate of their subjects. Specially, the subjects of Mewar were greatly disappointed, when they saw Maharana Jawan Singh rushing to Ajmer to attend upon the Governor-General, whereas his ancestors had observed tenaciously their marked indifference to the Darbars of the Mughal Emperors.

### **Institution of the Rajputana Agency**

Bentinck's visit to Ajmer convinced him of the general complaint of the rulers that the frontier depredations and the marauding raids were so frequent that almost all the States suffered on their account.<sup>1</sup> The treaties of 1817-18 provided that a State would not commit aggression on any one, and that in the event of a dispute arising between the States, it would be submitted to the arbitration and award of the British Government. To exercise effective control over the interstate relations of the States of Rajputana was, therefore, the solemn responsibility and obligation of the British Government.<sup>2</sup> However, it became evident to the Governor-General that the British authorities in Rajputana had failed to fulfil the obligations of their Government to these States.<sup>3</sup> They had taken no measures either to redress the grievances of the States, or to prevent the predatory incursions of one State on another.<sup>4</sup> Bentinck thus, saw the veracity of the complaints of the rulers. He observed very rightly that although the British Government had been able to exterminate the organized predatory hordes of the Pindaris in Rajputana, "the border feuds and plunderings are, perhaps, as numerous and expensive as ever" in this region.<sup>5</sup>

Bentinck attributed the laxity of British control over the States of Rajputana to their distance from the seat of the

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1. Bentinck's Minute d. 30 March, Cons. 16 April 1832, No. 22, F & P.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.



Resident at Delhi.<sup>1</sup> The Resident was the 'Supreme Controlling Authority' for most of these States, and on account of his varied and multifarious duties and assignments, he found it difficult to devote his attention and time to their proper superintendence and care.<sup>2</sup> Besides, the British jurisdiction over the States of Rajputana shared by the Superintendent and Political Agent, Ajmer<sup>3</sup>, the Resident in Malwa and the Resident at Delhi, made the task of settlement of disputes between these States difficult for the Political officers.<sup>4</sup>

To resolve the existing anomaly, Bentinck was convinced of the desirability of placing all the States of Rajputana under a single political authority with headquarters at Ajmer.<sup>5</sup> Accordingly, in 1832 the States of Tonk, Bharatpur, Alwar, Dholpur, Karauli, Kota, Bundi, Dungarpur and Sirohi were separated from the control of the Delhi Residency, Banswara and Partabgarh from the Malwa Agency, and Jodhpur, Jaipur, Udaipur, Jaisalmer and Kishangarh were removed from the charge of the Superintendent and Political Agent, Ajmer, and placed together under a single authority designated as the "Governor-General's Agent for the States of Rajpootana and Commissioner of Ajmer" with his headquarters at the central position of Ajmer.<sup>6</sup> Lieutenant Colonel A. Lockett, the Superintendent and Political Agent, Ajmer was appointed the first 'Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana'<sup>7</sup> (hereinafter the 'A. G. G.' would mean 'the Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana'). The A. G. G. was also entrusted with

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1. Bentinck's Minute d. 30 March, Cons. 16 April 1832, No. 22, F & P.

2. Ibid.

3. According to the orders of 24 February 1832, the Superintendent and Political Agent, Ajmer was placed in independent charge of conducting British relations with the States of Jodhpur, Kishangarh, Udaipur and Jaisalmer. H. T. Prinsep to Lockett, Superintendent and Political Agent, Ajmer d. 24 February, Cons. 12 March 1832, No. 23, F & P.

4. Reply to G. G. to the complaint of Bikaner against Jaisalmer d. 7 April, Cons. 9 July 1832, No. 6, F & P.

5. Bentinck's Minute d. 30 March 1832, *loc. cit.*

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid. For the list of the Agents to the Governor-General in Rajputana (1832-1858), See Appendix I.



the duties of the Commissioner of Ajmer.<sup>1</sup> The Superintendent of Merwara too, was placed under his control.<sup>2</sup>

Thus Bentinck's tour through a considerable part of Rajputana, and his friendly exchange of ideas at Ajmer with most of the rulers, resulted in the institution of the Rajputana Agency. It heralded a new era of effective British control over the States of Rajputana. This measure was suggested by Colebrooke as early as 1829. The Court of Directors who had, on many occasions,<sup>3</sup> suggested to the Governor-General of India to "concentrate as extensive a sphere of superintendence as possible under one officer" approved of the institution of a separate political agency for the States of Rajputana.<sup>4</sup>

To create a common agency for conducting British relations with the States of Rajputana was an administrative as well as a political decision. The Rajputana Agency was instituted to vindicate the paramount authority of the British Government in Rajputana. It had, as well, to check frontier depredations by exercising greater control over the interstate relations of the States of Rajputana. But this measure severed their relations with Delhi from the political point of view, and increased the importance of the British province of Ajmer, the headquarters of the A. G. G. The importance of the imperial city of Delhi, and with it that of the Mughal Emperor was lowered in the estimation of the people and rulers of Rajputana. This change brought home to the rulers, the necessity of cultivating intimate relations with the British Government. The people of Rajputana had similarity in historical tradition, political institutions and social customs. The British Government too, in conducting relations with the States of Rajputana followed the uniform principles of policy. Thus the institution of the Rajputana Agency was a natural and convenient arrangement.

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1. Political letter to COD d. 22 August 1833, No. 5, para. 17.

2. W. H. Macnaghten, Secretary to Government to A. Lockett, Agent of the Governor-General, Ajmer d. 2 July, Cons. 6 August 1832, No. 35, F & P.

3. Political letter from COD d. 21 March 1828, No. 27.

4. Political letter from COD d. 21 January 1835, No. 2.



### Assistants and Political Agents

With the inception of the Rajputana Agency, the States of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Kishangarh, Jaisalmer, Bikaner, Alwar, Udaipur, Tonk, Dholpur and Karauli were placed under the direct control of the A. G. G.,<sup>1</sup> while the remaining States of Rajputana were superintended by the different Political Agents who worked under the direction and control of the A. G. G.<sup>2</sup> The States which were under the direct control of the A. G. G. formed the 'Ajmer Political Agency' and he himself conducted British relations with them from his headquarters. As such, he exercised dual control over the States under the Ajmer Political Agency. He was both their Political Agent and the A.G.G.<sup>3</sup>

The main duties of the A.G.G. were : (i) to prevent the States from committing aggression on their neighbours, (ii) to supervise the regular and punctual remittance of the tribute by the Rajputana States and (iii) to keep the Political officers in check from interfering unauthoritatively in the internal affairs of the States.<sup>4</sup> These duties entailed upon the A. G. G. the responsibility of conducting British relations with the States which were under the jurisdiction of the Rajputana Agency.

To help the A.G.G. in conducting relations with the States, the British Government placed at his disposal the services of three subordinate officers at the headquarters of the Rajputana Agency in 1832.<sup>5</sup> These officers were known as the 'Assistants to the Governor General's Agent in Rajputana' (hereinafter the 'Assistant' would mean Assistant to the A. G. G.) The First Assistant looked after the management of the revenue and judicial affairs of Ajmer.<sup>6</sup> He was not ordinarily given political duties, but on occasions of necessity, he was

1. Bentinck's Minute d. 30 March 1832, *loc. cit.*

2. Cf. Chapters, III, IV, V and VI.

3. Sutherland A.G.G. to Secretary to Government d. 1 June, Cons. 7 August 1847, No. 845, F & P.

4. Macnaghten to Lockett A.G.G. d. 27 December, Cons. 7 January 1832, No. 32, F & P.

5. Bentinck's Minute d. 30 March 1832, *loc. cit.*

6. Ibid.



to help the A. G. G. Besides, he held the charge of the office of the A. G. G. in his absence.<sup>1</sup> The Second Assistant was to dispose of the routine business of the Rajputana Agency.<sup>2</sup> The appointment of the Third Assistant was made to help the A. G. G. in dealing with the matters of frontier depredations in Rajputana.<sup>3</sup> Later on, when Lockett felt the necessity of having more assistance to carry out various important duties of his office in an efficient manner,<sup>4</sup> the British Government sanctioned one more Assistant to him.<sup>5</sup> Lieutenant H. W. Trevelyan of the Bombay Artillery was appointed as the Fourth Assistant in the office of the A.G.G. in 1833.<sup>6</sup> The Fifth Assistant was appointed in 1847 to help the A. G. G. in superintending the proceedings of the 'International Court of *Vakils* at Ajmer.<sup>7</sup>

During the period from 1832 to 1858 a number of changes were made in the appointments of Political Agents in Rajputana States. All the nine States which were under the direct control of the A.G.G. in 1832, did not always continue under his direct charge. This was because only four Political Agencies were established on a permanent basis while the others were temporary,<sup>8</sup> having been established for reasons of minority of a ruler or maladministration in a State, etc.

## II

### Changes After Institution of the Rajputana Agency

#### Collection of Tribute at Ajmer

According to the terms of the treaties of 1817-18, the

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1. Bentinck's Minute d. 30 March 1832, *loc. cit.*; Resolution of Vice-President in Council d. 1 December, Cons. 24 December 1832, No. 38, F & P.
  2. Bentinck's Minute d. 30 March 1832, *loc. cit.*
  3. Ibid.
  4. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 20 November, Cons. 24 December 1832, No. 8, F & P.
  5. Macnaghten to J. Bax, Secretary to Bombay Government d. 1 December, Cons. 24 December 1832, No. 10, F & P.
  6. Trevelyan to Lockett d. 6 January, Cons. 26 January 1833, No. 57, F & P.
  7. Political letter to COD d. 17 October 1848, No. 60.
  8. Cf. Chapters III, IV, V, and VI.



States of Rajputana deposited their tribute in the British treasury at Delhi. After taking charge of the office of the A.G.G. in 1832, Lockett proposed to his Government to change the place of the collection of tribute to Ajmer<sup>1</sup>. The transmission of money from Delhi to Ajmer where it was required for payment to British troops at Neemuch and Nasirabad, was not only inconvenient but also extremely expensive. The interest and insurance charges on it cost the British Government a sum of over Rs. 14,000 per annum.<sup>2</sup> The British Government readily accepted this proposal, and allowed Lockett to order collection of the tribute from all the States of Rajputana at Ajmer<sup>3</sup>. But he was instructed to carry out this object with the consent of the rulers, for in view of the terms of the treaties they could not be compelled to pay it at Ajmer<sup>4</sup>. Accordingly, Lockett informed the tributary States of Kota, Bundi, Banswara, Dungarpur, Partabgarh, Sirohi, Mewar, Jodhpur and Jaipur to deposit immediately their tribute in the treasury at Ajmer<sup>5</sup>.

The only objection to the payment of tribute at Ajmer came from Jhota Ram, the *Mukhtiar* of Jaipur who cited in his favour the words of the treaty that the tribute 'shall be paid to the British Government through the Treasury of Delhi'<sup>6</sup>. Lockett had foreseen this objection from Jhota Ram, because the change would cause loss of the insurance profits from the Jaipur tribute to his firm at Delhi, known as 'Gyan Chand Saheb Ram'<sup>7</sup>. He told the Jaipur *Vakil* to impress on Jhota Ram the propriety of depositing the tribute at Ajmer, as the rulers of 'all the other tributary States had lately done and

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1. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 13 July, Cons. 27 August 1832, No. 28, F & P.
  2. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 20 April, Cons. 4 June 1833, No. 34, F & P.
  3. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 22 June, Cons. 23 July 1832, No. 19, F & P.
  4. Ibid.
  5. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 4 May, Cons. 6 June 1833, No. 23, F & P.
  6. Ibid.
  7. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 4 August, Cons. 24 September 1832, No. 17, F & P.



were now doing'.<sup>1</sup> Lockett even suggested to his Government to insist upon the Jaipur Darbar on paying the tribute into the treasury at Ajmer<sup>2</sup>. The British Government turned down this request of the A.G.G. It did not wish to compel the Jaipur Darbar to pay the tribute at Ajmer, owing to the clause of the treaty which specified Delhi as the place for the payment of tribute.<sup>3</sup>

The British Government only accepted the recommendations of the A.G.G. when they were sound, and did not give the Rajputana States cause for complaint by violating the treaties.

The State of Jaipur continued to deposit its tribute in the Delhi Treasury. In 1836, when Jaipur was required to pay for the maintenance of the Shekhawati Force, the question of its paying tribute at Ajmer was reopened by Lieutenant-Colonel N. Alves who had succeeded Lockett.<sup>4</sup> Rawal Berisal who, by then, had replaced Jhota Ram, was a reasonable man. He readily agreed to pay the tribute and make all other payments at Ajmer<sup>5</sup>.

With Jaipur accepting to pay the tribute at the Ajmer Treasury the controversy over the place of collection of tribute was resolved for good. It ended all links of the States of Rajputana with Delhi.

### **Rajputana Agency and the Lieutenant-Governor**

Since the formation of the Rajputana Agency in 1832, the A.G.G. corresponded directly with the British Government. However, when in 1836, Charles Metcalfe, an expert on the Rajputana affairs, was appointed<sup>6</sup> as the Lieutenant-Governor

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1. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 4 May, Cons. 6 June 1833, No. 23, F & P.

2. Ibid.

3. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 6 June, Cons. 6 June 1833, No. 26, F & P.

4. N. Alves A.G.G. to Macnaghten d. 5 February, Cons. 29 February 1836, No. 15, F & P.

5. Ibid.

6. Macnaghten to Metcalfe d. 28 March, Cons. 28 March 1836, No. 5, F & P; G. A. Bushby, Secretary to the Lieutenant Governor to Macnaghten d. 13 April, Cons. 2 May 1836, No. 47, F & P.



of the North-Western Provinces<sup>1</sup>, Agra, the Rajputana Agency was placed under him<sup>2</sup> so that he could direct it in conducting British relations with the States of Rajputana. This arrangement facilitated the working of the Rajputana Agency as the Rajputana States were in close proximity to Agra. The A.G.G. was henceforth to address his correspondence to Metcalfe on all occasions<sup>3</sup>. The rulers of Rajputana were also asked to address their letters to Metcalfe<sup>4</sup>. The work of the Rajputana Agency being purely of a political nature, it continued to have the patronage of the Governor-General<sup>5</sup>. Thus, despite his subordination to the Lieutenant-Governor, Agra, who had extensive powers in Rajputana affairs, the head of the Rajputana Agency continued to be designated as 'the Governor-General's Agent in Rajputana'.<sup>6</sup>

The extensive powers over the Rajputana Agency given to Metcalfe were, however, denied to T. C. Robertson who took over as the Lieutenant-Governor in January 1840.<sup>7</sup>

1. By the Charter Act of 1833 the Presidency of Bengal was bifurcated into (i) the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal, and (ii) the Presidency of Agra. (Cf. Proclamation and Notification constituting Agra as a separate Presidency d. 16 June, Cons. 19 July 1834, Nos. 1-6, F & P. In 1836, the Agra Presidency was turned into the North-Western Provinces, Agra. For details see, Macnaghten to Charles Metcalfe d. 28 March, Cons. 28 March 1836, No. 5, F & P.
2. Macnaghten to Metcalfe d. 28 March 1836, *loc. cit.*
3. Macnaghten to Alves, A. G. G. d. 28 March, Cons. 28 March 1836, No. 8, F & P.
4. Circulars from G. G. to the rulers of Rajputana d. 28 March, Cons. 28 March 1836, No. 10, F & P.
5. Macnaghten to Metcalfe d. 28 March 1836, *op. cit.*, para. 11.
6. The Commissioner of Delhi who worked both as the Territorial Superintendent and Political Agent at the Mughal Court at Delhi in subordination to the Lieutenant Governor, was designated as the 'Agent to the Lieutenant Governor of the North-Western Provinces'. Cf. Macnaghten to Metcalfe d. 28 March 1836, *loc. cit.*
7. When Metcalfe resigned from the Lieutenant-Governorship on 1 January 1838, Lord Auckland, the Governor-General himself assumed the immediate superintendence of the affairs of the North-Western Provinces. Consequently, the Rajputana Agency remained under the direct control of the Governor-General till Robertson took over charge as the Lieutenant Governor, Agra on 4 January 1840. Metcalfe to Auckland d. 5 August, Cons.



Henceforth, the A.G.G. in Rajputana addressed all correspondence to the Secret and Political Department of 'Government of India' through the Lieutenant-Governor.<sup>1</sup> Besides, all orders of the Government of India to the A.G.G. were transmitted through the Lieutenant-Governor.<sup>2</sup> Robertson was not permitted to dispose of important questions of policy which affected British relations with the States, such as modification of treaties, abatement of tribute, and receiving and answering letters from the rulers, as Metcalfe was empowered to do.<sup>3</sup> In cases of emergency, when the A.G.G. hesitated to act on his own responsibility and in which delay in making a reference to Calcutta was prejudicial to the public interest, Robertson was authorized to issue instructions direct to the A.G.G.<sup>4</sup> Whenever he felt the necessity, he could record his own opinion on the reference transmitted through him for orders of the Supreme Government.<sup>5</sup> With the exception of this mode of correspondence on political matters, the Lieutenant-Governor exercised discretionary powers in all matters of ordinary administration of the Rajputana Agency such as confirming sentences and adjusting disputes between the British Political Officers.<sup>6</sup> However, he was not permitted to interfere with the military establishments in Rajputana<sup>7</sup>.

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21 August 1837, Nos. 11-14, F & P; Office Memorandum by Macnaghten, d. 1 January, Cons. 25 April 1838, No. 194, F&P; Memorandum General Department d. 1 January, Cons. 25 April 1838, No. 195, F & P; Notification d. 4 February, Cons. 24 February 1840, No. 166, F & P.

1. Auckland to G.G. to T.C. Robertson d. 27 January, Cons. 16 March 1840, Nos. 2-4, F & P; T. H. Maddock Secretary to Government to Alves d. 4 February, Cons. 16 March 1840, No. 10, F & P.
2. Maddock to Alves d. 4 February, Cons. 16 March 1840, No. 10, F & P.
3. Ibid; Minute by T. C. Robertson, Lieutenant-Governor North-Western Provinces, Agra, d. 28 March, Cons. 28 May 1840, No. 28, F & P.
4. Auckland to Robertson d. 27 January; Cons. 16 March 1840, Nos. 2-4, F & P.
5. Ibid.
6. Maddock to Secretary to Government N. W. P. d. 16 March, Cons. 16 March 1840, No. 29, F & P; Robertson's Minute d. 28 March 1840, *loc. cit.*
7. Auckland to Robertson d. 27 January, Cons. 16 March 1840, Nos. 2-4, F & P.



The nominal powers vested in Robertson over the Rajputana Agency continued to hold good for his successors viz., G. R. Clerk (1843), James Thomason (1843-1853) and John Russel Colvin (1853-57). It was only at the time of the Uprising of 1857, and on the specific and urgent request of John Russel Colvin, the then Lieutenant-Governor<sup>1</sup> that the British Government vested in him, as a temporary measure, complete authority over all the Political officers and Contingents in Rajputana on May 25, 1857.<sup>2</sup> Thus the British Government by giving nominal control of the Rajputana Agency to the Lieutenant-Governor, Agra, kept him acquainted with the political developments in Rajputana as a result of which he could guide its affairs independently at the time of the Uprising of 1857.

#### **Appointment of Commissioner of Ajmer**

Besides the above changes, some more were brought about, which not only affected the relations of Lieutenant-Governor with the A. G. G., but also with the offices of the Superintendents of Ajmer and Merwara. Since the formation of the Rajputana Agency the Superintendents were in subordination to the A.G.G. The necessity of a change was felt in 1842 by the A.G.G. himself, when Lieutenant J.D Macnaghten resigned his position as the Superintendent of Ajmer. To utilize the services of an able officer like C. G. Dixon, the then Superintendent Merwara on the vacant post and as a measure of economy in the administrative arrangements, James Sutherland, the A. G. G. in Rajputana, proposed to his Government to combine the two offices of the Superintendents of Ajmer and Merwara into one. This proposal was accepted by the British Government.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, Dixon was appointed

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1. Colvin to G.G. (Telegraphic message) d. 24 May, Cons. 18 December 1857, No. 528, F & Sc.
  2. G. G. to Colvin (Telegraphic message), d. 25 May, Cons. 18 December 1857, No. 529, F & Sc.
  3. J. Sutherland, Agent to the Governor General and Commissioner Ajmer to J. Thomason, Secretary to Government d. 23 March, Cons. 7 December 1842, No. 102, F & P; Sutherland to C. G. Dixon, Superintendent Ajmer d. 13 May, Cons. 7 December 1842, No. 102, F & P.



Superintendent of Ajmer along with his civil and military charge of Merwara in August 1842.<sup>1</sup> He continued to work under the A.G.G. in Rajputana who was also the Commissioner of Ajmer.<sup>2</sup> The court of Directors welcomed this move, for it considered Dixon suitable for the post.<sup>3</sup>

The appointment of an able officer like Dixon gave much relief to the A.G.G. in carrying out his duties as the Commissioner of Ajmer. In 1848, the British Government itself realised the necessity of relieving the A.G.G. of the burden of the administration of Ajmer as much as possible, as it kept him heavily occupied and left him little time to devote himself to the urgent political duties of his own office. It saw in Dixon a promising officer and felt that he had the making of an able civil administrator.<sup>4</sup> On December 11, 1848, the British Government, therefore, authorized Dixon, as the Superintendent of Ajmer, to correspond directly with the Lieutenant-Governor on matters of civil management of Ajmer and Merwara, such as the administration of criminal justice, police and revenue.<sup>5</sup> Still the A.G.G. was left with some powers regarding Ajmer. In all 'international questions' between the 'British and Foreign States' the A.G.G. acted as referee and umpire.<sup>6</sup> Further, the A.G.G. continued to be an appellate authority in civil suits at Ajmer.<sup>7</sup> However, this did not necessitate any change in the designations of the A.G.G. and the Superintendent of Ajmer. The A.G.G. continued to have the designation of the 'Agent to the Governor-General and Commissioner of Ajmer and Merwara', and Dixon of the 'Superintendent of Ajmer.'<sup>8</sup>

The process of relieving the A.G.G. from the burden of the charge of the Commissioner of Ajmer, which began in

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1. J. Thomason, Secretary to Government to Sutherland d. 19 May 1843, No. 275, F & P.

2. Ibid.

3. Political letter from COD d. 30 October 1844, No 38, para 18.

4. H. M. Elliot, Secretary to Government to Colonel J. Low, A.G.G. d. 11 December, Cons. 16 December 1848, No. 19, F & P.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.



1848, was completed in 1853, when Henry Lawrence succeeded Low to the Rajputana Agency. At this time, the office of the Commissioner of Ajmer was entirely separated from that of the A.G.G. Dixon was raised to the office of the 'Commissioner of Ajmer' (combining the charge of the administration of Ajmer and Merwara) and was placed directly under the Lieutenant-Governor.<sup>1</sup> This was done on the ground that Ajmer was purely a civil charge, and therefore, Dixon could advantageously manage it under the authority of the Lieutenant-Governor.<sup>2</sup> As a result of these changes, the A.G.G. was left with no administrative authority over Ajmer and Merwara. Henry Lawrence was only left with the designation of the 'Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana'.<sup>3</sup>

#### **Jawad-Neemuch under the A.G.G.**

Not much time had elapsed since the above changes, when the British Government<sup>4</sup>, on the suggestion of Lieutenant-Governor, transferred the charge of the civil administration of the districts of Jawad and Neemuch to Henry Lawrence. These districts were formerly under the charge of G.A. Bushby, the Governor-General's Agent and Commissioner of Sagar and Narbada. This measure was thought to be a convenient and practicable arrangement by the British Government, for the districts of Jawad and Neemuch being not far from Ajmer could be better managed by the A.G.G. in Rajputana. Henry Lawrence, in his capacity of the Commissioner of Jawad and Neemuch, carried on the duties of the civil administration of Jawad and Neemuch with the help of a local Assistant at Neemuch and under the general supervision of the Lieutenant-Governor, Agra.<sup>5</sup>

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1. Grant to C.G. Dixon d. 28 January, Cons. 4 February 1853, No. 135, F & P.
  2. Ibid; Notification-Fort William-Foreign Department d. 28 January, Cons. 4 February 1853, No. 138, F & P.
  3. Dalhousie's Minute d. 26 January, Cons. 4 February 1853, No. 133, F & P.
  4. Offg. Under Secretary to Government to William Muir, Secretary to Government N. W. P. d. 8 December, Cons. 8 December 1853, No. 95, F & P; G. P. Grant, Offg. Secretary to Government to Muir d. 17 November, Cons. 8 December 1853, No. 52, F & P.
  5. Ibid; Henry Lawrence to Muir d. 27 September, Cons. 8 December 1853, No. 94; Muir to Henry Lawrence d. 14 December, Cons. 8 December 1853, No. 93, F & P.



### **Headquarters removed to Abu**

With the appointment of Dixon as the Commissioner of Ajmer, the A.G.G. was no longer required to be necessarily present at Ajmer. Thus, parting with the charge of civil administration of Ajmer, Henry Lawrence felt uneasy. In July 1855, he therefore, sought the permission of the Government to remove the headquarters of the Rajputana Agency to Neemuch or Mount Abu (in Sirohi).<sup>1</sup> The latter had been the summer headquarters of the Rajputana Agency for long.<sup>2</sup> In support of this, he pointed out that removing the headquarters to Abu would save the Government money usually paid as allowances to the Agency Staff during their stay in summer at Abu.<sup>3</sup> The British Government did not object to the proposal and permitted the transfer of the headquarters of the Rajputana Agency to Abu from April 1856.<sup>4</sup> Hence, Abu became the headquarters of the Rajputana Agency. The Court of Directors expressed satisfaction at this development.<sup>5</sup> In spite of this change of headquarters, Ajmer did not lose its importance as a British stronghold in the midst of Rajputana. This became evident during the Uprising of 1857, when the A.G.G. dashed from Abu to Ajmer to maintain proper control over the States of Rajputana.<sup>6</sup>

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M<sup>r</sup> A. Road, S. P.

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1. Henry Lawrence to Beadon d. 16 July, Cons 9 November 1855, No. 180, F & P.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Ibid.
  4. George Edmonstone, Under Secretary to Henry Lawrence d. 17 September, Cons. 9 November 1855, No. 181, F & P.
  5. Political Letter from COD d. 29 August 1857, No. 29, para. 81; Edmonstone to George Lawrence Offg. A. G. G. d. 6 November, Cons. 6 November 1857, No 3, F & P.
  6. George Lawrence to Edmonstone Secretary to Government d. 8 June, Cons. 18 December 1857, No. 205, F & Sc.



## CHAPTER II

### ***Constitution of the Rajputana Agency***

Impelled by his determination to consolidate British power in the States of Rajputana, Bentinck evolved an effective system of conducting British relations with them. The organization of the Rajputana Agency, as soon as it came into existence, was laid upon this system. In its working, the A.G.G. in Rajputana conducted British relations with the States and exercised discretionary powers in their political matters. In the performance of his duties, he was helped by his Assistants, Political Agents, News - Writers and the Agency *Vakils*. There were British troops at Neemuch and Nasirabad, and the local contingents in Rajputana, which he could call to his aid, whenever it was necessary. Besides, the 'International Courts of *Vakils*' assisted him in settling criminal disputes between the States.

#### **Status of A.G.G., Rulers and Political Agents**

The British Political officers in the Political and Foreign Department of the East India Company such as 'Agents to the Governor-General, Residents and Political Agents were a class by themselves. A Political officer accredited to an Indian Court was the "Representative of Friendship as much as Power of the British Government".<sup>1</sup> Thus, like his counterpart elsewhere in India, a Political officer accredited to a State in Rajputana exercised dual functions of the plenipotentiary as well as the representative of the paramount power. He enforced the observance of the treaty upon the State, and exercised control over it in the interest of the general peace and tranquillity of Rajputana.

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1. Maddock to Sutherland and to all Political Agents and Residents in India, d. 26 April, Cons. 13 July 1842, No. 1, F & P.



The 'Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana' was a senior Political officer under whom a group of States, and several 'Political Agents' were placed.<sup>1</sup> In the hierarchy of the Company, his status was in 'every respect upon an equality' with that of a 'Resident'<sup>2</sup> and he enjoyed all the privileges of the latter.<sup>3</sup> The A.G.G. in Rajputana, like the Resident corresponded directly with the British Government. At his headquarters, or while on an inspection tour of the States under his political jurisdiction, he was allotted the same strength of escort as was provided to a Resident.<sup>4</sup> In the same manner, like the 'Resident', he was entitled to a salute of 13 guns at the time of his visit to any of the States under his jurisdiction.<sup>5</sup> Among the Political officers, his status was only next to the Resident at Hyderabad.<sup>6</sup>

The Political Agents ranked below the A.G.G. in Rajputana as well as the 'Resident'. But the rank of a 'Political Superintendent' was equal to that of a Political Agent. The Political Agents and the Political Superintendents were the representatives of the A. G. G. in Rajputana in the States to which they were accredited. Among the Political officers of the Company, the rank of the 'Assistant to the Agent to the Governor-General' was the lowest.<sup>7</sup> The Political Agent and the Political Superintendent were both entitled to a salute of 11 guns in the States under their respective jurisdictions.<sup>8</sup> The Political Agents and the Political Superintendents were entitled to the salute of guns on their visit to the Darbars or on their

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1. G. G.'s Minute d. 30 March 1832, *loc. cit*

2. The Resident was a political officer who conducted British relations with a State to which he was accredited, as the Resident Gwalior, the Resident Hyderabad, etc. He was directly under the control of the Governor-General.

3. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 24 May, Cons. 18 June 1832, No. 23, F & P.

4. Ibid.

5. Table of Salutes to European Functionaries applicable to the territories under the authority of the Government of India (No. 1) Cons. 21 August 1857, No. 58, F & P.

6. Philip Woodruff, *The Men who Ruled India--The Guardians*, p. 68.

7. Sutherland to Maddock d. 31 October 1842, Cons. 4 January 1843, No. 35, F & P.

8. Table of Salutes to European Functionaries, *loc. cit*.



return from furlough.<sup>1</sup> As the representative of the paramount power, the person of the Political officer was inviolable. Any insult or violence done to him was tantamount to insulting the British Government.<sup>2</sup>

All the rulers of Rajputana were subordinate to the Governor-General,<sup>3</sup> but not so in case of the Political officers of the Rajputana Agency. The British Government maintained some difference in the extent of the status and rank of the Political officers and the rulers. Excepting the rulers of Udaipur, Jaipur and Jodhpur, the status of other rulers of Rajputana was equal to that of the A.G.G., in Rajputana. The latter had to acknowledge the higher status of the rulers of the first three States by addressing them in his *Kharitas* with the distinguished marks (*Alkab*) such as *Karam Farmae* or *Alee Shan* or some other title of respect, in addition to their family titles acknowledged by the treaties of 1817-18.<sup>4</sup> In his correspondence with the remaining States, he only addressed the rulers by their family titles.<sup>5</sup>

The rulers of the States of Rajputana were superior to

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1. Anderson, Sirohi Political Superintendent d. 22 October 1855, File No. 99, General Vol. I (1855-56), List No. 1, para 4, S. No. 33, *RAR*.
  2. On hearing about the discourteous conduct of the Maharao of Bundi towards Dr. Corbet, the then officiating Political Agent Harauti, Lord William Bentinck called for an explanation from the Maharao for such a behaviour. As a mark of disapprobation to the behaviour of the Maharao, Bentinck transferred the work of conducting British relations with the State of Bundi direct to the control of the A. G. G. at Ajmer. This caused uneasiness to the Maharao. He felt guilty of his misconduct towards Corbet and entreated the Governor-General to transfer his State to the control of the Political Agent Harauti. Seeing the Maharao realising his mistake, Bentinck acceded to his request. Political Letter to COD d. 13 November 1835, No. 29, para. 111; Bentinck to the Maharao of Bundi d. 19 May, Cons. 19 July 1834, No. 21, F & P.
  3. Propositions submitted to G. G. on the part of Maharana Jawan Singh of Udaipur and replies (No. 1) d. n. February, Cons. 3 December 1832, No. 26, F & P.
  4. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 29 July, Cons. 3 September 1832, No. 25, F & P; Macnaghten to Lockett d. 25 July, Cons. 25 July 1833, No. 12, F & P.
  5. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 25 July 1833, *loc. cit.*



the Political Agents or Political Superintendents in status.<sup>1</sup> But the Political Agents or the Political Superintendents were considered superior in status to the heirs-apparent.<sup>2</sup>

In 1842, James Sutherland, the A.G.G. in Rajputana, defined the relative ranks of the rulers of Rajputana in the following order : Udaipur, Jodhpur, Jaipur, Bundi, Kota, Bikaner, Jaisalmer, Bharatpur, Alwar, Kishangarh, Dungarpur, Banswara, Partabgarh, Karauli, Sirohi, Dholpur, Tonk and Jhalawar.<sup>3</sup>

Salutes of guns were accorded to the Indian Princes whenever they passed through British territory or cantonment or attended a Darbar of the Governor-General.<sup>4</sup> But there were no fixed rules with regard to this system.<sup>5</sup> In 1855, the British Government made an attempt to fix the scales of salutes of guns to the rulers.<sup>6</sup> Henry Lawrence, the A. G. G. in Rajputana, therefore, solicited the views of the Political Agents on the matter.

Major C. B. Burton, the officiating Political Agent Jaipur,<sup>7</sup> Sir Richmond Shakespeare, the Political Agent Jodhpur<sup>8</sup> and Lieutenant Monck Mason, the officiating Political Agent Harauti<sup>9</sup> desired uniformity in the salutes to all the rulers of Rajputana. The first two Political Agents recommended a salute of 17 guns for all, and the latter suggested a salute of 13

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1. Anderson to Henry Lawrence d. 22 October 1855, File No. 99, *loc. cit.*
  2. Ibid.
  3. Memorandum by Sutherland showing the relative rank of the Princes connected with the Rajputana Agency d. 7 November 1842, enclosed with Cons. October 1866, No. 124, Pol. A, Foreign Department.
  4. Monck Mason to Henry Lawrence d. 19 October, 1855, File No. 99, *loc. cit.*
  5. J. W. Dalrymple, Offg. Under Secretary to the Government to Henry Lawrence d. 14 September 1855, File No. 99, *loc. cit.*
  6. Ibid.
  7. C. B. Burton, Offg. Jaipur Political Agent to Henry Lawrence d. 17 October 1855, File No. 99, *loc. cit.*
  8. Shakespeare to Henry Lawrence d. 22 October, 1855, File No. 99, *loc. cit.*
  9. Mason to Henry Lawrence d. 19 October, 1855, File No. 99, *loc. cit.*



guns. But the A. G. G. in Rajputana differed from them. He contended that although uniformity would simplify matters, it would at the same time, give annoyance to the "older and superior" rulers of Rajputana.<sup>1</sup> Henry Lawrence, therefore, according to the classification of 1832 about the status of the rulers of Rajputana, recommended to grant a salute of 17 guns to the three premier States of Rajputana, viz., Mewar, Jodhpur and Jaipur and of 15 guns to the remaining ones.<sup>2</sup> Subsequently, having learnt that the Raja of Bharatpur had been receiving a salute of 17 guns till that time, he thought that it would be offensive to any ruler to give him a lesser number of gun salutes than the one prevalent according to the custom.<sup>3</sup> He, therefore, suggested to his Government that the Maharaja of Bharatpur be included in the list of rulers entitled to a salute of 17 guns. As the rulers of Bikaner, Kota and Bundi were of equal rank with Bharatpur, he considered them to be entitled to the same privilege.<sup>4</sup> The question of the number of guns of a salute was of a very great sentimental importance to the Indian Princes, though lightly considered by the British officers.<sup>5</sup> Henry Lawrence, therefore, preferred to err on the side of granting higher honours to the rulers than what they had before.<sup>6</sup> According to the recommendation of the A.G.G. in Rajputana, the British Government accorded the privilege of a salute of 17 guns to the rulers of Udaipur, Jaipur, Bikaner, Kota, Bundi, Jodhpur and Bharatpur, and of 15 to each of the rest, viz., Dholpur, Kishangarh, Jaisalmer, Jhalawar, Tonk, Alwar, Karauli, Partabgarh, Banswara, Dungarpur and Sirohi.<sup>7</sup>

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1. Henry Lawrence to Dalrymple d. 27 October 1855, File No. 99, *loc. cit.*
  2. Ibid.
  3. Henry Lawrence to Beadon d. 1 November 1855, File No. 99, *loc. cit.*
  4. Ibid.
  5. Ibid.
  6. Ibid.
  7. Amended table of salutes to Native Princes and Chiefs applicable to the territories under the authority of the Government of India (No. 3) Cons. 21 August 1857, No. 58, F & P.



Thus by 1858, the status of rulers of Rajputana was divided into three categories. The first category included the rulers of Udaipur, Jodhpur and Jaipur who had the privilege of being addressed to with extraordinary courtesies by the A.G.G. in Rajputana, besides their being entitled to a salute of 17 guns. In the second category were the rulers of Bikaner, Kota, Bundi and Bharatpur who had only the privilege of a salute of 17 guns. In the third category were the rulers of Dholpur, Kishangarh, Jaisalmer, Jhalawar, Tonk, Karauli, Partabgarh, Alwar, Banswara, Dungarpur and Sirohi who were only accorded a salute of 15 guns.

### **Powers of the A.G.G. in Rajputana**

A Political Agent in Rajputana had no power to take independent decision on any matter without the instructions of the A.G.G. The A.G.G. in Rajputana exercised discretionary powers in all political matters in his jurisdiction.<sup>1</sup> The decisions taken by him on his own discretion and initiative were generally accepted by the British Government.<sup>2</sup>

Like the Residents at the other Indian Courts,<sup>3</sup> the A G G. in Raiputana was also empowered to make requisitions on military commanders for the services of troops without the previous sanction of the Government. The military officer had no power to judge the wisdom of a political measure.<sup>4</sup> To take a decision on political matters was the privilege of the Political officer, and was not within the purview of the military officers. Of course, while a Political officer called for the aid of troops, he was supposed to furnish the military authority with all the information relating to the service to be performed which was necessary to enable the latter to estimate correctly

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1. Sutherland to Maddock d. 20 October 1839, Cons. 24 February 1840, No. 34, Para 5, F & P.

2. Maddock to Sutherland d. 7 November 1839, Cons. 24 February 1840, No. 35, F & P.

3. Macnaghten to J. Bax, Resident Indore d. 19 October, Cons. 19 October 1835, No. 60, para 4, F & P. C. Allen, Offg. Secretary to Government to Adjutant General of the Army d. 1 June, Cons. 25 June 1852, No. 72, F & P.

4. Dalhousie's Minute d. 15 December 1855, Cons. 4 January 1856, No. 111, F & P.



the amount of force required.<sup>1</sup> In 1839, Sutherland, the A.G.G. in Rajputana, called for military assistance to invade Jodhpur.<sup>2</sup> The troops marched under the command of Major General Hampton, while Sutherland conducted political negotiations with Maharaja Man Singh of Jodhpur.<sup>3</sup>

In case of a local contingent, the A. G. G. had the authority to delegate his powers to a Political Agent for making requisition for it at the time of some exigency.<sup>4</sup>

The extent to which a Political officer could exercise power in his jurisdiction was not rightly defined. An attempt to lay down a code of rules for the guidance of Political officers was made in 1856, but it was abandoned<sup>5</sup> in 1858, as most of the Political officers considered it of 'doubtful utility.'<sup>6</sup> This was because in diplomacy, exigency of the moment pressed for decision, which no code could provide for, except the discretion of the Political officer who acted according to circumstances.<sup>7</sup> The reason for entrusting the A.G.G. with large and even with plenary powers in political matters during 1832 to 1858 could also be attributed to the absence of modern means of communications such as telegraph and telephone. The A.G.G. in Rajputana, residing hundreds of miles away from Calcutta, dealt with the emergent situations in the light of what he and his colleagues believed to be right.

### **System of Report**

Like other British Political Agencies in India, it was an established procedure of the Rajputana Agency to keep

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1. Bushby to T. T. Metcalfe, Agent to the Lieutenant Governor, NWP, Delhi d. 30 April, Cons. 23 May 1836, No. 64, F & P.
  2. Sutherland to Secretary to Government d. 1 June, Cons. 7 August 1847, No. 845, F & P. For details see, Chapter V.
  3. Ibid.
  4. Sutherland to Ludlow d. 28 January, Cons. 28 February 1842, No. 22, para 4, F & P. For details see, Chapter V.
  5. Offg. Secretary to Government to Chief Commissioner Punjab d. 8 February, Cons. 12 February 1858, No. 38, F & P.
  6. G. B. Seton, Political Agent, SM country to H. L. Anderson Secretary to Government d. 27 November 1856, Cons. 12 February 1858, No. 21, F & P.
  7. G. L. Jacob, Political Agent, Kutch to H. L. Anderson d. 26 November 1856, Cons. 12 February 1858, No. 22, F & P.



everything on record, and to report every matter to the British Government.

The Political Agent used to send every letter (*kharita* or memorial) from a ruler to the Governor-General through the A.G.G. Besides, he reported every development in his political jurisdiction to the A.G.G. and not to the British Government. On his report, the A.G.G. generally issued him instructions directly, but if a report of the Political Agent needed the instructions of the Government, the A.G.G. forwarded it along with his own recommendations to the British Government. The British Government after going through the report of the Political Agent and the recommendations of the A.G.G., issued instructions to the latter. Thereupon, the A.G.G. conveyed the same to the Political Agent and if necessary, he guided him to implement them.<sup>1</sup> With regard to the States under his direct supervision, the A.G.G. conducted British relations with them through the Agency *Vakils*. If it was necessary to have negotiations with any of these States, the A.G.G. deputed his Assistant for doing so.<sup>2</sup> On the basis of the local experience, usages and customs, the A.G.G. as well as the Political Agent tailored and implemented the instructions of their Government.

The British Government sent its correspondence with the Rajputana Agency to the Court of Directors at London.<sup>3</sup> In return, the Court of Directors sent its remarks to the Governor-General on the despatches. In case of further inquiry from the Court of Directors on any subject, the Governor-General sent it invariably to the A.G.G. for necessary action.<sup>4</sup> On receiving

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1. Alves to Ross d. 12 January, Cons. 8 February 1836, No 57, F & P. Cf. Chapter III.

2. In 1835 H. W. Trevelyan, the Assistant to the A. G. G. was sent on tour of the States which were directly under the Ajmer Political Agency. Boileau, *op. cit.*, pp. 1f

3. Secret General despatches to COD d. 13 September 1834, No. 4; Political General despatch to COD d. 26 September 1838, No. 52.

4. Political despatch from COD d. 25 July 1838, para. 19. An extract of this letter the British Government sent on 13 December, 1838 to the A. G. G. in Rajputana. H. Torrens, Offg. Secretary to Government to A. G. G. d. 13 December 1838, Cons. 20 March 1839, No. 8, F & P. As this letter was concerned with the work of the Mewar



the reply from the latter, the Governor-General conveyed it to the Court of Directors.

### General rules for Correspondence

The A.G.G. was responsible for conducting British relations with the States of Rajputana. All correspondence<sup>1</sup> from the rulers of these States to the Governor-General was transmitted through him.<sup>2</sup> The Governor-General never accepted any letter from them without the knowledge of the A.G.G. In the usual correspondence, the A.G.G. addressed a ruler, and not his minister.<sup>3</sup> Departure from this practice was made only in special circumstances.<sup>4</sup>

In the case of those States of Rajputana to which Political Agents were accredited, the A.G.G. neither addressed his communications directly to the rulers nor received any communication directly from them. All communications with these States were transmitted through the channel of the Political Agents.<sup>5</sup> In the same way, the Political Agents were required to address the British Government only through the A.G.G.<sup>6</sup> During an emergency, the Political Agents were permitted to correspond directly with the Government, but in the normal circumstances this procedure was considered irregular and improper.<sup>7</sup> Further, a Political Agent was not

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Political Agent the A. G. G. sent it to him. When on 3 June 1839 the Political Agent sent the reply to the A. G. G., the latter forwarded the same to his Government. T Robinson, Offg. Mewar Political Agent to Sutherland d. 3 June, Cons. 28 August 1839, No. 51, F & P; Sutherland to Maddock d. 11 June, Cons. 28 August 1839, No. 51, F & P.

1. Such as complimentary letters, memorials or representations.
2. G. G. to Raja of Jaipur d. 26 June, Cons. 20 August 1832, No. 28, F & P.
3. George Lawrence Offg. A. G. G. to Edmonstone d. 19 February, 1858, File No. 1-Mutiny, Vol. VI, List No 1, p 5, S No. 43, *RAR*.
4. *Ibid*.
5. Low A. G. G. to Elliot d. 29 October, Cons. 17 November 1849, No. 183, F & P.
6. Edmonstone to George Lawrence d. 18 September 1857, File No. 1, Mutiny—1857, Vol. III, List No. 1, p. 4, S. No. 40, *RAR*.
7. *Ibid*. See also, Showers to George Lawrence d. 22 January 1858, File No. 1—Mutiny 1857, Vol. III, *loc. cit*.



allowed to interfere in the jurisdiction of another Political Agent<sup>1</sup>, because it was irregular, and created misunderstandings and serious embarrassments.<sup>2</sup> The A.G.G. took care to uphold the authority of the Political Agent.<sup>3</sup> But he sought the removal of a Political Agent, if he abused his office by accepting gratification from the State,<sup>4</sup> or adopted evasions in carrying out his orders.<sup>5</sup>

### Agency Vakils

The Agency *Vakils* were the diplomatic agents of the rulers of Rajputana. The British Government had made it a general rule that every State should depute its *Vakil* to the headquarters of its respective Political Agency.<sup>6</sup> The Rajputana Agency found these Agency *Vakils* useful for conducting British relations with their respective States.

Thus, the Agency *Vakils* clustered round the Agency office everyday. The *Vakil* accompanied the A.G.G. or the Political Agent when the latter went on a tour of inspection of the area under his jurisdiction.<sup>7</sup> He kept his ruler informed of the views and orders of the British Government,<sup>8</sup> and the A.G.G., or the Political Agent of everything of importance which occurred in the State.<sup>9</sup> In this capacity he worked as the 'Minister for Foreign Affairs' of his State.<sup>10</sup>

1. Swinton to Hawkins d. 20 August, Cons. 20 August 1830, No. 17, F&P. Edmonstone to George Lawrence d. 9 October, Cons. 9 October 1857, No. 69, F & P.
2. Edmonstone to George Lawrence d. 9 October 1857, *loc. cit*
3. Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 15 March. Cons. 12 June 1857, No. 187, para. 82.
4. Captain Rickards, the Political Agent Jaipur, was removed on the charge of bribery and corruption from the Jaipur Political Agency to Bhopal Political Agency. Cf. Chapter VI.
5. Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 15 March, Cons. 12 June 1857, No. 187, F & P.
6. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 7 April, Cons. 7 July 1832, No. 4, F & P.
7. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 6 August, Cons. 17 September 1832, No. 24, F & P; Macnaghten to Lockett d. 17 August, Cons. 17 September 1832, No. 25, F & P.
8. Sutherland to R. H. Hamilton, Offg. Secretary to N.W.P., d. 7 March, Cons. 6 April 1840, No. 41, F & P.
9. *Ibid.*
10. Sutherland to Secretary to Government d. 1 June, Cons. 7 August 1847, No. 845, F & P.



The Political Agent communicated with a ruler either in person or by written correspondence, or through the Agency *Vakils*.<sup>1</sup>

Some of the intelligent Agency *Vakils* enjoyed great power and privilege in their States as well as with the Political officers. Ridh Mal, the *Vakil* of the Jodhpur State wielded great influence and power in his State.<sup>2</sup> He was at the head of a deputation which Maharaja Man Singh had sent to meet James Sutherland, the A.G.G. in Rajputana, on his visit to Jodhpur in March, 1839. At that time, he proved himself indispensable to Sutherland in all his proceedings at Jodhpur.<sup>3</sup>

The Agency *Vakil* of a State could be dismissed by the A.G.G. or the Political Agent in case of estranged relations of the British government with a State; and secondly, on the unsatisfactory conduct of the *Vakil* himself. On several occasions, Sutherland had dismissed *Vakils* when they proved useless or injurious by counteraction.<sup>4</sup> He never wished to dismiss a *Vakil* who possessed great power and influence, for he considered such power 'good' when rightly exercised.<sup>5</sup>

### Regular submission of Diaries

In 1830, the system of writing of diaries by the Political officers was introduced by the British Government to exercise greater control over them, and 'to receive tidings' about the daily occurrences at the various Courts of the States of Rajputana.<sup>6</sup>

The Political Agents were supposed to maintain record of the daily occurrences at the Courts in the form of a diary or a register. This record regarding the States under the direct jurisdiction of the Ajmer Political Agency was maintained by the A. G. G. himself or by his Assistant.<sup>7</sup> Only gradually the

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1. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 14 September 1832, File No. 10, General-1832, List No. 1, S. No. 7, *RAR*.

2. Sutherland to Secretary to Government d. 1 June 1847, *loc. cit.*

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*

6. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 21 May, Cons. 18 June 1832, No. 22, F&P.

7. Sutherland to Maddock d. 31 October 1842, Cons. 4 January 1843, No. 35, F & P.



British Government could bring about uniformity in the method of maintaining diaries of all the Political officers.

It would be interesting to note that many of the Political officers did not maintain their diaries in a proper manner.<sup>1</sup> There were instances when the whole conversation with a ruler or some principal officers of the State, was studiously reported in detail, while in certain diaries no letter or report of any kind was recorded for weeks together, and the British Government remained in dark regarding several matters of importance.<sup>2</sup> This happened because the British Government did not lay down what matters were to be recorded.<sup>3</sup> To remove this deficiency, the British Government instructed the Political officers in July 1832 to furnish a diary<sup>4</sup> at the expiration of each week, agreeable to a chart which would be regularly supplied to them from the 'Kanpur Lithographic Press'.<sup>5</sup>

As a result of the introduction of the uniform system of maintaining diaries at all the Political Agencies in India, the matters transacted at the various Courts were recorded and reported to the British Government with minuteness and accuracy.<sup>6</sup> Thus, the business between the Political Agencies and the Supreme Government at Calcutta was conducted in the same way as that of the Supreme Government and the Court of Directors.<sup>7</sup>

The British Government insisted on the Political officers that they should submit diaries punctually within the prescribed time.<sup>8</sup> When they delayed in transmitting the diaries, they were asked to explain for the delay.<sup>9</sup>

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1. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 21 May, Cons. 21 May 1832, *loc. cit.*

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Vide Appendix II.*

5. Macnaghten to Lockett and to other Political Agents and Residents d. 29 July, Cons. 3 September 1832, No. 3, F & P.

6. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 21 May 1832, *loc. cit.*

7. *Ibid.*

8. H. Torrens to Alves and to all other Political officers d. 21 June, Cons. 18 July 1838, No. 2, F & P.

9. Alexander Speirs, Mewar Political Agent to Torrens, d. 6 July, Cons. 17 October 1838, No. 91, F & P.



### Office organization of the Rajputana Agency

To help the A.G.G. in his routine duties, the British Government provided ministerial staff to his office at the headquarters of the Rajputana Agency, and also established a separate department for intelligence. To increase the use of English language, Lord William Bentinck, began writing his *Kharitas* to the rulers of Rajputana from 1832 in English, and appended along with them their Persian translations.<sup>1</sup> But in appreciation of the difficulty of the majority of the rulers of these States in employing English knowing secretaries, and in view of their desire to correspond in Persian or Hindi with the Governor-General,<sup>2</sup> the British Government divided the office of the A.G.G. into three branches, viz., English office, Persian office and Hindi office.<sup>3</sup> Every branch of the office was placed under a Head Clerk<sup>4</sup> who was assisted by a number of clerks.<sup>5</sup> Besides, a Medical officer and an escort<sup>6</sup> were also attached to the office of the A.G.G. in Rajputana.

This type of office establishment was also provided separately at each subordinate Political Agency in Rajputana<sup>7</sup> with the difference that the office establishment of the A.G.G. for obvious reasons was bigger in size than that of a Political Agent.

The office establishment of the A.G.G. in Rajputana was maintained separate from the ministerial staff required for the civil administration of the British territory of Ajmer. The

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1. Bentinck, G. G. to Maharaja Rana Kirat Singh of Dholpur d. 15 November, Cons. 28 July 1833, No. 35, F&P; See also, M. Ruthanaswamy, *Some Influences that made the British Administrative System in India*, p. 203.
  2. The Raja of Bikaner desired to correspond in Hindi instead of Persian. File No. 21—Jaipur 1835, Vol. IV, List No. 1, p. 15, S.No. 157, RAR.
  3. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 26 June, Cons. 24 September 1832, Nos. 14-15, F & P.
  4. The Head Clerks of Persian and Hindi offices were known as 'Mir Munshi' and 'Pandit' respectively.
  5. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 26 June 1832, *loc. cit.*
  6. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 24 May, Cons. 18 June 1832, No. 23, F&P.
  7. Lists of the office establishment of Harauti Political Agency and Neemuch Political Agency, Cons. 13 March 1834, Nos. 8-9, F & P.



A.G.G. had no treasury establishment of his own and therefore, the tribute from the Rajputana States was deposited in the treasury of the Superintendent at Ajmer.<sup>1</sup> The type of staff employed in 1832 for the office of the A.G.G. remained almost the same till 1858, though modifications were made in it from time to time, either to effect economy or increase its efficiency.<sup>2</sup> The expenditure with regard to the establishment and the officers of the Rajputana Agency was borne by the Supreme Government, because the A.G.G. remained all the time under the patronage of the Governor-General in Council.<sup>3</sup>

Some experienced persons from the Delhi Residency were transferred in 1832 to the Rajputana Agency at Ajmer because they were familiar with the nature of work that was to be done at such an important office.<sup>4</sup> Another reason for relieving these persons from there was that on the abolition of the office of the Delhi Resident, his political duties were assigned to the Commissioner of Delhi,<sup>5</sup> which rendered some staff surplus. Thus, the separation of the States of Rajputana from Delhi, and the consequent establishment of the Rajputana Agency at Ajmer, did not add much to the expenses of the Foreign and Political Department of the Company.<sup>6</sup>

### **Intelligence Department**

The Intelligence Department was a useful branch of the Rajputana Agency establishment. In order to gather information from the States which were under the direct control of the Ajmer Political Agency, the A.G.G. appointed his own '*Mookhber*' (News-Writer) there.<sup>7</sup> There were three gradations of these *Mookhbers*, viz., *Akhbar Navis*, *Mutsadi* and *Harkara*

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1. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 15 August, Cons. 27 August 1832, No. 28, F & P.
  2. Political Letter to COD d. 28 September 1834, No. 33, para 89.
  3. Secretary to Government to Charles Morley, Accountant General of India, d. 28 August, Cons. 28 August 1837, No. 89, F & P.
  4. Macnaghten to Fraser, Commissioner Delhi, d. 9 April, Cons. 14 May 1832, No. 55, F & P.
  5. G.G.'s Minute d. 30 March 1832, *loc. cit.*
  6. Political Letter to COD d. 3 August 1835, No. 51, para 6.
  7. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 24 July, Cons. 20 August 1832, No. 46, F & P.



or *Khabardar*.<sup>1</sup> The subordinate Political Agents maintained their own News-Writers.

The duty of a News-Writer was to pick up news from all possible sources of information within his reach, and to report daily to the Political officer concerned important occurrences at the Court to which he was posted.<sup>2</sup> The News-Writer could do so by establishing personal contacts with the officers and the people of the States.<sup>3</sup> They also made use of the daily Court *Akhbars* and pamphlets.<sup>4</sup> The information collected by the News-Writers of the Ajmer Political Agency was either sent daily or weekly to the A.G.G.<sup>5</sup> There was a separate column in each Political Diary under the head "Occupations of the native princes and occurrences worthy of notice at their courts and in their dominions".<sup>6</sup> This column was maintained by the Political officer on the basis of the information gathered from the News-Writers. After compiling it properly, he sent it to the British Government for perusal. It kept the British Government well-informed about the Political developments in the jurisdiction of the Rajputana Agency, and enabled it to adjudge the success of its policy towards the States of Rajputana.<sup>7</sup>

Even before the establishment of its relations with the States of Rajputana, the British Government collected information about their affairs mainly through its News-Writers who were posted there for the purpose. After the conclusion of

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1. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 14 July, Cons. 20 August 1832, No. 45, F & P.
  2. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 5 November, Cons. 30 December 1832, No. 44, F & P.
  3. C. E. Trevelyan, Harauti Political Agent to Francis Hawkins, d. 15 July, Cons. 20 August 1830, No. 15, F & P.
  4. Abstract, Jodhpur *Akhbar* d. 9 January, Cons. 7 March 1838, No. 27, F & P., Abstract of Intelligence in Jodhpur *Akhbars* d. 17 February, Cons. 25 April 1838, No. 104, F & P., Extracts from Kota *Akhbars* from 18 April to 23 April 1838, Cons. 18 July 1838, No. 81, F & P.
  5. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 14 July, Cons. 20 August 1832, No. 45, F & P.
  6. Vide Appendix II.
  7. Edmonstone to George Lawrence, Offg. A.G.G. d. 9 October, Cons. 9 October 1857, No. 69, F & P.



treaties of 1817-18, it retained its News-Writers there as there was no alternative agency to replace them.<sup>1</sup> However by 1841 the British relations with these States were established on a sound footing. The Rajputana Agency with its satellite Political Agencies in the various States<sup>2</sup>, found itself effective in conducting British relations with them.<sup>3</sup> The information furnished by the News-Writers for the '*Akhbar* Department of the Diaries' became scanty. In such circumstances, Sutherland, the A.G.G. in Rajputana suggested to his Government to dispense with the services of the News-Writers in the Rajputana States except Jaisalmer where no Political Agent was posted, and its remote position rendered this arrangement desirable.<sup>4</sup> The British Government approved this proposal, and left the task of carrying out the details to his discretion.<sup>5</sup>

Before carrying out the measure, Sutherland ascertained the views of the Political Agents in Harauti, Mewar, Jaipur and Jodhpur on the subject. All except Captain J. Ludlow, the then Political Agent Jodhpur, agreed to dispense with the services of the News-Writers.<sup>6</sup> The State of affairs at Jodhpur in 1841 was so critical that "Ludlow regarded the intelligence department as a useful auxiliary branch of the Jodhpur Political Agency establishment".<sup>7</sup>

The views of the Political Agents helped Sutherland to take a final decision in this matter. He allowed Ludlow to keep the News-Writer till the termination of the disturbed state of affairs at Jodhpur<sup>8</sup>, and ordered all the other Political Agents to discharge their News-Writers with effect from June 1, 1841. The News-Writer in the border State of Jaisalmer

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1. Sutherland to Maddock d. 1 March, Cons. 29 March 1841, No. 23, F & P
  2. Vide Chapters III, IV, V and VI.
  3. Sutherland to Maddock d. 1 March 1841, *loc cit.*
  4. Ibid
  5. Maddock to Sutherland d. 29 March, Cons. 29 March 1841, No. 24, F & P.
  6. Sutherland to Maddock d. 13 May, Cons. 7 June 1841, No. 25, F&P.
  7. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 1 May, Cons. 7 June 1841, No. 25, F & P.
  8. Sutherland to Ludlow d. 4 May, Cons. 7 June 1841, No. 25, F & P.



alone was retained permanently.<sup>1</sup> This measure was approved by the British Government.<sup>2</sup> George Lawrence, the A.G.G. revived the system of appointing News-Writers in the States of Rajputana during the period of the Uprising of 1857.<sup>5</sup>

### Mughal and British System - A Comparison

Like the British, the Mughals also had their own system of conducting relations with the States of Rajputana. There were many striking resemblances between the two systems. Like the Mughal *Subedar* (Governor), the British Government appointed the A.G.G. at Ajmer (from 1856 at Abu) to maintain salutary hold over the Rajputana States. The duty of the A.G.G. to collect tribute from the States of Rajputana was akin to that of the Mughal *Subedar*. While theoretically, during the Mughal period almost all the Rajputana States were included in the Province of Ajmer, under the British hegemony they were placed under the Rajputana Agency.

In spite of the above similarities, the British system of controlling the States of Rajputana differed from the Mughal system in many ways. The A.G.G. exercised full control over the interstate relations of the States, and even interfered in their internal affairs, whereas the Mughal *Subedar* had no such authority over them. Any interference from the *Subedar* in their affairs was resented by the States as an encroachment upon their rights and privileges.<sup>4</sup> In the British period, the rulers of these States communicated with the Central Government through the A.G.G., while in the Mughal period they had direct dealings with the Central Government.<sup>5</sup> The only military agency appointed by the Mughal Government to control and watch over the affairs of Rajputana consisted of the *Qiladars* stationed at a few border outposts and forts like the Ranthambore.<sup>6</sup> The British Government maintained greater military strength than that of the Mughals in Rajputana.

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1. Sutherland to Maddock d. 13 May, Cons. 7 June 1841, No. 25, F&P.
  2. Maddock to Sutherland d. 7 June, Cons. 7 June 1841, No. 26, F & P.
  3. File No. 1-Munity, Vol. II, List No. 1, p. 4, S No. 39, RAR.
  4. P. Saran, *The Provincial Government of the Mughals, 1526-1658*, p.129
  5. Ibid.
  6. Ibid.



Besides the troops at Nasirabad and Neemuch cantonments, the A.G.G. had a number of local Contingents<sup>1</sup> at his command in Rajputana to maintain salutary hold over this region.

The basic difference between the Mughal *Subedar* and the A.G.G. was of their attitudes towards the Central Government. Unlike the *Subedar*, the A.G.G. was brought up in the liberal atmosphere and had neither the audacity to betray his Government, nor the ambition to carve out an independent kingdom for himself. Rarely the Mughal *Subedar*, whether the son of a Mughal Emperor or otherwise, could equal the A.G.G. in his loyalty to the Central Government. Thus the A.G.G. was a tower of strength to his Government.

The system which the British Government adopted in conducting its relations with the Rajputana States, was definitely more improved and efficient than the one adopted by the Mughals. In spite of the general British policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of these States, the British Government did not give the impression of relaxation of its political control over them, and always took measures to vindicate its paramount position in Rajputana.



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1. The Local Contingents were, the Merwara Battalion, Shekhawati Brigade, Jodhpur Legion, Mewar Bhil Corps and Kota Contingent. Vide, Chapter VIII.



## CHAPTER III

### ***Harauti Political Agency***

Since its inception in 1822, the Harauti Political Agency had been conducting British relations with the States of Kota and Bundi like other Political Agencies in Rajputana. Even after the abolition of the Political Agencies at Udaipur and Jaipur in 1830 and 1831 respectively, the Harauti Political Agency was retained.<sup>1</sup> Peculiar circumstances existed at the Kota Darbar due to strained relations between the Maharao and the Rajrana, the latter enjoying the hereditary status of the State Administrator. The responsibility to interpose judiciously between them as also to check any fissiparous tendency growing out of that discord devolved upon the Harauti Political Agent. This necessitated his constant presence at Kota.

On February 22, 1832, Captain R. Ross took charge of the Harauti Political Agency from Dr. James Corbet, the Agency Surgeon.<sup>2</sup> It was placed in subordination to the Rajputana Agency as soon as the latter was instituted.<sup>3</sup> The rulers of Kota and Bundi and the Rajrana were represented at

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1. The reason for the retention of the Harauti Political Agency was that the constant presence of the Political Agent was required at Kota to see that the pecuniary provisions and honours guaranteed by the British Government to the Maharao by the engagement of 1822 were properly maintained by the Rajrana. Aitchison, *op. cit.*, 1892, p. 329.
  2. R. Ross, Harauti Political Agent to G. Swinton, Chief Secretary to Government d. 22 February, Cons. 12 March 1832, No. 44, F & P.
  3. W. H. Macnaghten, Secretary to G.G. to Ross d. 17 May, Cons. 2 July 1832, No. 31, F & P.



the Harauti Political Agency headquarters at Kota by their respective *Vakils*.

### Ross as Political Agent

Soon after Ross assuming charge of the Harauti Political Agency, Maharao Ram Singh of Kota reported to him Rajrana Madho Singh's deceptive intention in adopting an obsequious deportment towards him at Ajmer, which they had visited to pay homage to the Governor-General in January 1832.<sup>1</sup> He contended that since their return to Kota the Rajrana had given up that demeanour. He had assumed it falsely at Ajmer to divert him from addressing the Governor-General on their relations. The Maharao desired that the Rajrana should observe the same mark of respect towards him which he felt constrained to show at the Ajmer Darbar, and which traditions demanded of him.<sup>2</sup>

When the Maharao rode an elephant in the procession at Ajmer, the Rajrana had followed him on horseback. The Maharao pleaded with Ross that Madho Singh should behave likewise on occasions like Dashehra. Further, he wanted the Rajrana to hold consultations with him prior to his making any appointments to key positions in the State administration.

Ross found the Maharao's entreaties and expectations inadmissible for their being contrary to the spirit of the engagement of 1822. He interpreted the Rajrana's riding behind him on 'so remarkable an occasion' as the procession at Ajmer was, as an expression of his loyalty towards the Kota House of which the Maharao was the symbol.<sup>4</sup> In this context, he also referred to Madho Singh's father, Zalim Singh who had declined to conclude a treaty with the British Government, unless it was in the name and on behalf of the late Maharao Umed Singh. Thus, he impressed upon Maharao Ram Singh

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1. Ross to A. Lockett, A.G.G. d. 29 June, Cons. 22 August 1832, No. 47, F & P. On the demise of his father, Rajrana Zalim Singh in 1824, Madho Singh succeeded him. Maharao Kishore Singh died in 1828, and his nephew, Ram Singh ascended the *gaddi* of Kota. Aitchison, *op. cit.*, (1892), p. 318.

2. Ross to Lockett d. 29 June 1832, *loc. cit.*

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*



that his insinuations regarding Rajrana Madho Singh's intentions at the Ajmer Darbar did not have much substance.<sup>1</sup>

The tenor of replies of Ross to the Maharao received the approval of the A.G.G., Lieutenant-Colonel A. Lockett.<sup>2</sup> The British Government considered the conduct of Ross, on this occasion, 'highly judicious'.<sup>3</sup>

In this way, Ross was successful in upholding the engagement of 1822, and in preventing the Maharao from interfering in the administration of the State assigned to the Rajrana under the British guarantee.

### Corbet as Political Agent

Bad health constrained Ross to proceed on furlough, handing over charge of his office temporarily to Corbet on July 5, 1832.<sup>4</sup> Trifling matters kept the Maharao and the Rajrana at daggers drawn which, off and on, compelled the Political Agent to interfere to settle them.<sup>5</sup> For instance, on July 13, 1832 the Maharao complained to Corbet that in spite of his repeated requests the Rajrana had done nothing to repair the dilapidated wall of the Arjun Mahal. The complaint of the Maharao was a genuine one which Corbet also realized. He, therefore, impressed upon the *Vakil* of the Rajrana to take immediate steps to repair the wall, for it was incumbent on the Rajrana to take due care of the matter in accordance with the engagement of 1822.<sup>6</sup>

Corbet found himself busy, mostly mediating to settle various issues between the contending parties.<sup>7</sup> It also convinced him that the office of the Harauti Political Agent entailed heavy duties and great responsibilities.

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1. Ross to Lockett d. 29 June 1832, *loc. cit.*

2. Lockett to Ross d. 7 July, Cons. 20 August 1832, No. 47, F & P.

3. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 18 July, Cons. 20 August 1832, No. 48, F & P.

4. J. Corbet, Offg. Political Agent Harauti to Lockett d. 5 July, Cons. 6 August 1832, No. 31, F & P.

5. Corbet to Lockett d. 21 July, Cons. 17 September 1832, No. 33, F&P.

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*



**Demand of a new policy evaded**

The hostile spirit and jealousy subsisting between the Rajrana and the Maharao was just what might be reasonably expected from a coalition which was both unnatural and impolitic. In the opinion of Lockett, it was a kind of 'Political *lusus naturae*' where two bodies unite back to back in a state of never-ceasing counteraction.<sup>1</sup> He was convinced that such a state of affairs could not last long. In view of this, he urged the Governor-General for a practicable and natural course of policy for the State of Kota.<sup>2</sup> While proposing this, Lockett suggested no measure of his own to rectify the anomaly, and thus could not prove himself equal to the high office that he held. In the absence of definite proposals from the A.G.G., the British Government found itself in a quandary and had no solution to offer to remedy the inconvenient relations between the Maharao and the Rajrana.<sup>3</sup>

This deadlock in the Kota affair, however, did make the British Government and its representative in Rajputana fully conscious of the necessity to amend the Supplementary Treaty of February 1818 with Kota.

**Wilkinson as Political Agent**

Launulot Wilkinson on taking charge of the Harauti Political Agency on January 8, 1833<sup>4</sup> also observed the unpopular character of the administration of Kota. Rajrana Madho Singh who was a domineering sort of administrator sustained his position in the State despite his unpopularity.<sup>5</sup> Like his father, the late Rajrana Zalim Singh, he systematically reduced his

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1. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 31 July, Cons. 17 September 1832. No. 33, F&P.

2. Ibid.

3. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 12 August, Cons. 17 September 1832. No. 34, F&P.

4. Wilkinson, Offg. Harauti Political Agent to Lockett d. 18 January, Cons. 12 February 1833, No. 112, F&P.

5. Wilkinson to A. Speirs, Offg. A. G. G. d. 2 March, Cons. 3 April 1834, No. 74, F & P.



opponents to insignificance and ejected many persons, specially those belonging to the Hara dynasty, who owed loyalty to the Maharao. The Hara *jagirdars* whose villages and lands were thus resumed were found irreconcilably opposed to the existing order of things in the State. However, unlike his father, Madho Singh lost confidence and sympathy of the agricultural and poor classes for his inability to give them protection and justice.<sup>1</sup> Besides, the army having been always more or less in arrears of pay had ever been ready to revolt against his authority. This unpopularity of Madho Singh among almost all sections of people made his position critical and even wretched, specially when the Maharao was ready to take advantage of any situation to regain his lost rights.<sup>2</sup>

In these circumstances, on the death of Rajrana Madho Singh on February 26, 1834 the Political Agent found it extremely difficult to preserve peace and tranquillity in the State.<sup>3</sup> Kunwar Madan Singh, the son and successor of Rajrana Madho Singh was young and inexperienced. But he had always been on more cordial relations with Maharao Ram Singh than his father was. Except his own pretensions to executive authority, Madan Singh was prepared to consult Maharao's pleasure in many respects which the late Madho Singh had neglected. Despite it, the Political Agent contended that perfect tranquillity in their anomalous relative positions was as incompatible as the union of fire and water.<sup>4</sup> Wilkinson proved true in his remarks.

### Macnaghten as Political Agent

Cornet J. D. Macnaghten who succeeded Wilkinson on March 8, 1834<sup>5</sup> observed that the Maharao had begun to

1. Wilkinson to A. Speirs, Offg. A.G.G. d. 2 March, Cons. 3 April 1834, No. 74, F & P.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. J. D. Macnaghten, Offg. Harauti Political Agent to Speirs d. 8 March, Cons. 10 April 1834, No. 7, F & P.



encroach upon the powers and functions of the Rajrana.<sup>1</sup> The Maharao had thus started taking advantage of the inexperience and young age of Madan Singh. On apprehending a disposition of this nature on the part of the Maharao, Major Nathaniel Alves, the then A.G.G. in Rajputana enjoined Macnaghten, several times, to repress the aggressive policy of the Maharao.<sup>2</sup>

### **Ross resumed charge as Political Agent**

In the meanwhile, Ross resumed his duties at the Harauti Political Agency in November 1834. In view of the instructions of the A.G.G. he kept an eye on the Maharao's activities. He subtly frustrated every attempt of the Maharao to encroach upon the power and authority of the Rajrana.<sup>3</sup> To decide civil suits was within the administrative jurisdiction of the Rajrana. In June 1835, a civil dispute arose between two wealthy bankers. The Maharao tried to influence the decision of the Rajrana in favour of one of them. Ross thought this to be the pertinacious endeavour of the Maharao to obstruct the prerogatives of the Rajrana. He, therefore, forbade the Maharao to do so.<sup>4</sup>

### **Rajrana abstained from the Darbar**

The cleavage between the Maharao and the Rajrana continued to widen. In July 1835, the Maharao communicated to Ross his displeasure at the Rajrana's absence from the Darbar held in honour of the Rajrana's birthday.<sup>5</sup> The Political Agent did not see in it any desire of the Rajrana to slight the authority of the Maharao. He attributed it to the Rajrana's fear of life in attending the Darbar without the presence of the Political Agent as the Maharao had not invited the Political Agent.<sup>6</sup>

### **Symptoms of general insurrection**

In these embittered relations of the Rajrana with the

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1. Ross to Alves d. 11 June, Cons. 6 July 1835, No. 8, F & P.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ross to Alves d. 13 July, Cons. 3 August 1835, No. 35, F & P.

6. Ibid.



Maharao, the former was confronted by the warlike preparations of the Hara *jagirdar* of Indergarh in Kota. The policy of oppressing the Hara *jagirdars*, the adherents of the Maharao followed by the late Zalim Singh and his successors, proved the bane of the government of the Rajrana.

Egged on by the influential Khatauli Chief, Bhawani Singh who was an inveterate hereditary enemy of the Indergarh Raja, the late Rajrana Madho Singh had adopted harassing measures against the minor Raja of Indergarh.<sup>1</sup> When the Indergarh Raja himself attained to manhood, he gradually prepared to avenge the oppressive acts of the late Rajrana. Seeing this, Rajrana Madan Singh in September 1835 solicited assistance from the Political Agent for suppressing the rebellious spirit of the Indergarh Raja.<sup>2</sup>

Under the treaty between the British Government and the Kota State, the Rajrana possessed unquestionable right to chastise the feudatories of the State. He thought the Indergarh Raja too gallant a quarry to be struck down by the Kota troops.<sup>3</sup> By securing the permission of the Political Agent to proceed against Indergarh, he wanted to impress upon the Raja that he had the backing of the British Government in the chastisement.<sup>4</sup> Ross was not impressed by the Rajrana's application, as he did not want the British name being used in the Rajrana's atrocious proceedings against Indergarh. He therefore, declined to lend his support to the operations against Indergarh.<sup>5</sup> Later on, convinced of the fact that the situation was becoming increasingly dangerous on account of the many feudatories of Kota joining the Indergarh Raja against the Rajrana, he sought the permission of the A.G.G. to settle the issue by mediation, if the contending parties so desired.<sup>6</sup> In

1. Ross to Alves d. 13. September, Cons. 5 October 1835, No. 45, F & P.

2. Ibid.

3. Ross to Alves d. 8 October, Cons. 2 November 1835, No. 46, F & P.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ross to Alves d. 29 September, Cons. 26 October 1835, No. 14, F&P.



this instance the Political Agent was bolstered up by the A.G.G. who authorized him to mediate, if both the parties requested for it.<sup>1</sup>

This authority to settle the issue by mediation strengthened the position of Ross at Kota. He exercised his influence to dissuade the Rajrana from his hostile designs against Indergarh; the result being that the Rajrana accepted his mediation.<sup>2</sup> Eventually, Ross succeeded in settling the Indergarh affair.<sup>3</sup>

This affair is a conspicuous example of the dependence of the Rajrana on the support of the British Government in maintaining his hereditary position in Kota. It also revealed his dwindling authority to administer the State and the gradual strengthening of the Hara Chiefs.

### **Efforts to strengthen Rajrana's rule failed**

Due to the incapacity of the Rajrana to rule, the efforts of the local officers to maintain peace and order at Kota proved futile. In November 1835, the delay and irregularity by the Rajrana in disbursement of pay to his troops, made them turbulent and uncertain in their allegiance.<sup>4</sup> To avert the recurrence of any crisis, he proposed to the A.G.G. that the mutinous and disorderly Kota troops or a portion of them be converted into a well-paid and efficient force under a British officer.<sup>5</sup> The A.G.G. strongly recommended this proposal to his Government mainly for the reason that the formation of such a force would give stability to the tottering government

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1. Alves to Ross d. 4 October, Cons. 26 October 1835, No. 14, F&P.

2. Ross to Alves d. 20 November, Cons. 21 December 1835, No. 22, F & P.

3. Referred in a letter from Trevelyan to Alves d. 31 July, Cons. 1 November 1837, No. 27, F & P.

4. Ross to Alves d. 25 November, Cons. 28 December 1835, No. 27, F & P.

5. Ibid.



of the Rajrana, which was entitled to British support.<sup>1</sup> He suggested that if the proposed contingent and the advice of the Political Agent proved insufficient to preserve the Rajrana's rule, the British Government would then have grounds for pressing for a new arrangement in favour of the Maharao.<sup>2</sup>

The arguments of Alves convinced the British Government of the efficacy of forming a corps at Kota. In December 1835, it authorized Ross to suggest the plan for the formation of the corps to the Rajrana, if the latter was inclined to the measure. The Rajrana was also to be given to understand that in the event of his inability to perform the duties of a ruler, the British Government would separately provide him a State comprising the districts granted by the British Government to his grand father, Zalim Singh as a reward for his co-operation in the Pindari War in 1817-18.<sup>3</sup> Alves conveyed these instructions to the Political Agent with certain reservations. He instructed him to enter into serious discussions with the Rajrana on all these points except on the subject of bestowing a separate principality on him.<sup>4</sup> This showed that the Political officers did not implement the instructions of their Government blindly. They fitted them according to the need of the circumstances.

In the conference of February 4, 1836 with the Rajrana, Ross conveyed to him the above instructions except the proposition relating to the organization of a contingent. This he did for the reason that it might not be accepted by the Rajrana in the first instance. But he specifically impressed upon the Rajrana that he must pay the 'arrears' to his troops, and disband such soldiers as he could not pay punctually. The Rajrana promised to fulfil all that was required of him. He assured the

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1. Alves to Macnaghten d. 3 December, Cons. 28 December 1835, No. 26, F & P.

2. Ibid.

3. Macnaghten to Alves d. 28 December, Cons. 28 December 1835, No. 28, F & P.

4. Alves to Ross d. 24 January, Cons. 16 February 1836, No. 32, F & P.



Political Agent of an immediate disbursement of pay to the Kota troops.<sup>1</sup> Thereupon, Ross discreetly suggested to his Government that if the Rajrana failed to pay the arrears of pay to the troops, either the proposition of organizing a contingent should be enforced on the Rajrana as a condition of British support to him, or he should be altogether deprived of the British guarantee to maintain his power in the State.<sup>2</sup>

### **Maharao's impatience for a change**

In the meanwhile, in view of the weak and inefficient rule of Rajrana Madan Singh, the Maharao became impatient to improve his position.<sup>3</sup> He gave an indication of it by sending an unauthorized mission to Metcalfe, the then Lieutenant-Governor at Agra, to represent against several provisions in the agreement of 1822.<sup>4</sup> Metcalfe declined to receive this mission because of its being altogether irregular and unwarranted in the known circumstances of the British relations with the Kota State.<sup>5</sup>

The efforts of the Maharao to free himself from the trammels of the Rajrana's administration proved of no avail due to his failure to receive any favour from the British authorities. The latter desired to strengthen the hands of the Rajrana and to maintain the existing order of things at Kota.

On the other hand, the Rajrana's ability did not equal his intention. Despite the repeated persuasions of Ross, he failed to fulfil his promise to pay off the arrears, and make regular payment to the troops. This gave Ross a cause to reiterate his proposal that the Rajrana should allow British officers to organize and command a portion of the Kota troops. He hoped that it would suppress the temptation of the Maharao

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1. Ross to Alves d. 5 February, Cons. 29 February 1836, No. 21, F & P.

2. Ibid.

3. Ross to Alves d, 24 August, Cons. 10 October 1836, No. 13, F & P.

4. Metcalfe, Lieutenant-Governor, Agra to Lord Auckland, G. G. of India d. 18 September, Cons. 1 November 1837, No. 26, F & P.

5. Ibid.



to better his position, which - his conviction of the weakness of the Rajrana had held out to him. He also suggested that if the Rajrana did not accept this offer, and yet desired to have British support in the event of an internal crisis, the alternative before the British Government should be to establish the Rajrana in a separate State.<sup>1</sup> The A.G.G. concurred with the Political Agent in this opinion and recommended to his Government to send a communication to the Rajrana to this effect.<sup>2</sup>

The reports of Ross and Alves led the British Government to understand that the people of Kota were more inclined to the rule of the Maharao rather than that of the Rajrana.<sup>3</sup> Even the possibility of insurrection against the Rajrana was not ruled out. The Political Agent was, therefore, directed to propose to the Rajrana, in the first instance, the 'most eligible arrangement' of a separate principality for him. In case of his rejecting the offer, it was to be suggested to him that he should conduct the administration 'implicitly' by the advice of the Political Agent, and should place under the command of British officers a considerable part of the Kota troops. If the Rajrana rejected both the offers, the Political Agent was to make him understand that the British Government would like to close down its Political Agency at Kota, as it was inconsistent with its own reputation to countenance his maladministration.<sup>4</sup>

### **Trevelyan as Political Agent**

Ross who received these instructions was compelled for reasons of ill-health to leave Kota. On February 15, 1837 he was succeeded by Captain W.H. Trevelyan to hold

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1. Ross to Alves d. 24 August, Cons. 10 October 1836, No. 13, F & P.
  2. Alves to Bushby d. 17 September, Cons. 10 October 1836, No. 13, F & P.
  3. Macnaghten to Bushby d. 31 October, Cons. 31 October 1836, No. 42, F & P.
  4. Ibid.



charge in an officiating capacity.<sup>1</sup> Trevelyan acquainted the Rajrana with the decision of the British Government. The Rajrana showed his readiness to accept half of the Kota State as a condition to resign his executive authority, but the stigma of inefficiency of his rule evident in the British offer actuated him to decline it in preference to the retention of the executive authority in the State.<sup>2</sup> On the suggestion of his Agency *Vakil*, the Rajrana also did not agree to the proposal that he should maintain a force under British officers and conduct the administration of the State with the advice of the Political Agent alone. It was argued by the Agency *Vakil* that if the advice of the Political Agent were to be sought in all the matters of administration and a large body of Kota troops were to be placed under his order, he would be vested with the civil and military government of the State and all authority would slip from the hands of the Rajrana.<sup>3</sup> This showed that the Agency *Vakil* had by experience become quite sharp and had begun to show signs of deep understanding of the implications involved in the proposals of the Political Agent. Thereupon, Trevelyan plainly told the Rajrana that the presence of a Political Agent at Kota without the authority to control his misgovernment was both 'impolitic and unfair'. 'If the Agent is withdrawn', the Rajrana said, 'I will accompany him'.<sup>4</sup> Expression of such sentiments by the Rajrana manifested his lack of confidence to rule Kota without the presence of the Political Agent. However, Trevelyan did not fail to apprehend the weakness of the Rajrana. He was confident that if the British Government made a 'tempting offer' of a territory yielding Rs. 15 lakh yearly to the Rajrana and insisted upon him to accept it, the latter would readily resign his executive authority.<sup>5</sup> Alves fully

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1. Trevelyan, Harauti Political Agent to Alves d. 31 July, Cons. 1 November 1837, No. 28, F & P.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.



concurred with this view. He considered it the best line of policy for bringing to a close the existing 'unpopular' arrangement at Kota.<sup>1</sup>

### **Ludlow as Political Agent**

Trevelyan who was conducting the duty of the Political Agent with great zeal and ability was also compelled to leave Kota due to ill health.<sup>2</sup> Captain John Ludlow, the Third Assistant to the A.G.G., assumed duties as the Acting Harauti Political Agent on September 1, 1837.<sup>3</sup>

### **Dismemberment of Kota**

The reports of the misgovernment at Kota received from the experienced British officers and Trevelyan led Metcalfe, the Lieutenant-Governor,<sup>4</sup> and Lord Auckland, the Governor-General,<sup>5</sup> to conclude that the best means of saving the embarrassing position of the British Government and improving British relations with the Kota State would be to grant a separate principality to the Rajrana. To facilitate negotiations with the Rajrana on this subject, the Governor-General, on November 15, 1837, personally wrote to him to make up his mind on the question of a separate principality.<sup>6</sup> He was told that by his accepting the proposal, the British Government would derive no advantage beyond that of removing all grounds of collision and disputes at Kota.<sup>7</sup> Simultaneously, the Governor-General

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1. Alves to R.H. Scott, Offg. Secretary to Lieutenant-Governor d. 16 August, Cons. 1 November 1837, No. 27, F & P.
  2. Political letter to COD d. 10 January 1838, No. 3, para. 1.
  3. J. Ludlow Offg. Harauti Political Agent to Alves d. 1 September, Cons. 2 October 1837, No. 41, F & P.
  4. Metcalfe to Auckland d. 18 September, Cons. 1 November 1837, No. 26, F & P.
  5. Macnaghten to R.H.C. Hamilton, Offg. Secretary to Lieutenant-Governor d. 15 November, Cons. 20 December 1837, No. 28, F & P.
  6. Auckland to Rajrana Madan Singh d. 15 November, Cons. 20 December 1837, No. 29, F & P.
  7. Ibid.



instructed the A.G.G. to offer to the Rajrana a separate principality for himself and his lineal male descendants to the extent of one-third, or even three-eighth of the Kota territory.<sup>1</sup> But Alves conveyed these instructions to the Harauli Political Agent with reservations on January 2, 1838.<sup>2</sup> He instructed him only to make it known to the Rajrana that as much as one-third of the Kota territory would be assigned to him and to his lineal descendants. The apprehension of the refusal of the Maharao to acquiesce in the proposal of separating three-eighth of his territory for the Rajrana, induced the A.G.G. to take this decision.<sup>3</sup>

Ludlow attempted to implement the instructions to the best of his ability. He reopened negotiations with Rajrana Madan Singh. Madan Singh, again, expressed his reluctance to accept the proposal of a separate principality for the reason that it presumed that he had failed to administer the State properly since his assumption of the executive office. He contended that his administration differed in no essential particulars from what had existed since the time of Zalim Singh.<sup>4</sup> These assertions were easily refuted by the Political Agent. He alluded to the most defective features in the Government of Kota : to the Rajrana's severity towards the Hara feudatories whose *jagirs* had been unjustly confiscated, to the existing disorganization and inefficiency of the troops which were at this time in arrears of about five months' *Chitta*<sup>5</sup> and three years' *Hissab*<sup>6</sup>, to the constant distressing differences between the Maharao and himself and to the growing unpopularity of his administration. The Political Agent availed himself of this occasion to refer to the relative positions of Madan Singh and his highly gifted grand father. He drew the inference that the position of

1. Macnaghten to Hamilton d. 15 November 1837, *loc.cit.*

2. Alves to Ludlow d. 2 January, Cons. 25 April 1837, No. 2, F & P.

3. Ibid.

4. Ludlow to Alves d. 7 February, Cons. 25 April 1838, No. 3, F & P.

5. Twenty days' pay in every month.

6. Ten days' pay in every month.



Madan Singh was one of extreme difficulty and embarrassment to the British Government.<sup>1</sup> Thus, after holding many conferences with Madan Singh, the Political Agent made him assent to the proposition of a separate principality, leaving its extent to the liberal consideration of the British Government.<sup>1</sup> However, the Rajrana requested the Political Agent that the terms of the new Treaty should entitle him and his heirs to a perpetuity of succession by adoption in failure of lineal descent.<sup>2</sup>

Ludlow was now ready to support the Rajrana in his hopes. While reporting these developments to the A.G.G., he expressed that if the Rajrana's request was acceded to, he would be thoroughly reconciled to the proposed change. He also invited Alves to visit Kota, for the Rajrana had expressed his earnest desire to confer with him in person.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, Alves reached Kota.<sup>4</sup> He unhesitatingly recommended to his Government to grant to the Rajrana and his heirs the right of adoption as desired by him.<sup>5</sup>

While congratulating the Rajrana for his accepting the offer of a separate principality, the Governor-General readily modified his previous instructions so far as to allow him and his heirs the right of adoption from the descendents of Zalim Singh.<sup>6</sup> The presence of the A.G.G. at Kota proved helpful to the Political Agent in expediting the negotiations. As desired by the A.G.G. in Rajputana,<sup>7</sup> Ludlow had a private meeting with the Maharao, in which he succeeded in persuading him to

1. Ludlow to Alves d. 7 February 1838, *loc. cit.*

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*

4. Alves to Macnaghten d. 27 February, Cons. 25 April 1838, No. 3, F & P.

5. Alves to Macnaghten d. 20 February, Cons. 25 April 1838, No. 3, F & P.

6. Tr. of a *Kharita* from G.G. submitted by Ludlow to Rajrana Madan Singh d. 16 March, Cons. 18 July 1838, No. 70, F&P.

7. Alves to Macnaghten d. 14 April, Cons. 18 July 1838, No. 68, F&P.



sign his assent to the arrangements which the British Government would make for partitioning the Kota territory.<sup>1</sup> This apart, the Maharao agreed, although reluctantly, to pay money from the Kota treasury for the maintenance of a body of troops under British officers.<sup>2</sup>

The consent of the Maharao gave a free hand to Alves and Ludlow to make arrangements for the partition of Kota. On April 8, 1838, both of these British officers, on behalf of their Government signed a treaty with Rajrana Madan Singh. Accordingly, a separate principality with the one-third territory of Kota (comprising 17 *Paraganas*) was granted to Rajrana Madan Singh, his heirs and successors under British protection.<sup>3</sup> As a ruler of the proposed State of Jhalawar, Madan Singh acknowledged British supremacy, and guaranteed that he would not negotiate with any other State without the sanction of the British Government. He also agreed to supply troops according to his means, whenever called upon to do so by the British Government.<sup>4</sup> Out of the annual amount of Rs. 2,64,300 of Kota tribute, Rajrana was saddled with a share of Rs. 80,000.<sup>5</sup> The

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1. Tr. of a *Kharita* from Maharao Ram Singh to Ludlow d. 23 March, Cons. 18 July, 1838, No. 70, F&P.

2. Ibid.

3. Treaty between the British Government and the Rajrana Madan Singh d. 8 April, Cons. 18 July 1838, No. 72, F&P. The names of the 17 paraganas were as follows : Chechat, Sukeit, Choumuhla (comprising Pachphar, Ahor, Deeg and Gungrar), Jhalrapatan (commonly called Oormal), Reenchwa, Bakani, Delunpur, Kotrah-bhalta, Surerah, Rutlaee, Manoharthana, Phoolburode, Chuchoornee, Kakoornee, Cheepabarod, the portion of Shergarh beyond or East of the Purwan or Newaj, and Shahabad. Schedule appended to the Treaty of 10 April, 1838 of *Paraganas* set apart to constitute a separate principality for Rajrana Bahadur his heirs and successors under the designation of Jhalawar. Cons. 18 July 1838, No. 71, F&P. Cf. Aitchison, *op. cit.*, (1932), p. 367.

4. Treaty between the British Government and Rajrana Madan Singh d. 8 April 1838, *loc. cit.*

5. Alves to Macnaghten d. 14 April, Cons. 18 July 1838, No. 68, F&P.



Rajrana agreed to liquidate in four years, a part of the State debt amounting to nearly Rs. 15 lakh.<sup>1</sup> As was desired by Madan Singh, the British Government conferred on him the title of '*Maharajrana*', thus prefixing '*Maha*' to his hereditary title of '*Rajrana*'.<sup>2</sup>

On April 10, 1838 another treaty was signed with the Maharao. Consequent upon the Rajrana relinquishing the administration of Kota State guaranteed by the Supplementary Article of the Treaty of Delhi, Maharao Ram Singh assented to repeal the said Article, and agreed to cede the seventeen *Paraganas* to the Rajrana and to his heirs and successors.<sup>3</sup> Henceforth, he was only to pay Rs. 1,84,000 as tribute to the British Government.<sup>4</sup> According to the third article of this Treaty, the Maharao was held responsible to fulfil the pecuniary obligations arising out of the arrangements of separation and transfer of the territory to the Rajrana.<sup>5</sup> By the fifth article, the Maharao incurred the obligation to pay Rs. 3 lakh yearly for the maintenance of a body of troops under British officers.<sup>6</sup> The Maharao executed the new Treaty in a most cheerful manner.<sup>7</sup> When the business was over, he expressed gratitude to the British Government for freeing him from the galling surveillance of the hereditary premiership of the Rajrana.<sup>8</sup> The

1. Treaty between the British Government and Maharao Ram Singh d. 10 April, Cons. 18 July 1838, No. 71, F&P.

2. Auckland to Maharajrana Madan Singh d. 1 May 1838, Cons. 18 July 1838, No. 75, F&P; Maddock to Alves d. 1 May, Cons. 18 July 1838, No. 74, F&P.

3. Treaty with Kota d. 10 April 1838, *loc. cit.*

4. Ludlow to Alves d. 12 April, Cons. 18 July 1838, No. 69, F&P.

5. Ibid; Schedule appended to the treaty of debts for liquidation by the Maharao, his heirs and successors, agreeably to the third article of the treaty of 1838, Cons. 18 July 1838, No. 71, F&P; Cf. Aitchison, *op. cit.*, (1932), p.368.

6. Treaty with Kota d. 10 April 1838, *loc.cit.*

7. Alves to Macnaghten d. 14 April, Cons. 18 July 1838, No. 68, F&P.

8. Ibid.



restoration of the Maharao to power in his own capital and territory, was also received favourably both by the inhabitants and the soldiers.<sup>1</sup>

### **Installation of Madan Singh on the *gaddi* of Jhalawar**

The seat of the new State of Jhalawar was to be called Jhalrapatan, the name by which Madan Singh wished it to be known. Madan Singh continued to hold office as the Rajrana till April 27, 1838.<sup>2</sup> He left Kota for the capital of his State of Jhalawar in the evening of April 28, 1838.<sup>3</sup> On reaching Jhalrapatan on May 2, 1838, Madan Singh fell sick.<sup>4</sup> This delayed the installation ceremony. On his recovery, it could only be performed on August 1, 1838.<sup>5</sup> On this occasion Shah Manik Chand of Kota, on the instructions of Ludlow, presented a *Khillat* of investiture to Maharajrana Madan Singh, on behalf of the British Government. In return the Maharajrana presented a *Nazrana* to the Governor-General.<sup>6</sup> The Maharajrana in a *Kharita* expressed his gratitude to the British Government for exalting him to the position of a ruler under its protection.<sup>7</sup> The British Government found the arrangement 'perfectly satisfactory'.<sup>8</sup> It expressed its approbation for the 'sense of the patience, ability and discretion' manifested by Alves and Ludlow throughout the negotiations.<sup>9</sup>

Thus the mistake committed by Metcalfe in 1817 was

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1. Alves to Macnaghten d. 17 May, Cons. 18 July 1838, No. 80, F&P.
  2. Ludlow to Alves d. 12 April, Cons. 18 July 1838, No. 69, F & P.
  3. Ludlow to Alves d. 10 April, Cons. 18 July 1838, No. 69, F & P.
  4. Ludlow to Alves d. 11 May, Cons. 18 July 1838, No. 81, F & P.
  5. Ludlow to Alves d. 9 August, Cons. 26 September 1838, No. 19, F & P.
  6. Ibid.
  7. Tr. of a *Kharita* from Mhaharajrana Madan Singh of Jhalawar to Ludlow Cons. 26 September 1838, No. 19, F & P.
  8. Macnaghten to Alves d. May, Cons. 18 July 1838, No. 74, F & P.
  9. Ibid.



rectified by the partition of the State of Kota in 1838. The cleavage between the Maharao and the hereditary administrator which was once a dilemma, and had given an anxious time to the British Government over a period of two decades, at last found a solution. The authority of the Maharao was once again vindicated in Kota; the Rajrana was raised from the position of an administrator to the sovereign of a separate State. This strengthened the British position among the Harauti States too, for the partition had weakened the Kota State which prior to it, subsisted as a powerful State in Rajputana; the Maratha incursions before 1817-18 had humbled the other Rajputana States, but Kota could save itself by maintaining friendly relations with them.

### Trevelyan as Political Agent

On April 25, 1839, W.H. Trevelyan resumed the officiating charge of the Harauti Political Agency from Ludlow at Alniawas (in Marwar), when the latter was accompanying the camp of Sutherland to Jodhpur.<sup>1</sup> But Trevelyan, at this time showed negligence towards his duties. Instead of joining the headquarters of the Political Agency at Kota, he went to Nasirabad and conducted his duties from there. He depended either on the reports procured through the News-Writers of the Harauti Political Agency or from the Kota Agency *Vakil* for submitting his reports about the developments in his political jurisdiction.<sup>2</sup> In fact, Trevelyan adopted this procedure with the desire to give a free hand to the Maharao in conducting the affairs of his State.<sup>3</sup> But the British Government construed his absence from Kota as a negligence towards his duties.<sup>4</sup> As

1. W.H. Trevelyan Offg. Harauti Political Agent to Sutherland Offg. A.G.G. d. 2 September, Cons. 20 October 1839, No. 49, F & P.

2. Trevelyan to Sutherland d. 10 August, Cons. 2 October 1839, No. 47, F&P.

3. Sutherland to Maddock d. 4 September, Cons. 2 October 1839, No. 49, F & P.

4. Maddock to Sutherland d. 26 August, Cons. 2 October 1839, No. 48, F&P.



a mark of disapprobation of his conduct, it ordered him to hand over the charge of the Harauti Political Agency to Captain C. Richardes, and to return to his substantive post of the Assistant to the A.G.G. at Ajmer.<sup>1</sup>

### **Richardes as Political Agent**

On October 7, 1839, Captain C. Richardes took over charge from Trevelyan, as the officiating Harauti Political Agent.<sup>2</sup>

### **Animosity between Maharajrana and Maharao continued**

The anxiety of the Maharao to be out of the trammels of a hereditary minister had led him to sign the Treaty of 1838, otherwise he would not have accepted his minister to be a sovereign of a part of the territory of Kota.<sup>3</sup> As the State of Jhalawar had come into existence as a result of the helplessness of the Maharao and his bad relations with his hereditary minister, the ill-will between them continued unabated, even after the partition of Kota. In the embittered feelings of these rulers, their respective followers and subjects also participated by leading plundering incursions into each other's territory.<sup>4</sup> This state of affairs demanded the constant attention and interposition of the Political Agent.<sup>5</sup> Besides, the Maharao looked upon the Maharajrana with suspicion to such an extent that he, in 1840, raised objection to the Maharajrana constructing a fortified palace within his own territory.<sup>6</sup> The explanation of Richardes to the Maharao that Maharajrana intended to erect

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1. Trevelyan to Sutherland d. 2 September, Cons. 2 October 1839, No. 49, F & P.
  2. Sutherland to Maddock d. 14 October, Cons. 27 November 1839, No. 57, F & P.
  3. Ludlow to Alves d. 12 April, Cons. 2 October 1839, No. 48, F&P.
  4. Sutherland to H. Torrens, Offg. Secretary to Government d. 20 June, Cons. 13 July 1840, No. 46, F & P.
  5. Ibid.
  6. Maharao of Kota to Richardes d.n. Cons. 13 July 1840, No. 46, F&P.



this fortified palace for his residence, did not satisfy the Maharao.<sup>1</sup> Richardes considered it essential that the disposition of the Maharao to treat the Maharajrana with contempt should be checked to guard against any future complication.<sup>2</sup> The A.G.G. sought the instructions of the Government in this connection.<sup>3</sup> The British Government directed the A.G.G. to remonstrate against the objection of the Maharao, and dissuade him from exhibiting his unbecoming spirit against the Maharajrana.<sup>4</sup> At the same time, the Political Agent was instructed to be vigilant that any fortified palace within the Jhalawar territory be not so situated as to give just cause of complaint to the Kota State.<sup>5</sup> Thus the maintenance of good relations between the rulers of Kota and Jhalawar became one of the main concerns of the Harauti Political Agent.

### **Institution of the Kota Contingent**

The other important development which took place as a result of the partition of Kota during the incumbency of Richardes was, the formation of an auxiliary force under the command of the British officers, which was to be maintained at the expense of the Kota State.

The demand of the first payment for the institution of this auxiliary force was to be fixed by the British Government in accordance with the fifth Article of the Kota Treaty of 1838. In consideration of the financial stringency of the State of Kota, the British Government did not invoke this article just after the conclusion of the Treaty.<sup>6</sup> In September 1839, Sutherland, the A. G. G. was instructed to report on the

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1. Richardes Offg. Harauti Political Agent to Sutherland d. 15 June, Cons. 13 July 1840, No. 46, F & P.

2. Ibid.

3. Sutherland to Torrens d. 20 June, Cons. 13 July 1840, No. 46, F & P.

4. Torrens to Sutherland d. 13 July, Cons. 13 July 1840, No. 47, F & P.

5. Ibid.

6. Macnaghten to Alves d. 1 May, Cons. 18 July 1838, No. 74, F & P.



capabilities of the State to meet the expenses for the maintenance of the contingent.<sup>1</sup> In response to it, Sutherland submitted a scheme for embodying a force at Ajmer, as the Maharao was not in favour of stationing it within his State.<sup>2</sup> Its maintenance was estimated to cost one and a half lakh of rupees per annum to the Kota State in the first year of its embodiment.<sup>3</sup> The contingent was to be raised to the scale of two lakh of rupees in the second year; to that of two and a half lakh of rupees in the third, and to the whole amount of three lakh in the fourth year. By this period he hoped that the State of Kota would have paid off the State debt amounting to Rs. 10 lakh, which on the division of the territory fell to its share.<sup>4</sup> The British Government realizing the situation, approved of the plan proposed by the A.G.G.<sup>5</sup>

When Richardes demanded from the Maharao the payment for the first year for the embodying of the auxiliary force, the latter expressed his inability to pay it and protested against its formation to the British Government.<sup>6</sup> The Maharao considered the demand to be just, only when the Jhalawar State was made to share one-third of it. However, he expressed his willingness to pay Rs. 1,50,000 readily.<sup>7</sup> In the existing circumstances, the British Government felt satisfied with this

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1. Maddock to Sutherland Offg. A.G.G. d. 9 September, Cons. 18 December 1839, No. 16, F&P.
  2. Sutherland to Maddock d. 2 January, Cons. 19 February 1840, No. 27, F&P.
  3. Ibid.
  4. Sutherland to Maddock d. 2 January, Cons. 19 February 1840, No. 27, F&P.
  5. Maddock to Sutherland d. 16 January, Cons. 19 February 1840, No. 29, F&P.
  6. Richardes to Sutherland d. 5 March, Cons. 11 May 1840, No. 33, F&P.
  7. *Kharita* from the Maharao of Kota to Sutherland d.n., Cons. 11 May 1840, No. 34, F&P; *Kharita* from the Maharao to G.G. d.n., Cons. 11 May 1840, No. 35, F&P.



contribution of the Kota State,<sup>1</sup> and ordered Sutherland to organize a force under British officers such as could be maintained with this sum.<sup>2</sup>

Accordingly, a contingent under the command of Captain J.E. Bruere was raised<sup>3</sup> in the British district of Ajmer, and was denominated as the Kota Contingent, because the Kota State met its expenses. In 1842, it was raised to a force costing two lakh of rupees<sup>4</sup>.

The Maharao failed to pay the second instalment of Rs. 2 lakh. In consequence, the Contingent was without funds.<sup>5</sup> The A.G.G., therefore, called upon the Political Agent to impress upon the Maharao for the immediate payment of the due sum.<sup>6</sup> Accordingly, in July 1843, the Political Agent with his own efforts could collect from the Maharao, a sum of Rs. 1 lakh for the maintenance of the Kota Contingent for the period of the last six months of 1842.<sup>7</sup>

While making this payment, the Maharao again expressed his difficulty in procuring the sum for the Kota Contingent on account of the former debt due to advances by bankers to the State for the payment of tribute.<sup>8</sup> He further stated that the heavy demands of the British Government, and the payment of the State debt were involving him deeply in debt. He even showed his inability to meet the expenses necessary for

1. Maddock to Sutherland d. 20 April, Cons. 11 May 1840, No. 36, F&P.
2. Maddock to Sutherland d. 29 June, Cons. 29 June 1840, No. 44 F&P.
3. Richardes to Sutherland d. 22 May, Cons. 28 June 1841, No. 45, F&P.
4. Richardes to Sutherland d. 25 February, Cons. 19 April 1843, No. 37, F&P.
5. P.T. French, Assistant to the A.G.G. to Richardes d. 15 June, Cons. 22 July 1843, No. 74, F&P.
6. French to Richardes d. 15 June, Cons. 22 July 1843, No. 74, F&P.
7. Richardes to French d. 29 June, Cons. 22 July 1843, No. 75. F&P.
8. Ibid.



the efficient administration of his State, and for his own maintenance, unless the British Government reduced its demands.<sup>1</sup> On the A.G.G. forwarding this complaint to his Government,<sup>2</sup> the Governor-General informed the Maharao that the payment due for the Contingent be made without delay.<sup>3</sup>

Even after receiving this communication, the Maharao reiterated the hardship of his case to the Political Agent.<sup>4</sup> Convinced of the Maharao's difficulties, Richardes recommended to the Government to limit the amount of the payment of the Contingent to Rs. 1,50,000 which, added to the annual tribute of Rs. 1,84,360 would bring his total payments to the British Government to rupees 3,34,360. Further, he suggested that if the Contingent was to be maintained at an annual cost of Rs. 3 lakh, the difference was to be met from the Kota tribute.<sup>5</sup> Sutherland did not agree to this view as the reasons advanced by him for lowering the British demand were not sufficiently convincing.<sup>6</sup> However, to assess properly the financial condition of the State in this context, the A.G.G. suggested to his Government to take over the management of the State for a couple of years, as it did at Jaipur.<sup>7</sup>

### **Burton as Political Agent**

When on March 5, 1844, Captain C.E. Burton succeeded Richardes<sup>8</sup> to the Harauti Political Agency, the question

1. Richardes to French d. 29 June, Cons. 22 July 1843, No. 75, F&P.
2. Sutherland to James Thomason, Secretary to Government d. 3 July, Cons. 22 July 1843, No. 72, F&P.
3. Thomason to Sutherland d. 22 July, Cons. 22 July 1843, No. 76, F&P.
4. Richardes to Sutherland d. 19 September, Cons. 21 October 1843, No. 84-B, F&P.
5. Ibid.
6. Sutherland to Thomason d. 22 September, Cons. 21 October 1843, No. 84, F&P.
7. Ibid.
8. Burton, Offg. Harauti Political Agent to C. Thoresby Offg. A.G.G. d. 5 March, Cons. 30 March 1844, No. 35, F&P.



regarding the Kota Contingent was still unsettled. The opposition of the Maharao to the payment for the maintenance of the Contingent was at its extreme. This came to the notice of the British Government in May 1844, from an entry of April 10, 1844, in the Political Diary of the Harauti Political Agency.<sup>1</sup> The Maharao's constant pretension was his 'inability' to pay for the Contingent and also the 'injustice' of the British Government in demanding from his State alone for the maintenance of the auxiliary force which was kept for the protection of all the States of Harauti.<sup>2</sup>

These continued protests of the Maharao at last, compelled the A.G.G. to urge his Government for a final decision in the matter lest the Maharao should go on procrastinating the payments.<sup>3</sup>

Thereupon, the British Government took stock of the situation, and found that the Maharao's case being one of hardship, deserved its prompt attention. The Maharao paid to the British Government in all, a yearly sum of Rs. 3,84,300 in place of Rs. 2,64,300, the original demand of tribute by the Treaty of 1817.<sup>4</sup> Thus after the treaty of 1838, the Kota State paid to the British Government an amount of Rs. 1,20,000 more than it paid before this State was deprived of one-third of its territory. Had the Kota State paid the full amount of rupees three lakh, its total annual payments to the British Government

1. W. Edwards, Under Secretary to Government to Thoresby d. 11 May, Cons. 11 May 1844. No. 46, F&P; Thoresby to Burton d. 22 May, Cons. 5 October 1844, No. 274, F&P.

2. Burton to Thoresby d. 28 May, Cons. 5 October 1844, No. 248, F&P.

3. Thoresby to Currie d. 8 June, Cons. 5 October 1844, No. 246, F&P.

4. By the Treaty of 1817 original Tribute	2,64,300
Tribute by the Treaty of 1838	1,84,300
Payment to Contingent by the Treaty of 1838	2,00,000
	<u>3,84,300</u>
Difference between original demand of 1817 and payments in 1844	1,20,000



would have amounted to Rs. 4,84,300 i.e., Rs. 2,20,000 above the sum that it had been paying to the Government prior to its partition in 1838. In view of it, the British Government considered it 'just and expedient' to commute its demand of rupees three lakh to a reasonable amount. Thus, in 1844 it fixed the payment for the Kota Contingent at rupees two lakh annually.<sup>1</sup> Further, it decided that if that sum proved insufficient, the difference would be made up from the Kota tribute.<sup>2</sup> This decision of the British Government was totally on the lines of the proposal of Richardes, the predecessor of Burton.

In 1844, the British Government sanctioned the construction of a cantonment in the district of Ajmer, at Deoli which was near the Kara Nadi, and twelve miles North-East of Jehazpur (in Mewar), ten miles due East of Sawur (in Ajmer) and about fifty-five miles north of Kota.<sup>3</sup> On its completion in February 1857, the Kota Contingent was permanently shifted to this cantonment.<sup>4</sup> The stationing of the Kota Contingent at Deoli made it possible to maintain the awe of British power in the Harauti region, and in its vicinity. It further strengthened the British position in Rajputana.

The Harauti Political Agency was thus successful in settling the difficult situation that existed in Kota State at the time of its institution in 1822. The partition of Kota State, with one-third of its territory forming the new State of Jhalawar, resulted in the Maharao's taking the reins of administration of his State into his own hands, and his hereditary minister who had ruled his State with the title of Rajrana and

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1. Resolution of the G. G. in Council d. 14 September, Cons. 5 October 1844, No. 260, F & P.
  2. Ibid. See also, W. Edwards, Under Secretary to Thoresby d. 14 September, Cons. 5 October 1844, No. 261-KW, F & P.
  3. Currie to Thoresby d. 5 January, Cons. 27 January 1844, No. 96, F & P.
  4. J. B. Dennys, Commanding Kota Contingent to George Lawrence Offg. A. G. G. d. 23 February, Cons. 17 April 1857, No. 287, F. & P.



with authority in accordance with the Supplementary Treaty of 1818, was now saddled in the new independent State of Jhalawar as its ruler. The long-drawn out administrative controversies which existed between the Maharao and the Rajrana had thus come to an end. Subsequently, an auxiliary force known as the Kota Contingent was raised and permanently stationed at the Deoli Cantonment in February 1857 for being available at hand, to handle any disturbance or unrest in the Harauti region, which lay peculiarly isolated from the other parts of Rajputana on account of its natural features. The Harauti Political Agency also placated the Kota Maharao by securing for him financial concessions from the British Government in the payment for the maintenance of the Kota Contingent. In its various efforts to further British interests in the Harauti States, and to resolve their internal problems, the Harauti Political Agency worked in close collaboration with the A.G.G., seeking his advice and help as and when necessary, which enabled the latter to co-ordinate his policy of consolidating British power, maintaining peace and order and to watch British interests in respect of the States of Rajputana. Thus, the Harauti Political Agency worked as a very effective unit of the Rajputana Agency.

Even after the final settlement of the Kota affairs, the Harauti Political Agency was not abolished, but was retained to conduct British relations with the Harauti States of Kota, Bundi and the State of Jhalawar which was included within its jurisdiction consequent upon the partition of Kota in 1838. A number of reasons could be attributed for its retention. The A.G.G. in Rajputana was, himself, fully conscious that the withdrawal of the Political Agent would cause inconvenience to the rulers of the Harauti region in transacting their day to day affairs with the British Government.<sup>1</sup> Secondly, the old animosity between the Maharao and the Maharajrana had still not abated, and needed the close vigilance of the British

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1. Sutherland to Maddock d. 4 September, Cons. 2 October 1839, No. 49, F & P.



Government to prevent any anomalous situation arising out of it.<sup>1</sup> This apart, the British Government itself desired to maintain a Political Agency in Harauti, a region peculiarly isolated by natural features,<sup>2</sup> especially when the Maharao of Kota and the Maharajrana of Jhalawar were opposed to the Kota Contingent being stationed in their territories.<sup>3</sup> However, the partition of Kota ended the necessity for the Political Agent's interference in the internal affairs of the State. This placed the Harauti Political Agent on par with the Political Agents accredited permanently at Jaipur, Jodhpur and Neemuch. Till the breaking out of the Uprising of 1857 no change took place in the jurisdiction of the Harauti Political Agency.<sup>4</sup> Burton continued as the Political Agent till he was murdered at Kota by the rebellious troops of the Kota State.<sup>5</sup>

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1. On 1 July 1847, Maharajrana Madan Singh of Jhalawar died. At this occasion, the Maharao of Kota was accused by the Maharajrana Prithi Singh for compassing the death of the late Madan Singh by magic. R. Morrieson Offg. Harauti Political Agent to J. Low, A. G. G. d. 24 July, Cons. 24 December 1847, No. 131, F&P; Political letter from COD, No. 23 of 1849, paras. 7-8.
  2. Harauti Political Agent to C. U. Aitchison d. 10 February 1872, Cons. April 1873, Nos. 70-71, Finance-B, F & P.
  3. Richardes to Sutherland d. 5 March, Cons. 11 May 1840, No. 33, F&P.
  4. During the absence of Burton on sick leave from December 1850 to March 1853 R. Morrieson, the Assistant to the A. G. G. held the temporary charge of the Harauti Political Agency. Burton to Low d. 17 December 1850, Cons. 31 January 1851, No. 112, F&P; Henry Lawrence to R. Morrieson, Assistant to A. G. G. d. 26 March, Cons. 8 April 1853, No. 149, F & P.
  5. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 27 July, Cons. 31 December 1858, Nos. 3146-7, F & P.



## CHAPTER IV

### ***Mewar Political Agency***

On the institution of the Rajputana Agency in 1832 the Sirohi Political Agency, which was under the Resident at Delhi, was abolished.<sup>1</sup> Subsequently, a new Political Agency was created with headquarters at Neemuch on the Northern borders of the States of Banswara and Partabgarh.<sup>2</sup> The new agency had a wider jurisdiction as its sway extended over Banswara and Partabgarh besides Sirohi, Dungarpur and the Mewar Hill tract which formerly lay within the jurisdiction of the Sirohi Political Agency.<sup>3</sup> It functioned under the control of the Rajputana Agency and aimed at effective control over the interstate relations as well as maintenance and promotion of the British interests in that quarter.<sup>4</sup> Captain G.J. Pasley took over the charge of the new Agency at Neemuch on June 9, 1832.<sup>5</sup> The Neemuch Political Agency appropriately took its designation from its headquarters.

The measure of withdrawing the Political Agent from Sirohi was distasteful to Rao Shiva Singh.<sup>6</sup> He earnestly requested the Governor-General for posting a Political Agent permanently at Sirohi a step which he considered essential for

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1. Macnaghten to Speirs, Sirohi Political Agent d. 5 May, Cons. 4 June 1832, No. 43, F & P.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Macnaghten to Pasley, Assistant Political Agent Neemuch, d. 5 May, Cons. 4 June 1832, No. 45 F&P.
  4. Ibid.
  5. Brooke, *History of Meywar*, p. 37.
  6. Rao Shiva Singh of Sirohi to G.G. recd. 3 June, Cons. 9 July 1832, No. 40, F & P.



the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in his State.<sup>1</sup> The withdrawal of the Political Agent from Sirohi was in consonance with the British policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of the States of Rajputana. Besides, there was no further need for retaining a Political Agent at Sirohi, as the objects for which he was appointed in 1823 had been attained by the beginning of 1832. The financial condition of the State had improved. Trade had begun to pass through Sirohi.<sup>2</sup> However, the State could not thrive as the development of its revenues was still impeded due to disorder on the periphery of the State.<sup>3</sup> The British Government was quite conscious of its duty of maintaining peace and order on the borders of Sirohi<sup>4</sup>, and other States in its vicinity. The Governor-General, therefore, was not in favour of disturbing the new administrative arrangement. Accordingly, he declined to accede to the request of the Rao and advised him to manage the internal affairs of his State himself.<sup>5</sup>

### **Speirs as Political Agent**

The work of Pasley did not, however, meet with the approval of his Government. He coerced and suppressed the Bhils in the Mewar Hill tract. This enraged the Bhils and made Pasley unpopular.<sup>6</sup> Consequently, the Governor-General replaced Pasley by 'a more efficient officer,'<sup>7</sup> Lieutenant-Colonel A. Speirs, who was the officiating A.G.G. at Ajmer.<sup>8</sup> Speirs took over charge of the Neemuch Political Agency on

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1. Rao Shiva Singh of Sirohi to G.G. recd. 3 June, Cons. 9 July 1832, No. 40, F & P.
  2. Speirs to Macnaghten d. 14 January, Cons. 3 April 1832, No. 15, F&P.
  3. Ibid.
  4. Political Letter to COD d. 31 December 1832, No. 14, para. 160.
  5. G.G. to Rao Shiva Singh d. 7 June, Cons. 9 July 1832, No. 41, F&P.
  6. Brooke, *History of Meywar*, pp. 37-8.
  7. William Bentinck's minute d. 1 February, Cons. 6 February 1834, No. 20, F & P.
  8. Secretary to Government to A. Speirs, Offg. A.G.G. d. 6 February, Cons. 6 February 1834, No. 21, F & P.



May 7, 1834.<sup>1</sup> He could rightly fit into the role, for he was already well conversant with the nature of British relations with the States which were within the jurisdiction of the Neemuch Political Agency.

### **Mewar placed under Neemuch Political Agency**

With the institution of the Rajputana Agency the work of conducting British relations with the State of Udaipur had come under the direct control of the A.G.G.<sup>2</sup> In his meeting with Bentinck at Ajmer, Maharana Jawan Singh pleaded for a reduction in the annual tribute of three lakh rupees. Bentinck considered the request to be unreasonable, for a concession had already been granted in 1826.<sup>3</sup> Besides, he reminded the Maharana that the protection of the States of Rajputana from the attacks of the predatory powers imposed upon the British Government a heavy expense of which only a small part was made up by the tributes.<sup>4</sup>

Due to maladministration, Mewar State had fallen in arrears of tribute to the extent of seven and a half lakhs of rupees by April 1833.<sup>5</sup> Lockett, the A.G.G. in Rajputana was largely responsible for these arrears<sup>6</sup> as he had failed to realize the tribute regularly from the Maharana. Besides, he was unable to persuade the Maharana to prevent his subjects from committing depredations in the neighbouring States.<sup>7</sup> Alves, the successor of Lockett, saw the remedy in transferring Mewar from the direct control of the Rajputana Agency to the care of

1. Speirs, Political Agent Neemuch to Alves, Offg. A.G.G. d. 7 May, Cons. 29 May 1834, No. 19, F & P.
2. Resolution of G.G. in Council d. 16 April, Cons. 16 April 1832, No. 23, F & P. cf. Chapter I, p. 40.
3. Proposition submitted to G.G. on the part of Maharana Jawan Singh and replies. Cons. 3 December 1832, No. 26, F & P.
4. Ibid.
5. Lieutenant-Colonel Lockett to Secretary to Government d. 25 April, Cons. 16 May 1833, Nos. 17-19, F & P.
6. Ibid.
7. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 10 November, Cons. 10 December 1832, Nos. 45-6, F & P.



the Neemuch Political Agency. Mewar being nearer to Neemuch than Ajmer, it was more convenient for the Neemuch Political Agent than the A.G.G. at Ajmer, to exercise control over the affairs of Mewar and to see that the State fulfilled its obligations towards the Paramount Power.<sup>1</sup> The British Government fully concurred with the expediency of the measure.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, on March 14, 1836, it placed the State of Mewar under the jurisdiction of the Political Agent at Neemuch<sup>3</sup>. The transfer of Udaipur (Mewar) to the superintendence of the Neemuch Political Agency added to the importance of the latter.

#### **Liquidation of arrears of tribute**

After the transfer of Mewar to the Political Agency at Neemuch, the A.G.G. found it convenient to bring pressure upon the Maharana to fulfil his tributary obligations. On May 6, 1836, he issued instructions to Speirs to prevail upon the Maharana to pay the current tribute punctually as well as a lakh of rupees annually in liquidation of the arrears of tribute.<sup>4</sup> When Speirs made this demand on the Mewar Durbar, the Maharana assured him of the punctual payment of annual tribute, and followed his word by paying the tribute for 1836, and also rupees one lakh towards the payment of arrears.<sup>5</sup> He, however, expressed his inability to continue payment of one lakh rupees a year regularly in addition to the current tribute.<sup>6</sup> But the concerted efforts of Speirs made the

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1. Alves to Macnaghten d. 16 December 1835, Cons. 18 January 1836, No. 7, F & P; Alves to Macnaghten d. 14 February, Cons. 14 March 1836, No. 28, F & P.
  2. Macnaghten to Alves d. 18 January 1836, Cons. 18 January 1836, No. 8, F & P.
  3. Macnaghten to Alves d. 14 March, Cons. 14 March 1836, No. 29, F & P.
  4. Alves to A. Speirs, Neemuch Political Agent d. 6 May, Cons. 6 June 1836, No. 50, F & P.
  5. Speirs to Alves d. 2 May, Cons. 19 June 1837, No. 6, F & P.
  6. Ibid.



Maharana accept the arrangement regarding the liquidation of arrears.<sup>1</sup> This arrangement won the approbation of the Governor-General.<sup>2</sup> The success of Speirs showed that the transfer of Mewar to the Neemuch Political Agency was a proper arrangement for conducting British relations with the State of Mewar.

### **Neemuch Agency designated as Mewar Political Agency**

In July 1837, the designation of the Neemuch Political Agency was changed to Mewar Political Agency on a representation from the Maharana.<sup>3</sup> This new designation was a partial and incomplete description of the scope and extent of the Political Agency which was not confined to Mewar State alone but also embraced several other States. The reason for complying with the request of the Maharana for changing the nomenclature of the Neemuch Political Agency to Mewar Political Agency, could be attributed to Mewar's highest status among the States of Raiputana.

### **Accumulation of arrears of tribute**

Maharana Jawan Singh expired on August 30, 1838 leaving the State in financial difficulties to his successor, Maharana Sardar Singh.<sup>4</sup> He had incurred heavy debts amounting to rupees nineteen and a half lakh and a large amount of

1. Speirs to Alves d. 23 April, Cons. 18 July 1838, No. 91, F&P.

2. Macnaghten to Alves d. 15 May, Cons. 18 July 1838, No. 92, F&P.

3. Macnaghten to R.H. Scott, Offg. Secretary to Lieutenant-Governor N.W.P. d. 17 July, Cons. 17 July 1837, Nos. 21-2, F&P.

4. Speirs to Alves d. 13 December 1838, Cons. 9 January 1839, No. 72, F&P.



tribute to the British Government was also in arrears.<sup>1</sup> The new Maharana, Sardar Singh assured the Political Agent that he would make all efforts to clear off the huge arrears of tribute. However, he contended that if the embarrassments of his State,<sup>2</sup> and the smallness of his annual revenue were taken into account, the tribute chargeable thereon was high when compared to what was paid by the State of Kota or Jodhpur. He, therefore, represented to the British Government to commute the tribute from three lakhs of Udaipur rupees to two lakhs of Company's rupees which was to involve a reduction of 29,000 Udaipur rupees.<sup>3</sup>

The British Government rejected this request on the ground that the amount of tribute had been fixed at a 'very reasonable' rate with reference to the revenue which Mewar was capable of yielding under 'good management'.<sup>4</sup> However, in the event of the Maharana evincing an 'honest and hearty desire' to clear his country of its financial embarrassments, the British Government showed its readiness to make adjustment of its claims on favourable terms.<sup>5</sup>

### Robinson as Political Agent

By the time the above instructions reached the Mewar

1. Speirs to Alves d. 13 December 1838, Cons. 9 January 1839, No. 72, F&P. The debt against the State was as follows:

Arrears due on account of tribute to the British Government up to 31 December, 1838	7,82,500
Amount due to various <i>Sahookars</i>	7,50,000
Amount to the troops and other retainers	2,50,000
On account of Sundries	1,00,000
Amount to be paid for compensation on account of thefts and robberies committed by the subjects of Mewar	85,000
Total Udaipur Rs.	19,67,500

2. Ibid.
3. Torrens to Alves d. 17 January, Cons. 3 April 1839, No. 59, F&P.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.



Political Agent, Speirs was transferred to the Gwalior Residency, and from him Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Robinson took over the charge of the Mewar Political Agency on January 1, 1839.<sup>1</sup> Robinson gave favourable consideration to the financial difficulties of the State. In 1841, at the request of the Maharana for reduction in his tribute, he unhesitatingly recommended the matter for consideration to his Government,<sup>2</sup> but the latter turned down the request.<sup>3</sup> It did not see any reason why the payment of tribute from the Udaipur State should suffer simply because the State could not manage its revenue affairs properly. It remarked:<sup>4</sup>

If such an argument were admissible the dues of the Supreme Government would everywhere be liable to be sacrificed, and no State would be found without a plea for reduction of its tribute or for a total exemption from paying tribute.

### Reduction of the tribute

In spite of the rejection of his recommendation for the reduction of the tribute, Robinson continued in his efforts to secure some financial relief to the State of Mewar, as he was convinced of the financial embarrassments of the State. On November 4, 1843, he, again, sent through the A.G.G., a *Kharita* from Maharana Swarup Singh, the successor of Maharana Sardar Singh,<sup>5</sup> requesting for a reduction in the

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1. Robinson Offg. Mewar Political Agent to Alves d. 1 January, Cons. 6 February 1839, No. 28 F&P.
  2. Robinson to Sutherland d. 1 March, Cons. 5 April 1841, No. 17, F&P.
  3. Secretary to Government to Sutherland d. 6 April, Cons. 6 April 1841, No. 22, F&P.
  4. Ibid. See also, Political letter to COD d. 15 September 1842, No. 50, paras. 32-3.
  5. Sardar Singh died on July 14, 1842. Robinson to Sutherland d. 16 July, Cons. 31 August 1842, Nos. 33-5, F&P.



annual tribute from three lakhs of Udaipur rupees to two lakhs of Company's rupees.<sup>1</sup> The debts of the State, he said, amounted to twenty two lakh rupees besides the arrears of tribute of seven lakh rupees. The expenditure still exceeded the income of the State by one to two lakhs of rupees a year.<sup>2</sup> He added that since his assumption of the charge of the Mewar Political Agency about five years ago, the current tribute had been realized with tolerable regularity, but this had only been secured by the dint of most persevering and disagreeable importunity. There was no instance when the Maharana paid instalments at the stipulated time, and whenever he paid, it was always with the borrowed money. Of course, on the arrear account Robinson had only been able to obtain the liquidation of a very small portion, scarcely one lakh of rupees.<sup>3</sup> The convincing arguments of the Political Agent, in support of the request of the Maharana, succeeded in softening the stern attitude of the British Government on the question of the commutation of tribute. The British Government inquired of the A.G.G. whether, in his opinion, the amount of tribute was a heavy burden on the Maharana, and whether the remission of the desired sum of rupees 32,000, for a limited period of three years, would materially contribute to the Maharana's convenience.<sup>4</sup>

At this time, Lieutenant-Colonel Thoresby was officiating as the A.G.G. in the absence of Sutherland who was on leave. In reply, the A.G.G. proposed to his Government that the diminution of the tribute by so slight a sum, and for a few years, would do little to relieve the State of its financial difficulties. He contended that the finances of the State could only be

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1. Robinson to A.G.G. d. 4 November 1843, Cons. 6 January 1844, Nos. 84-5, F&P.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Secretary to Government to Thoresby d. 23 December 1843 Cons. 6 January 1844, Nos. 84-7, F&P.



improved by (i) better administration and (ii) greater economy.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, he suggested that if the permanent reduction in the demand was granted to Mewar it might be:<sup>2</sup>

made conditional on such a change in the administration of affairs as would effectually embrace these two important, and doubtless indispensable points; and His Highness might be given clearly to understand, that any continuation of the favour beyond the term of 3 years, must depend entirely upon the character of the intermediate management of his finances.

The suggestion of Thoresby influenced the British Government. Consequently, it even started thinking of giving some permanent relief to the State from the heavy burden of the stipulated quantum of tribute. To consider the matter further, it asked for a detailed statement of the receipts and disbursements of the State from the Political Agent. It remarked:<sup>3</sup>

There can be no disposition on the part of the British Government to press hardly upon the Maharana either as to the payment of the arrears of tribute or as to its future amount; but before the Maharana can be in a position to claim the forbearance and assistance of the Government in the renunciation or diminution of its demand upon the revenues of Oodeypoor, it is necessary that His Highness should show he has established a regular system of economy - in his expenditure and is doing all he can to diminish it.

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1. Thoresby to Currie d. 2 February, Cons. 10 February 1844, No. 52, F & P.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Currie to Thoresby d. 9 February, Cons. 10 February 1844, No. 56, F & P.



In compliance with the instructions of his Government, Robinson sent to it the statements of the Udaipur Treasury for the year 1842-43 A.D.<sup>1</sup> After going through the statements Thoresby, the then officiating A.G.G., found it impossible to verify or even understand the accounts furnished. He, therefore, recommended that the matter should be considered closed till the Maharana again moved it.<sup>2</sup> The British Government accepted the advice of the A.G.G.<sup>3</sup> The suspicion of the British Government about the reliability of the accounts furnished by the Minister of the State was the governing factor in its decision to keep the matter in abeyance.

Convinced of the genuineness of the demand of the Maharana of Mewar for a reduction in the payment of huge tribute, Robinson endeavoured to allay the doubts of his Government. In May 1846, along with his strong recommendation, he sent a *Kharita* from the Maharana to the Governor-General for a reduction in the tribute to the extent of two lakhs of Company's rupees. He furnished a statement prepared under the supervision of the Maharana himself, which showed the income of the State as Rs. 13,70,889, annas 5 and pies 6 and expenditure Rs. 16,53,750, annas 8 and pies 9.<sup>4</sup> He specifically pointed out that the statement was substantially correct as the Maharana was a man of integrity.<sup>5</sup> There was no material difference between this document and the one furnished before. The statement showed the income of the State falling short of the expenditure by Rs. 2,84,861, annas 3 and pies 3. Maharana Swarup Singh did his best to improve the financial condition of the State. When he came to the throne, the liabilities of the State were estimated between rupees 15 to 20 lakh. He reduced them

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1. Robinson to Thoresby d. 9 May, Cons. 22 June 1844, Nos. 69-71, F & P.

2. Thoresby to Currie d. 4 June, Cons. 22 June 1844, No. 67, F&P.

3. Currie to Thoresby d. 20 June, Cons. 22 June 1844, No. 72, F&P.

4. Robinson to Sutherland d. 23 May, Cons. 18 July 1846, Nos. 156-7, F & P.

5. Ibid.



by 10 or 12 lakhs of rupees from the *Nazarana* of 3 lakh rupees received from the *jagirdars* on his succession, the reliefs which they paid on investiture in their fiefs on the occasion of each demise and the fines contingently derived from his *Kamdars*.<sup>1</sup>

Sutherland, the A.G.G. at Ajmer, shared the view with Robinson that the amount of tribute was too high.<sup>2</sup> He did not fail to see that the British claim of tribute from Mewar had been a cause of complaint for a long time and a stumbling block in the establishment of cordial relations between Mewar and the British Government. He adduced the example of Jaipur, where the tribute was reduced from eight lakhs of rupees to four lakhs, to prove that the original assessment of tribute in 1817-18 was very high. The grievous mistakes committed at that time due to ignorance proved detrimental to the interests of several Indian States.<sup>3</sup> The astuteness of the Mewar Political Agent in furnishing a statement of receipts and expenditure of Mewar, the incessant efforts of the Maharana to improve the financial condition of the State, and the exposition by the A.G.G. of the blunder committed by Charles Metcalfe in calculating the British claim of tribute from Mewar left the British Government with no other choice than to reduce the amount of tribute from 3 lakh Udaipur rupees to 2 lakh Company's rupees.<sup>4</sup> By this arrangement a saving of Rs. 24,000 per annum was effected in the revenues of Mewar. While communicating this sanction to the A.G.G. in Rajputana, the Governor-General hoped that it would be duly appreciated by the Maharana and stimulate him to explore possibilities for improving the financial condition of his State.<sup>5</sup>

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1. Robinson to Sutherland d. 23 May, Cons. 18 July 1846, Nos. 156-7, F & P.

2. Sutherland to Currie d. 28 May, Cons. 18 July 1846, No. 155, F&P.

3. Ibid.

4. Currie to Sutherland d. 25 June, Cons. 18 July 1846, No. 159, F&P.

5. Ibid. See also, *Kharita* from G.G. to Maharana of Udaipur d. n. Cons. 18 July 1846, No. 160, F&P.



Sutherland when communicating this concession to Robinson emphasized:<sup>1</sup>

I am sure this act of grace will be highly appreciated not only by the Maharana, the Chiefs and the people of Mewar but throughout Rajpootana. Measures of this kind gain for our Government the fidelity, good faith, and honest dealing of the Rajputs.

The help which the Political Agent extended to the ruler in securing remissions of this kind from his Government strengthened his hands, and increased his influence in the State. It made the ruler realize the fact that the Political Officer was not appointed like a Maratha governor to extort tribute from him unreasonably. The liberal attitude of the Rajputana Agency towards the realization of tribute definitely helped this diplomatic agency to establish a close bond of ties between the rulers of Rajputana and the British Government.

### **Estrangement between the Chief of Salumber and the Maharana**

Apart from the question of tribute the case of the chief of Salumber attracted the special attention of Robinson. Rawat Padam Singh of Salumber was a 'hereditary premier' of Mewar.<sup>2</sup> The Salumber House, since the days of its founder, in lieu of its claim to the *gaddi* of Mewar, had retained the right to advise the Maharana on all matters of the State.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, the endeavours of the Maharana from time to time had been to free himself from this yoke. Consequently, violent disturbances agitated Mewar for many years prior to the British connections with the State. At the

1. Sutherland to Robinson d. 5 July, Cons. 17 October 1846, No. 270, F & P.

2. Report of J.C. Brooke, officiating Mewar Political Agent to George Lawrence Offg. A.G.G. d. 14 February 1853, Cons. 17 February 1854, No. 153, F&P.

3. Ibid.



time of the conclusion of the British treaty with Mewar, Padam Singh tried to establish his claim to the premiership of the State as his hereditary right. For this purpose, he used the good offices of his relative Chundawat Ajit Singh to convince Metcalfe, the then Resident at Delhi of his claim. However, he met with little success.<sup>1</sup> The British Government did not recognize his right. In this manner, the British Government expressed itself in favour of keeping the Maharana's authority free from the dominating influence of the Chief of Salumber. Despite this, the latter never lost sight of his hereditary right to the premiership of the State.

Rawat Padam Singh died in 1849. Maharana Swarup Singh took advantage of the situation. He thought it would be politic to abolish some of the privileges traditionally enjoyed by the Salumber House as they gave it pretensions of superiority.<sup>2</sup> With his conviction that, at the time of any eventuality, he would be protected and helped by the British Government, he decided to encroach upon the feudal rights of the Rawat of Salumber. Consequently, quite contrary to the tradition he did not proceed to Salumber to pay a visit of condolence, and to escort Rawat Kesri Singh, the son of Padam Singh for investiture to Udaipur. Desirous of regaining the hereditary right of *Bajurria* of his family, Rawat Kesri Singh was not ready to accept further deprivation of his hereditary privileges. He wrote to the Political Agent on the subject.<sup>3</sup>

The Political Agent, then summoned the Rawat and the Maharana to his camp. The Rawat did not go, for he apprehended that the Maharana might perform the investiture in the Political Agent's camp. Thus, the very point

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1. Report of J. C. Brooke, officiating Mewar Political Agent to George Lawrence, Offg. A. G. G. d. 14 February 1853, Cons. 17 February 1854, No. 153, F & P.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.



would have been lost which he considered to be bound inseparably to his honour.<sup>1</sup>

This conduct on the part of the Rawat displeased Robinson so much that he authorized the Maharana to sequester certain portions of Salumber fief.<sup>2</sup> This was in complete conformity with the wishes of the Maharana, and he sequestered certain villages of Salumber. Thus, having kept the Rawat away from Udaipur, and having obtained possession of a portion of his estate, the Maharana became a great gainer in this dispute.

### **Changes in Mewar Political Agency**

During Robinson's tenure of office some important changes took place in the constitution of the Mewar Political Agency. In 1841, the State of Sirohi was transferred to the charge of the Commandant of the Jodhpur Legion at Erinpura.<sup>3</sup> In the same year, the Commandant of the Mewar Bhil Corps at Kherwara, in addition to his military duties, was entrusted with the political charge of the Mewar Hill tract between Sirohi and Dungarpur. In the latter capacity he worked as the First Assistant to the Mewar Political Agent.<sup>4</sup> In 1844, the Second-in-Command of the Mewar Bhil Corps at Kotra was constituted as the Second Assistant to the Mewar Political Agent for the settlement of complaints which might be lodged with him by the subjects of Idur and Sirohi against one another.<sup>5</sup> The appointment of the two Assistants to the Mewar Political Agent placed the latter second in rank only to the

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1. Report of J. C. Brooke, officiating Mewar Political Agent to George Lawrence, Offg. A. G. G. d. 14 February 1853, Cons. 17 February 1854, No. 153, F & P.

2. Ibid.

3. Maddock to Sutherland d. 1 March, Cons. 1 March 1841, No. 19, F & P.

4. Maddock to Sutherland d. 3 May, Cons. 3 May 1841, Nos. 44-5, F & P.

5. Currie to Thoresby Offg. A.G.G. d. 25 February, Cons. 2 March 1844, No. 57, F & P.



**A.G.G.** and first among all the Political Agents of the Rajputana Agency.

Robinson, after a long illness, died on June 18, 1850 at Neemuch.<sup>1</sup> Colonel John Low, the then **A.G.G.** in Rajputana, was much impressed by Robinson's eminent success during his tenure, for he had been largely responsible for developing cordial and friendly relations with the rulers of Udaipur, Dungarpur, Partabgarh and Banswara.<sup>2</sup> The role of Robinson as the Mewar Political Agent amply proved that he had, generally speaking, been eminently successful in his duty of realizing tributes from the princely States under his jurisdiction.<sup>3</sup> He was instrumental in solving the crucial problem of Mewar tribute. It was owing to his unqualified support to the requests of the Maharana that the British Government commuted the tribute. But, on the other hand, he failed to bring about a rapprochement between the contending parties in Mewar. The confiscation of the villages of the chief of Salumber by the Maharana, with the support of the Political Agent, made it apparent that the British Government was on the side of the Maharana, and desired to strengthen him against the *jagirdars* of the State.<sup>4</sup>

### George Lawrence as Political Agent

On the death of Robinson, Captain A. Mackintosh, the Superintendent of Jawad and Neemuch, took over charge of the Mewar Political Agency, as an interim arrangement.<sup>5</sup> Low was of the opinion that it was quite impossible for a person to perform the duties of both the offices with efficiency, even for a

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1. A. Mackintosh, Superintendent Jawad-Neemuch and in charge of the Mewar Political Agency to J. Low, A.G.G. d. 19 June, Cons. 2 August 1850, No. 224, F & P.
  2. Low to Elliot d. 24 June, Cons. 2 August 1850, No. 223, F&P.
  3. Ibid.
  4. Report of Brooke on Mewar d. 14 February 1853, *loc. cit.*
  5. Mackintosh to Low d. 19 June, Cons. 2 August 1850, No. 224, F & P.



short while.<sup>1</sup> The duties of the Superintendent were confined to the civil administration of the districts of Jawad and Neemuch while those of the Political Agent often required him to visit the States of Udaipur, Dungarpur, Partabgarh and Banswara.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, to ensure smooth and efficient performance of both, civil duties of Jawad and Neemuch and the political duties of the Mewar Political Agency, the A.G.G. left Mackintosh with the duties of Superintendent and appointed Showers, who was then Assistant to the A.G.G. to officiate as the Mewar Political Agent till further arrangement.<sup>3</sup> Showers took over officiating charge of the Mewar Political Agency from Mackintosh on July 2, 1850.<sup>4</sup> This arrangement was approved by the British Government.<sup>5</sup>

The British Government selected Lieutenant-Colonel G. St. P. Lawrence of the 2nd Regiment Light Cavalry, who was at that time Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar and had 30 years' standing in the Company's service for the post of Mewar Political Agent.<sup>6</sup> George Lawrence took over charge of the Mewar Political Agency from Showers on November 28, 1851.<sup>7</sup>

George Lawrence did not find the new office to be a sinecure. The estrangement between the Maharana and the Rawat of Salumber had reached its climax. The Rawat, having failed to procure redress, had turned out the Maharana's troops

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1. Low to H. M. Elliot, Secretary to Government d. 24 June, Cons. 2 August 1850, No. 223, F & P.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. Low to C. L. Showers, Assistant to A.G.G. d. 24 June, Cons. 2 August 1850, No. 224, F & P.

4. Showers, Offg. Mewar Political Agent to Low, d. 2 July, Cons. 23 August 1850, No. 99, F & P.

5. Elliot to Low d. 24 July, Cons. 2 August 1850, No. 228, F & P.

6. Minute by G. G. d. 18 July, Cons. 2 August 1850, No. 228, F & P; Elliot to Low d. 24 July, Cons. 2 August 1850, No. 228, F & P; Notification of Foreign Department d. 24 July, Cons. 2 August 1850, No. 230, F & P.

7. Low to Elliot d. 7 December 1850, Cons. 10 January 1851, No. 22, F & P.



from his confiscated villages in October 1851, and taken possession of them himself.<sup>1</sup> This was the height of indignity which this recusant *jagirdar* could hurl upon his Sovereign.

### Brooke's Report

In this embittered situation the contending parties appealed to Colonel John Low, the A.G.G. in Rajputana for settlement. He warned both of them of the injury which the embitterment would eventually cause to their mutual relations.<sup>2</sup> On their insistence he directed George Lawrence to probe into the affair.<sup>3</sup> Soon after, George Lawrence was called upon to officiate as the A. G. G. at Ajmer as Low had been transferred to the Hyderabad Residency. As such the responsibility to investigate into the dispute devolved upon Captain J. C. Brooke, the First Assistant to the Mewar Political Agent,<sup>4</sup> who was appointed to officiate as the Mewar Political Agent in the absence of George Lawrence.

Brooke had the advantage of his previous knowledge of the Mewar affairs. He entered laboriously into the investigation, and found that the local opinion was in favour of the Chief of Salumber.<sup>5</sup> The neglect of the Maharana in performing the ceremony of investiture was decried by all classes of Rajputs. The neighbouring Princes, and all respectable persons, generally, inquired from Brooke when the hereditary honours of the family of Salumber were to be restored to Rawat Kesri Singh.<sup>6</sup> As far as

1. C. L. Showers, Offg. Mewar Political Agent to Low d. 25 November, Cons. 25 December 1851, No. 435, F & P; Brooke's report on Mewar d. 14 February 1853, *loc.cit.*

2. Henry Lawrence to J. P. Grant, Offg. Secretary to Government d. 17 October 1853, Cons. 17 February 1854, No. 152, F & P.

3. Ibid.

4. Captain J.C. Brooke took charge of the office of First Assistant to the Political Agent and Superintendent of Mewar Hill tract on April 11, 1846 from Hunter. Notification Foreign Department d. 2 May, Cons. 6 June 1846, No. 279, F & P.

5. Report of Brooke on Mewar d. 14 February 1853, *loc.cit.*

6. Ibid.



the question of feudal service to the Maharana was concerned, the Rawat declined to remain in attendance on the Maharana at Udaipur, in consequence of the ceremony of investiture not having taken place, but he was ready to send the quota of troops for service (*Chakari*) to Udaipur in the traditional manner.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, the Maharana was anxious that the right of hereditary Councillor should be formally given up by the Chief of Salumber. Brooke considered this insistence of the Maharana unjust.<sup>2</sup> He found that the power of hereditary councillorship, which was enjoyed customarily by the Rawat, was undefined since the British connection with Mewar.<sup>3</sup> Further, he suggested to his Government to allow it to remain as it was. This was one of the checks exercised on the despotic power of the Maharana. As such, Brooke did not desire that the British Government should interfere in favour of its abolition.<sup>4</sup>

The inquiries convinced Brooke that the dissensions between the Maharana and the chief of Salumber had their origin in Maharana's denial of the customary honour of investiture to the head of the Chundawats. He reported that the injustice originated from the Maharana's side, and that it was no fault of the Rawat.<sup>5</sup> In this manner he, throughout, advocated the cause of the feudal rights of the Rawat.

1. Report of Brooke on Mewar d. 14 February 1853, *loc.cit.*
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. This power was now and then exercised by some powerful member of the Chundawat clan. (i) In 1818, Thakur Ajit Singh, the influential chief had signed the treaty with the British on behalf of the Maharana. (ii) In 1838, Thakur Deley Singh of Assen lent the support of his clan to Maharana Sardar Singh in his succession to the *gaddi*.
4. Ibid.
5. Throughout this long period of his estrangement from the Maharana, Rawat Kesri Singh had conducted himself and caused his dependents to follow a respectable yet firm course. With the single exception of the expulsion of the Maharana's troops from the sequestered villages for which there were many excuses, the Maharana had not been able to bring any well-founded complaint against him.



Meanwhile, George Lawrence handed over his officiating charge of the Rajputana Agency to his brother, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Henry Montgomery Lawrence on March 5, 1853,<sup>1</sup> and resumed his duty at the Mewar Political Agency. While forwarding the Brooke report on July 8, 1853 George Lawrence endorsed the finding that the neglect of the Maharana to invest with his own hands the Rawat with a sword (*Talwar Bandhai*) was the first and almost the only grievance giving rise to the dispute.<sup>2</sup> But George Lawrence differed materially with Brooke on feudal rights. He considered such privileges of the chief valueless,<sup>3</sup> and in no way relevant to the existing circumstances. The Maharana was under British protection, and as such, required no military assistance from his nobles against an external danger, nor was the British Government bound by the treaty to support them.<sup>4</sup>

As it was the general policy of the British Government to uphold 'as much as possible the dignity of the native prince', George Lawrence proposed to the A. G. G. to overlook the claim of the Rawat of Salumber to the hereditary councillorship. In support of his view, he contended that : (i) it was disallowed by Tod and had been in abeyance since the British treaty with Mewar and (ii) that if once admitted, it would make the subject the rival of his master as was already the case.<sup>5</sup> Further, he showed reluctance to mediate upon the original grievance of the Salumber Chief. He remarked that it would be preferable to suggest to the Maharana, verbally, to perform the investiture ceremony rather than to insert it in any agreement as it could involve a loss of dignity to the Maharana.<sup>6</sup>

1. George Lawrence to Allen, d. 5 March, Cons. 18 March 1853, No. 126, F & P.

2. George Lawrence to Henry Lawrence d. 8 July 1853, Cons. 17 February 1854, No. 155, F & P.

3. Ibid.

4. George Lawrence to Henry Lawrence d. 31 October 1854, Cons. 9 February 1855, No. 154, F & P.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.



In February 1855, when Henry Lawrence along with George Lawrence visited Udaipur, Kesri Singh raised the matter of the revival of his hereditary privileges, but met with little success. Neither was the Maharana prepared to acquiesce in the right of hereditary premiership, nor would the A. G. G. insert anything about it in any agreement. The A. G. G. was not in favour of the practice of allowing any particular Chief to be consulted by the Maharana, although he had no objection if the Maharana consulted the Chief of Salumber whenever he liked. He considered that the time for forcible *Bajurria* had passed. The Rawat's insistence on 'full abstract *feudal rights*' at a period when 'sovereigns and Chiefs' only existed by the force of 'foreign pressure' (the British Government), was considered by Henry Lawrence as 'unreasonable'.<sup>1</sup>

As to the question of the investiture of the Rawat of Salumber, Henry Lawrence explained to the former that he had advised the Maharana to visit Salumber to install him as was the custom.<sup>2</sup> But considering the violent feud between the Maharana and the Rawat, and the bad health of the former, the A.G.G. wondered if the Maharana could possibly do so. The A.G.G. pointed out that by this the Rawat would rather be a gainer, as his right to be installed would be maintained, and could only be forfeited by his continued misconduct. Besides, until the Maharana visited Salumber for the ceremony there was no necessity of his attending upon the Maharana, which he was otherwise bound to do during the whole year. The A.G.G. in Rajputana, therefore, told the Rawat that in the event of the Maharana not visiting Salumber he had nothing to do but to furnish his contingent to the State, in which case the Maharana would have no power to injure or annoy him.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Henry Lawrence to Ceil Beadon, Secretary to Government d. 21 August 1855, Cons. 4 January 1856, No. 115, F & P.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.



While both the Political Agent and the A.G.G. supported the gradual destruction of the hereditary privileges of the Salumber house, the Rawat was adamant to regain them, or at least, to maintain his leadership among the Chiefs. He had formed his own clique against the Maharana. This clique comprised mainly the Chiefs who had their own differences with the Maharana on the questions of 'service' and *Chhatund* in particular. As the Chief of Salumber enjoyed the support of the other discontented chiefs, he persisted in his demand.<sup>1</sup> The natural corollary of his recalcitrant attitude was that in spite of the best efforts of the local British authorities no reconciliation could be effected between the Chief of Salumber and the Maharana.

Nevertheless, the Salumber Chief even went on with the old cry that he had not been heard. In June 1855 the Maharana admitted the right of the Chief of Salumber to be installed at Salumber either by the heir-apparent, or the Maharana himself. He promised that the custom would be preserved by his successor. On account of his ill-health he expressed his inability to perform the ceremony at Salumber. This did not satisfy the Rawat.<sup>2</sup> He continued to oppose the Maharana as he had nothing to fear from him. The disgruntled Chiefs of Gogunda, Kurawad, Kothariya, Bhindar and Amet were his supporters.<sup>3</sup> As such, the Rawat seized forcibly the custom-post of Geengla which had been given up in 1827 by his father to the Maharana at Cobbe's desire. On an explanation being demanded for his action by the Political Agent, he sent unsatisfactory and insolent replies. Thereupon, Henry Lawrence suggested to the Maharana to impose a penalty to the extent of Rs. 1,000 on Salumber.<sup>4</sup> At the same time he strongly urged upon

1. Henry Lawrence to Beadon d 21 August 1855, Cons. 4 January 1856, No. 115, F & P.

2. George Lawrence to Henry Lawrence, d. 14 June 1855, Cons. 4 January 1856, No. 123, F & P.

3. Henry Lawrence to G.F. Edmonstone Secretary to Government of India, d. 5 February 1857, Cons. 9 April 1858, No. 241, F & P.

4. Ibid.



his Government the inadvisability of allowing the Chief of Salumber to go without punishment. He recommended that the two principal recusant *jagirdars*, the Rawat of Salumber and the Maharaj of Bhindar,<sup>1</sup> should be deposed in favour of their next of kin and banished from Rajputana.<sup>2</sup> He even suggested that the nobles be permitted to choose another sovereign, should the Maharana not come to terms with his other disaffected Chiefs.<sup>3</sup>

These suggestions of Henry Lawrence did not show any political sagacity and cleverness, and smacked even of a rash decision. It was the obligation of the British Government to maintain the power and authority of a ruler within his State. In no circumstance could the British Government, therefore, have contemplated of supporting the faction of the nobles headed by the Chief of Salumber in its attempt to oust the Maharana. It was unwise to think of banishing the Chiefs of Salumber and Bhindar, for such an action would have widened the gulf between the Maharana and the disaffected Chiefs and worsened the situation.

### Showers as Political Agent

However, before the British Government could decide upon the proposal of Henry Lawrence, the latter was transferred as Commissioner to Oudh. George Lawrence took over charge as the officiating A. G. G. and Captain C. L. Showers, the then Assistant to the Agent to the Governor

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1. On the plea of an attempted robbery by residents of a Tonk village, the Bhindar Chief sent a large party to invade the Tonk Territory and seized five men with their property. For a long time, he defied the instructions of the Maharana and the Political Agent in this connection.
  2. Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone, d. 5 February 1857, Cons. 9 April 1858, No. 241, F & P.
  3. Ibid.



General, again took over as the officiating Political Agent, Mewar on March 17, 1857.<sup>1</sup>

Not much time had elapsed since the appointment of Showers at the Mewar Political Agency when the Uprising of 1857 broke out in Rajputana. In view of this crisis, Lord Canning, the then Governor-General, avoided the risk of taking any measure against the Chiefs or the Maharana until the British power appeared 'in strength in Rajputana'.<sup>2</sup> The fear that the Salumber party might take advantage of the British difficulties in Rajputana during the Uprising of 1857 kept the Mewar Political Agent and the A.G.G. on tenterhooks.<sup>3</sup>

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1. C.L. Showers offg. Mewar Political Agent to George Lawrence, Offg. A.G.G. d. 17 March, Cons. 20 May 1857, No. 90, F & P.
  2. Edmonstone to George Lawrence d. 28 January, Cons. 9 April 1858, No. 271-KW, F & P.
  3. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 27 July, Cons. 31 December 1858, Nos. 3146-7, F & P; C.L. Showers, *A Missing Chapter of the Indian Mutiny*, p. 128.



## CHAPTER V

### *Jodhpur Political Agency*

The relations between the British Government and the State of Jodhpur were cordial from 1818 to 1831.<sup>1</sup> The failure of Maharaja Man Singh of Jodhpur to attend the Governor-General's Durbar at Ajmer in January 1832, however, led to estrangement of his relations with the British Government. Lockett, the then Superintendent and Political Agent at Ajmer took serious note of the absence of the Maharaja, and considered it as his deliberate attempt to insult the Governor-General. As a mark of disapproval of his conduct, Lockett dismissed the *Vakil* of Jodhpur from Ajmer and recalled his news-writer from Jodhpur. This made Maharaja Man Singh apprehend that the British Government had taken offence at his inability to wait upon the Governor-General during his sojourn in Ajmer. Subsequently, he wrote an explanatory letter to Metcalfe, the then Vice-President-in-Council at Calcutta, soliciting his influence to impress upon the Governor-General that he should not have any prejudice against him on that account.<sup>2</sup> This effort on the part of the Maharaja proved of no avail, for the British Government

1. For instance, when in December 1831 Dhonkal Singh, the posthumous son of Maharaja Bhim Singh presented a representation to the British Government for his claim to Jodhpur *gaddi*, it declined to entertain his pretensions to it. It considered Maharaja Man Singh as the *de facto* ruler of Jodhpur. Prinsep to Dhonkal Singh d. 4 January, Cons. 30 January 1832, No. 122, F & P.
2. Maharaja Man Singh of Jodhpur to Vice-President-in-Council d. 6 April, Cons. 7 May 1832, No. 32, F & P.



manifested its disapprobation of his conduct by supporting the measure taken by Lockett.<sup>1</sup> Thus on the institution of the Rajputana Agency in 1832, when the State of Jodhpur was placed under the direct control of the A.G.G. in Rajputana,<sup>2</sup> its relations with the British Government were far from being satisfactory.

### Lockett and the State of Jodhpur

The suspension of diplomatic channel of communication between the State of Jodhpur and the Ajmer Political Agency made Maharaja Man Singh feel humiliated and aggrieved. In his first letter to the Governor-General after the latter's visit to Ajmer, he earnestly requested for the restoration of his diplomatic relations.<sup>3</sup> He also hoped that Lockett who was now the A.G.G. in Rajputana, would be instructed to conduct British relations with his State in a manner that would revive the bonds of friendship and union between the two Governments, and also expedite settlement of certain questions pertaining to the alleged outrages committed by his subjects on the neighbouring States.<sup>4</sup> The Governor-General showed forbearance towards the Maharaja for his absence at the Ajmer Durbar, and assured him that if he would depute a 'proper individual' to Ajmer, Lockett would not refuse to receive him.<sup>5</sup>

Even after the permission of the Governor-General Man Singh did not depute his *Vakil* to Ajmer.<sup>6</sup> The A.G.G. held

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1. Vice-President to Maharaja of Jodhpur d. 7 May, Cons. 7 May 1832, No. 34, F & P.
  2. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 28 September, Cons. 26 November 1832, No. 14, F & P; Cf. Chapter I, p. 37.
  3. Maharaja of Jodhpur to G. G. recd. 26 May, Cons. 6 June 1833, No. 14, F & P.
  4. Ibid. Vide, Chapter VIII.
  5. G. G. to Maharaja of Jodhpur d. 6 June, Cons. 6 June 1832, No. 17, F& P.
  6. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 5 October, Cons. 31 October 1833, No. 38, F & P.



that this extraordinary conduct of the Maharaja was due to his wishful thinking for an imminent political upheaval in India, which was based on his reliance on 'the old foolish report' that the Russians and the Persians, unitedly, were about to march into India, to emancipate the 'King of Delhi' from the tutelage of the British.<sup>1</sup> The British Government did not take notice of it and directed the A.G.G. to keep patience. He was told that the absence of the Jodhpur *Vakil* at Ajmer should not prevent him from addressing Man Singh on the pending questions.<sup>2</sup>

However, during Lockett's tenure of office, the matters could not be settled, for Maharaja Man Singh did not take Lockett to be judicious and objective. This view had perhaps deterred him from deputing his *Vakil* to Ajmer.

### Alves and the State of Jodhpur

On Major A. Speirs' assuming the officiating charge of the Rajputana Agency from Lockett, Maharaja Man Singh expressed his willingness to depute his *Vakil* to Ajmer.<sup>3</sup> When Lieutenant-Colonel N. Alves took over charge of the Rajputana Agency in June 1834, he found Pandit Chiman Ram, *Vakil* of Jodhpur at his office at Ajmer.<sup>4</sup> In return, a News-Writer was appointed at Jodhpur.<sup>5</sup> The expectation of Alves that the appointment of Jodhpur *Vakil* at Ajmer would help the Maharaja to settle the pending questions proved to be correct.<sup>6</sup> On meeting a

1. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 5 October, Cons. 31 October 1833, No. 38, F & P.

2. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 31 October, Cons. 31 October 1833, No. 44, F & P. See for details, Chapter VIII.

3. Tr. of a *Kharita* from Man Singh to Major Speirs, Offg. A. G. G. recd. 19 December 1833, Cons. 10 January 1834, No. 17, F & P.

4. N. Alves, A. G. G. to C. E. Trevelyan, Deputy Secretary to Government d. 4 June, Cons. 26 June 1834, No. 59, F & P.

5. Tr. of a *Kharita* from Alves to Man Singh d. 10 October, Cons. 2 December 1834, No. 31, F & P.

6. Alves to Macnaghten d. 9 September, Cons. 6 November 1834, No. 19, F & P.



special Mission from Jodhpur, Alves finally settled the pending questions.<sup>1</sup>

The re-establishment of a proper diplomatic channel of communication between the A.G.G. and the Maharaja marked the restoration of 'unity and friendship' between them.<sup>2</sup> As a result, when Lieutenant H. W. Trevelyan, the Assistant to the A. G. G. in Rajputana, visited Jodhpur in 1835, Man Singh readily agreed to pay Rs. 1,50,000 for the maintenance of the Jodhpur Legion, in lieu of furnishing 1,500 horse for general service to the British Government.<sup>3</sup>

### Ascendancy of the Naths in Jodhpur

The cordial relations between the State of Jodhpur and the British Government could not last long due to the baneful influence of Bhim Nath, the spiritual *Guru* of Man Singh.<sup>4</sup> Ever since the accession of Man Singh to the *gaddi*, the influence of the *Naths* in the State had been increasing through the Nath *Guru* of the Maharaja. The implicit faith of the Maharaja in the spiritual powers of the Nath *Guru*,<sup>5</sup> and his life of increasing indolence

1. Paper executed by the Jodhpur Mission accepted by Alves d. 3 October, Cons. 2 December 1834, No. 24, F & P; Cf. Chapter VIII.

2. Tr. of a *Kharita* from Alves to Man Singh d. 10 October, Cons. 2 December 1834, No. 31, F & P.

3. Tr. of an agreement between Man Singh and the British Government concluded by Trevelyan d. 7 December 1835, Cons. 8 February 1836, No. 65, F & P.

4. Alves to Prinsep d. 29 January, Cons. 21 March 1838, No. 112, F&P.

5. In 1805, Man Singh was besieged in his *jagir* at Jalore, by the troops of Maharaja Bhim Singh, the then ruler of Jodhpur, and was in great straits, with the prospects of starvation or surrender. Under the circumstances, Deo Nath assured Man Singh that if he only held out for a few days more, good news would reach him from Jodhpur. He maintained his position accordingly. At the expiry of three days intelligence was received of the death of Bhim Singh, by what means produced, was not known. These incidents are only important as accounting for the influence which the Naths exercised over Man Singh through the rest of his life. Sutherland to Secretary to Government d. 1 June, Cons. 7 August 1847, No. 845, F & P.



had thrown him into the hands of the Naths, to the annoyance of many *Thakurs* of the State.<sup>1</sup>

Due to the dominance of the Naths in the administration, a number of evils had set in by 1838. The payment of tribute to the British Government fell in arrears, the State accumulated debt,<sup>2</sup> and the Maharaja borrowed money for his domestic expenses.<sup>3</sup> A considerable portion of the State territory was held by Naths, Charans, and Jogis as *jagir*, and nothing was levied on them.<sup>4</sup> Bad and lax governance made the country less safe to the travellers. The frontiers of Jodhpur, on the side of Shekhawati and Bikaner, were in a continued state of plunder and confusion.<sup>5</sup>

### **Maladministration in the State**

This distracted condition at Jodhpur, if allowed to continue, would have meant the failure of the A. G. G. in fulfilling the obligations of his Government in Rajputana. Alves, therefore, took up the matter with the Maharaja. He repeatedly invited the latter's attention to the disturbed condition of Marwar frontiers bordering on Shekhawati and Bikaner, the considerable amount of debt which his State owed to the British Government, and impressed upon him the desirability of establishing an efficient administration at the capital in particular, and throughout the territories of Marwar in general.<sup>6</sup> But his efforts bore no fruit and the Maharaja continued to be negligent.

At this time, the disaffected Chiefs of Marwar were planning to undermine the influence of the Naths so as to improve the tone of administration of the State.<sup>7</sup> Alves

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1. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 28 September, Cons. 26 November 1832, No. 14, F & P.

2. Alves to Prinsep d. 2 March, Cons. 28 March 1838, No. 27, F & P.

3. Alves to Prinsep, d. 29 January, Cons. 21 March 1838, No. 112, F&P.

4. Alves to Prinsep d. 2 March, Cons. 28 March 1838, No. 27, F & P.

5. Alves to Prinsep d. 29 January, Cons. 21 March 1838, No. 112, F&P.

6. Alves to Man Singh d. 26 January, Cons. 7 March 1838, No. 27, F & P.

7. Alves to Prinsep d. 29 January, Cons. 21 March 1838, No. 112, F & P; Extract from the diary of the Rajputana Agency d. 3 January, Cons. 7 March 1838, No. 25, F & P.



visualized possibilities of success in these efforts, and was vigilant in abstaining himself from any act that might be construed as his disapproval of the efforts of these chiefs.<sup>1</sup>

It was in such circumstances that, on January 29, 1838 Alves suggested to his Government to sequestrate the Salt Works at Nawa and Godha belonging to Marwar, as a measure of security for the payment of arrears of tribute due from the State.<sup>2</sup>

In case the claims of the British Government remained unsatisfied, and if the Chiefs failed in their attempt to effect a change in the State Administration, Alves proposed to send a mission to Jodhpur to persuade the Maharaja to remove Bhim Nath from power, who misgoverned the State.<sup>3</sup> Further, if the mission did not succeed in establishing order in Marwar, he contended that the British Government would be left with no choice but to take over the administration of Jodhpur for as long as it might be expedient.<sup>4</sup>

The British Government approved the policy proposed by Alves. He was permitted to sequestrate the Salt Works of Nawa and Godha.<sup>5</sup> On the A. G. G.'s instructions, Lieutenant-Colonel Morrieson, then Superintendent at Sambhar, took possession of the Salt Works of Nawa and Godha.<sup>6</sup> The sequestration of these Salt Works was in addition to the Jodhpur share of Sambhar occupied earlier by the British Government in 1834 as a punishment to the Maharaja for his non-cooperation with the British Government in the

1. Alves to Prinsep d. 29 January, Cons. 21 March 1838, No. 112, F & P.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Macnaghten to Alves d. 7 March, Cons. 13 June 1838, No. 2 F & P.

6. R. Morrieson, Assistant-in-charge of Sambhar, to Alves d. 13 June, Cons. 25 July 1838, No. 48, F & P; *Kharita* from Alves to Man Singh d. 7 May, Cons. 26 September 1838, No. 66, F & P.



apprehension of thugs, and as a security for the pecuniary demands of the British Government on Jodhpur.<sup>1</sup>

The revenues from the Salt Works did not give hope that the dues of the British Government would be recovered. No new form of administration came about at Jodhpur. The Maharaja showed indifference to the A. G. G.'s solicitations for improving the distracted condition on the borders and in the administration of the State.<sup>2</sup> Bhim Nath and his agent Harak Chand acquired even greater control over the administration.<sup>3</sup> Imposition of fines and confiscation of the villages of the chiefs became the order of the day.<sup>4</sup> These developments made the administration of the State slip from bad to worse.

The *Vakil* of Jodhpur at the Ajmer Political Agency showed concern about the utter confusion throughout Marwar. He repeatedly requested the A. G. G. to depute a British officer to Jodhpur. But the A. G. G. did not give him any hope, specially because the Maharaja had called for no aid from the British Government.<sup>5</sup> The main reason which encouraged Alves to take this indifferent attitude was the serious illness of Bhim Nath at that time. He hoped that with the death of Bhim Nath a great obstacle in the development and progress of the State would be removed.<sup>6</sup>

Bhim Nath died on July 21, 1838, but Alves' expectations

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1. Cf. Chapter VIII.

2. Abstract of 28 *Kharitas* addressed to Man Singh between 1 January 1838 to 13 April 1838 on the subject of injuries by attacks of armed bands, robbers and thieves and the withholding of tribute money, etc. Cons. 26 September 1838, No. 66, F & P.

3. Abstract of intelligence in the Jodhpur *Akhbar* from 17 February to 24 February 1838, Cons. 25 April 1838, No. 104, F & P.

4. Alves to Macnaghten d. 23 April, Cons. 25 April 1838, No. 112, F & P.

5. Alves to Macnaghten d. 15 June, Cons. 26 September 1838, No. 68, F & P.

6. Alves to Macnaghten d. 26 June, Cons. 26 September 1838, No. 69, F & P.



did not come true.<sup>1</sup> Lachhmi Nath who succeeded to the title of his father, Bhim Nath, could not bring about any change in Man Singh's attitude towards the rebel Chiefs although, prior to his succession, he was considered to be the supporter of their cause.<sup>2</sup> The amount collected from the sequestrated Salt Works was also found insufficient to meet the pecuniary claims of the British Government.<sup>3</sup> The frontiers continued to be disturbed.<sup>4</sup> Thus all hopes of Alves were belied. But before he could resolve to act upon his well planned-out policy towards Jodhpur, he was transferred to the Hyderabad Residency.

### Sutherland and the State of Jodhpur

All communication between the A. G. G. and the State of Jodhpur again ceased abruptly in 1839, due to the withdrawal of the Agency *Vakil* by Maharaja Man Singh. Thereupon, James Sutherland, who had succeeded Alves at the Rajputana Agency, decided to visit Jodhpur to impress upon Man Singh, by friendly and amicable discussion, the necessity of establishing an administration at Jodhpur which should have the power of governing the country in peace, and affording protection to neighbouring States from the plundering raids committed by the subjects of Jodhpur, besides liquidating the arrears of tribute due to the British Government.<sup>5</sup> The mission of Sutherland was on the lines which Alves had proposed to his Government in 1838.

### Sutherland's negotiations failed at Jodhpur

Sutherland reached Jodhpur, on April 3, 1839, with his assistant Captain J. Ludlow, Dr. Russel and Lieutenant

1. Alves to Man Singh d. 27 July, Cons. 30 August 1838, No. 72, F & P.

2. Alves to Macnaghten d. 12 October, Cons. 26 September 1838, No. 111, F & P.

3. Ibid.

4. Alves to Macnaghten d. 14 December 1838, Cons. 9 January 1839, No. 66, F & P.

5. Sutherland to Maddock d. 10 June, Cons. 24 July 1839, No. 38, F & P.



**Thomas.**<sup>1</sup> After protracted negotiations the Maharaja agreed to pay all the pecuniary demands of the British Government at the Ajmer treasury.<sup>2</sup> Sutherland's endeavours to convince the Maharaja of establishing an efficient government at Jodhpur, which necessitated the dismissal of the Nathis and the return of the disaffected Chiefs to their fair share of emoluments and power, proved of no avail.<sup>3</sup> Convinced of the fact that his objects could not be realized through negotiations alone, Sutherland left for Ajmer on June 1, 1839.<sup>4</sup> Later on, he communicated to the Maharaja that, as he had failed in fulfilling his commitments to the British Government, his State no more enjoyed the British protection.<sup>5</sup> Simultaneously, to punish Man Singh, he suggested to his Government to besiege Jodhpur.<sup>6</sup> He contended that a blow to the State of Jodhpur, the most insolent of all the Indian States, would have a salutary effect in Rajputana where resistance to the British demands was being built up over some years.<sup>7</sup> The British Government unhesitatingly authorized the A.G.G. to invade Jodhpur.<sup>8</sup>

### **Institution of Jodhpur Political Agency**

In August 1839, a British force comprising the Light Field Force detachment from Nasirabad, the Shekhawati Brigade, the Merwara Battalion and the Jodhpur Legion marched against Jodhpur.<sup>9</sup> Man Singh did not put up any

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1. Sutherland to Maddock d. 10 June, Cons. 24 July 1839, No. 38 F & P.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Sutherland to Maddock d. 10 July, Cons. 24 July 1839, No. 39, F & P.

5. Sutherland to Man Singh d. 14 June, Cons. 24 July 1839, No. 36, F & P.

6. Sutherland to Maddock d. 8 June, Cons. 17 July, No. 72, F & P.

7. Ibid.

8. Torrens to Sutherland d. 11 July, Cons. 7 August 1839, No. 27, F & Sc.

9. Sutherland to Maddock d. 21 August, Cons. 13 November 1839 No. 97, F & Sc.



resistance. The movement of the British troops ended on September 28, 1839 with the occupation of the Fort of Jodhpur. Sutherland had considered this measure essential as a warning to the other Princely States.<sup>1</sup>

A sense of danger to his position compelled the Maharaja to comply with the terms dictated to him by Sutherland. The Maharaja agreed to exclude the Naths from the administration of the State, to restore the expatriated Chiefs to their possessions and rights, and to pay all accumulated dues to the British Government along with the cost of the expedition.<sup>2</sup> On the request of the Maharaja, Sutherland, without the prior sanction of his Government returned to him the Salt Works of Sambhar, Nawa and Godha.<sup>3</sup> Further, he proposed to form a Council of Regency presided over by Political Agent, which in consultation with the Maharaja should direct the government of the State, until the Chiefs were restored to their rights, and order was established in the State. This was accepted both by the Chiefs and the Maharaja.<sup>4</sup> Accordingly, Sutherland in exercise of his special powers<sup>5</sup> appointed his third Assistant, Captain J. Ludlow as the Jodhpur Political Agent.<sup>6</sup> Ludlow assumed charge of his new office on September 9, 1839, and this marked the establishment of the Jodhpur Political Agency.<sup>7</sup> The Maharaja deputed a *Vakil* to the Jodhpur Political Agency.<sup>8</sup>

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1. Sutherland to Maddock d. 20 October 1839, Cons. 24 February 1840, No. 34 F & P.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Maddock to Sutherland d. 25 September, Cons. 27 November 1839, No. 33, F & P.

6. Sutherland to Maddock d. 3 January, Cons. 15 March 1841, No. 36, F & P.

7. Macnaghten to Ludlow d. 27 January, Cons. 16 March 1840, No. 130, F & P.

8. Sutherland to R. H. C. Hami'ton, Offg. Secretary to Lieutenant Governor N. W. P. d. 7 March, Cons. 6 April 1840, No. 41, F & P.



Thus the State of Jodhpur was transferred from the direct control of the Ajmer Political Agency to the Jodhpur Political Agent who was to work under the guidance of the A.G.G.

#### Arrangements for the payment of British dues

The actions of the A.G.G. were approved by the British Government, who desired him to make distinct arrangements for the speedy payment of the arrears of tribute, the expenses for the maintenance of the Jodhpur Legion (*Sawar Kharcha*), and the expenses of the military operation.<sup>1</sup> Thereupon, Sutherland, with the concurrence of all the parties at Jodhpur and with the help of Ludlow succeeded in making arrangements regarding the total British demand of rupees ten lakhs. The Chiefs, the minister and the *Pasbans* together agreed to contribute Rs. 6,55,000 as '*Rekh*'. The remaining amount of Rs. 3,45,000 was to be collected as '*Gharbab*' (house-tax) from every house in the State.<sup>2</sup> In this way, the total amount was to be deposited into the British treasury by the middle of December, 1840.<sup>3</sup> The arrangement for the payment of the tribute (Rs. 1,80,000) was made from the Sambhar revenues.<sup>4</sup> The *Sawar Kharch* amounting to Rs. 1,15,000 was to be paid from the *Rekh* by the *Thakurs* of the State.<sup>5</sup> This was the first occasion when they took upon themselves the responsibility of a payment of this kind. The arrangements made by Sutherland at Jodhpur settled nearly all the questions which had long distracted Marwar. The conduct of all parties during the negotiations at Jodhpur was cordial and conciliatory. Therefore, Sutherland proposed to his Government to remove the British garrison from the Jodhpur Fort and to restore it to the Maharaja.<sup>6</sup> The British

1. Maddock to Sutherland d. 7 November 1839, Cons. 24 February 1840, No. 41, F & P.

2. Sutherland to Maddock d. 29 December, 1839, Cons. 24 February 1840, No. 37, F & P.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.



Government approved of all arrangements thus made, and permitted him to withdraw the British troops from Jodhpur.<sup>1</sup> Sutherland, finally withdrew the British garrison from the Jodhpur Fort on 27 February, 1840.<sup>2</sup> The Maharaja ascended the fort<sup>3</sup> on March 1, 1840.

With zeal, Sutherland, laid a solid foundation for the new form of Government at Jodhpur which was acceptable to the people.<sup>4</sup> The policy which he ably executed was that of his predecessor, Alves. But the establishment of a Council of Regency at Jodhpur was an extension of his own policy, which he had followed at Jaipur.<sup>5</sup>

### **The expelled chiefs reconciled**

Meanwhile, Ludlow, with the help of the Council of Regency comprising the eight prominent Chiefs and the Maharaja, had started making arrangements for the restoration of the expelled Chiefs and others to their rights. The territorial claims of those prominent among them, were settled.<sup>6</sup> The lands paying Rs. 1,04,000 of *Rekh* were resumed from the Chiefs whom the Maharaja had favoured formerly; and their major portion was distributed among the humbler Chiefs, and the dependents of the Court, who, in the late conflict of parties at Jodhpur had lost their means of subsistence.<sup>7</sup> These measures brought about a reconciliation between the Maharaja

1. Secretary to G. G. to Sutherland d. 13 January, Cons. 24 February 1840, No. 38, F & P.

2. Sutherland to Hamilton d. 2 March, Cons. 23 March 1840, No. 57, F & P.

3. Ibid.

4. Maddock to Thomason d. 10 March, Cons. 23 March 1840, No. 56, F & P.

5. Cf. Chapter VI.

6. Sutherland to J. Davidson, Secretary to Lieutenant Governor N.W.P. d. 18 February, Cons. 23 March 1840, No. 55, F & P.

7. Sutherland to R. H. C. Hamilton, Offg. Secretary to Lieutenant Governor, N. W. P., d. 2 March, Cons. 23 March 1840, No. 57, F&P.



and the disaffected chiefs. They also gave a 'satisfactory turn' to the affairs at Jodhpur.<sup>1</sup>

### Improvements in the State administration

Ludlow devoted himself to building up an efficient system of administration in the State in November 1840. The procedure of receipts and disbursements was improved. Proper arrangements for the watch and ward of the city were made.<sup>2</sup> The judicial system was reformed without bringing about any major change in the existing pattern of justice of the State. The salary due to the army was paid.<sup>3</sup> The State army was reconstituted, and a large number of men were discharged to effect economy in its expenditure.<sup>4</sup> In conformity with the engagement of December 29, 1839, the payments to the British Government on account of tribute and *Fauj kharch* were completed by the end of 1840.<sup>5</sup> The measures introduced by Ludlow renovated the administration, restored the financial condition and established the authority of the Maharaja in the State. In discharging these tasks, which rarely fell to the lot of a Political officer to perform, Ludlow had employed his ability and exercised his discretion so well, that he won the appreciation of the A.G.G.<sup>6</sup>

### Removal of the Naths

The baneful influence of the Naths continued to be effective in Jodhpur. On his return to the headquarters on January 1, 1842 after a six-week tour to Godwar, a place in the interior of the State, Ludlow felt the extent to which

1. Sutherland to R. H. C. Hamilton, O.Tg. Secretary to Lieutenant Governor, N. W. P., d. 2 March, Cons. 23 March 1840, No. 57, F & P.

2. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 26 November, 1840, Cons. 15 March 1841, Nos. 35-36, F & P.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Sutherland to Maddock d. 3 January, Cons. 15 March 1841, No. 35, F & P.



Lachhmi Nath and his protege still had the capacity to influence the affairs of the State. He found that the Naths, with the support of the Maharaja, had begun to meddle in the affairs of the State.<sup>1</sup> They had secured a complete hold over the *Diwan*,<sup>2</sup> usurped fresh villages, procured the State money for their benefit and even pressed their importunities to such an extent that a large number of State jewels had to be pawned to procure money wherewith to gratify them.<sup>3</sup> The older the Maharaja grew, the greater appeared the power of these priests over him. In these circumstances, Sutherland was compelled to instruct Ludlow to employ the Jodhpur Legion for expelling the Naths from the State, if the Maharaja failed to do so himself.<sup>4</sup> This action of Sutherland was upheld by his Government.<sup>5</sup>

Ludlow efficiently carried out the instructions of the A.G.G. The Maharaja's reluctance to persuade the Naths to leave Jodhpur left Ludlow with no alternative but to effect their expulsion or seizure.<sup>6</sup> The attempt to seize the three principal Naths failed, but they were expelled. Most of the Nath families had already quit Marwar, and a few that remained there were on the eve of following them.<sup>7</sup> Further, on Ludlow's threat to the Maharaja of withdrawing British protection to the State, and as a result of the incessant efforts of the Agency *Vakil*, Riddh Mal, the Maharaja entered into a written agreement in March 1842 that the expelled Naths would not return without the permission of the British

1. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 18 January, Cons. 28 February 1842, No. 22, F & P.

2. The Diwan had identified himself entirely with the Naths as a means of winning the favour of the Maharaja.

3. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 18 January 1842, *loc.cit.*

4. *Ibid.*

5. Secretary to Government to Sutherland d. 28 February, Cons. 28 February 1842, No. 23, F & P.

6. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 26 March, Cons. 7 September 1842, No. 29, F & P.

7. *Ibid.*



**Government.** According to this agreement, the lands of the Naths yielding Rs. 4,50,000 were resumed except a few villages held by copper-plate grants in perpetuity.<sup>1</sup> Further, to keep the Naths away from the internal affairs of the State, their villages in perpetual grants were made over to *Sahukars*, who were to deposit all the yields of their resources into treasury, whence the perpetual grantees were to receive the full amount of the produce of the lands. Besides, a stipend amounting to three lakh rupees per annum was assigned for the maintenance of the Naths. This was also to be paid to them direct from the treasury. Besides these restraints, Ludlow retained a wing of the Jodhpur Legion at Jodhpur to seize any of the Naths or their adherents who might attempt to interfere in the administration of the State.<sup>2</sup> Only a limited number of the Naths required for performing *Puja* at the temples were retained at Jodhpur. The firmness with which Ludlow carried out the very delicate task of purging the Jodhpur administration of Nath influence demonstrated the power and control he had acquired in the State.<sup>3</sup>

The new restraints imposed upon the Naths, by the agreement of March 1842, to check the return of their sect to power, failed in its objectives by August 1842. About 600 Naths had retraced their steps before finally quitting Marwar.<sup>4</sup> The Political Agent, therefore, impressed upon the Maharaja to effect their expulsion from Marwar on the threat that, if they held out, the allowance of the whole sect would be stopped.<sup>5</sup> The Chiefs and ministers also repeatedly requested the Maharaja to expel the Naths. But the Maharaja showed utter reluctance

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1. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 26 March, Cons. 7 September 1842, No. 29, F & P.

2. Ibid.

3. Sutherland to Maddock d. 1 April, Cons. 15 June 1842, No. 18, F & P.

4. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 16 August, Cons. 12 October 1842, No. 38, F & P.

5. Ibid.



to order what might have the appearance of severity. He manifested his hostile disposition towards the British Government by allowing his people, at his own door, to pelt with stones his own Agency *Vakil*, Ridh. Mal, whom they considered to be the protagonist of the British interests in the State. The Maharaja sat among the Naths and took no part in the affairs of the State except in misapplying its resources and encouraging the attachment of the lands of the Chiefs opposed to his priests. The Maharaja hoped that by offering this line of passive resistance, he would be able to effect a change in the British policy towards Jodhpur which would 'leave the sovereign uncontrolled in his government, and place the Naths in the position which they formerly enjoyed'.<sup>1</sup> The A.G.G. saw no reason for agreeing to the designs of the Maharaja. In case the Maharaja persisted in his course of passive resistance, he suggested to his Government to depose him and place the rightful heir on the *gaddi*.<sup>2</sup> The Governor-General kept this proposal in abeyance.<sup>3</sup> He wrote a *Kharita* to the Maharaja, requiring him to fulfil his agreement of expelling the Naths from Marwar.<sup>4</sup> At the same time he authorized Sutherland:<sup>5</sup>

to effect, by force if necessary, the entire expulsion of the Naths, and the due appropriation of the revenue of Jodhpur to the performance of its engagements with the British Government and the public purposes of the State.

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1. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 24 December 1842, Cons. 14 June 1843, No. 74, F & P.
  2. Sutherland to Maddock d. 18 January, Cons. 14 June 1843, No. 73, F & P.
  3. Secretary to Government to Sutherland d. 2 February, Cons. 14 June 1843, No. 76 A, F & P.
  4. Lord Ellenborough, G. G. to Maharaja Man Singh d. 26 February, Cons. 14 June 1843, No. 82, F & P.
  5. Offg. Secretary to Government to Sutherland d. 26 February, Cons. 14 June 1843, No. 81, F & P.



levies imposed on the feudal chiefs, and to oppose the sequestration of their villages from them for non-payment of the levies.<sup>1</sup>

Shakespeare, at the Maharaja's request and on realizing the gravity of the situation, summoned to Jodhpur the *Thakurs* who came as a group. The Political Agent urged on them to submit to the authority of the Maharaja and to attend the Durbar individually and separately for the adjustment of their claims. They, however, refused to break up their combination.<sup>2</sup>

Thereupon, the troops of the Maharaja proceeded to occupy Gular for enforcing the payment of the arrears of *Rekh*<sup>3</sup> upon the Thakur. The Thakur with his armed retainers offered resistance. He was soon joined by other recusant *Thakurs* and their armed retainers from Ajmer, Mewar and Jaipur.<sup>4</sup>

### Monck Mason as Political Agent

However, on his transfer to Baroda, Shakespeare left the Jodhpur Political Agency on March 28, 1857, in the hands of Lieutenant G.H. Monck Mason,<sup>5</sup> with the confidence that the latter would be able to compose the differences between the Maharaja and the disaffected *Thakurs*.<sup>6</sup>

Shakespeare's assessment came true to the extent that the disaffected Chiefs approached the British Government as well as George Lawrence, the newly appointed A.G.G. in Rajputana

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1. George Lawrence, Offg. A.G.G. to Edmonstone d. 2 May, Cons. 12 June 1857, No. 204, F&P.

2. Ibid.

3. The Thakur of Gular acknowledged not having paid '*Rekh*' for four and a half years.

4. Political letter to COD d. 9 January 1858, No. 2, para 235.

5. G. H. Monck Mason, Jodhpur Political Agent to Edmonstone d. 28 March, Cons. 24 April 1857, No. 382, F&P.

6. Shakespeare to Edmonstone d. 24 March, Cons. 24 April 1857, No. 381, F&P.



for the settlement of their disputes with the Maharaja.<sup>1</sup> The A.G.G. manifested no sign of complying with their request. Further, as a mark of his duty, he warned the retainers of the neighbouring States through the appropriate Political Agents to desist from helping the disaffected *Thakurs*.<sup>2</sup> The mode of action of the A.G.G. was in conformity with the British policy in Rajputana States. The British Government, therefore, approved of his actions, and desired him to persevere in the course he had chosen earlier in respect of their disputes also.<sup>3</sup>

However, before the State forces could overcome the resistance at Gular, the uprising of 1857 had started against the British authority.<sup>4</sup> The State troops were instantaneously summoned by the A.G.G. to Ajmer. The Maharaja realizing that his authority depended upon British support, unhesitatingly withdrew his troops from Gular to assist the British against the rebels.<sup>5</sup>

In the meantime, the group of disaffected nobles had gained a powerful ally in the Chief of Ahwa, Thakur Kushal Singh.<sup>6</sup> In April 1857, Kanji, the Chief of Beethora, because of some family feud, was murdered by the servants of the

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1. Memorial of Mertia Thakurs to Edmonstone, d. 1 May, Cons. 12 June 1857, No. 203, F&P; Memorial of the Agents of Mertia Thakurs to Edmonstone, recd. 14 May, Cons. 12 June 1857, No. 201, F&P.
  2. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 2 May, Cons. 12 June 1857, No. 204, F&P.
  3. Edmonstone to George Lawrence d. 12 June, Cons. 12 June 1857, No. 209, F&P; Political Letter to COD d. 9 January 1858, No. 2, paras 236-241.
  4. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 29 October, Cons. 27 November 1857, No. 346, F&P.
  5. Tr. of a *Kharita* from Maharaja Takht Singh of Jodhpur to George Lawrence 27 Ramzan 1273 (Muslim era), Cons. 26 June 1857, No. 118, F&Sc.
  6. Report on the origin of the dispute between Jodhpur and Ahwa Thakur from Captain J. P. Nixon, Jodhpur Political Agent to W.F. Eden, Offg. A.G.G., d. 5 September 1859, Cons. March 1863, No. 56, Political-A, Foreign Department.



Ahwa Chief. Thereupon, the Maharaja of Jodhpur attacked the village of Balotra in Ahwa *jagir*. But Kushal Singh at once ejected the invaders. The Maharaja found himself unable to vindicate his authority in the absence of his troops, which were on duty at Ajmer.<sup>1</sup>

The British Government had renounced the policy of supporting the disaffected chiefs in the State against their ruler, after the demise of Maharaja Man Singh. From this change of policy, it appeared to the Chiefs that the British Government and the Political officers were strengthening the hands of Maharaja Takht Singh. It was this impression among the disaffected Chiefs, which created difficulties for Monck Mason at Jodhpur, and made it difficult for George Lawrence to maintain the British prestige and power in Rajputana during the period of the 1857 uprising.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Cons. March 1863, No. 56, Political -A, Foreign Department.

2. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 27 July, Cons. 31 December 1858, Nos. 3146-47, F&P.



## CHAPTER VI

### *Jaipur Political Agency*

On the institution of the Rajputana Agency in 1832, the responsibility of conducting British relations with the State of Jaipur devolved upon the A.G.G.<sup>1</sup> The State of Jaipur posted a *Vakil* at the Ajmer Political Agency to watch its interests<sup>2</sup> while the A.G.G. posted his two *harkaras* at Jaipur for securing information from there.<sup>3</sup>

#### **Lockett and the State of Jaipur**

During the time of Bentinck's march from Delhi to Ajmer, Sanghi Jhota Ram, the minister of Jaipur, held a meeting with H. T. Prinsep, Secretary to the Governor-General, at Mubair (in Jaipur) on January 6, 1832 and complained that Lockett had deliberately avoided communication with the ruling party at Jaipur during his tour through Shekhawati (September 1831) and subsequently since his appointment as the Superintendent and Political Agent at Ajmer, while he had frequently seen Rawal Berisal who was known to be the head of the opposition against the ruling group and the Regent Rani. Further, he requested Prinsep to reduce the tribute as it was exorbitant.

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1. Macnaghten to Lockett, A.G.G. d. 17 April, Cons. 2 July 1832, No. 42, F&P; See *Supra*, p. 40.
  2. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 8 June, Cons. 20 August 1832, No. 25, F&P.
  3. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 4 July, Cons. 20 August 1832, Nos 45-6, F&P.



Prinsep assured the minister that no favour would be shown to any party by the representative of the British Government, but he gave him no hope of any remission in tribute which, he thought, was in accordance with the treaty with Jaipur.<sup>1</sup> Subsequently, the Governor-General, in a *Kharita* to the ruler of Jaipur, endorsed the views of his Secretary, and assured him that if the 'Representative of the British Government' adopted a partisan attitude he would incur his 'severe displeasure'.<sup>2</sup>

Further, the Governor-General, in December 1832, instructed Lockett, who by then had assumed the charge of A.G.G. in Rajputana that, to enable the Jaipur State to prosper, he should view the conduct of its affairs with indulgence, as the tribute of rupees eight lakhs imposed upon it, was reported to be high. Besides, Lockett was enjoined to take every opportunity to uphold the constituted authorities of Jaipur State against Berisal, or any other individual attempting to defy the authority of the State. Bentinck avowedly declared that the British policy was to collect the tribute regularly and not to interfere in the internal affairs of the State in the same way as it was followed in relation to the other States of Rajputana.<sup>3</sup>

To Lockett, the tribute imposed on the State of Jaipur in 1818 was not 'very heavy'. His experience was that the authorities at Jaipur, instead of improving resources of the State, were constantly engaged in intrigues to exterminate their rivals from power.<sup>4</sup> Besides, they aggrandized themselves at the expense of the State, whereas they ought to have administered

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1. Memorandum submitted by H.T. Prinsep, Secretary to Governor-General to George Swinton, Chief Secretary to the Government d. 12 February, Cons. 2 April 1832, No. 45, F&P.

2. *Kharita* from Bentinck to Raja of Jaipur d. 10 March, Cons. 2 April 1832, No. 45, F&P.

3. W.H. Macnaghten, Secretary to the Governor-General to A. Lockett, A.G.G. d. 7 December 1832, Cons. 7 January 1833, No. 33, F&P.

4. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 18 December 1832, Cons. 4 February 1833, No. 16, F&P.



the State with justice and equity.<sup>1</sup> In spite of the difference of opinion with the Governor-General on the question of tribute, Lockett assured him that he would follow his instructions.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, he refrained from meddling in the internal affairs of the State. In 1833, Udai Bhanote Rani, one of the widows of Maharaja Jagat Singh of Jaipur, complained to the A.G.G. of the maltreatment she had received at the hands of Bhattianiji the Regent Rani and other authorities of the State on account of her refusal to give up the *patta* of the *jagir* of rupees 16,000 and to accept instead another *jagir* of rupees 8,000.<sup>3</sup> Lockett refused to interfere in the matter as it was clearly an internal affair.<sup>4</sup> The British Government concurred with Lockett.<sup>5</sup>

Whenever the Jaipur Darbar supplicated for remission in tribute, either on account of the arrears<sup>6</sup> or on account of drought,<sup>7</sup> Lockett<sup>8</sup> stubbornly upheld the British claim. He always believed that even a partial remission of the dues of Jaipur would have prejudicial effect on the other tributary States

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1. In October 1832, the Maharaja and the Maji accused Rawal Berisal of a conspiracy to murder Sanghi Hukum Chand, the brother of Jhota Ram. The investigation conducted by Alexander Speirs, the Assistant to the A.G.G. revealed that the alleged attempt at assassination never did in reality take place. It was a plot devised by the enemies of the Rawal to effect his ruin. Political letter to COD d. 30 August 1833, No. 6, paras 5 and 27.
  2. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 18 December 1832, Cons. 4 February 1833, No. 16, F&P.
  3. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 27 March, Cons. 16 April 1833, Nos. 21-2, F&P. Maharaja Jagat Singh had granted *jagir* to Rani Udai Bhanote.
  4. Ibid.
  5. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 16 April, Cons. 16 April 1833, No. 23, F&P.
  6. Political letter to COD d. 30 August 1833, No. 6, para 62.
  7. Maji Sahiba of Jaipur to Vice-President Recd. 25 May, Cons. 18 June 1832, No. 86, F&P.
  8. Tr. of a *Kharita* from Maharaja Jai Singh to G. G. recd. 18 September, Cons. 31 October 1833, No. 29, F&P.



of Rajputana.<sup>1</sup> The strictness with which Lockett viewed the question was supported by the Governor-General who intimated to the Maharaja of Jaipur that the tribute of his State was fixed with reference to its average capacity and not on an estimate of peculiarly favourable seasons.<sup>2</sup> Despite repeated requests of the Jaipur Darbar for reduction in tribute<sup>3</sup> the Governor-General refused to change his decision.<sup>4</sup> The extent to which the British Government showed its desire to adhere to its decision was entirely based on the report of the A.G.G. who never viewed the solicitations of the Jaipur authorities favourably.

There was no sign of improvement in the British relations with the State of Jaipur during the tenure of Lockett. Neither was the question of tribute settled nor did the relations of Jaipur Darbar and Rawal Berisal improve. The case of Rawal Berisal was a striking example of the British system of guaranteeing protection to the Chiefs of Jaipur. This led to dissensions and confusion in the State.<sup>5</sup> However, after the appointment of A. Speirs as the officiating A.G.G., the British Government saw an opportunity to restore harmony in the State.

Bhattianiji, who was an inveterate enemy of the Rawal passed away in 1833.<sup>6</sup> Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh III was to take the charge of the administration on attaining maturity in

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1. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 18 September, Cons. 31 October 1833, No. 29, F&P
  2. G.G. to Maharaja of Jaipur d. 31 October, Cons. 31 October 1833, No. 34, F&P.
  3. Tr. of a *Kharita* from Maharaja of Jaipur to Governor-General, recd. 17 October, Cons. 5 December 1833, No. 7, F&P; Tr of a *Kharita* from Maharaja of Jaipur to G. G. recd. 4 November, Cons. 15 November 1833, No. 9, F&P.
  4. Secretary to Government to Speirs offg. A.G.G. d. 27 December, Cons. 27 December 1833, No. 24, F&P.
  5. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 7 December 1832, Cons. 7 January 1833, No. 33, F&P.
  6. Political letter to COD No. 17 of 1834, para 125; Political letter to COD d. 6 April 1838, No. 14, para 108.



1835. This seemed a suitable opportunity to the British Government for bringing about a reconciliation between the Rawal and the Maharaja. In April 1834, Speirs was, therefore, directed to make efforts in this regard so that the British interference in the internal affairs of the State could be avoided in future.<sup>1</sup>

### Alves and the State of Jaipur

N. Alves had already taken charge of the Rajputana Agency from Speirs by the time these orders reached Ajmer. But before Alves could carry out the wishes of his Government, Jai Singh, after assuming the reins of government, was taken seriously ill, and died on February 5, 1835.<sup>2</sup> The circumstances of the death of the Maharaja led to a general belief that he was administered poison by or on the orders of Jhota Ram.<sup>3</sup> Upon this, Jhota Ram pretended his readiness to be relieved of his ministerial position and requested the A.G.G. to visit Jaipur immediately.<sup>4</sup>

### Young Raja taken under British protection

On the instructions of his Government,<sup>5</sup> Alves visited Jaipur. He issued a proclamation at Jaipur notifying that as the late Maharaja Jai Singh was believed to have died an unnatural death, the British Government being the paramount power had taken upon itself the care of the minor successor, Maharaja Ram Singh.<sup>6</sup> The tender age of the heir justified the 'special interposition' of the British Government in Jaipur. Jhota Ram

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1. Macnaghten to A. Speirs, Offg. A.G.G. d. 25 March, Cons. 24 April 1834, No. 23, F&P.
  2. Alves to Macnaghten d. 8 February, Cons. 5 March 1835, No. 54, F&P.
  3. Intelligence from Jaipur, received from the *Vakil* of Rawal Berisal d. 17 February, Cons. 5 March 1835, No. 59, F&P.
  4. Tr. of a letter from Jhota Ram to Alves Recd. 10 February, Cons. 5 March 1835, No. 56, F&P; Alves to Macnaghten d. 19 February, Cons. 5 March 1835, No. 57, F&P.
  5. Macnaghten to Alves d. 5 March, Cons. 5 March 1835, No. 60, F&P.
  6. Political letter to COD d. 4 May 1835, No. 20.



was confined at Dausa (in Jaipur) till the investigation into the charges levelled against him was over.<sup>1</sup>

### **Party of the A.G.G. attacked at Jaipur**

Alves did not find any circumstantial evidence against Jhota Ram to prove that he was responsible for the death of the late Maharaja.<sup>2</sup> However, in view of the public opinion the British Government, instead of detaining Jhota Ram, ordered Alves to expatriate him from the State.<sup>3</sup> Before Alves carried out this order, circumstances spontaneously took a virulent turn at Jaipur.

On June 4, 1835, when Alves, along with his Assistants, Captains Martin Black, John Ludlow and Cornet Macnaghten, was returning from the palace at Jaipur after a conference with the *Thakurs* and Maji Chandrawatji, the Regent Rani, he was attacked and seriously wounded by one Fateh Singh. Ludlow and Macnaghten escaped from the city, but Captain Black fell victim to the frenzy of a large mob.<sup>4</sup> The act of the occupation of the Jaipur portion of Sambhar Salt Lake and Shekhawati and Torawati by the British Government in 1834-35, was used by the conspirators as a stimulus to incite the crowd against the British officers.<sup>5</sup> This event at Jaipur not only bewildered the Regent Rani<sup>6</sup> but also attracted the attention of the people as well as the Princes of Rajputana.<sup>7</sup>

### **Alves established confidence at Jaipur**

After this event Alves evinced great energy and promptitude in re-establishing the confidence of the State authorities

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1. Political letter to COD d. 4 May 1835, No. 20.
  2. Alves to Macnaghten d. 6 May, Cons. 1 June 1835, No. 19, F&P; Alves to Macnaghten d. 23 May, Cons. 15 June 1835, No. 21, F&P.
  3. Macnaghten to Alves d. 1 June, Cons. 1 June 1835, No. 21, F&P.
  4. Alves to Macnaghten d. 11 June 1835, File No. 23-Jaipur, Vol. I, 1835, List No. 1, p. 17, S. No. 172, File pp. 10-17, *RAR*.
  5. Alves to Macnaghten d. 21 July 1835, File No. 23-Jaipur, *op. cit.*, File pp. 136-65.
  6. Tr. of a letter from Rani Chandrawat to Alves d. 17 June, Cons. 13 July 1835, No. 26, F&P.
  7. Ross, Harauti Political Agent to Alves, d. 20 November, Cons. 21 December 1835, No. 22, F&P; Bolieau, *op. cit.*, p. 108.



in the British power. He assured Maji Chandrawatji of the security and protection of her son and the Raj.<sup>1</sup> After having consultations with Rawal Berisal, the principal chief of Jaipur,<sup>2</sup> Alves acquiesced in his appointment as the *Mukhtiar* of the State with unfettered powers in its administration. This measure was considered by Alves as the only means of establishing an effective government at Jaipur,<sup>3</sup> which the British Government approved.<sup>4</sup> It marked the beginning of the process of depriving the Regent Rani of her ascendancy in the State. The appointment of Rawal Berisal as the *Mukhtiar* undermined the status of the Regent Rani and, therefore, it was disliked by her.

### Appointment of a Political Agent refused

In the meantime, the British Government, in order to allay the outraged feelings of the people ordered, Alves on September 21, 1835 to restore Shekhawati and Torawati to the State of Jaipur.<sup>5</sup> When Alves offered the control of these tracts to Rawal Berisal, the latter showed his readiness to accept the offer if a Political Agent was appointed at Jaipur to aid and advise him in carrying out the general administration of the State and in managing the tracts.<sup>6</sup> Alves found in this proposal an echo of his own mind. He, therefore, unhesitatingly recommended to his Government to appoint a Political Agent at Jaipur.<sup>7</sup>

But the Governor-General declined to accept the recommendation of Alves. He desired that the State should be left to itself in its internal affairs.<sup>8</sup> In November 1835, Alves was

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1. Tr. of a letter from Alves to Maji Chandrawat, d. 17 June, Cons 13 July 1835, No. 22, F&P.
  2. Tr. of a letter from Rawal Berisal to Alves, d. 14 June, Cons 6 July 1835, No. 11, F&P.
  3. Alves to Macnaghten, d. 19 June, Cons. 6 July 1835, No. 10, F&P.
  4. Macnaghten to Alves, d. 6 July, Cons. 6 July 1835, No. 12, F&P.
  5. Macnaghten to Alves d. 21 September 1835, referred in Cons. 16 November 1835, No. 26, F&P.
  6. Alves to Macnaghten d. 25 October, Cons. 16 November 1835, No. 27, F&P.
  7. *Ibid.*
  8. Macnaghten to Alves d. 16 November, Cons. 16 November 1835, No. 28, F&P.



directed to withdraw British interference in Shekhawati and Torawati if the Jaipur Government showed its ability to suppress depredations there without seeking British help. Alves was told that the general consent and support of the British Government to the administration of the Rawal was only to be extended in the shape of his having frequent consultations on the matters of the State with the A. G. G. Alves was further advised that the chiefs of the State should be consulted on the formation of a new administration, if the Rawal was unable to maintain his power without the aid of the Political Agent. If, however a "national government" could not be formed in the State, the Governor-General pointed out that he would appoint a Political Agent with full powers to interfere in the administration of the State and to introduce "British functionaries in the management of every department" there.<sup>1</sup> The inclination of the Governor-General to sanction British interference in the State showed that he was considerably impressed by the recommendation of the A.G.G.

### **Shekhawati restored to Jaipur**

In accordance with the instructions of his Government, Alves started negotiations with the Rawal who assured him of his capacity to conduct the affairs of Shekhawati and Torawati along with the general administration of the State of Jaipur.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, the two districts were restored to Jaipur.<sup>3</sup> It made the Rawal popular with the people in general and assuaged their outraged feelings against the British.<sup>4</sup>

### **Conspirators punished**

In the meantime, the British Government demanded punishment of all the persons involved in the perpetration of the outrage of June 4, so that such an event might not be repeated in future.<sup>5</sup> The investigation of the Jaipur Durbar,<sup>6</sup>

1. Macnaghten to Alves d. 16 November 1835, *loc. cit.*

2. Political letter to COD d. 26 September 1836, No. 25, para 26.

3. *Ibid*

4. Political letter to COD d. 28 November 1836, No. 33, paras 64-5.

5. Secretary to Government to Alves d. 15 June, Cons. 15 June 1835, No. 65, F&P.

6. Alves to Macnaghten d. 11 September, Cons. 5 October 1835, No. 41, F&P.



and the trials conducted by the Special Court constituted for this purpose at Jaipur,<sup>1</sup> revealed that the conspiracy of June 4 was hatched by a clique of Jain Bankers, the partisans of Sanghi Jhota Ram. The conspirators were punished. Prominent among them, Dewan Amar Chand Saravagee and Hidayat Ullah, were executed. Shivrul Sahu, Manik Chand Bhaosa, Jhota Ram and his brother Hukam Chand were given imprisonment for life while the other conspirators were convicted and given various terms of imprisonment.<sup>2</sup> The downfall of Jhota Ram made the position of the Rawal more secure in the State than before.

The Sanghi group was not happy to see Rawal Berisal continuing in power. In May 1837, under the leadership of Thakur Megh Singh of Diggi, this dissident group again hatched a plot at Jaipur to subvert Rawal Berisal's administration with the help of some of the troops of the State. But the influence and vigilance of the Rawal enabled him to nip the designs of the conspirators in the bud.<sup>3</sup>

### Institution of the Jaipur Political Agency

In such circumstances Alves decided to further strengthen the hands of the Rawal in administering the State. On February 2, 1838 he reported to his Government that due to defalcation in the revenues and the seasonal drought, the

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1. The Special Court at Jaipur comprised Hindu Mal, the *Vakil* of Bikaner, Sardar Mal, the *Vakil* of Jaisalmer, and three *Thakurs* of Jaipur State, viz., Prithvi Singh of Turai, Madho Singh of Mundana and Bakhtawar Singh of Pachewar. (Tr. of a warrant constituting the court signed by Alves, and seal of Jaipur, Cons. 1 August 1836, No. 20, F&P). Lieutenant Colonel A. Speirs was its President.
  2. Ludlow, Assistant A.G.G. to Secretary to Government d. 4 June, Cons. 15 June 1835, No 63 F&P; Alves to Macnaghten d. 11 September, Cons. 5 October 1835, No. 41, F&P; Tr. of a letter from Jhota Ram to Diwan Amar Chand, Cons. 5 October 1835, No. 41, F&P; Alves to Bushby d. 26 November, Cons. 19 December 1836, No. 22, F&P. See also, *State Trials, held under the Special Commission at Jeypoor for the trial of the Ex-Minister Sungee Jhota Ram, his brother and other persons*, 1837.
  3. Alves to R.H.C. Scott, Offg. Secretary to Lieutenant Governor, N.W.P., d. 4 June, Cons. 3 July 1837, No. 13, F&P; Political Letter to COD d. 31 January 1838, No. 6, para 2.



financial condition of the State had become very deplorable.<sup>1</sup> The resources of the State were, therefore, unable to meet the demand of tribute.<sup>2</sup> Further, as the Rawal could not depend on the Maji for help, Alves again pleaded with his Government to appoint a Political Agent at Jaipur, for it would help the Rawal in improving the financial condition of the State.<sup>3</sup> The Governor-General evaded the proposal but showed his readiness to reduce the tribute of the State after knowing its financial resources and expenditure.<sup>4</sup> The A.G.G. saw no reason for his Government to make any pecuniary sacrifice in this manner. He held that the exact financial resources and the requisite civil and military establishments for the State needed to be ascertained satisfactorily.<sup>5</sup> For this purpose, he reiterated his request for the temporary appointment of an experienced and talented Political Agent at Jaipur. He believed that in the expectations of reduction in tribute, the Jaipur authorities would extend all co-operation to the Political Agent in his work of reducing the State expenditure.<sup>6</sup> This convinced Lord Auckland, the then Governor-General, who appointed Ross as Political Agent at Jaipur.<sup>7</sup>

Ross had already worked as a Political Agent in the Rajput States of Kota and Bundi. His experience and sense

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1. Alves to Macnaghten d. 2 February, Cons. 21 March 1838, No. 116, F&P.
  2. *Ibid.* An amount of rupees eight lakh was in arrears on account of tribute to the British Government, exclusive of rupees five lakh that ought to have been paid by April 2, 1837. At this time, Alves had calculated the expenditure of the State as rupees 30 lakh while the revenue was rupees 20 lakh a year, excepting that of Sambhar, which was retained by the British Government to meet the expenses of military expedition in Shekhawati in 1834-35.
  3. *Ibid.*
  4. Torrens to Alves d. 25 June 1838, referred in Cons. 14 November 1838, No. 23, F&P.
  5. Alves to Macnaghten d. 18 July, Cons. 14 November 1838, No. 23, F&P.
  6. *Ibid.*
  7. Macnaghten to Alves d. 16 August, Cons. 14 November 1838, No. 25, F&P.



of discretion eminent'y qualified him for his appointment at Jaipur.<sup>1</sup> In order to guard against any misunderstanding about the new appointment, Lord Auckland clearly intimated to Maharaja Ram Singh to receive Ross as a friend as he was temporarily appointed to ascertain the necessity of lowering the tribute of the State.<sup>2</sup> On September 29, 1838 Ross joined as Political Agent at Jaipur<sup>3</sup> and was to work under the direction of the A.G.G. This marked the end of the direct control of the Ajmer Political Agency over Jaipur.

### Ross as Political Agent

Meanwhile, in May 1838 after the demise of Rawal Berisal, Maji Chadrawatji appointed his son, Rawal Shiva Singh, as her minister without the consent of the British Government.<sup>4</sup> She did this in order to assert her authority in the State.<sup>5</sup> Subsequently, the British Government approved the appointment, for it could only hope to maintain its influence in the State through the party of Rawal to which Shiva Singh belonged.<sup>6</sup>

Chandrawatji soon realized that the appointment of Ross at Jaipur was tantamount to increasing the British influence in the internal affairs of the State. She, therefore, became keen to undermine the position of Ross in the State. In November 1838, in order to deprive Ross of any support from her people, she tried to prevail upon Shiva Singh to accept her 'implicit obedience', and to have no direct contact with Ross.<sup>7</sup> The Rawal, knowing well that the Political

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1. Macnaghten to Alves d. 16 August 1838, *loc. cit.*
  2. Lord Auckland G.G. to the Raja of Jaipur d. 16 August, Cons. 14 November 1838, No. 27, F&P.
  3. Alves to Macnaghten d. 2 October, Cons. 31 October 1838, No. 47, F&P.
  4. Alves to Macnaghten d. 30 May, Cons. 27 June 1838, No. 35, F&P. Rawal Berisal died on May 27, 1838.
  5. *Ibid.*
  6. *Kharita* from Auckland to Raja of Jaipur d. 16 July, Cons. 17 October 1838, No. 66, F&P.
  7. R. Ross, Jaipur Political Agent to Alves d. 5 November, Cons. 5 December 1838, No. 56, F&P.



Agent was the real source of his strength, refused to pledge obedience to her, and showed his determination to consult Ross on affairs of the State.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, frustrated in her plan by her own nominated Minister, Maji Chandrawatji made 'overtures' through Major Henry Forster, the Commander of the Shekhwati Brigade, that she would pay off every pice of the arrears of tribute, and submit to the British authorities in all matters implicitly, provided a person who enjoyed the mutual confidence of the British and herself, was nominated as Minister in place of Shiva Singh.<sup>2</sup> Forster refused to intervene on her behalf.<sup>3</sup> Her proposal also received no favour from Ross. He did not desire to desert the Rawal, and leave him at the mercy of the Maji, as it was only from his party that the British Government could hope for loyalty or attachment' in Jaipur. Ross did not desire to repeat the mistake which the British Government had committed in 1824, by acquiescing in the selection of a minister of the choice of Bhattianiji, which had diminished British influence in the Court of Jaipur.<sup>4</sup> As to her promise to pay off the arrears of the tribute, Ross was of the opinion that the amount was so high that, even if she wanted to pay, she would not do so.<sup>5</sup> The A.G.G expressed his concurrence with the views of the Political Agent. He himself was not ready to concede uncontrolled power to Chandrawatji on any ground, for it would have again endangered the life of the minor Raja, and weakened the British influence in the State.<sup>6</sup>

### **Rani's Vakil denied attendance at the Agency**

The efforts of Chandrawatji to acquire supremacy in the State went against her interests. To make her more dependent

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1. Ross to Alves d. 5 November 1838, *loc. cit.*

2. Major Forster, Commanding the Shekhawati Brigade to Ross d. 5 November, Cons. 5 December 1838, No. 56, F&P.

3. *Ibid.*

4. Ross to Alves d. 5 November, Cons. 5 December 1838, No. 56, F&P; Cf. *Supra*, p. 23.

5. *Ibid.*

6. Alves to Macnaghten d. 8 November, Cons. 5 December 1838, No. 56, F&P.



on the minister, and to discourage further female rule in Jaipur, Ross refused to receive any *Vakil* from her at the Political Agency.<sup>1</sup> She called it discourtesy<sup>2</sup> as it was against usual procedure that communications to her were addressed through her minister.<sup>3</sup> But on the contrary, Ross told her to conduct further correspondence with him through her minister.<sup>4</sup> This measure appeared to the A.G.G. 'very judicious', and as such received his assent.<sup>5</sup>

### Suppression of the revolt at Ramgarh

The effort of the British Government to deprive the Regent Rani of her authority in the State in preference to her minister compelled her to seek help from other quarters to overthrow the power of the Rawal, and to regain her lost position in the State. Jhota Ram's brother-in-law, Bakshi Munna Lal who was the Commander of the Jaipur forces, acted in favour of Chandrawatji, and incited the two Battalions stationed at Ramgarh to revolt against the Rawal. They revolted ostensibly for the recovery of the arrears of their pay.<sup>6</sup> A Jaipur force of 2,000 Nagas joined their cause. Alves suspected Chandrawatji's hand and that of the old Sanghi faction in the revolt of the troops.

On the failure of the Rawal to suppress the rebellious troops, Alves reached Jaipur on November 11, 1838.<sup>7</sup> On the advice of Alves, Bakshi Munna Lal was removed from the

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1. Tr. of a letter from Ross to Shiva Singh in reply to Maji's letter d. 7 November, Cons. 19 December 1838, No. 52, F&P.
  2. Tr. of a Hindi letter from Maji to Ross d. 6 November, Cons. 19 December 1838, No. 52, F&P.
  3. Tr. of a note from Shiva Singh to Ross recd. 10 November, Cons. 19 December 1838, No. 52, F&P.
  4. Ross to Alves d. 11 November, Cons. 19 December 1838, No. 52, F&P.
  5. Alves to Ross d. 13 November, Cons. 19 December 1838, No. 52, F&P.
  6. Memorandum submitted in Hindi by Alves through the medium of the Minister to Maji Chandrawatji and the Durbar of Jaipur d. 13 November, Cons. 19 December 1838, No. 52, F&P.
  7. Alves to Macnaghten d. 13 November, Cons. 19 December 1838, No. 52, F&P.



command of the Jaipur forces on November 18, 1838, and Thakur Lachman Singh of Chomu, the brother of the Rawal, was appointed in his place. This change further strengthened the position of the Rawal. Rani Chandrawatji expressed resentment over this change by denying all help in the chastisement of the mutinous troops.<sup>1</sup> Thereupon, accompanied by the British troops from Nasirabad and the Jaipur State troops, Alves marched to suppress the rebellion at Ramgarh.<sup>2</sup> The fear of the British force induced the mutineers to surrender without any resistance.<sup>3</sup>

### **Establishment of a Council of Regency at Jaipur**

Even after giving substantial help to the Rawal, the Political officers had to resort to extreme measures of employing British troops in Jaipur to put down those opposed to him. Sutherland, the successor of Alves to the post of A.G.G., considered this as ample evidence of the fact that the Rawal had become 'unpopular' in the State.<sup>4</sup>

The Rawal was himself conscious of his inability to administer the State in the face of opposition of the Maji, and due to the repugnance of all classes, without the direct and effectual assistance of the Political Agent.<sup>5</sup> It was because of this that he proposed to Ross on February 21, 1839 that the office of the Political Agent be made permanent, and that the officer occupying that position should give him active support in administering the affairs of the State.<sup>6</sup> Convinced of the weakness of the Rawal, Ross saw no harm in acceding to his request.<sup>7</sup> The A.G.G. also unhesitatingly recommended to his

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1. Ross to Alves d. 19 November, Cons. 19 December 1838, No. 55, F&P.
  2. Alves to Macnaghten d. 24 November, Cons. 19 December 1838, No. 57, F&P.
  3. *Ibid.*
  4. Sutherland to Maddock d. 12 March, Cons. 26 June 1839, No. 29, F&P.
  5. Extracts from the Diary of the Jaipur Political Agency d. 19 February, Cons. 29 May 1839, No. 77, F&P.
  6. Tr. of a note from Rawal Shiva Singh to Ross d. 21 February, Cons. 29 May 1839, No. 77, F&P.
  7. Ross to Sutherland d. 21 February, Cons. 29 May 1839, No. 77, F&P.



Government to appoint a 'Resident Agent' at Jaipur as a first measure for the correction of the manifold evils under which Jaipur State laboured.<sup>1</sup> Further, since the attempts of the Jaipur authorities at 'self-government' had failed miserably, and the British Government had experienced great disappointment in backing the Rawal, Sutherland was compelled to think of establishing a government at Jaipur that would not only be effective and respected by all parties in the State, but would also be of a stable character during the minority of the ruler.<sup>2</sup> On his proposal,<sup>3</sup> a Council of Regency was formed consisting of five *Thakurs* with the Political Agent as its President. Bhopal Singh Rajawat of Jhullye, Lachman Singh Nathawat of Chomu, Rawal Shiva Singh Nathawat of Samod, Sur Singh Chutterbhujat of Bagru and Sumer Singh Khangarote of Punchewar were selected as its members 'both on the score of rank and respectability'. Sumer Singh Khangarote was selected as the fifth member in preference to Thakur Megh Singh of Diggi, a 'turbulent and unprincipled man' whose collusion with Jhota Ram was considered sufficient ground for his exclusion from the Council of Regency.<sup>4</sup>

The Regent Rani was deprived of the right to exercise any control over the Council, for it was felt that it was impossible for a lady living in *purdah* (*pardanashin*), to administer the affairs of the State. In spite of her unwillingness the Rani had to accept her exclusion from the Council of Regency as a *fait accompli*.<sup>5</sup>

The formation of the Council of Regency not only ended the possibility of the revival of female ascendancy in the administration of Jaipur, but also openly introduced British interference in the internal affairs of the State for which Alves had made incessant efforts in the past.

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1. Sutherland to Maddock d. 1 March, Cons. 29 May 1839, No. 77, F&P.

2. Sutherland to Maddock d. 12 March, Cons. 26 June 1839, No. 29, F&P.

3. *Ibid.*

4. Ross to Sutherland d. 8 March, Cons. 26 June 1839, No. 29, F&P.

5. Sutherland to Maddock d. 12 March, Cons. 26 June 1839, No. 29, F&P.



Ross allowed the sessions of the Council to be held in his absence on the plea that on ordinary occasions his presence would be unnecessary and embarrassing to the members, and would involve him in the working of that body.<sup>1</sup> Being free from the interference of the Political Agent in their proceedings, the members behaved as if they were the supreme body to administer the State and regarded the Political Agent, who was the President of the Council, as a mere cypher or a silent observer. The most remarkable feature in the Acts passed by the Council was the election of Rawal Shiva Singh as Prime Minister, as if he were to represent the government.<sup>2</sup> The work of the collection of land revenue was entrusted to Diwan Sampat Ram and Diwan Jeewan Ram under the control of the Council. Thakur Nawal Singh, a staunch supporter of the Nathawats was given the charge of the Department of Civil Courts (*Diwani* matters). Besides, Bahaderji, the third brother of the Rawal was made the head of the *Faujdari* Department.<sup>3</sup> These appointments gave proof of the growing Nathawat influence in the State administration. The Acts passed by the Council had given a dominant position to the Nathawats in the governance of the State. Ross did not desire to exert his influence in a way which might adversely effect the ascendancy of the Nathawats. The interference of the Political Agent would have subverted entirely the arrangements under trial, and would have introduced strife and contention into the Council.<sup>4</sup>

When the Council of Regency was formed, Sutherland had placed the Shekhawati Brigade entirely under its control.<sup>5</sup> The expenses incurred in maintaining the Brigade were borne by the State of Jaipur, and the Brigade was commanded by Major Henry Forster. Ross, having apprehensions that the members of the Council might endeavour to consolidate their power against the British authority, submitted the draft of an

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1. Ross to Sutherland d. 10 April, Cons. 10 July 1839, No. 37, F&P.
  2. Ross to Sutherland d. 31 March, Cons. 10 July 1839, No. 37, F&P.
  3. Rules for transacting the business of Jaipur by order of the Council of five d. 31 March, Cons. 10 July 1839, No. 37, F&P.
  4. Ross to Sutherland d. 31 March 1839, *loc. cit.*
  5. Sutherland to Ross d. 12 March, Cons. 26 June 1839, No. 29, F&P.



Act to the Council, desiring that Forster be placed directly under his control.<sup>1</sup> Encouraged by their success in the first few sittings of the Council, the five members who designated themselves as the 'Council of Five' excluding the Political Agent, rejected the proposal of Ross. They desired to exercise control over Forster themselves on the ground that he was a servant of the State and was paid by it.<sup>2</sup> They also passed an Act which established their control over the Brigade.<sup>3</sup> At this time, Megh Singh of Diggi was actively mobilizing support for his own inclusion in the Council. Ross, therefore, did not find it opportune to insist on the revision of the Act passed in his absence till the matter subsided.<sup>4</sup>

The A.G.G. also considered the passage of this Act by the Council of Five for exercising control over the Shekhawati Brigade as quite illegal. He did not consider it within the purview of the self-styled 'Council of Five' to pass a legislative Act at a meeting in which the Political Agent, who was also the head of the Council, was not even present. Besides, he considered the self-assumed designation of the 'Council of Five' by the *Thakurs*, as inappropriate, for the number of members could at any time be changed by the British Government.<sup>5</sup> He also encouraged Ross to take active interest in the administration of the State.<sup>6</sup>

By this time the A.G.G. had received the assent of the Governor-General to the 'interesting experiment' of governing the State by the Council of Regency.<sup>7</sup> Consequently, a proclamation in the name of the British Government was issued at

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1. Draft of an Act for the better conduct of the control of Jaipur Government over its troops under the command of Forster submitted to the Council of Regency by Ross d. 30 March, Cons. 10 July 1839, No. 37, F&P.
  2. Ross to Sutherland d. 3 April, Cons. 10 July 1839, No. 37, F&P.
  3. Tr. of Act No. 3 of the Jaipur Council recd. 2 April, Cons. 10 July 1839, No. 37, F&P.
  4. Ross to Sutherland d. 3 April 1839, *loc. cit.*
  5. Sutherland to Ross d. 6 April, Cons. 10 July 1839, No. 37 F&P.
  6. Sutherland to Ross d. 14 April, Cons. 10 July 1839, No. 37, F&P.
  7. Maddock to Sutherland d. 1 April, Cons. 26 June 1839, No. 30, F&P.



Jaipur in April 1839, announcing the formation of a Council of Regency consisting of five of the principal *Thakurs* of the State with Political Agent as its head, to administer the State during the minority of Maharaja Ram Singh, free from the control of the Maji.<sup>1</sup>

The British Government did not charge any money from the State for the duties which the Political Agent performed as the President of the Council of Regency.<sup>2</sup> It was because the State was a tributary State and the Council of Regency was established there on the initiative of the British Government.<sup>3</sup> The British Government made the office of the Political Agent at Jaipur permanent from April 18, 1839.<sup>4</sup>

The proclamation dealt a death-blow to the ambitions of the self-styled 'Council of Five', and made the position of the Political Agent supreme in the Council of Regency. Subsequently, the members of the Council revised the Act pertaining to the Shekhawati Brigade and placed it under the direct control of Ross.<sup>5</sup> Secured of his position at Jaipur, the Political Agent successfully wiped out opposition evinced by Megh Singh, the sworn enemy of the Rawal, for his exclusion from the Council of Regency.<sup>6</sup> By this measure, Ross substantially strengthened the position of the Council of Regency at Jaipur.

### **Thoresby as Political Agent**

The establishment of the Council of Regency on a solid footing helped Major C. Thoresby who succeeded Ross on

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1. Proclamation on the part of the British Government to the Chiefs and people of Jaipur by Sutherland d. 18 April, Cons. 10 July 1839, No. 37, F&P.
  2. Maddock to Sutherland d. 1 April, Cons. 26 June 1839, No. 30, F&P.
  3. Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 8 September. Cons. 3 October 1856, No. 132, F&P.
  4. Maddock to Sutherland d. 18 April, Cons. 3 July 1839, No. 5, F&P.
  5. Tr. of a revised reply of the Council of Regency d. 27 June, Cons. 18 September 1839, No. 81, F&P.
  6. Ross to Sutherland d. 20 May, Cons. 14 August 1839, No. 74, F&P; Political letter to COD d. 10 March 1840, No. 8, para 2.



August 14, 1839,<sup>1</sup> to face any opposition in the State and to accomplish the incomplete task of his predecessor. In May 1840, with the help of a detachment from Jaipur, he suppressed the rebellious designs of the two Najib Battalions stationed at Hindaun.<sup>2</sup> Further, when in November 1840, Kishan Singh Khangarote of Khundel, occupied the fort of Kalik which was once a part of his ancestral *jagir*, Thoresby, with the assistance of the Jaipur State troops and the Shekhawati Brigade, succeeded in securing the unconditional surrender of Thakur Kishan Singh and his confederates on December 25, 1840.<sup>3</sup>

The Kalik affair was the last in the line of the sporadic conspiracies and revolts which were hatched at the instance of the Maji and the Sanghi group in opposition to the Rawal who was pliant to the British. These loud protests of the dissident group brought about a change in the British policy towards Jaipur. Sutherland, the A. G. G. in Rajputana, felt the necessity of accelerating the measures to repair the cleavage in the body-politic of Jaipur.<sup>4</sup> Consequently, he decided to withdraw British support from the Nathawat party, and to strike a balance in the affairs of the State. He adopted a benevolent and liberal attitude towards the Sanghi group. The *jagirs* of Chaman Singh and Bhim Singh, the prominent members of the Sanghi group, were confiscated by Rawal Berisal in 1835.<sup>5</sup> Sutherland, on his own initiative<sup>6</sup> and with the assistance of Thoresby,<sup>7</sup> made the Council of Regency restore the aforesaid *jagirs* to the sons of the deceased *Thakurs*.<sup>8</sup>

1. Thoresby, to Maddock d. 14 August, Cons. 25 September 1839, No. 169, F&P.
2. Thoresby to Sutherland d. 21 May, Cons. 15 June 1840, No. 38, F&P.
3. Thoresby to Sutherland d. 13 January, Cons. 1 February 1841, No. 35, F&P.
4. Sutherland to Maddock d. 5 October, Cons. 4 December 1839, No. 27, F & P.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*; Sutherland to Maddock d. 16 November 1839, Cons. 22 January 1840, No. 11, F & P.
7. Thoresby to Sutherland d. 25 September, Cons. 19 October 1840, No. 19, F & P.
8. Torrens to Sutherland d. 19 October, Cons. 19 October 1840, No. 19, F & P. For details see, Vijay Kumar Vashishtha, "British Policy Towards the Proscribed Thakurs of Rajputana During the Hegemony of East India Company", *PRHC*, Second Session, Jaipur 1968, pp. 138-40.



### Commutation of Tribute

The change in the British policy not only assuaged the enraged feelings of the dissident group at Jaipur, but also gave an opportunity to the Political Agent to divert his attention to the overdue question of assessing the propriety of his Government charging a tribute of Rs. 8 lakh yearly from Jaipur. After collecting the correct information about the income of the State, Thoresby on January 30, 1841, strongly recommended to his Government to reduce the amount of tribute charged from Jaipur.<sup>1</sup> He expressed the opinion that in 1818 the annual payment of Rs. 8 lakh was fixed on the basis of the misleading report about the revenues of the State.<sup>2</sup> By the end of April 1842, the State of Jaipur had paid to the British Government Rs. 1,35,71,000, in all as tribute while Rs. 46,28,999 were still due as arrears.<sup>3</sup> Sutherland supported the Political Agent's contention. He expressed the opinion that the British Government would never have believed in the inability of the Jaipur State to pay the huge annual tribute of Rs. 8 lakh,<sup>4</sup> if the resources of the State had not been clearly assessed by the Political Agent.

These efforts made the British Government commute the annual tribute from Rs. 8 lakh to a fixed sum of Rs. 4 lakh with effect from November 1, 1830<sup>5</sup>, and also to abandon its claim to the arrears due from the State in this behalf.<sup>6</sup> Thus, a blunder committed by Metcalfe in assessing the tribute of Jaipur in 1818, was now rectified. Further, this also revealed that Lockett's report of 1832, suspecting the incapacity of the State to pay the huge sum of tribute, was based on prejudice

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1. Thoresby to Sutherland d. 30 January, Cons. 22 March 1842, No. 42, F & P.
  2. *Ibid.*
  3. Sutherland to Maddock d. 2 February, Cons. 22 March 1842, No. 42, F & P.
  4. *Ibid.*
  5. Maddock to Sutherland d. 8 July, Cons. 31 August 1842, No. 52, F & P; Thomason to Sutherland, d. 25 February, Cons. 22 March 1843, No. 55, F & P; Jaipur Vol. IX, 1839-40, List No. 1, p. 17, S. No. 168, *RAR*.
  6. Maddock to Sutherland d. 8 July, Cons. 31 August 1842, No. 52, F & P.



against the State of Jaipur. By securing financial relief to Jaipur, Thoresby fulfilled the main object of the mission of Ross. Subsequently, the Court of Directors approved this reduction in the annual tribute.<sup>1</sup> Further, in 1843, the British Government on the suggestion of Thoresby, took over the Shekhawati Brigade as a British force, and relieved the State of Jaipur, the Shekhawati Chiefs as well as the Maharaja of Bikaner of the burden of bearing the expenses for its maintenance.<sup>2</sup>

Thoresby was eager to free the State completely from its financial difficulties. In 1843, the State of Jaipur owed Rs. 13 lakh to its bankers.<sup>3</sup> But before he could take measures to reduce this debt, he left Jaipur for Ajmer to officiate for Sutherland who had taken sick leave to proceed to the Cape of Good Hope.<sup>4</sup> The work of Thoresby in bringing about financial relief to Jaipur further strengthened the relations between the British Government and the State of Jaipur. His exertions of four and a half years accomplished much, and smoothened the path of his successor.

### **Ludlow as Political Agent**

Major John Ludlow succeeded Thoresby to the Jaipur Political Agency on January 24, 1844.<sup>5</sup> The financial condition of the State showed signs of considerable improvement during the first few months of Ludlow's appointment. Various sums of money were recovered from the places where they were deposited during the tenure of Jhota Ram. From this recovery alone, about two-thirds of the debt of the State to the bankers was liquidated.<sup>6</sup>

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1. Political Letter from COD. d. 1 November 1843, No. 35.

2. J. Thomason to Sutherland d. 25 February, Cons. 22 March 1842, No. 55, F & P.

3. Thoresby to Sutherland d. 13 September, Cons. 25 November 1843, No. 56, F & P.

4. Sutherland to Currie d. 27 May, Cons. 24 October 1846, No. 215, F & P.

5. Thoresby, Offg. A.G.G. Rajputana to Currie d. 24 January, Cons. 3 February 1844, No. 172, F & P.

6. J. Ludlow, Jaipur Political Agent to Thoresby d. 30 September, Cons. 26 October 1844, No. 64, F & P.



In the efficient and smooth working of the Council of Regency, the personal influence of Sutherland did play a prominent role. This became evident during his absence on leave from the Rajputana Agency. Taking advantage of his position as *Faujdar* in the State and of the Nathawat influence in the Council, Lachman Singh invariably opposed the measures which were taken by the Council of Regency for improving the finances of the State.<sup>1</sup> The 'creatures' of the two Nathawat brothers were said to pervade all departments connected with disbursement except the treasury.<sup>2</sup> The cumulative effect of this was that the efficiency of the Council was impaired and necessary reductions in expenditure were thereby often retarded, or prevented. This made the position of the Political Agent as the legitimate controlling authority of the Jaipur administration extremely difficult.<sup>3</sup> To free the State from debt, it had become essential to fathom and counteract the intrigues of the Nathawats.<sup>4</sup> In this task the circumstances favoured John Ludlow.

Thakur Sumer Singh, one of the five members of the Regency, and the 'submissive creature' of the *Fauj Musahib*, Thakur Lachman Singh, died on September 20, 1844. This event was considered a suitable opportunity by Ludlow to weaken the Nathawat combination in the Council, by leaving the selection of the fifth member in abeyance.<sup>5</sup> This measure was liable to help the Political Agent in exercising his casting vote in the circumstances of an equal division in the Council on any question. The A.G.G. recommended to his Government that the vacancy in the Council of Regency be allowed to remain vacant.<sup>6</sup> The Governor-General agreed to the proposal.<sup>7</sup>

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1. Ludlow to Thoresby d. 30 September, Cons. 26 October 1844, No. 64, F&P.
  2. *Ibid.*
  3. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 13 May, Cons. 24 October 1846, No. 216, F & P.
  4. Ludlow to Thoresby d. 30 September, Cons. 26 October 1844, No. 64, F & P.
  5. *Ibid.*
  6. Thoresby to Currie d. 15 October, Cons. 26 October 1844, No. 63, F & P.
  7. Currie to Thoresby d. 20 October, Cons. 26 October 1844, No. 63, F & P.



The importance Thakur Lachman Singh had acquired in the administration resulted in making the Nathawat influence predominant during 1844-45. Thoresby was favourably inclined towards Lachman Singh for his co-operation in correcting the bad management of the State during his tenure as Political Agent at Jaipur. This forbade him to accept Ludlow's dissatisfaction with the conduct of Thakur Lachman Singh.<sup>1</sup> Thoresby's soft corner for Lachman Singh made Ludlow powerless in the State. As a consequence, a Political officer of Ludlow's ability and experience was confronted with difficulty in dealing with the Council of Regency.<sup>2</sup>

Sutherland resumed his duties as the A.G.G. in Rajputana at Ajmer in 1846. He was a strong advocate of governing the States during minorities through the Council of Regency composed of the principal Chiefs. He considered himself fortunate enough in returning to his duty at a time when the Council of Regency at Jaipur, which was formed on his own initiative, was working so badly that it would have discredited the whole system.<sup>3</sup> To preserve the reputation of the system, he considered it essential to curb the Nathawat influence in the Council.<sup>4</sup> With this object in mind, he reached Jaipur on May 15, 1846.<sup>5</sup>

He did not fail to observe that Thakur Lachman Singh had used his power over the army as an instrument of intimidation in the State and even the young Maharaja and his mother were under some apprehensions.<sup>6</sup> Besides, he received complaints of unconstitutional interference on the part of the two Nathawat brothers in the various departments of the

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1. Thoresby to Currie d. 15 October 1844, *loc. cit.*
  2. Sutherland to Currie d. 27 May, Cons. 24 October 1846, No. 215, F & P; Ludlow to Sutherland d. 23 May, Cons. 7 August 1847, No. 838, F & P.
  3. Sutherland to Currie d. 27 May, Cons. 24 October 1846, No. 215, F & P.
  4. Sutherland to Ludlow d. 8 May, Cons. 24 October 1846, No. 216, F & P.
  5. Sutherland to Currie d. 27 May, Cons. 24 October 1846, No. 215, F & P.
  6. *Ibid.*



State. There were even charges of embezzlement of the extensive public resources against them. In the meeting of the Council of Regency at Jaipur Political Agency House on May 18, 1846, Sutherland told Thakur Lachman Singh that he ceased to be a member of the Council forthwith. He made no objection, for all the members acknowledged the right of the A.G.G. to reshuffle the Council. Again, in the meeting of May 27, 1846, the three remaining members of the Council of Regency elected Raja Hardas Ram of Lowan and Thakur Bhim Singh, the son of the late Thakur Megh Singh of Diggi, to the two vacant seats. Hardas Ram was also appointed as the Commander of the Jaipur army.<sup>1</sup> Thus by introducing two Chiefs of the opposite faction, Sutherland neutralized the influence of the Nathawats and gave a representative character to the Council of Regency. However, the removal of Lachman Singh resulted in making his brother Rawal Shiva Singh disinterested in administration.<sup>2</sup> Ultimately, he retired to his *jagir*, and did not resume his work so long as Sutherland remained at the helm of affairs in Rajputana.<sup>3</sup> The sacrifice of tribute made by the British Government in Jaipur principality and the reduction of Nathawat predominance in the Council of Regency facilitated the task of Ludlow in carrying on his work at Jaipur.<sup>4</sup>

After the reorganization of the Council, Ludlow ascertained the amounts of territorial grants and embezzlements during the predominance of Nathawat influence.<sup>5</sup> For the purpose, Ludlow and the Council appointed five *Munsifs*. The investigations proved that Nathawat brothers and the Diwans, Chander, Sampat Ram and Jatan Singh Rajawat were

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1. Sutherland to Currie d. 27 May, Cons. 24 October 1846, No. 215, F & P.
  2. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 3 May, Cons. 7 August 1847, No. 838, F & P.
  3. Political letter to COD d. 18 June 1851, No. 22.
  4. Sutherland to Elliot d. 21 May, Cons. 7 August 1847, No. 837, F & P.
  5. Sutherland to Currie d. 27 May, Cons. 24 October 1856, No. 215, F & P.



responsible for an embezzlement<sup>1</sup> of a large sum of Rs. 3,07,164, annas 2 and pies 3. Out of this huge amount of embezzlement, a sum of Rs. 1,56,181 and 6 annas was recovered. The villages, which the Nathawats had illegally gratned to their partisans, were resumed and added to fisc.<sup>2</sup> It was estimated that the resumed villages would add Rs. 1,25,351 and annas 12 to the State revenues annually.<sup>3</sup> This revealed the character of the Nathawats, the *Diwans*, and others in the most unfavourable light. When the British Government had granted extensive remissions of tribute and made great efforts to retrieve the finances of the State, the Nathawat brothers and their partisans continued to nibble at the resources of the State. Sutherland remarked on the situation:<sup>4</sup>

But the Chiefs and the administrators of Jeypoor have long been more venal than those of any of the Rajpoot States — dating perhaps from the period of the friendly connection of Maharaja Jey Singh with the Emperor Aurangzebe. These are matters perfectly understood by the other States of Rajpootana, and the efforts of the British Government during a minority to produce an improved tone, and a better system of administration, are appreciated accordingly by the sovereigns, the Chiefs and the people of other States.

In 1847, Ludlow was constrained to dismiss Thakur Bhim Singh of Diggi from the membership of the Council for giving shelter to a Shekhawati robber, Dungenji at Surwarea. This amounted to denying the *jagirdars* the right of asylum (*sharana*) to the anti-social elements. In place of Bhim Singh,

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1. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 3 May, Cons. 7 August 1847, No. 838, F & P; Sutherland to Elliot d. 21 May, Cons. 7 August 1847, No. 837, F & P.
  2. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 3 May, Cons 7 August 1847, No. 838, F & P.
  3. Sutherland to Elliot d. 21 May, Cons. 7 August 1847, No. 838, F & P.
  4. *Ibid.* James Tod and Reginald Heber had also low opinion about the Durbar of Jaipur.



Rawat Ranjit Singh was nominated as the fifth member of the Council.<sup>1</sup>

### Education of the young Maharaja

Ludlow also paid special attention to the education and administrative training of young Maharaja Ram Singh. He was shocked to find that the progress of education of the young Maharaja had been neglected up to his eleventh year, most of his time having been wasted in amusements and ceremonial observances. His education was confined to the study of Sanskrit and martial exercises both on horseback and foot.<sup>2</sup>

This progress of the education of the young Maharaja, fell short of the expectations of the British Government. James Sutherland, the founder of the Council of Regency at Jaipur, had hoped that under the care and instructions of the British Government, Ram Singh would become "one of the distinguished rulers of the land".<sup>3</sup> This was in accordance with the wishes of the Court of Directors. It had, time and again, instructed the Governor-General to impart the young Maharaja education having "something of science, of literature and moral feeling of Europe" alongwith "the practical knowledge of his countrymen and their institutions without which he could not be qualified to rule over them".<sup>4</sup> Agreeing to these instructions, the British Government had desired that the education of young Ram Singh should be conducted under the guidance of the Political Agent.<sup>5</sup> John Ludlow successfully implemented the instructions of his Government.

Ludlow made arrangements for the education of Ram Singh under a regularly trained master from the Upper Orphan

1. Tr. of a *Kafiyat* from Council of Regency to Ludlow d. 27 September, Cons. 31 December 1847, No. 344, F & P.
2. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 9 October, Cons. 20 November 1847, No. 65, F & P.
3. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 8 December 1847, Cons. 25 February 1848, No. 24, F & P.
4. Political Despatch from COD d. 23 October 1839, No. 19, para. 6; See also, Ludlow to Sutherland d. 8 December 1847, *loc. cit.*
5. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 8 December 1847, *loc. cit.*



School. On being subsequently objected by Maji Chandrawatji and the members of the administration that the Maharaja should only be taught by a Brahmin, Ludlow in 1845, appointed Sheodeen, a Brahmin graduate from Agra College, Agra for imparting instruction to him. By the time Ram Singh entered his fifteenth year on September 23, 1847, he had cultivated his interest in Urdu, Hindi, Persian and English. He was also taught History of the world, natural history, botany and natural philosophy. Besides, he was kept informed by the official authorities on all matters of the State so that he might cultivate interest and gain administrative insight. He was of an amiable temper and good disposition, intelligent and possessed good memory. Ludlow confidently hoped that "he will become a merciful and benign ruler".<sup>1</sup> The Maharaja justified the confidence reposed in him.

### Education for the Masses

Ludlow also made a beginning of modern education in the State by opening in 1844, a "Free School" (which later became Maharaja's College). It was placed under the superintendence of Sheodeen under whose guidance it made progress.<sup>2</sup> A Medical School could not be opened at Jaipur in view of the prejudices and superstitions of the Hindu population against the dissection of the human body.<sup>3</sup>

Ludlow also revived the schools established by Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh II. He found that the Brahmins and others were getting salaries for the performance of duties which had been in abeyance for generations. With the help of the local officers, he revived and brought into operation one hundred and eighteen village schools in twenty out of the fifty-two *parganas* in the Jaipur territory. These schools were placed under the superintendence of local officers.<sup>4</sup>

1. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 9 October 1847, *loc. cit.*

2. *Ibid.*

3. Secretary to Government to A.G.G. Rajputana d. 17 August, Cons. 29 August 1846, Nos. 102-103, F & P.

4. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 9 October 1847, *loc. cit.*



## Social Reforms

Ludlow also introduced many social reforms in the State. Female infanticide<sup>1</sup> and trafficking in slaves<sup>2</sup> were declared illegal. It was through his influence with the Council of Regency that among all the Indian States, the State of Jaipur was the first to make a proclamation for the abolition of *Sati* on April 26, 1846.<sup>3</sup> The example set by Jaipur strengthened the hands of other rulers to abolish the custom in their respective territories.

## Works of Public Utility

Ludlow also initiated many works of public utility in the State from the contributions made by the *sardars* and citizens. With the concurrence of the Council of Regency, he established in May 1844, a 'Dispensary and Hospital' in the city of Jaipur for the care of indigent patients and all other persons who desired medical or surgical assistance according to European system.<sup>4</sup> This infant institution had attracted the attention of the people not only in the State of Jaipur but also in the neighbouring States because "it was only a revival of a Hospital said to have been originally established by Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh II, the founder of the city of Jaipur."<sup>5</sup> Besides, roads and passes in the proximity of the city of Jaipur were improved for the benefit of travellers and traders.<sup>6</sup> An

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1. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 12 April, Cons. 30 November 1844, Nos. 152-54, F & P; Ludlow to Sutherland d. 17 April, Cons. 17 April 1847, No. 48, F & P; See also, V.K. Vashishtha, "Abolition of Female Infanticide in Rajputana", *JRIHR*, October-December 1974, Vol. XI, No. 4, p. 32.
  2. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 5 March, Cons. 1 May 1847, Nos. 48-50, F & P.
  3. Proclamation by the Raja of Jaipur d. 23 August, Cons. 17 October 1846, No. 268, F & P. See also, V. K. Vashishtha, "Abolition of Sati in the States of Rajputana", *PRHC*, Third Session, Udaipur (1969), pp. 133-35.
  4. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 23 May, Cons. 8 June 1844, No. 51, F & P.
  5. Sutherland to Currie d. 10 June, Cons. 18 July 1846, No. 183, F & P.
  6. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 26 November, Cons. 26 December 1846, Nos. 125-26, F & P.



acqueduct was built for bringing water into the city of Jaipur. A scheme was also envisaged for trapping in a dam the water of a stream that passed at a distance of a mile from there.<sup>1</sup> When in December 1847, Ludlow was preparing to go to Europe on furlough, the foundation of the dam and its side walls were in an advanced stage of construction.<sup>2</sup>

The dominating position of John Ludlow as the head of the Council of Regency and the liberality of the British Government in the remission of tribute of the State had increased his personal influence there. As a result of this favourable situation he initiated many beneficial measures in the State with the co-operation of the Council of Regency and ministers.<sup>3</sup> The Maji did not interfere in the administration because she was convinced that the welfare of her son and the State was carefully provided for by the British Government. By his salutary measures, Ludlow was able to show to the people a contrast in the administration during his dominance and that of the Nathawats.<sup>4</sup>

The main motive of Ludlow in providing facilities for the education and training to the young Maharaja and introducing salutary reforms in the State was to raise the prestige of the British Government as a faithful ally among the States of Rajputana by showing the benefit which Jaipur could derive from British participation in the administration during the minority of Maharaja Ram Singh.<sup>5</sup> About these reforms,

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1. Thoresby, Offg. A.G.G. Rajputana to Currie d. 26 March, Cons. 11 April 1845, No. 50 F&P; See also, Ludlow to Sutherland d. 8 December 1847, *loc. cit.*, para. 13.
  2. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 8 December 1847, *loc. cit.*
  3. Sutherland to Currie d. 27 May, Cons. 24 October 1846, No. 215, F & P, para. 10. See also, Sutherland to Currie d. 5 July, Cons. 17 October 1846, Nos. 269-70, F & P; Sutherland to Secretary to Government d. 1 June, Cons. 7 August 1847, No. 845, F & P.
  4. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 8 December 1847, *loc. cit.*
  5. *Ibid.*, See also, Sutherland to Elliot d. 20 October, Cons. 20 November 1847, No. 64, F & P.



John Sutherland, A.G.G. in Rajputana, expressed the opinion that:<sup>1</sup>

through the diffusion of good government, the gradual development of education, and medical treatment, we shall at no very distant period produce a very salutary and lasting effect on the character and manners of the people of Rajputana.

He considered the administration during the period of minority of the ruler as the best period for the British authorities because the ministers readily co-operated with them to bring about beneficial changes in the State.<sup>2</sup>

### Rickards as Political Agent

When Ludlow went to Europe on furlough Captain W.H. Rickards of the 14th Native Infantry took charge of the Political Agency at Jaipur on February 2, 1848.<sup>3</sup> Ludlow had failed to relieve the State completely from the burden of debt. This was an uphill task which was accomplished by Rickards. With his untiring efforts he succeeded in improving the finances of the State.<sup>4</sup> In 1851, he repeatedly reported to the A.G.G. that the State had been entirely freed from debt; a surplus had accumulated in the State Treasury, and that the character and conduct of the Raja was very satisfactory.<sup>5</sup> The Maharaja was grounded well in the administration of the State. When several important cases were forwarded to him for his examination, he dealt with them so creditably that Rickards passed orders upon them without any hesitation.<sup>6</sup> These reports impressed Low, the successor to Sutherland, so much that he proposed to his Government to free Maharaja Ram Singh from the control of the Regency on the 18th anniversary of his birthday.<sup>7</sup> The Governor-General

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1. Sutherland to Currie d. 10 June, Cons. 18 July 1846, No. 183, F & P.

2. Sutherland to the Secretary of Government d. 1 June 1847, *loc. cit.*

3. Sutherland to Elliot d. 7 February, Cons. 3 March 1848, No. 49, F & P.

4. Rickards, Jaipur Political Agent to Low d. 17 January, Cons. 8 August 1851, No. 57, F & P.

5. Rickards to Low d. 17 January, Cons. 8 August 1851, No. 57, F & P, Rickards to Low d. 7 July, Cons. 8 August 1851, No. 57, F & P.

6. Rickards to Low d. 17 January, Cons. 8 August 1851, No. 57, F & P.

7. Low to H.M. Elliot d. 8 July, Cons. 8 August 1851, No. 56, F & P.



expressed his satisfaction on the report, and consented to the proposal.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, on September 23, 1851, Maharaja Ram Singh assumed the reins of his State.<sup>2</sup> This marked an end of the regime of the Council of Regency at Jaipur.

However, Rickard's conduct was not above board. He accepted gratification and utterly neglected the interests of the Maharaja.<sup>3</sup> Henry Lawrence, the A.G.G., reported the matter to his Government. After a thorough inquiry, the British Government transferred Rickards to the Bhopal Agency on a reduced salary.<sup>4</sup> This scandal, however, had no adverse effects on the relations of the British Government with the State of Jaipur.

### Eden as Political Agent

Captain W.F. Eden, who was appointed as Political Agent at Jaipur in September 1856,<sup>5</sup> was helped by Maharaja Ram Singh in maintaining the British position at Jaipur during the Uprising of 1857.<sup>6</sup> It was for his gratitude to the Political Agent who had worked for the good of the State during his minority that Maharaja Ram Singh chose to remain loyal to the British Government at this critical juncture.

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1. Elliot to Low d. 28 July, Cons. 8 August 1851, No. 59, F&P; Political letter to COD, d. 6 December 1851, No. 36, para 10.
  2. Elliot to Low d. 24 December 1851, Cons. 13 February 1852, No. 230, F&P; See also, Cons. 21 November 1851, No. 17, F&P.
  3. Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 3 January, Cons. 7 March 1856, No. 154, F&P.
  4. Edmonstone to Rickards d. 8 February, Cons. 7 March 1856, No. 161, F&P. For details about the charges against Rickards, See, Batra, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-72.
  5. Eden succeeded Captain E. I. Hardcastle to the Jaipur Political Agency on 22 September 1856. Notification Fort William-Foreign Department d. 21 November, Cons. 21 November 1856, No. 96, F&P. During the period of the removal of Rickards from the Jaipur Political Agency and succession of W.F. Eden, Major Burton and Captain E.I. Hardcastle in succession officiated as the Jaipur Political Agent. Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 3 April, Cons. 11 April 1856, No. 171, F&P.
  6. George Lawrence, Offg. A.G.G. to Edmonstone d. 27 July, Cons. 31 December 1858, Nos. 3146-47, F&P.



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## CHAPTER VII

# ***Adhoc Political Agencies in Rajputana***

### I

## **Bharatpur Political Agency**

Lieutenant Colonel A. Lockett, the Political Agent at Bharatpur, was transferred as Superintendent and Political Agent at Ajmer in 1831. G. T. Lushington, the Assistant to the Resident at Delhi, succeeded him at the Bharatpur Political Agency.<sup>1</sup> On the institution of Rajputana Agency in 1832, the Bharatpur Political Agency was transferred from the control of Delhi Residency to Rajputana Agency <sup>2</sup>

### **Lushington as Political Agent**

Like his predecessor, Lushington continued to administer the State through the Regent Ministers, Dewan Bhola Nath and Lala Nand Lal.<sup>3</sup> The British Government paid special attention to the education of the young Raja Balwant Singh who was taught English besides Persian and Hindi. The Regent Ministers as well as the Political Agent provided him with some training in public affairs.<sup>4</sup> Lushington considered him intelligent and potential enough to transact the business of the State independently. When Balwant Singh entered his

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1. Governor - General's Minute d. 13 October, Cons. 28 October 1831, No. 9, F&P.
  2. Macnaghten to G. T. Lushington, Bharatpur Political Agent d. 17 May, Cons. 2 July 1832, No. 41, F&P.
  3. Lushington to Martin d. 10 June, Cons. 29 July 1831, No. 28, F&P; Political Letter to COD d. 15 December 1831, No. 23 para. 179.
  4. Lushington to Lockett A.G.G. d. 2 June 1833, Cons. 3 January 1834, No. 43, F&P.



eighteenth year in 1833, Lushington proposed to his Government to abolish the Bharatpur Political Agency and leave the State in the charge of Balwant Singh.<sup>1</sup> Further, he suggested the auspicious day of *Dasehra* as the appropriate occasion for the investiture ceremony.<sup>2</sup> The proposal had the support of the Regent Ministers,<sup>3</sup> and was endorsed by A. Speirs, the then officiating A.G.G. in Rajputana.<sup>4</sup> Thereupon, the British Government consented to instal Raja Balwant Singh on the Bharatpur *gaddi* with full powers.<sup>5</sup>

Raja Balwant Singh assumed the reins of the administration on October 12, 1834.<sup>6</sup> In consequence of this, the charge of conducting British relations with the State of Bharatpur devolved upon the A.G.G. at Ajmer.<sup>7</sup> As necessitated by this new arrangement, the State of Bharatpur appointed one Lala Bhadur Singh as its *Vakil* to the Ajmer Political Agency.<sup>8</sup>

### Re-establishment of the Bharatpur Political Agency

Maharaja Balwant Singh reigned for 18 years. He died on March 21, 1853,<sup>9</sup> when his only son Jaswant Singh was two years old.<sup>10</sup> His sudden death necessitated early and

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1. *Ibid*; Lushington to A. Speirs, Offg. A.G.G. d. 21 February, Cons. 1 May 1834, No. 6, F&P.
  2. Lushington to Speirs d. 21 February, Cons. 1 May 1834, No. 6, F&P.
  3. *Ibid*.
  4. Speirs to Macnaghten d. 28 February, Cons. 1 May 1834, No. 6, F&P.
  5. C.E. Trevelyan, Secretary to Government to Alves d. 1 May, Cons. 1 May 1834, No. 7, F&P.
  6. Lushington to Alves d. 14 October 1834, File No. 21—Bharatpur, List No. 1, S. No. 160, p. 9, *RAR*.
  7. Lushington to Alves d. 15 October 1834, File No. 21—Bharatpur, *loc. cit*; See also, Aitchison, *op. cit.*, (1932), p. 342
  8. Lushington to Alves d. 9 October 1834, File No. 21—Bharatpur, *oc. cit*.
  9. Tr. of a *Kharita* from the Maji Sahiba to G.G. d. 30 March, Cons. 20 May 1853, No. 78, F&P.
  10. Henry Lawrence to C. Allen, Offg. Secretary to Government d. 27 March, Cons. 8 April 1853, No. 149, F&P.



adequate arrangements for the protection of the minor prince and for overcoming any eventuality that might arise in the State. Agra being close to Bharatpur, the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces sent T. Taylor, the Commissioner of Agra, to look after the State of Bharatpur until Henry Lawrence, the then A.G.G. in Rajputana, made other necessary arrangements.<sup>1</sup> Henry Lawrence deputed to Bharatpur his Assistant, Captain (later Major) Robert Morrieson, a seasoned and experienced officer of the Rajputana Agency with the immediate object of taking care of the State Treasury and of maintaining peace in the State.<sup>2</sup> Morrieson reached Bharatpur on April 13, 1853.<sup>3</sup> This marked the re-establishment of the Political Agency at Bharatpur.

Henry Lawrence recommended to his Government that Morrieson should have full authority to conduct the administration of Bharatpur during the minority of the raja.<sup>4</sup> However, in view of the feelings of the Bharatpur Durbar and on the advice of the Commissioner of Agra, Henry Lawrence decided that Morrieson should act merely as the Political Agent,<sup>5</sup> and that Dhao Bhai Ghasi Ram, a respectable old Chief of Bharatpur, might administer the territory,<sup>6</sup> aided by two Chiefs. This was, again an attempt on the part of the A.G.G. to revive the system of Regency Rule during the minority of the prince. On May 10, 1853, the British Government concurred with the A.G.G. in his proposal, but cautioned him that in the event of the plan failing to work smoothly, 'the Raj should be administered by the Political Agent on behalf of the minor'.<sup>7</sup>

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1. Henry Lawrence to Allen d. 27 March, Cons. 8 April 1853, No. 149, F&P.
  2. Henry Lawrence, to R. Morrieson, Assistant to A.G.G. d. 26 March, Cons. 8 April 1853, No. 149, F&P.
  3. Morrieson, Assistant to A. G. G. on deputation to Bharatpur, d. 14 April 1853, File No. 40—Bharatpur 1853, List No. 1. S. No. 112, p. 10, *RAR*.
  4. Henry Lawrence to Allen d. 27 March 1853, *loc. cit.*
  5. Henry Lawrence to Allen d. 5 April 1853, File No. 40—Bharatpur 1853, *loc. cit.*
  6. *Ibid.*
  7. Allen to Henry Lawrence d. 10 May 1853, File No. 40—Bharatpur 1853, *loc. cit.*



While conveying the Government's instructions to Major Morrieson, the A.G.G. directed him to maintain a 'native administration' at Bharatpur, 'controlled and influenced by the friendly advice of a Political Agent'.<sup>1</sup> Besides, the A. G. G. advised him to train the Chiefs and officers of the State in the ways of good government, so that the beneficial effect of the British interference there might endure.<sup>2</sup> He did not desire Morrieson to administer the State directly with the assistance of the officers (*Mutsadies*) from the British provinces. It was likely to be unpalatable to the Chiefs, and there was a fear that the good effects of British supervision during the minority would pass away with the departure of the Political Agent from Bharatpur.<sup>3</sup>

Morrieson registered his disapproval of these instructions, and desired permission to exercise 'full authority' in the State administration.<sup>4</sup> For this purpose, he wanted to employ Indian officers from the British territories. However, Henry Lawrence held that during the minority period the State should be governed by a 'Native Regent', or a Council of Regency under the supervision of the Political Agent, and without the assistance of the *Mutsadies* from the British territories. He thought it essential to preserve the fabric of the State administration from falling to pieces.<sup>5</sup> If it was not possible to carry on the State administration without 'foreign aid', he assured Morrieson that he would obtain the permission of the Government for appointment of a 'Native officer' from the British territories to assist him at Bharatpur.<sup>6</sup> It was only in the eventuality of a complete failure of the 'Native Regency' that Henry Lawrence was ready to permit the Political Agent to administer the State by his own 'instruments'.<sup>7</sup> Even in doing so, the Political Agent

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1. Henry Lawrence to Morrieson, Political Agent Bharatpur d. 24 May 1853, File No. 40 - Bharatpur 1853, *loc. cit.*
  2. *Ibid.*
  3. *Ibid.*
  4. Henry Lawrence to Allen d. 22 June 1853, File No. 40 - Bharatpur, *loc. cit.*
  5. *Ibid.*
  6. *Ibid.*
  7. Henry Lawrence to Morrieson d. 28 May 1853, File No. 40—Bharatpur, *loc. cit.*



was to employ as far as possible, 'the old Native Regency' and to make only such changes as were absolutely necessary, because the management of the State in the final analysis was to revert to the Maharaja, his Chiefs and officials.<sup>1</sup> Further, the A.G.G. distinctly warned Morrieson that if he wished to remain at Bharatpur, he should conduct the administration according to these sound principles of British policy.<sup>2</sup>

At last, Morrieson agreed to do his best to conduct the administration according to these instructions.<sup>3</sup> Henry Lawrence's policy was readily approved of by his Government, for it had seen the success of the system of Regency rule at Indore, Gwalior, Bhopal and Jaipur.<sup>4</sup> As the Bharatpur Political Agency was re-established solely for the benefit of the Bharatpur State which did not pay any tribute and could well meet its expenses, the British Government saddled the State with the responsibility of paying for the expenses of the Bharatpur Political Agency.<sup>5</sup>

### **Morrieson as Political Agent**

Dhao Bhai Ghashi Ram, who enjoyed the confidence of the late Maharaja, was appointed Regent. Morrieson preferred this appointment for he found a solitary Regent more manageable than a Council of Regency.<sup>6</sup> However, he did not give willing co-operation to Dhaoji in conducting the administration.<sup>7</sup>

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1. Henry Lawrence to Morrieson d. 28 May 1853, *loc. cit.*
  2. *Ibid.*
  3. Morrieson to Henry Lawrence d. 7 June 1853, File No. 40 - Bharatpur, *loc. cit.*
  4. Allen to Henry Lawrence d. 15 July, Cons. 15 July 1853, No. 110, F&P.
  5. Allen to Henry Lawrence d. 10 June, Cons. 10 June 1853, No. 73, F&P; Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 8 September, Cons. 3 October 1856, No. 132, F&P; Edmonstone to Henry Lawrence d. 30 September, Cons. 3 October 1856, No. 134, F&P.
  6. Morrieson to Henry Lawrence d. 7 June 1853, File No. 40 - Bharatpur, *loc. cit.*; Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 15 March 1857, Cons. 12 June 1857, No. 187, F&P.
  7. Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 15 March 1857, *loc. cit.*



To help the Political Agent in carrying out his work at Bharatpur, the A.G.G. appointed Syfoola Khan, as the Deputy Agent in September 1854.<sup>1</sup> Khan, a man from the British Province, was competent but was also 'harsh and overbearing'. The A.G.G. directed the Political Agent that either judicial or revenue work, but not both, be made over to the Deputy; the latter was to have no concern with the Durbar or Durbar affairs, or the Maharani, or the Chiefs.<sup>2</sup> Notwithstanding this order, Morrieson made over the State Treasury to Syfoola Khan, who virtually exercised control over every official and Chief in the State.<sup>3</sup> He countersigned Dhaoji's treasury orders before they were cashed. The cumulative result of Morrieson's placing implicit confidence in the Deputy was that Dhaoji expressed a desire to resign. Henry Lawrence visited Bharatpur in September 1855 and, on finding that he really wished to leave, accepted his resignation.<sup>4</sup>

There being no possibility of forming another 'native administration', Henry Lawrence, after consulting all the parties in the State, placed the Political Agent on September 12, 1855, in full charge of the administration. The British Government had as early as May 10, 1853 given him this alternative.<sup>5</sup> It was the earnest desire of Henry Lawrence that the Political Agent should be assisted by three or four Chiefs acting in complete subordination to him. But Morrieson was opposed to this measure; so the A.G.G. suggested that the Political Agent might hold consultations with some of the Chiefs on Durbar matters and on questions pertaining to the local customs.<sup>6</sup> The A.G.G. enabled Morrieson to become stronger in the State; he gave him magisterial and revenue powers in addition to those he enjoyed as Political Agent. Thus at last, by depriving the *Mukhtiar* of his support, Morrieson succeeded in compelling the A.G.G. to acquiesce in his long

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1. Henry Lawrence to Morrieson d. 28 September 1854 (Encl. "Z", No. 3) Cons. 12 June 1857, No. 187, F&P.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 15 March 1857, *loc. cit.*

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*



cherished desire to run the administration of the State during the minority of the Raja by his own 'instruments'. The change in the position of the Political Agent at Bharatpur resulted in his becoming more dependent on the Deputy and several other Indian officers from the British provinces.

*Organization of judicial machinery* : One of the departments of the State in which the A.G.G. introduced reforms, against the wishes of the Political Agent was the judiciary. At the outset, Morrieson put off all civil suitors with the plea that they would be heard when a court was established. The A.G.G. forbade him from doing so as the old courts and their officials still existed, although ignored.<sup>1</sup> He even authorized the employment of three or four 'Hindustanees' of established character in the State judiciary. The Political Agent, however, could find none except the Deputy's relations and retainers. This compelled Henry Lawrence to envisage the scheme of employing in the judicial department of the State only Bharatpur officials who would be of service to the Raja when he attained majority; they were to receive fair pay, and work according to the few plain rules meant for their guidance. Accordingly, he was obliged to fall back on the old officials. He appointed the old Diwan, Bhola Nath as Chief judge and restored the old magistrate, Brij Ballabh to his functions at the request of the people of Bharatpur city. He also appointed Chaudhari Charan Singh, a man of ability and a relative of the Raja to a similar capacity at Deeg.<sup>2</sup>

The judicial machinery thus established by the A.G.G. worked with efficiency. In 1855-56, out of 2411 cases, only 21 judgements were reversed. Even the success of the judicial measures did not bring about any change in the attitude of

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1. Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 15 March 1857, *loc. cit.*

2. *Ibid.*



Morrieson who thwarted rather than aided the scheme of judicial reforms in the State.<sup>1</sup>

*Measures for fiscal relief* : Morrieson was opposed to not only the judicial reforms but all the measures meant to provide 'fiscal relief' to the people.

The State's land revenue was over-assessed in the time of the late Raja. During the first half of 1855, Henry Lawrence directed Morrieson to make a summary settlement.<sup>2</sup> Morrieson resisted the A.G.G.'s repeated instructions by giving evasive replies that no accounts were available as there were no *patwaris* (village accountants).<sup>3</sup> The fact, however, was that Morrieson wanted either to raise the assessment or to keep the territory under his direct management (*Kham-tahsil*).<sup>4</sup> His contention was influenced by his Deputy, Syfoola Khan, and one Har Sewak known to be his favourite. He had appointed Har Sewak as the Revenue officer and *tehsildar* of the *pargana* of Gopalgarh.<sup>5</sup>

Henry Lawrence continued to insist on a summary assessment on equitable terms. The year 1854 was one of famine in many quarters. Excepting Har Sewak, 'every Durbar official urged the necessity of relief'.<sup>6</sup> Henry Lawrence visited Bharatpur in August 1855 to make the summary settlement himself. In the course of a week, he succeeded in effecting a summary settlement of three *parganas*, viz., Gopalgarh, Kama and Pahari at a reduction of about 14 to 15 per cent on the total *jama*

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1. Henry Lawrence to Morrieson d. 26 December 1856, quoted in the report from Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 15 March 1857, *op. cit.*, para. 42.
  2. Henry Lawrence to Morrieson d. 8 February 1855; Lawrence to Morrieson d. 23 July 1855, File No. 44-Bharatpur, Vol. I (1855), List No. 1, S. No. 114, *RAR*.
  3. Morrieson to Henry Lawrence d. 18 June 1855, File No. 44-Bharatpur, Vol. I, *loc. cit.*
  4. Henry Lawrence to Morrieson d. 23 July 1855, File No. 44-Bharatpur, Vol. I, *loc. cit.*
  5. Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 15 March 1857, *loc. cit.*
  6. *Ibid.*



of Rs. 4,98,417. This reduction Henry Lawrence did not find excessive. Morrieson, however, talked of a deliberate and wanton loss of revenue to the State to the tune of three and a half lakh rupees per annum.<sup>1</sup>

Finding Morrieson unwilling to carry out 'settlement' on his terms, Henry Lawrence relieved him of this duty, and instructed Captain J.P. Nixon, to stay on in Bharatpur State to complete the work in the remaining *pa-ganas*.<sup>2</sup> He wanted to introduce a regular settlement upon the principles which had governed proceedings of the British Government in its own territories. In doing so, the A.G.G. instructed Nixon to keep in mind 'not only the rights and customs of the Bharatpur Raj, but even its very prejudices'.<sup>3</sup>

Nixon carried out his arduous duty with care, zeal and ability.<sup>4</sup> When he was about to revise the settlement on the basis of his survey for the remaining term of the Maharaja's minority,<sup>5</sup> the Revolt of 1857 broke out, and Nixon with his party of surveyors left Bharatpur for Agra.<sup>6</sup> In consequence, the work came to a standstill.<sup>7</sup>

*Interference in the Salt - Works :* In September 1856, Morrieson thought of increasing the revenues of the State.<sup>8</sup> To him, every Bharatpur official appeared dishonest and he believed that 'good pay and good treatment' and even strict supervision would not bring any improvement in them. He dubbed them 'robbers' and 'rogues', and, therefore, entrusted the Salt-Works to Syfoola Khan. He insisted on salt being

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1. Henry Lawrence to Morrieson d. 15 March 1857, *loc cit.*

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*

4. Henry Lawrence to Nixon, Assistant to A.G.G. d. 26 January 1857, File No. 44-Bharatpur, Vol. II, List No. 1, S. No. 115, p. 44, *RAR*; Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 15 March 1857, *loc. cit.*

5. Political letter to COD d. 9 January 1858, No. 2.

6. Morrieson to George Lawrence d. 8 July, Cons. 28 July 1857, No. 44-A, F & P.

7. *Ibid.*

8. Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 15 March 1857, *loc. cit.*



carried away within a stipulated period and introduced innovations in weighing, etc. All these changes impaired the trade to such an extent that at the busiest period of the year, the salt trade was entirely stopped.<sup>1</sup>

All these measures which Morrieson proposed and implemented were against the instructions of the A.G.G. When the latter was apprised of the crisis in salt trade, he instantaneously directed Morrieson to suspend all the unauthorized innovations which did not bear the sanction of Vansittart, the Customs Commissioner, Agra. In the beginning, Morrieson resisted, but on the personal remonstrances of Vansittart, he gave in. This did not pacify the traders who on the other hand, complained of heavy losses amounting to several lakhs of rupees on account of the stoppage of the trade for two or three months - a period when salt was dear and transport was cheap.<sup>2</sup>

*Morrieson fled from Bharatpur* : Morrieson's interference in the Salt-Works so much annoyed the A.G.G. that he recommended to his Government his removal from the Bharatpur Political Agency. Morrieson was already unpopular with every class, high and low, with ryots, traders, soldiers, *sardars* and officials at Bharatpur, because of his petty and uncalled for interference. In all the measures he sought to implement, he neglected consulting the Chiefs who were the representatives of the three leading classes, the Jats, the Gujars and the State officials. Had he consulted the Chiefs from time to time before introducing any new measure or effecting a change, he would have not only gained their support but even succeeded in satisfying their vanity.<sup>3</sup> In fact, in supervising the State administration he worked more as a cavilling censor than a friendly adviser.

Morrieson did not prove himself the right instrument for the implementation of the British policy in Bharatpur. Even in carrying out the A.G.G.'s instructions, his attitude was obstructive, if not contumaciously disobedient. His reluctance

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1. Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 15 March 1857, *loc. cit.*

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*



in co-operating with the A.G.G. in conducting the summary settlement, in reorganizing the judicial system in the State and his unwarranted and untimely innovations in the Salt-Works proved injurious to the British interest in Bharatpur.

Before the British Government could decide to act on the report of the A.G.G. against Morrieson, the Uprising of 1857 had taken place in India. During this period, Morrieson's unpopularity added to the problems already created by the Uprising. The troops of the State of Bharatpur evinced dissatisfaction against the British Government and the Durbar officials expressed their inability to give Morrieson any protection.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, under the pall of darkness, the Political Agent had to leave for Ajmer on the night of July 8, 1857.<sup>2</sup> The State administration slipped into the hands of one Gulab Singh, who was the nominee of the Maji Sahiba of Bharatpur, the mother of the minor prince.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the British Government remained unrepresented in the State till October 18, 1857 when after the British reoccupation of Delhi, Captain J. P. Nixon assumed charge as the officiating Political Agent at Bharatpur.<sup>4</sup>

## II

### Sirohi Political Superintendent

On the formation of a new Political Agency at Neemuch, in 1832, the State of Sirohi was placed under its political charge.<sup>5</sup> Sirohi being in closer proximity to Jodhpur than Neemuch, Sutherland, the A.G.G. in Rajputana, proposed in 1840 the transfer of the State to the charge of the Political Agent at Jodhpur.<sup>6</sup> Robinson, the Political Agent at Neemuch,

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1. Morrieson to George Lawrence, Offg. A.G.G. d. 9 July Cons. 28 July 1857, No. 44-A, F & P.
  2. Morrieson to George Lawrence d. 8 July, Cons. 28 July 1857, No. 44-A, F & P.
  3. *Ibid.*
  4. J.P. Nixon to George Lawrence d. 18 October, Cons. 14 December 1857, No. 199, F & P.
  5. Macnaghten to Paisley d. 5 May, Cons. 4 June 1832, No. 45, F & P; *Supra*, p. 98.
  6. Sutherland to Thomason d. 30 March, Cons. 27 April 1840, No. 30, F & P.



thought that this would prove a speedy and effective measure to deal with the disturbances on Marwar-Sirohi border.<sup>1</sup> Captain J. Ludlow, the then Political Agent at Jodhpur, also showed his readiness to accept the proposal.<sup>2</sup>

Before deciding on the proposal, the British Government sought the advice of Alexander Speirs, the Resident at Gwalior,<sup>3</sup> who had formerly acted as Political Agent at Sirohi as well as at Neemuch. He objected to the measure on the ground that it would be most unpalatable to the Rao of Sirohi, his Chiefs and the people, owing to the animosity and hostile feelings which had existed for many years between the States of Sirohi and Jodhpur.<sup>4</sup> The British Government was so much carried away by this opinion that it preferred occasional inconveniences in deciding the disputes between Sirohi and Jodhpur than to hurt the feelings of the Rao of Sirohi.<sup>5</sup>

Robinson did not find this decision of the British Government convincing.<sup>6</sup> His experience was that since Sirohi was quite distant from Neemuch it enabled him to exercise merely a nominal supervision over the State's affairs.<sup>7</sup> He, therefore, suggested, as an alternative, that Major Downing, the Commandant of the Jodhpur Legion at Erinpura (in Sirohi) be nominated to the political charge of Sirohi. This would also satisfy the Rao's vanity.<sup>8</sup> Sutherland was satisfied with the desirability of this measure in view of the incompetence of the Regent of Sirohi; moreover, the State required close supervision for the development of its resources.<sup>9</sup> On the British

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1. Sutherland to Thomason d. 30 March, Cons. 4 June 1832, No. 45, F & P.
  2. *Ibid.*
  3. Maddock to A. Speirs, Resident Gwalior d. 27 April, Cons. 27 April 1840, No. 31, F & P.
  4. Speirs to Maddock d. 12 May, Cons. 8 June 1840, No. 112, F & P.
  5. Maddock to Sutherland d. 8 June, Cons. 8 June 1840, No. 113, F & P.
  6. Robinson to Sutherland d. 28 January, Cons. 1 March 1841, No. 18, F & P.
  7. *Ibid.*
  8. *Ibid.*
  9. Sutherland to Maddock d. 2 February, Cons. 1 March 1841, No. 18, F & P.



Government's sanction<sup>1</sup> of this proposal, Sirohi was transferred in 1841 to the charge of Major Downing,<sup>2</sup> who was designated as 'the Political Superintendent, Sirohi' and placed in subordination to the A.G.G. at Ajmer.<sup>3</sup>

In 1841, several European officers sought Downing's help for securing them the Rao's permission to build their houses for a summer resort at Mount Abu, a hill station in the State of Sirohi.<sup>4</sup> Before opening negotiations with the Rao on this subject, Downing sought the advice of Sutherland, on the matter.<sup>5</sup> Mount Abu being within a 'foreign territory', Sutherland solicited the instructions of his Government for the terms on which a British officer could be allowed to build a house there.<sup>6</sup> Simultaneously, he drew the attention of his Government to the suitability of Mount Abu as a sanatorium for European soldiers from the Cantonment of Deesa which was under the Bombay Presidency.<sup>7</sup> The British Government had no objection to the officers building houses for seasonal accommodation at Mount Abu if the Rao of Sirohi permitted them to do so.<sup>8</sup> With the Rao consenting to this proposal many European officers built their bungalows at Mount Abu.<sup>9</sup>

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1. Maddock to Sutherland d. 1 March, Cons. 1 March 1841, No. 19, F & P.
  2. Sutherland to Downing, Commandant Jodhpur Legion d. 13 March, Cons. 3 May 1841, No. 34, F & P.
  3. Sutherland to Maddock d. 28 May, Cons. 28 June 1841, No. 46, F & P.
  4. Downing, Political Superintendent to Sutherland d. 24 May, Cons. 28 June 1841, No. 39, F & P.
  5. *Ibid*
  6. Sutherland to Maddock d. 26 May, Cons. 28 June 1841, No. 39, F & P.
  7. *Ibid*.
  8. Maddock to Sutherland d. 28 June, Cons. 28 June 1841, No. 40, F & P.
  9. W. Anderson, Political Superintendent, Sirohi to Brigadier Hughes, Commanding North Division, Ahmedabad d. 19 December 1844, Cons. 7 March 1845, No. 6, F & P; Anderson to Thoresby d. 3 November 1844, Cons. 15 February 1845, No. 21 F & P.



When the British Government consulted the Bombay Government for building the sanatorium at Mount Abu,<sup>1</sup> the latter declined it mainly on account of financial reasons.<sup>2</sup> However, the Court of Directors persisted with the idea and suggested to the Bombay Government to build a sanatorium at Mount Abu at a small expense.<sup>3</sup> This made the Bombay Government and the Commanding officer of North Division of Bombay Army, Brigadier General Hughes, solicit the co-operation of Captain William Anderson, the Political Superintendent at Sirohi for obtaining the Rao's consent for building a sanatorium at Mount Abu for the sick and convalescent Europeans from the Cantonment of Deesa.<sup>4</sup>

### **Anderson as Political Superintendent**

Anderson had been working since September 2, 1844, as the Political Superintendent of Sirohi and Commander of the Jodhpur Legion, when Downing proceeded on leave.<sup>5</sup> He saw difficulty in securing the consent of the Rao to the proposal of the Bombay Government specially for the reason that there were a number of temples at Mount Abu, and the Rao visualized the presence of European soldiers there with misgiving<sup>6</sup>. In this connection, he suggested to Major C. Thoresby, the officiating A.G.G. that if the sanatorium was to be built at Mount Abu, a strict code of regulations would have to be laid down for the observance of the Europeans

1. Maddock to Secretary to the Government of Bombay d. 28 June, Cons. 28 June 1841, No. 41, F & P.
2. J.P. Willoughby, Secretary to Government of Bombay to Maddock d. 11 May, Cons. 7 June 1843, No. 5, F & P.
3. Political letter from COD d. 30 October 1844, No. 38. para. 1.
4. Hughes to Anderson d. 28 October 1844, Cons. 15 February 1845, No. 22, F & P.
5. C. Thoresby, Offg. A.G.G. to Currie d. 5 September, Cons. 21 September 1844, No. 22, F&P; Notification Fort William—Foreign Department, d. 21 September, Cons. 21 September 1844, No. 23, F&P.
6. Anderson to Thoresby d. 3 November 1844, Cons. 15 February 1845, No. 21, F&P.



there.<sup>1</sup> On Thoresby's recommendation,<sup>2</sup> the British Government unhesitatingly permitted Anderson to guarantee to the Rao that due consideration would be given by the Europeans to the religious sentiments of the Abu inhabitants.<sup>3</sup>

In accordance with the instructions of his Government, Anderson assured the Rao that soldiers would be prevented from going into the villages, or in any way molesting the inhabitants, and from killing cows or bullocks, peafowls or pigeons; temples and shrines would be kept free from intrusion, and that adequate measures would be taken by the British Government to prevent any loss to crops or any other property at Mount Abu.<sup>4</sup> These assurances dispelled the Rao's misapprehension, and he allotted a piece of land near the Nakki Lake at Mount Abu for building the sanatorium.<sup>5</sup> Brigadier General Hughes of the Bombay Army was also informed of these negotiations, as the Cantonment of Deesa, whence the soldiers were to avail of the sanatorium facilities, was within the jurisdiction and control of the Bombay Government.<sup>6</sup>

A sanatorium was built at Mount Abu in 1845.<sup>7</sup> It was under the control of the Bombay Government and not under the Rajputana Agency.<sup>8</sup> In 1846, 100 invalids from Deesa were sent there. Their stay at Mount Abu proved of great benefit to their health. Consequently, it became a regular resort for the European invalids.<sup>9</sup> By 1847, the people at

1. Anderson to Thoresby d. 3 November 1844, Cons. 15 February 1845, No. 21, F&P.
2. Thoresby to Currie d. 8 November 1844, Cons. 15 February 1845, No. 20, F&P.
3. Edmonstone to Thoresby d. 10 February, Cons. 15 February 1845, No. 24, F&P; Thoresby to Anderson d. 9 March, Cons. 16 May 1845, No. 48, F&P.
4. Anderson to Hughes d. 16 April, Cons. 16 May 1845, No. 50, F&P.
5. Anderson to Thoresby d. 17 April, Cons. 16 May 1845, No. 49, F&P.
6. Anderson to Hughes d. 16 April, *loc. cit.*
7. Anderson to Thoresby d. 12 September, Cons. 12 September 1845, No. 72, F&P; Edmonstone to Thoresby d. 12 September, Cons. 12 September 1845, No. 75, F&P.
8. Currie to Thoresby d. 12 September, Cons. 12 September 1845, No. 76, F&P.
9. Sutherland to Elliot d. 23 May, Cons. 7 August 1847, No. 824, F&P.



Mount Abu had also become accustomed to the presence of the Europeans. About 20 houses were built by the European officers by this time. Beef was not used at Mount Abu, for it was offending to Hindus and Mount Abu was a very sacred spot in their estimation.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, the proposal of the A.G.G. for the establishment of a sanatorium at Mount Abu, though in the first instance shelved by the Bombay Government, was implemented because it had won the support of the Court of Directors. But the building of the summer resorts for the British officers and a sanatorium for the European soldiers at Mount Abu was possible only due to Anderson's perseverance in negotiating with the Rao for the purpose. Further, the appointment of Anderson as the Magistrate (1851)<sup>2</sup> and 'Justice of the Peace' (1854)<sup>3</sup> at Mount Abu and Anadra enabled him to maintain law and order there. Through this arrangement the Rajputana Agency could amicably resolve the periodic disputes between the natives and the Europeans there.<sup>4</sup>

### **Sirohi Administration under Political Superintendent**

In 1847, on the demise of the deposed ruler, Rao Udai Bhan<sup>5</sup>, his brother, Rao Shiva Singh, the then Regent of Sirohi, was recognized as his successor to the *gaddi* by the British Government.<sup>6</sup> The new ruler did not prove himself an efficient and able administrator. The State of Sirohi was in debt, and Shiva Singh found himself incapable of curtailing

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1. Sutherland to Elliot d. 23 May, Cons. 7 August 1847, No. 824, F&P.

2. Tr. of a Hindi *Kharita* from Rao Shiva Singh of Sirohi to Anderson d. 28 August, Cons. 3 October 1851, No. 110, F&P; Notification—Foreign Department, Simla d. 23 September 1851, Cons. 3 October 1851, No. 112, F&P.

3. Edmonstone to Henry Lawrence d. 29 November, Cons. 1 December 1854, No. 125, F&P.

4. The British subjects who resided at Mount Abu were the invalids at the sanatorium and the European soldiers of the Bombay army.

5. Udai Bhan died on 11 January, 1847. Cf. Anderson to Sutherland d. 13 January, Cons. 27 February 1847, No. 111, F&P.

6. Edwards to Sutherland d. 17 February, Cons. 27 February 1847, No. 112, F&P.



his expenses and meeting the demands of his creditors.<sup>1</sup> In January 1854, he very desperately requested the British Government to manage his State for seven or eight years so that its finances might be repaired. Upon this, Anderson proposed to the A. G. G. that Shiva Singh be allowed the services of a Political officer to manage the affairs of his State which had fallen hopelessly in debt. Further, he expressed the hope that by establishing order in the State and reviving the confidence of the people many of the traders who had left Sirohi within the preceding forty years, might return gradually.<sup>2</sup>

Before taking up the matter with his Government, Henry Lawrence wanted Anderson to procure from the Rao an explicit declaration that if the British Government took charge of his territory, he would agree to any arrangements that might be deemed necessary.<sup>3</sup> When the Rao gave the required guarantee<sup>4</sup>, the A.G.G. had a free hand to make arrangements for the proper administration of the State. Major Anderson, a prudent and conciliatory officer, was intimately acquainted with the Sirohi affairs and enjoyed the confidence of the Rao.<sup>5</sup> The A.G.G., therefore, strongly recommended to his Government that Anderson be appointed to look after the affairs of the State. He suggested that the State should pay an allowance to Anderson for his extra labour.<sup>6</sup> The arrangement was sanctioned<sup>7</sup> by the British Government on April 28, 1854.

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1. Anderson to Henry Lawrence d. 30 January, Cons. 28 April 1854, No. 140, F&P.
  2. *Ibid*
  3. Henry Lawrence to Anderson d. 2 February, Cons. 28 April 1854, No. 140, F&P.
  4. Anderson to Henry Lawrence d. 14 February, Cons. 28 April 1854, No. 140, F&P.
  5. Henry Lawrence to Grant d. 1 April, Cons. 28 April 1854, No. 139, F&P.
  6. *Ibid*.
  7. Grant to Henry Lawrence d. 28 April, Cons. 28 April 1854, No. 141, F&P.



Anderson directed the affairs of Sirohi<sup>1</sup> from May 15, 1854 onwards. He proposed to the A.G.G. the means by which the debt of two lakh rupees could be liquidated within the stipulated period. Bakhat Chand and Kushal Chand, the bankers of Ahmedabad, agreed to advance a loan to the State at the interest of eight per cent per annum, provided a British officer endorsed the bond.<sup>2</sup> With the help of ready money, Anderson hoped to reduce the debt by half.<sup>3</sup> He thought he would not require a loan exceeding rupees eighty thousand and saw no risk in the British Government's guaranteeing the loan, as the mortgage involved the land revenue of the State.<sup>4</sup> Finding Anderson enthusiastic and zealous in improving the State, the A.G.G.<sup>5</sup> obtained the necessary permission of his Government for guaranteeing the loan.<sup>6</sup>

The support which the A.G.G. and the British Government extended to the proposal of loan greatly encouraged Anderson<sup>7</sup>. He tried to manage the administration without meddling in small matters. He undertook construction of roads and tanks which were necessary for the State.<sup>8</sup> Henry Lawrence appreciated this measure.<sup>9</sup> The financial condition of the State being poor, a tribute of fifteen thousand rupees on the revenue of Rs. 94,187 of the State was quite out of proportion as compared to what the other principalities of Rajputana paid. Henry Lawrence, therefore, recommended that

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1. Anderson to Henry Lawrence d. 1 May, Cons. 30 November 1855, No 114, F&P
  2. Anderson to Henry Lawrence d. 27 June, Cons. 28 June 1854, Nos. 159-160, F&P.
  3. *Ibid.*
  4. Anderson to Henry Lawrence d. 27 June, Cons. 28 June 1854. Nos. 159-160, F&P.
  5. Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 29 June, Cons. 28 July 1854, No. 158, F&P.
  6. Edmonstone to Henry Lawrence d. 28 July, Cons 28 July 1854, No. 161, F&P.
  7. Anderson to Henry Lawrence d. 1 May, Cons. 30 November 1855, No. 114, F&P.
  8. Anderson to Henry Lawrence d. 1 May, *loc. cit.*
  9. Henry Lawrence to Ceil Beadon, Secretary to Government, d. 12 July, Cons. 30 November 1855, No. 113, F&P.



either half of the tribute from Sirohi be permanently expended on roads within the limits of the State or at least for three years the full amount of Rs. 15,000 should be devoted to the construction of the main road between Deesa and Erinpura for the proper maintenance of peace and order on that highway.<sup>1</sup> He referred to the earlier unconditional reduction of Jaipur and Mewar tributes as arguments in favour of the proposed concession to Sirohi. He also mentioned the Rao's suit in this connection.<sup>2</sup> The British Government regretted the reduction of the tributes in question but it declined to make a similar reduction in the case of Sirohi.<sup>3</sup>

This refusal to commute the Sirohi tribute could not stem the progress of the State. Anderson was able to relieve the State considerably of its financial burden. When he assumed charge of Sirohi in 1854, he found a debt<sup>4</sup> of Rs. 1,46,656; in 1855, this was reduced<sup>5</sup> by Rs. 16,453, and a further reduction of Rs. 31,250 was effected in 1856. The total amount of the remaining debt was, therefore, Rs. 98,953. The aggregate receipts in 1856 were of the order of Rs. 1,00,043, and the expenditure Rs. 68,793 leaving a balance of Rs. 31,250.<sup>6</sup> In consequence of this improved state of affairs, the bankers of Ahmedabad withdrew their representative from Sirohi, finding his occupation gone. Anderson was confident that he could obtain any sum that he might require from the Mahajans of Sirohi who by this time had developed faith in the State administration.<sup>7</sup>

Cultivation increased in the State, land became valuable (as shown by the number of boundary disputes), property was

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1. Henry Lawrence to Ceil Beadon d. 12 July, Cons. 30 November 1855, No. 113, F&P.
  2. *Ibid.*, See also *supra*, pp. 105, 167.
  3. Edmonstone to Henry Lawrence d. 17 September, Cons. 30 November 1855, No. 120, F & P.
  4. Anderson to Henry Lawrence d. 1 May, Cons. 30 November 1855, No. 114, F & P.
  5. *Ibid.*
  6. Anderson to Henry Lawrence d. 15 October 1856, Cons. 2 January 1857, No. 62, F & P.
  7. *Ibid.*



more secure and the Mahajans began to return. The number of sepoy of the Jodhpur Legion, who were posted for security purposes a few years back, was reduced from 350 to 60 in October 1856. Anderson, therefore, asserted that there was no part of India which afforded more security to travellers and property than Sirohi.<sup>1</sup>

Brahmins, Bhats and Mahajans who formerly enjoyed special privileges in the eyes of law were now, on the commission of crime, punished like other criminals. The criminal jurisdiction was exercised entirely by the Sirohi authorities under the supervision of the Superintendent.<sup>2</sup> Out of the penalty funds an amount of Rs. 2,000 was set aside for improving the Nasirabad-Deesa road leading through Sirohi. Dr. Young, the surgeon incharge of the Jodhpur Legion, supervised a vaccinator who was paid by the State. All castes, save Bhils and Grassias, availed themselves of his services.<sup>3</sup>

In managing the affairs of the State, Anderson adopted a middle course. He neither stood aloof and looked at misrule with apathy, nor completely overruled the 'native authorities' and did everything himself.<sup>4</sup> Unlike Morrieson at Bharatpur, Anderson managed the Sirohi administration with the aid of 'natives' alone.<sup>5</sup> The A.G.G. eulogized Anderson for his exemplary services to the people of Sirohi and to his own Government.<sup>6</sup> Anderson received the unfailing support of the Rao who displayed much good sense in all matters of business.<sup>7</sup> Unusual as it was for the native rulers to invite British interference, it was still more unusual for such interference to lead to an increased confidence and goodwill<sup>8</sup> which obtained between the Rao and Anderson and

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1. Anderson to Henry Lawrence d. 15 October 1856, Cons. 2 January 1857, No. 62, F&P.
  2. *Ibid.*
  3. *Ibid.*
  4. Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 1 December 1856, Cons. 2 January 1857, No. 61, F & P.
  5. *Ibid.*
  6. *Ibid.*
  7. Anderson to Henry Lawrence d. 15 October 1856, *loc. cit.*
  8. Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 1 December 1856, *loc. cit.*



redounded equally to their credit.<sup>1</sup> Anderson's able and conciliatory superintendence led to the prosperity of the State and generated good feelings in the State authorities towards him.<sup>2</sup>

Lord Canning, the Governor-General, and the members of his Council also commended Anderson for his ability and good judgement.<sup>3</sup> Anderson introduced remarkable improvements in every branch of the administration of Sirohi - revenue, judicial and police and also in the social relations of different castes and sects within a short span of time.<sup>4</sup>

### **Hall as Political Superintendent**

The cumulative result of Anderson's successful exertions was that, the British relations with the Sirohi State were on a very cordial basis when he handed over charge as the Sirohi Political Superintendent and Commandant of the Jodhpur Legion, on February 1, 1857 to Captain J. D. Hall, the second-in-Command of the Jodhpur Legion.<sup>5</sup>

This favourable state of affairs at Sirohi, however, did not continue for long. The revolt of the Jodhpur Legion in 1857 at Mount Abu and Erinpura disturbed very much the usual order and quiet of Sirohi and deprived the Rao of that moral and physical strength which the presence of the Legion in his confines had long afforded him.<sup>6</sup> By 1857, the State savings reported to be Rs. 11,978, were absorbed by the domestic expenditure on funerals and marriages, and the maintenance of extra troops for the defence of the town and the frontiers of the State. There was, therefore, no reduction in the State debt during Hall's tenure except what had been already effected by the voluntary relinquishment of Rs. 5,972, anna 1 and pies 6

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1. Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 1 December 1856, *loc. cit.*
  2. *Ibid.*
  3. Edmonstone to Henry Lawrence d. 31 December 1856, Cons. 2 January 1857, No 67, F & P.
  4. *Ibid.*
  5. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 5 February, Cons. 20 February 1857, No. 193, F & P.
  6. J. Hall, offg. Political Superintendent, Sirohi to George Lawrence d. 25 January, Cons. 24 September 1858, No. 169, F & P.



on the part of the Mahajans. The debt in August 1857 amounted to Rs. 89,215 and 6 pies.<sup>1</sup> However, the loyalty which the Rao of Sirohi displayed by assisting Hall and other Europeans at the time of the revolt of the Jodhpur Legion<sup>2</sup> at Abu, made the British Government reciprocate his gesture by reducing the annual tribute of Rs. 15,000 to half and remitting all the arrears of tribute.<sup>3</sup> On receiving this favour, the Rao reiterated his wish to remain always 'a friend and well-wisher of the British Government'.<sup>4</sup>

However, Hall did not prove as successful as Anderson in conducting the State affairs. On the A.G.G.'s recommendation<sup>5</sup> the British Government<sup>6</sup> relieved Hall of his charge. Anderson had meanwhile returned to Rajputana from England and was given the combined political charge of the States of Jodhpur and Sirohi with his headquarters at Jodhpur, on April 15, 1858.<sup>7</sup>

### III

#### An Appraisal

The above study gives ample evidence of the fact that there were mainly three reasons which made the British Government establish Political Agencies in Rajputana during the period 1818-58 : (i) maladministration in the States, (ii) minority of a ruler, and (iii) an urgency to exercise effective

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1. J. Hall, Offg. Political Superintendent, Sirohi to George Lawrence d. 25 January, Cons. 24 September 1858, No. 169, F&P.
  2. Hall to George Lawrence d. 27 August, Cons. 30 October 1857, No. 618, F & Sc.
  3. R. Simson, offg. Under Secretary to Government of India to George Lawrence d. 18 December, Cons. 18 December 1857, No. 3, F & P; See also, File No. 1852-1858-1868, List No. 10, p. 116, S. No. 20, R4R.
  4. Tr. of a *Kharita* from Rao of Sirohi to A. G. G. Rajputana d. 17 January, Cons. 5 March 1858, No. 143, F & P.
  5. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 12 January, Cons. 5 February 1858, No. 150, F & P.
  6. Edmonstone to G. Lawrence d. 5 February, Cons. 5 February 1858, No. 152, F & P.
  7. George Lawrence to Beadon d. 26 April, Cons. 14 May 1858, No. 155, F & P.



control over the interstate relations in the interest of securing general tranquillity in the region.

**(i) British Policy during Maladministration**

In 1818, it was for the first time that a Political Agent was appointed in Mewar to improve its distracted condition. The same purpose led to the appointment of Political Agents at Jaipur (in 1821) and at Jodhpur (in 1840). The British Government normally appointed a Political Agent to end maladministration not only on its own initiative but also on the request of a ruler himself, as it happened in the case of Sirohi in 1854. But the appointment of a Political Agent in a State on this ground alone was not always sanctioned. For instance, in February 1845, Maharawal Gaj Singh (1820-1846) of Jaisalmer proposed that a Political Agent be appointed to improve the administration of his State. Thoresby, the officiating A.G.G. in Rajputana, did not consider it expedient, and, therefore, the British Government turned down the proposal.<sup>1</sup>

**(ii) British Policy during the period of minority**

The policy of appointing a Political Agent as the head of the Regency Council during the minority of a ruler was enunciated by Charles Metcalfe for the first time in 1826 in Bharatpur. The appointment of a Political Agent in 1839 at Jaipur was in continuation of this policy. From this time onwards, a Political Agent was generally appointed as the head of a Regency Council which consisted of *Thakurs* or distinguished persons of a State. This discontinued the practice of appointing the mother of the minor prince as Regent. The British Government did not consider that a lady living in purdah could properly look after the State interests during the minority period. As a paramount power, the Imperial Government considered it as its primary responsibility to provide protection to the minor prince and his State. This assumption of guardianship of a minor ruler or interference in his State to safeguard other interests also obviated the chances of bloodshed, anarchy and confusion which could

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1. Currie to Thoresby d. 2 May, Cons. 2 May 1845, Nos. 67-70, F & P.



arise from the attempts, on the part of his ambitious relatives, to become Regent.<sup>1</sup> This British policy was considered by Low not only justifiable, but also highly expedient and proper.<sup>2</sup> However, the appointment of a Political Agent in a State during the period of the minority was just a matter of policy and not always a general rule. Therefore, it was not always sanctioned in case of every minor ruler. The best exposition of this policy was evident in the States of (a) Jaisalmer and (b) Banswara.

(a) No Political Agent was appointed when Ranjit Singh, the minor and adopted son of Maharawal Gaj Singh, ascended the *gaddi* of Jaisalmer in July 1846. John Sutherland, the A.G.G. in Rajputana, under whose direct control the State fell, made proper arrangements for the administration of Jaisalmer through Sardar Mal Purohit, the State *Vakil*, residing at the Ajmer Political Agency. Kesri Singh, the father of Ranjit Singh, was chosen as the Regent with the consent of Maji Ranawat and the *jagirdars*. This peaceful settlement of affairs at Jaisalmer ruled out the possibility of the deputation of a Political Agent there.<sup>3</sup> Of course, the A.G.G. saw to it that the administration was conducted smoothly by the Regent during the period of minority.<sup>4</sup>

(b) During such period of minority the British Government occasionally allowed the Political Agent to appoint a minister of his own choice in the State.<sup>5</sup> This policy of indirect interference in the internal affairs of the State of Banswara was followed by Lieutenant-Colonel Robinson, the Political Agent at Neemuch.

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1. Robinson, Political Agent Mewar to Low A. G. G. d. 10 October, Cons. 17 November 1849, No. 185, F & P.
  2. Low to Elliot d. 16 October, Cons. 17 November 1849, No. 183, F&P.
  3. Currie to Sutherland d. 21 August, Cons. 29 August 1846, Nos. 115-16, F&P.
  4. Sutherland to Edwards d. 22 February, Cons. 7 August 1847, No. 806, F&P.
  5. Robinson to Low d. 10 October, Cons. 17 November 1844, No. 23, F&P.



Lachman Singh, the minor and adopted successor of Maharawal Bahadur Singh<sup>1</sup> succeeded to the *gaddi* of Banswara in 1844.<sup>2</sup> On seeing the disturbances and party feuds for gaining power, Robinson gave his avowed support in 1849 to Thakur Ratan Lal of Garhi (in Banswara), the *Mukhtiar* of the State.<sup>3</sup> The affairs of the State were virtually under Ratan Lal's management and were before him under his father Arjan Singh, from a period anterior to British relations with the State. Robinson considered Ratan Lal to be a man of great influence and intelligence who could maintain peace and order among the tribal population of the wild tracts in Banswara.<sup>4</sup> It was for this reason that he selected and supported him as the minister of the State. Had the Rawal of Banswara been mature enough to judge for himself what was beneficial to his State, Robinson would never have thought of interfering in the choice of a minister, or any of his servants.<sup>5</sup> In the event Robinson considered it more necessary to exercise his 'utmost influence in upholding the existing administration' than passively witness its subversion by a set of disrupted characters<sup>6</sup>. Robinson's policy of interference in Banswara was avowedly supported by Low, who observed in his letter :<sup>7</sup>

During the minorities of Native Sovereigns under our protection, we are almost always under the necessity of exercising our power at the Durbar, in some shape or other either in order to guard the interest of the minor Prince or to secure general tranquillity in his territory and neighbourhood.

This policy was approved by the British Government.<sup>8</sup>

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1. Maharawal Bahadur Singh, the ruler of Banswara, died on 2 February 1844. Cf. Robinson to Thoresby d. 10 February, Cons. 9 March 1844, No. 51, F&P.
  2. Elliot to Thoresby d. 9 March, Cons. 9 March 1844, No. 53, F&P.
  3. Robinson to Low d. 10 October, Cons. 17 November 1844, No. 23, F&P.
  4. Robinson to Low d. 10 October, Cons. 17 November 1849, No. 185, F&P.
  5. *Ibid.*
  6. *Ibid.*
  7. Low to Elliot d. 16 October, Cons. 17 November 1849, No. 183, F&P.
  8. Elliot to Low d. 29 October, Cons. 17 November 1849, No. 186, F&P.



### (iii) Agencies for controlling interstate relations

A few measures adopted by the British Government from time to time gave ample proof that Political Agencies were established to exercise effective control over the interstate relations in Rajputana : the institution, for example, of a separate political agency for the Rajputana States (1832)<sup>1</sup>, the establishment of the Neemuch Political Agency (called as the Mewar Political Agency after 1837)<sup>2</sup> and the transfer of Sirohi State in 1841 to the charge of the Commandant of the Jodhpur Legion at Erinpura. The British Government appointed Political officers, whenever needed, for the purpose of exterminating dacoits and robbers from some tract or to reclaim such tribes as Minas, Bhils, Grassias and Mers. It was in pursuance of this policy that a Superintendent was appointed in the joint tract of Merwara<sup>3</sup>, a Political Superintendent was posted at Barmer and two assistants were placed under the control of the Mewar Political Agent to supervise the affairs of the Mewar Hill tract.<sup>4</sup> The tenacity of purpose of the political officers further helped the British Government to exercise a greater hold on the interstate relations in the region.

### Nature of British interference

This study also focusses on the five kinds of British interference in the States of Rajputana. The first interference was in the form of 'advice' to a ruler on his request who was allowed to govern his State of his free will. The second one was to appoint a Political Agent as the head of the Regency Council for administering a State with powers to sanction or withhold its decisions. He was also vested with powers to appoint persons of his own choice to assist him in governance of the State. In the third kind, a Political Agent did not interfere directly in the affairs of a State, but appointed a minister of his own choice there and gave him his avowed

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1. See *supra*, p. 39

2. See *supra*, p. 98

3. See *supra*, p. 16

4. Cf Chapter VIII.



support to conduct the administration. The minister in other words, worked in proxy for the Political Agent. The fourth type was one of 'mediation'. It was generally extended to settle disputes between the ruler and his *jagirdars*; it was either extended on the request of both the contending parties,<sup>1</sup> or when a dispute arose which could endanger the peace and tranquillity of the neighbouring States.<sup>2</sup> The fifth kind of interference occurred when the British Government took over the administration of the tract of a State directly under its control and managed it through its own officers.<sup>3</sup> This course was resorted to only when a State failed in maintaining peace and order in its disturbed area. As the paramount power in India, the British Government considered it as its responsibility to maintain general tranquillity and order in the Princely States.

It became clear by 1858 that the British Government had established on a permanent basis four Political Agencies in subordination to the A.G.G. in Rajputana : (i) Mewar Political Agency, (ii) Jodhpur Political Agency, (iii) Jaipur Political Agency and (iv) Harauti Political Agency. Retention of the first three of these agencies on a permanent basis could be attributed to the higher status of the rulers of Mewar, Jaipur and Jodhpur.<sup>4</sup> Appointment of a Political Agent only in one of the three States would have given rise to jealousy and complaints. Besides, the British Government had understood that by keeping a salutary hold over these three principal Rajput States, it could safely maintain its control over the remaining States of Rajputana. Continuance of the Harauti Political Agency was mainly owing to the reason that the Harauti region (comprising the States of Bundi, Kota and Jhalawar) stood peculiarly isolated by natural features from other parts of Rajputana.

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1. As in case of Maharana and Salumber Chief.

2. As in case of the Jodhpur chiefs.

3. The occupation of Merwara by the British Government is a glaring example for this type of interference.

4. See *supra*, pp. 54-5.



The system of appointing Political Agents or Political Superintendents in subordination to the A.G.G. in Rajputana, was a sound one in so far as it was governed by the motive of aiding the latter in conducting British relations with the States and in exercising effective control over their interstate relations. Without this kind of assistance it could not have been possible for the A. G. G., to maintain single-handedly the paramount authority of the British Government in the region. It was through their good offices that he could effectively prevent squabbles, border feuds and hostilities between the rulers and their vassals. Thus, it was through the A. G. G. and his subordinate functionaries that the British Government fulfilled the obligations of a paramount power in relation to the Rajputana States.



## CHAPTER VIII

### ***Border Depredations and Thugi : Establishment of Contingents and Courts of Vakils***

The anti-social elements, found in almost all the States of Rajputana, had been active on the interstate borders and become a menace to the general peace and tranquillity in the region. These bands of dacoits roamed at will from one State to another, due to the weak administrative machinery of the States.<sup>1</sup> The Chiefs (*jagirdars*) patronized them;<sup>2</sup> some of the rulers gave them protection and encouraged them to carry on their predatory incursions on the contiguous States towards which they bore animosity.<sup>3</sup>

Besides, there were the turbulent Bhils and Minas inhabiting some parts of the States where the rulers exercised little control over them.<sup>4</sup> These tribes committed crimes, plundered villages and robbed the travellers and traders as they liked.

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1. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 5 May, Cons. 4 June 1832, No. 37, F&P.
  2. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 26 September, Cons. 8 November 1841, No. 122, F&P. For instance, Thakur Shyam Singh of Bussao (in Jaipur) aided and abetted the Shekhawati plunderers. He was not ready to help the State authorities in their capture, as it would have lessened his influence and profits. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 5 May, Cons. 4 June 1832, No. 37, F&P.
  3. Trevelyan to Sutherland d. 2 September, Cons. 8 November 1841, No. 49, F&P.
  4. Richardes to Sutherland d. 18 August, Cons. 8 November 1841, No. 118, F&P.



The thugs had made travel insecure; they fleeced the innocent travellers by trickery. There had been occasions when the sepoy of the British Regiments had fallen a prey to these thugs while travelling on the highway between Bombay and the Gangetic province.<sup>1</sup> The problem of thugs in Rajputana was more or less the same as in other parts of India; hardly any road was safe from their heinous activities.<sup>2</sup> For bringing about their total extirpation throughout India, the British Government had established a Thugi Department at Saugar in 1830.<sup>3</sup>

It was incumbent upon the British Government, as the paramount power, to take such measures as might ensure peace and security to the people, and to persuade the rulers to restrain their subjects from carrying on frontier depredations on their neighbouring States. This was possible only when the British Government exercised effective control over the interstate relations of the Rajputana States. Consequently, a separate political agency was established at Ajmer in 1832 with its jurisdiction extending over all the States.<sup>4</sup> For a closer and effective superintendence over them, Political Agents were stationed in a number of States, as well as at the main points of disturbance within the jurisdiction of the Rajputana Agency.<sup>5</sup> These measures were taken not only to conduct British relations with the States, but also to supervise their interstate relations as well as to curb the anti-social elements on their borders. In fact, the sheet-anchor of the interstate policy of the British Government especially after 1832, was to prevent each State from committing aggression on its

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1. *Kaifiyat* transmitted to A.G.G. Rajputana and by him forwarded to the rulers of Rajputana d. 6 July, Cons. 31 October 1833, No. 42, F&P.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*, See also, D.C. Boulger, *Lord William Bentinck*, pp. 73-6.

4. Reply of G. G. to the complaints of Bikaner against Jaisalmer d. 7 April 1832, *loc. cit.* See also *supra*, pp. 39-40.

5. See *supra*, pp. 98-9. The Neemuch Political Agency (designated in 1837 as the Mewar Political Agency) was created in 1832 specially for the purpose of checking depredations, besides the work of conducting British relations with the States of Mewar, Dungarpur, Partabgarh, Banswara and Sirohi.



neighbours, to maintain peace and tranquillity in the States and to mediate between them.<sup>1</sup>

# I

## Institution of the Jodhpur Legion

After the institution of the Rajputana Agency, the British Government took decisive steps to maintain peace and tranquillity in Rajputana. In June 1832, the British Government thought of a plan for launching military operations against the *khosa* freebooters in Nagar Parkar.<sup>2</sup> As the contemplated scene of military operations against the *khosas* was quite close to the borders of Jodhpur and Jaisalmer, Lockett requested the rulers of these States<sup>3</sup> to send their troops to assist the Parkar Field Force in suppressing the *khosa* freebooters. The Jaisalmer force was readily despatched.<sup>4</sup> But it was only after a great persuasion by Lockett that Maharaja Man Singh of Jodhpur reluctantly spared his troops for the purpose.<sup>5</sup>

### Jodhpur troops in Malani

The Malani tract (in Jodhpur) was the well-known refuge for the *khosa* freebooters. Pheroo, a *khosa* chief, resided in Khotra (in Malani) and commanded 100 notorious plunderers. As they were required on certain occasions for certain purposes Maharaja Man Singh, had no inclination to expel them from his territory.<sup>6</sup> This led Lockett to extend the military operations of the Parkar Field Force to Malani in order to clear the

1. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 27 December 1832, Cons. 7 January 1833, No. 32, F&P.
2. Macnaghten to C. Norris, Chief Secretary, Bombay Government d. 16 June, Cons. 16 July 1832, No. 7, F&P.
3. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 9 August, Cons. 17 September 1832, No. 15, F&P; Lockett to H. Pottinger, Resident Kutch d. 6 October, Cons. 12 November 1832, No. 1, F&P.
4. Lockett to Pottinger d. 6 October, Cons. 12 November 1832, No. 1, F&P.
5. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 28 September, Cons. 26 November 1832, No. 14, F&P.
6. *Ibid.*



frontier of the freebooters.<sup>1</sup> The commanders of Jodhpur Force made every possible effort to thwart the operations in Malani by secretly apprising the freebooters of the intended measures against them, and by giving the most notorious of them asylum in their own camp.<sup>2</sup> However, Lieutenant Colonel G. Litchfield, the Commander of the Parkar Field Force, succeeded in seizing with the active co-operation of the Jaisalmer troops, a number of robbers at Barmer, Chotan, etc., in the territory of Malani.<sup>3</sup>

### Malani under British Superintendence

After these operations, the tract of Malani was kept under British superintendence, and a British Force was stationed at Barmer, under the control of the Bombay Government, with instructions to check the recurrence of predatory activities on that frontier.<sup>4</sup> In 1839, the Superintendent at Barmer was transferred from the control of Bombay Government to the A.G.G. in Rajputana.<sup>5</sup> In 1849, on the abolition of the British post at Barmer, the Superintendent was withdrawn from Malani and the administration of this tract was placed under the charge of the Jodhpur Political Agent.<sup>6</sup>

The British intervention in Malani, although an infringement of the treaty, was justifiable on the ground that the suppression of the predatory activities over there was necessary to maintain general peace in India. Besides, the Maharaja of Jodhpur did not possess sufficient means to maintain tranquillity in this distant territory of his own.<sup>7</sup> It was for this reason

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1. Lockett to Swinton d. 27 December 1832, Cons. 16 April 1833, No. 71, F&P.
  2. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 4 April, Cons. 6 June 1833, No. 12, F&P.
  3. Captain Cavaye, in charge of Jodhpur and Jaisalmer troops, to Lockett d. 10 December 1832, Cons. 16 April 1833, No. 72, F&P.
  4. Pottinger to Macnaghten d. 5 September, Cons. 26 September 1839, No. 12, F&P; Boileau, *op. cit.*, p. 108.
  5. Maddock to Sutherland d. 10 June, Cons. 21 August 1839, No. 46, F&P.
  6. Malcolm, Political Agent Jodhpur and Superintendent Malani to Low d. 1 January 1850, *loc. cit.*
  7. Macnaghten to G. A. Bushby, Secretary to Lieutenant Governor N.W.P. d. 26 September, Cons. 26 September 1836, No. 30, F&P.



that Malani as a whole was taken under British superintendence for an indefinite period.<sup>1</sup> The tract was not returned to the Maharaja in spite of his repeated requests.<sup>2</sup>

### **Jodhpur troops invade Jaisalmer**

Soon after the cessation of operations in Malani, a body of Jodhpur troops plundered a number of villages of Jaisalmer.<sup>3</sup> Maharawal Gaj Singh of Jaisalmer attributed it to the Jodhpur Maharaja's hostile attitude towards Jaisalmer, for extending zealous co-operation to the British in Barmer.<sup>4</sup> At last, on Lockett's instructions Man Singh withdrew his troops from Jaisalmer.<sup>5</sup> Man Singh contended that he had not sent his troops to Jaisalmer for the purpose of plunder but to help its ruler in ending the incursions of Bhati freebooters on the Jodhpur territory.<sup>6</sup> This did not convince Lockett, as the Maharaja had taken this step without obtaining his prior permission.<sup>7</sup>

### **Jodhpur troops at Ajmer**

Simultaneously, Lockett demanded from Man Singh, a contingent of 1,500 Horse at Ajmer, to co-operate with the British troops for the suppression of the plunderers in the Shekhawati tract.<sup>8</sup> Accordingly, in January 1833, Man Singh despatched Jodhpur contingent to Ajmer with the same reluctance as he had shown earlier while sending his troops to Barmer.<sup>9</sup>

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1. Macnaghten to Bushby d. 26 September, Cons. 26 September 1836, No. 30, F&P.
  2. Sutherland to Maddock d. 20 October 1839, Cons. 24 February 1840, No. 15, F&P; Political letter from COD d. 15 October 1844, No. 61. The tract of Malani was restored to the State of Jodhpur in 1891.
  3. Extract from the Jaisalmer *Akhbar* d. 1 March, Cons. 16 April 1833, No. 17, F&P.
  4. *Kharita* from Maharawal Gaj Singh of Jaisalmer to Lockett recd. 22 March, Cons. 16 April 1833, No. 17, F&P.
  5. *Kharitas* from Lockett to Man Singh of Jodhpur d. 20 March and 22 March, Cons. 16 April 1833, No. 17, F&P.
  6. *Kharita* from Man Singh to Lockett recd. 2 April, Cons. 6 June 1833, No. 13, F&P.
  7. *Ibid.*
  8. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 28 September, Cons. 26 November 1832, No. 14, F&P.
  9. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 26 March, Cons. 6 June 1833, No. 20, F&P.



### Proposal for a Force

This contingent did not satisfy Lockett at all, as it was deficient in the stipulated number of 1,500 Horse, besides being devoid of any notion of order and discipline;<sup>1</sup> a party of 50 or 60 soldiers of the Jodhpur contingent had plundered the Udaipur town of Rampura on 17 March 1833, which Man Singh totally denied.<sup>2</sup>

Lockett considered the contingent 'worse than useless', and unfit for use in the intended suppression of the Shekhawati plunderers.<sup>3</sup> He proposed to his Government that instead of fulfilling the obligation to furnish a contingent of 1,500 Horse, the Maharaja of Jodhpur should provide money for maintaining a body of 1,000 or 800 horse under the command of the British officers.<sup>4</sup>

The Maharaja's reluctance in despatching troops to Barmer and Ajmer, the aggression of Jodhpur troops on the inhabitants of Jaisalmer and Udaipur, and their covert support to the plundering gangs of Barmer (in Malani) compelled Lockett to wonder in his official communication to his Government: "Whether this species of relation shall any longer continue between the East India Company and the Raja of Jodhpur."<sup>5</sup> Thereupon, the Governor-General reprimanded the Maharaja for his contumacious conduct and deliberate impugment of the treaty;<sup>6</sup> further, he directed him to pay attention to the instructions of Lockett.<sup>7</sup>

The A.G.G.'s proposal for the institution of a contingent under the command of British officers did not meet the assent of the British Government, as it was the first occasion when

1. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 4 April, Cons. 6 June 1833, No. 12, F&P.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Kharita* from G. G. to Man Singh d. 6 June, Cons. 6 June 1833, No. 18, F&P.

7. *Ibid.*



the Jodhpur contingent of Horse was requisitioned.<sup>1</sup> The British Government did not see sufficient evidence to indict the Jodhpur contingent for its participation in the plunder of Rampura.<sup>2</sup> However, it took serious note of the attack of Jodhpur troops on Jaisalmer. It directed the A. G. G. to demand reparation from the Maharaja for "the insult offered to the British Government as the paramount power and the avowed conservator of the public tranquillity in Rajpootana."<sup>3</sup>

### Jodhpur's persistent intractability

The Governor-General's *Kharita* failed to bring any change in the contumacious attitude of the Maharaja. Not before long, the *Thakur* of Jowla (in Jodhpur), attacked and plundered the village of Manpura in Kishangarh. Thereupon, Lockett desired the Maharaja to punish the *Thakur* and pay compensation to the sufferers.<sup>4</sup> The Maharaja did not take note of this.<sup>5</sup> In spite of the fact that Jodhpur's claim on the tribute of Sirohi was already denied to Man Singh, he sent his troops to commit plundering raids into that State on the pretext of collecting tribute.<sup>6</sup> These flagrant violations of the treaty by the State of Jodhpur, did not end here but continued unabated.

### Operations against Thugs

The Thugi Department of the British Government intensified its operations against thugs in Rajputana in 1833. As a result of the effectual measures of this Department in Hyderabad, Nagpur, Gwalior, Bundelkhand, etc., numerous thugs fled for refuge in the direction of Rajputana. The Thugi Department deputed a party under D.F. McLeod to seize them. On

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1. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 6 June, Cons. 6 June 1833, No. 19, F&P.
  2. *Ibid.*
  3. *Ibid.*
  4. Lockett to Man Singh d. 5 August, Cons. 31 October 1833, No. 40, F&P.
  5. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 6 October, Cons. 31 October 1833, No. 40, F&P.
  6. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 26 October 1833. Referred in Cons. 5 December 1833, No. 20, F&P.



McLeod's request, Lockett persuaded the rulers of Rajputana to assist the officers of the Thugi Department in seizing the thugs, and never to release any thug after capture.<sup>1</sup>

### **Suspension of the operations in Jodhpur**

In this attempt all the rulers of Rajputana co-operated with McLeod, with the single exception of the Maharaja of Jodhpur and his dependent, the *Thakur* of Alniawas.<sup>2</sup> The Maharaja had refused to surrender to McLeod the thugs apprehended by the local authorities.<sup>3</sup> Thereupon, McLeod requested Lockett to secure for him the Maharaja's co-operation in seizing the thugs.<sup>4</sup> But Lockett was so much infuriated with Man Singh that he considered it useless to approach him for this purpose.<sup>5</sup> This constrained McLeod to abandon all operations against the thugs in the Jodhpur territory.<sup>6</sup>

### **Robbery at Ajmer**

Not much time had passed since the abandonment of British operations against the thugs in Jodhpur when some robbers from Bhowal, a village in Marwar, committed burglary on the night of October 6, 1833, in the house of Dr. C. Mottley, the Assistant Surgeon of the Agency at Ajmer.<sup>7</sup> Lockett was shocked to learn that the outrage was committed by the plunderers from Jodhpur.<sup>8</sup> He demanded from the Maharaja the restoration of the plundered property and punishment to the Thakur of Bhowal.<sup>9</sup>

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1. *Kaifiyat* transmitted to the Governor-General's Agent in Rajputana and by him forwarded to the several rulers d. 6 July, Cons. 31 October 1833, No. 42, F&P.
  2. *Kaifiyat* by D F McLeod, Officer in charge operations against Thugi in Rajputana to Lockett d. 7 September, Cons. 31 October 1833, No. 42, F&P.
  3. *Ibid.*
  4. McLeod to Sleeman d. 27 September, Cons. 31 October 1833, No. 43, F&P.
  5. *Ibid.*
  6. F.C. Smith A G.G. Saugar and Narbada territories to Macnaghten d. 10 October, Cons. 31 October 1833, No. 43, F&P.
  7. C. Mottley, Surgeon to the A.G.G. to Lockett d. 8 October, Cons. 31 October 1833, No. 48, F&P.
  8. Lockett to Man Singh d. 26 October, Cons. 5 December 1833, No. 23, F&P.
  9. *Ibid.*



The Maharaja contumaciously disregarded the A.G.G.'s representations. This convinced the British Government of the necessity of taking some punitive measure against the Maharaja. Before doing so, it instructed the A. G. G. to persevere in making earnest representations to the Maharaja to resolve differences, so as to bring him and his advisers to a more rational line of conduct so that no ground might be left for them to complain that 'ample warning was not given'.<sup>1</sup>

About enlisting the Maharaja's co-operation for the apprehension of thugs, the A.G.G. was directed to take up the matter afresh. The Maharaja was to be told that as the extirpation of thugs was in the interest of humanity, the British Government would not accept Jodhpur State's right to grant asylum to them.<sup>2</sup> A. Speirs, the then officiating A.G.G., addressed the Maharaja accordingly.<sup>3</sup>

Maharaja Man Singh declined to co-operate with the British in the extirpation of thugs.<sup>4</sup> He considered it an interference of the Paramount Power in his long established right to grant asylum. He showed his readiness for the detention and apprehension of the thugs by his own officers.<sup>5</sup> He promised Speirs that he would send his reply to the *Kharitas* of the Governor-General as well as those of Lockett through a 'respectable agent'.<sup>6</sup>

Thus, Speirs also failed in his efforts to elicit the Maharaja's co-operation in the British Government's measures against the thugs. His efforts, of course, led the Maharaja to resume correspondence with the A.G.G., and to evince his desire in settling the pending questions.

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1. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 31 October, Cons. 31 October 1833, No. 44, F&P.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Kharita* from Major Speirs, Offg A G.G. to Man Singh d. 6 December 1833, Cons. 10 January 1834, No. 17, F&P.

4. Tr. of a *Kharita* from Man Singh to Speirs recd. 19 December 1833, Cons. 10 January 1834, No. 17, F&P.

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*



### British Government's Orders

The Maharaja's obstinacy with regard to the apprehension of thugs, his neglect of the remonstrances of the A.G.G., and his inordinate delay in replying to the Governor-General's letter pertaining to the repeated aggressions of Jodhpur upon 'foreign territories', compelled the British Government to give a serious consideration to the conduct of the Maharaja.<sup>1</sup> The British Government thought that if the Maharaja's conduct was imitated by the other Indian States, it would affect adversely the British 'Political system' in India.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, on May 15, 1834, it directed Nathaniel Alves, the A.G.G. in Rajputana, to demand from the Maharaja reparation for the aggressions on neighbouring States, and a fair security against the recurrence of similar misconduct without coming to an open rupture.<sup>3</sup> Besides, the Maharaja was required either to co-operate with the British Government in the apprehension of thugs, or to suggest an alternative plan for their seizure.<sup>4</sup> Subsequently, Alves was instructed to assemble a British force at Ajmer.<sup>5</sup> When it was ready to proceed to Jodhpur, he was again to address the Maharaja requiring immediate compliance with the demands already put forward besides the two fresh demands viz., (i) that the Maharaja should defray the cost of assembling the Field Force and (ii) that in lieu of the contingent of 1,500 Horse, he should pay for the maintenance of a body of 1,000 Horse under the command of British officers for whatever kind of service.<sup>6</sup> Man Singh was to be given only forty eight hours to accept or refuse these demands. If he accepted, he was to send with his reply, as a token of his sincerity, sufficient money to meet all the pecuniary demands including the cost of assembling the Field Force.<sup>7</sup> In case he offered resistance,

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1. C. E. Trevelyan to Alves d. 15 May, Cons. 15 May 1834, No. 37, F&P.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*

5. Macnaghten to Alves d. 22 August, Cons. 13 September 1834, No. 8, F&P.

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*



he was to be deposed and Dhonkal Singh, the posthumous son of the late Maharaja Bhim Singh, would succeed him to the *gaddi* <sup>1</sup>

### **Failure of Sawai Ram's Mission**

Before the A.G.G. could act accordingly, Man Singh sent a Mission under Sawai Ram to Ajmer.<sup>2</sup> It showed its readiness to pay compensation on account of the incursions of the subjects of Jodhpur into Jaisalmer, Sirohi, Kishangarh and the attack on Mottley's bungalow.<sup>3</sup> But it persisted in its claim that the Jodhpur State alone possessed the right to punish and expel the thugs from its territory. Every endeavour of the A.G.G. proved futile in explaining to the Mission that in the extirpation of thugs only the British Government could deal successfully as it possessed mass of evidences, approvers and witnesses.<sup>4</sup> In this situation, Alves had no alternative but to order Captain Burton, Deputy Commissary General at Kanpur, for the preparation of a force against Jodhpur.<sup>5</sup>

### **Jodhpur's acceptance of the major demands**

On getting scent of the preparations of the Field Force against the State, the Jodhpur Durbar was filled with 'consternation and alarm'.<sup>6</sup> Now the main question before the Maharaja was to avert its march against him. He, therefore, sent a special Mission to Ajmer invested with full powers to discuss the pending questions.<sup>7</sup> After lengthy deliberations, the Mission agreed to all the original demands of the British Government, and also to one of the two additional ones, that the cost of collecting the Field Force would be met by the

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1. Macnaghten to Alves d. 22 August, Cons 13 September 1834, No. 8, F&P.
  2. Alves to Macnaghten d. 9 September, Cons. 6 November 1834, No. 19, F&P.
  3. *Ibid*,
  4. *Ibid*.
  5. Alves to Burton, Deputy Commissary General, Kanpur d. 9 September, Cons. 6 November 1834, No. 19, F&P.
  6. Alves to Macnaghten d. 7 October, Cons. 2 December 1834, No. 23, F&P.
  7. Tr. of a *Kharita* from Man Singh to Alves d. 10 September, Cons. 2 December 1834, No. 24, F&P.



Maharaja of Jodhpur, which would not exceed five lakhs of rupees.<sup>1</sup> Man Singh finally solicited forgiveness for commission and omission from the Governor-General.<sup>2</sup> Thus, the British military expedition against Jodhpur was somehow averted in 1834.<sup>3</sup>

### Sequestration of Sambhar

The British Government found the measures adopted by Alves lenient. He had not negotiated the additional demand pertaining to the commutation of 1,500 Horse for monetary payment, nor had he obtained any security from Jodhpur for its punctual payment of the expenses of the armament, nor even the guarantee that the Maharaja would co-operate with the British in the suppression of thugi.<sup>4</sup> It was not ready to place any trust in the Maharaja's assurance to fulfil the engagement which his plenipotentiaries had concluded, on his behalf, with the A.G.G. at Ajmer. Therefore, it ordered Alves to sequester the Jodhpur share of the salt-works of Sambhar as a material guarantee for the fulfilment of the Maharaja's promises.<sup>5</sup> The Governor-General wrote a *Kharita* to the Maharaja explaining that as soon as the expenses of the armament were reimbursed and sufficient proof was furnished of his readiness to co-operate in the suppression of thugi, the Sambhar tract<sup>6</sup> would be restored to him. The British Government kept Man Singh in 'a state of probation'.<sup>7</sup> Accordingly, N.B. Edmonstone, the Assistant to the A.G.G., took possession of the Jodhpur portion of Sambhar on January 27, 1835.<sup>8</sup> He worked under the control of the A.G.G. in Rajputana.<sup>9</sup>

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1. Paper executed by the Jodhpur Mission accepted by Alves d. 3 October, Cons. 2 December 1834, No. 24, F&P.
  2. Tr. of a *Kharita* from Man Singh to Bentinck d.n., Cons. 2 December, 1834, No. 28, F&P.
  3. Alves to Brigadier General Stevenson d. 6 October, Cons. 2 December 1834, No. 24, F&P.
  4. Macnaghten to Alves d. 2 December, Cons. 2 December 1834, No. 36, F&P.
  5. *Ibid.*
  6. *Kharita* from G. G. to Man Singh d. 2 December, Cons. 2 December 1834, No. 34, F&P.
  7. *Ibid.*
  8. N. B. Edmonstone, Offg. Superintendent, Ajmer to Alves d. 27 January, Cons. 19 February 1835, No. 34, F&P.
  9. Macnaghten to Alves d. 5 March, Cons. 5 March 1835, No. 51, F&P.



To prevent a possible misunderstanding of the British motives in the sequestration of the Jodhpur share of the salt-works at Sambhar, Alves informed all the rulers within his jurisdiction in this connection,<sup>1</sup> about the motives and objects of British action against Jodhpur.<sup>2</sup> Thus, Alves apprised the rulers of the measures that the British Government could take in case of the failure of a ruler to fulfil his obligations concerning the general welfare of the people.

### Institution of the Jodhpur Legion

To secure the commutation of the Horse contingent for money payment and to enlist the co-operation of Jodhpur for the apprehension of thugs, the A. G. G. deputed his Assistant, Lieutenant H W. Trevelyan, to Jodhpur.<sup>3</sup> In this task, Man Singh promised him all co-operation. He issued instructions to his principal *Thakurs* and officers to extend full assistance to the officers of the Thugi Department.<sup>4</sup> Thus, the Maharaja gave up his right of asylum in the case of thugs.<sup>5</sup>

After long deliberations, Trevelyan was also able to conclude an agreement with the Maharaja according to which the latter accepted to pay Rs. 1,15,000 per annum in lieu of the obligation to provide a contingent of 1,500 Horse.<sup>6</sup> Alves recommended to his Government to accept the offer, as the amount was sufficient to support a legion which could be employed for the prevention of outrages on Sirohi and Jodhpur frontiers, and for the protection of the traffic on the route joining Pali, Ajmer and Gujrat.<sup>7</sup> The British Government

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1. Circular to the rulers under the Rajputana Agency d.n. Cons. 23 January 1835, No. 30, F&P.
  2. Alves to Macnaghten d. 28 December, 1834, Cons. 23 January, 1835, No. 29, F&P.
  3. Alves to Macnaghten d. 23 January, Cons. 11 February 1835, No. 35, F&P; Boileau, *loc. cit.*, p. 1.
  4. H. W. Trevelyan, 3rd Assistant to A.G.G. d. 23 October, Cons. 16 November 1835, No. 31, F&P.
  5. *Ibid.*
  6. Tr. of a *Kharita* from Man Singh to Alves d. 22 September, Cons. 2 November 1835, No. 42, F&P.
  7. Alves to Macnaghten d. 26 September, Cons. 19 October 1835 No. 32, F&P.



approved this proposal, and Trevelyan concluded the agreement with the Maharaja in December 1835.<sup>1</sup> The Jodhpur Legion was accordingly raised at Ajmer in 1836, with Captain Downing as its Commandant.<sup>2</sup> It was stationed at Bargaon (in Sirohi) in January 1837 to keep in check the Minas and Bhils on the Marwar-Sirohi border.<sup>3</sup> In 1840, a Company of Bhils was raised from the Mewasse villages of Sirohi, and was attached to the Jodhpur Legion.<sup>4</sup> In March 1842, the headquarters of the Jodhpur Legion were shifted from Bargaon to Erinpura in the territory of Sirohi.<sup>5</sup> Thus Lockett's proposal of 1832, for organizing a British force in lieu of a contingent of 1,500 horse, was finally accomplished. Jodhpur was, thus, the first State in Rajputana wherein the British Government introduced the policy of raising contingent at the expense of the State, both with the object of exercising control over the Rajputana States, and of fulfilling its obligations in apprehending the freebooters who roamed at free will from one State to another.

The main duty of the Jodhpur Legion Commandant was to check periodic aggressions, whether from the side of Sirohi or Jodhpur, and to offer the people protection from plunderers.<sup>6</sup> The distracted internal conditions of Jodhpur in 1837, and the inability of the State troops to keep in check the plunderers, had led to an increase in the number of mounted plunderers, and the outrages of the Bhils and Minas on the

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1. Tr. of an agreement between Maharaja Man Singh of Jodhpur and British Government, concluded by Trevelyan d. 7 December 1835, Cons. 8 February 1836, No. 65, F&P.
  2. Alves to Macnaghten d. 5 March, Cons. 28 March 1836, Nos. 41-A, 41-B, F&P; Captain Downing was appointed the commandant of the Jodhpur Legion on 1 January 1836. Alves to Macnaghten d. 5 March, Cons. 28 March 1836, No. 41-A, F&P.
  3. Speirs to Alves d. 31 January, Cons. 20 March 1837, No. 64, F&P.
  4. Secretary to Government to Sutherland d. 30 November, Cons. 30 November 1840, No. 39, F&P.
  5. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 16 March, Cons. 7 September 1842, No. 29, F&P.
  6. Bushby, Secretary to N. W. P. to Alves d. 16 November, Cons. 5 December 1836, No. 33, F&P.



border of Sirohi and Marwar.<sup>1</sup> In this context, on the recommendation of Alves,<sup>2</sup> the Lieutenant-Governor of North-Western Provinces<sup>3</sup> gave discretionary powers to Downing to pursue the plunderers in whatever territory they might be. This measure was also approved of by the British Government.<sup>4</sup>

The Jodhpur Legion proved effective in restoring order on the frontiers of Sirohi and Marwar. But the continued failure of the Jodhpur State to establish strong police posts on its frontiers, and its growing maladministration increased the occurrence of border depredations on the Jodhpur side of Shekhawati and Bikaner.<sup>5</sup> The repeated remonstrances of the A.G.G. failed to make any improvement in the situation.<sup>6</sup> At last, Sutherland, the successor of Alves, invaded Jodhpur in 1839, to compel the Maharaja to pay compensation and to check the incursions of the Jodhpur subjects into the neighbouring States.<sup>7</sup> This coercion proved effective in achieving its purpose. John Ludlow, who was appointed Political Agent at Jodhpur, in September 1839, settled all cases pertaining to the compensation for the aggressions on the neighbouring State of Bikaner and the Shekhawati tract, besides improving internal administration of the State.<sup>8</sup> Sutherland restored the salt-works of Sambhar to Jodhpur on the request of the Maharaja.<sup>9</sup>

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1. Alves to Bushby d. 12 February, Cons. 20 March 1837, No. 64, F&P.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Bushby to Macnaghten d. 25 February, Cons. 20 March 1837, No. 64, F&P.

4. Macnaghten to Bushby d. 20 March, Cons. 20 March 1836, No. 65, F&P.

5. Alves to Macnaghten d. 26 January, Cons. 7 March 1838, No. 27, F&P.

6. Abstract of 28 *Kharitas* addressed to Man Singh between 1 January 1836 to 13 April 1838, on the subject of injuries by attacks of armed bands, robbers and thieves, Cons. 26 September, 1838, No. 66, F&P, *Supra*, p. 124

7. Sutherland to T.H. Maddock d. 20 October, Cons. 24 February 1839, No. 34, F&P; See *Supra*, pp. 129-30.

8. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 26 November, Cons. 15 March 1841, No. 35, F&P.

9. Sutherland to Maddock d. 20 October 1839, Cons. 24 February 1840, No. 34, F&P.



The removal of the disorders in Marwar by the British intervention in 1839-40, gave security to the neighbouring States of Jaisalmer and Bikaner.<sup>1</sup> The success of the British armed intervention in Jodhpur impressed the other States of the British power and influence and made them vigilant of their duties and responsibilities towards their neighbouring States as well as the paramount power.

On September 2, 1844, Anderson, the then Second-in-Command of the Jodhpur Legion, took over the command of the Jodhpur Legion from Downing.<sup>2</sup> He apprehended many of the gangs of bandits on the Sirohi-Marwar border with the help of the sepoy of the legion.<sup>3</sup> When Anderson left for England on furlough, Captain J. D. Hall, the Second-in-Command of the Jodhpur Legion, took charge as its Commandant on February 1, 1857.<sup>4</sup> Hall remained in command of this Legion till it revolted against the British at the time of the 1857 Uprising.<sup>5</sup>

## II

### Extension of the Policy Towards Jodhpur to other States

The lawlessness and insecurity in Rajputana arising from the prevalence of thugi, border raids and dacoity and also owing somewhat to the laxity of the British and the negligence of the rulers, had assumed the proportions of an interstate problem by 1832.<sup>6</sup> The importance which the British Government accorded to the suppression of thugi throughout India

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1. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 15 January, Cons. 14 February 1842, No. 33, F&P.
  2. Thoresby to Currie d. 5 September, Cons. 21 September 1844, No. 22, F&P; See *Supra* p. 192.
  3. Sutherland to Secretary to Government d. 1 June, Cons. 7 August 1847, No. 845, F&P.
  4. H. Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 5 February, Cons. 20 February 1857, No. 193, F&P.
  5. G. Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 27 July, Cons. 31 December 1858, No. 3156-7, F&P.
  6. The British records of the period of this study use the term 'international' for interstate.



became evident when it sequestered the Sambhar Lake portion of Jodhpur as a condign punishment to Maharaja Man Singh for thwarting the British operations against the thugs in his territory. This punitive measure was adopted as a general policy towards all the Rajputana States. It was repeated in the State of Jaipur, when its ruler showed reluctance to handover the thugs to the officers of the Thugi Department.<sup>1</sup> In 1835, the British Government also sequestered the Jaipur share of the Lake and the district of Sambhar as a punishment for the same reason. It was only when the State of Jaipur gave satisfactory proof of its readiness to co-operate with the British Government in the suppression of thugi in its own territory<sup>2</sup> that Sambhar was restored<sup>3</sup> to Jaipur in 1842.

The A. G. G. from time to time felt the need for taking effective measures for the suppression of dacoity and plunder in Rajputana. When the misrule of one State proved detrimental to the peace and tranquillity of the other States, the British Government endeavoured to improve the situation by tightening up the administration of that State either by remonstrance or coercion as the situation demanded. The armed preparations against Jodhpur in 1834 and the coercive measures which the British Government again adopted against it in 1839 showed this trend of British policy towards the Rajputana States as well as the role of Rajputana Agency in the formation of this policy. The same policy led to the British intervention in the Shekhawati tract of Jaipur which was infested with plunderers who proved a menace to the travellers and the neighbouring States. From 1832, the Rajputana Agency repeatedly sought the permission of its Government to intervene in the

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1. Macnaghten to Alves d. 2 December, Cons. 2 December 1834, No. 36, F & P.

2. Bentinck to the Raja of Jaipur d. 2 December, Cons. 2 December 1834, No. 35, F&P. On 27 January 1835, Edmonstone, the Assistant to the Agent, took charge of the Jaipur portion of the Lake of Sambhar. Cons. 15 June 1835, Nos. 38-39, F & P.

3. Sutherland to Maddock d. 17 June, Cons. 31 August 1842, No. 50, F & P.



affairs of the tract.<sup>1</sup> But the predatory system in the tract continued to threaten the peace of the neighbouring States, despite the notes of protest sent by the British Government to the State of Jaipur. Finally, the British Government had to permit Alves in 1834 to use force for suppressing the plunderers.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, Alves marched into the tract and took its possession,<sup>3</sup> while destroying at the same time a number of haunts and strongholds of the plunderers there.<sup>4</sup> In 1835, he raised the Shekhawati Corps (later on called as the Shekhawati Brigade) composed of the Shekhawats and the Bidawats. The expenditure for its maintenance was shared by the States of Jaipur and Bikaner<sup>5</sup> and the chiefs of Shekhawati.<sup>6</sup> It was placed under the command of a British officer, Lieutenant Henry Forster, and was stationed at Jhunjhunu (in Jaipur State).<sup>7</sup> It was only in 1836, when Rawal Berisal, the *Mukhtiar* of the Jaipur State, assured the A.G.G. that he would be able to maintain peace in the tract,<sup>8</sup> that the British Government restored it to Jaipur.<sup>9</sup> Besides, the force under Forster was placed in the service of Jaipur State in 1839.<sup>10</sup> The State added

1. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 5 May, Cons. 4 June 1832, No. 37, F & P. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 4 June, Cons. 20 August, 1832, No. 24, F & P; Speirs to Macnaghten d. 15 April, Cons. 12 June 1834, No. 116, F&P.
2. Macnaghten to Alves d. 9 August, Cons. 13 September 1834, No. 6, F & P.
3. Alves to Macnaghten d. 6 December, Cons. 31 December 1834, No. 26, F&P.
4. Alves to Macnaghten d. 16 March 1835, File No. 21-Jaipur, Vol. IV, list No. 1, p. 15, S.No. 157, *RAR*.
5. Alves to Macnaghten d. 10 January, Cons. 5 February 1835, No. 55, F&P; H.W. Trevelyan, Assistant to A.G.G. d. 1 March, Cons. 30 March 1833, No. 30-A, F&P.
6. Political letter to COD d. 1 June 1835, No. 21, para 7-8.
7. Henry Forster, Commanding Shekhawati Horse, d. 31 March 1835, File No. 21-Jaipur, Vol. IV, *loc. cit*; Captain W. Prior, *History of the 13th (Shekhawati) Regiment of Bengal Infantry from the time of its first organisation as a part of Shekhawati Brigade in A. D. 1896*, pp. 20ff.
8. Alves to Macnaghten d. 20 January, Cons. 8 February 1836, No. 67, F & P.
9. Macnaghten to Alves d. 8 February, Cons. 8 February 1836, No. 67, F & P.
10. *Ibid.*



more arms to it and turned it into a Brigade<sup>1</sup> In view of the weak financial condition of the States of Jaipur and Bikaner and the chiefs of Shekhawati, Sutherland prevailed upon his Government to bear the expenses of this force. Consequently, the Shekhawati Brigade was turned into a British force<sup>2</sup> and withdrawn<sup>3</sup> from the tract in 1847. But the withdrawal of the Brigade was followed by the recrudescence of plunder in the territory. Owing to the inability of the Jaipur State to deal with the situation, the Rajputana Agency had to depute its officers from time to time along with the troops of the States of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Bikaner for apprehending the plunderers in Shekhawati.<sup>4</sup>

When some part of a State became the haunt of professional plunderers and dacoits, and the State failed to prevent them from committing depredations in the neighbouring States, the British Government, if the situation so demanded, occupied the tract for an unspecified time. The extension of British military operations in the Malani tract, and its superintendence by a British officer with a force under him, has already been cited as an example of this British policy in Rajputana. The retention of Malani under British superintendence was in continuation of the Wilder policy of 1823-24 in Merwara.<sup>5</sup>

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1. Political letter from COD d. 5 July 1837, No. 9.
  2. James Thomason, Offg. Secretary to Government to Sutherland d. 25 February, Cons. 22 March 1843, No. 54, F&P; Sutherland to Thomason d. 4 July, Cons. 29 July 1843, No. 106, F&P; Political despatch from COD d. 19 March 1845, No. 11, para 10.
  3. W. Edwards, under Secretary to Government to Military Deptt. d. 11 May, Cons. 22 May 1847, No. 27, F&P; Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 2 January, Cons. 1 February 1856, No. 62, F&P; Prior, *loc cit.*
  4. Sutherland to Elliot, Secretary to Government d. 24 January, Cons. 31 March 1848, No. 62, F&P; Henry Lawrence to Beadon d. 4 June, Cons. 5 October 1855, No. 103, F&P; Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 27 July, Cons. 31 August 1855, No. 52, F&P; Political Letter to COD d. 15 February 1856, No. 20, para 260.
  5. The British Government gave permanent shape to the arrangements of 1823 24 regarding the shares of the States of Marwar and Mewar in Merwara by concluding agreements with them in 1832-33 and 1846.



Further, the British Government, in pursuance of its general policy of checking depredations and maintaining peace in the States, invariably took advantage of the favourable opportunities to form Contingents on a permanent basis under the British officers at the expense of the States.<sup>1</sup> This was justified on the ground that the troops of the States, whenever requisitioned by the British Government in consonance with the treaties, generally proved themselves incompetent for military service owing to inadequate discipline.<sup>2</sup> In Rajputana, the Contingents so formed remained under the general control of the A.G.G. The Jodhpur Legion was instituted as a result of this policy, especially for maintaining peace and order on the Sirohi-Marwar frontier. The Shekhawati Brigade was stationed in the Shekhawati tract for more than a decade (1835-1847) as a sequel to this general British policy. The Mewar Bhil Corps was raised<sup>3</sup> in the Mewar Hill tract in 1840, under the command of Captain W. Hunter, with headquarters at Kherwara.<sup>4</sup> This was done with the express purpose of maintaining peace in the region stretching from the Sirohi frontier to the extreme limits of Banswara State and for recruiting the tribes of Bhils, Minas and Grassias as soldiers with the sole aim of reclaiming them from predatory habits.<sup>5</sup> The same policy led the British Government to form the Kota Contingent after the bifurcation of the State of Kota.<sup>6</sup> It was, in fact, through these 'hybrid'

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1. Macnaghten to Alves d. 1 May, Cons. 18 July 1838, No. 74, F & P.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Joint report by Sutherland, Robinson and Captain Lang, Political Agent Mahikanta to Secretary to Government d. 25 March, Cons. 3 May 1841, No. 44, F & P; Maddock to Sutherland d. 3 May, Cons. 3 May 1841, No. 45, F & P. The Mewar Bhil Corps was raised at the expense of Rs. 1,20,000. The State of Udaipur was to contribute Rs. 50,000 per annum and the balance was to be borne by the British Government.

4. Captain W. Hunter assumed charge of the Commandant of the Mewar Bhil Corps on 19 December 1840. W. Hunter, Commandant Mewar Bhil Corps to Robinson d. 20 December 1840, Cons. 25 January 1841, No. 28, F & P.

5. Joint report by Sutherland, Robinson and Lang, *loc. cit.*; Sutherland to Hunter d. 21 May, Cons. 5 July 1841, No. 18, F & P.

6. Macnaghten to Alves d. 1 May, Cons. 18 July 1838, No. 74, F & P; Richardes to Sutherland d. 22 May, Cons. 28 June 1841, No. 45, F&P.



Corps comprising the Bhils, the Minas, the Grassias, and the sepoy from Oudh (from where generally the sepoy of the Regiments of the Bengal Presidency were recruited) that the Rajputana Agency claimed to exercise a sort of a high police function over the States of Rajputana.

### III

#### Institution of the 'International Courts of Vakils' in Rajputana

Besides the establishment of the contingents, the British Government also devised a system of settling disputes between the States arising from border depredations through the agency of its own officers.<sup>1</sup> For instance, in 1835, Alves deputed his Assistant Lieutenant H. W. Trevelyan on a special mission to the Western States of Rajputana to settle a long-standing feud between Jaisalmer and Bikaner.<sup>2</sup> It was mainly due to the efforts of Trevelyan that the *Vakils* of these two States entered into an agreement not only to refrain from committing aggression on each other, but also to deliver the desperadoes seeking shelter within their boundaries.<sup>3</sup>

In this system of arbitration, the British Government could not direct a State to surrender those individual offenders who took refuge in its territory for trial before some tribunal. In order to secure a proper judicial trial for the offenders who were a threat to peace on the interstate borders<sup>4</sup> the British Government established the 'International Court of *Vakils*' at the headquarters of each permanent Political Agency in Rajputana between 1842 and 1847. Each of these Courts was

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1. Reply of G.G. to the complaints of Bikaner against Jaisalmer d. 7 April 1832, *loc. cit.*

2. Boileau, *op. cit.*, pp. 1, 6 and 88.

3. *Ibid.*

4. Secretary to Government to Sutherland d. 3 August, Cons. 3 August 1840, Nos. 4-7, F&P.



designated after the place where the respective Political Agency to which it belonged was situated.<sup>1</sup>

The jurisdictions of the 'International Courts of *Vakils*' were also earmarked. The Ajmer Court, established in 1842,<sup>2</sup> dealt with the cases between the States of Kishangarh and Dholpur, and the British province of Ajmer. It was also the court of appeal for the other Courts of *Vakils* in Rajputana. The Neemuch Court (1842) enjoyed jurisdiction over the States of Udaipur, Banswara, Dungarpur and Partabgarh; the Harauti Court (1847) at Kota exercised power over the States of Kota, Bundi and Jhalawar; the Jaipur Court (1847) had jurisdiction over the States of Jaipur, Bharatpur, Tonk and Alwar, whereas the Court of *Vakils* at Jodhpur (1847) dealt with the cases between the States of Jodhpur, Bikaner, Jaisalmer and Sirohi.<sup>3</sup>

The *Vakils* representing different States at the headquarters of a Political Agency constituted the bench of the Court of *Vakils* over which the Political Agent presided.<sup>4</sup> This system removed the possibility of objections by the rulers against the trial of their subjects by the British officers. The Assistant to the A.G.G. presided over the Court of *Vakils* at Ajmer as a special measure.<sup>5</sup> However, the A.G.G. in Rajputana, whenever he felt the necessity and found time, could himself preside over this Court.<sup>6</sup> The judgements passed by the Courts at the subordinate Political Agencies were subject to the approval of the

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1. Note by Sutherland on the working of the Court of *Vakils* in Rajputana d. 23 October 1846, Cons. 20 February 1847, No. 47, F&P; Sutherland's circular to Rajputana States d. 10 March, Cons. 1 May 1847, No. 34, F&P.
  2. Sutherland to Secretary to Government d. 14 January, Cons. 5 April 1843, Nos. 29-30, F&P.
  3. Sutherland's Circular to Rajputana States d. 10 March 1847, *loc. cit.*
  4. *Ibid.*
  5. Political Letter to COD d. 17 October 1848, No. 60.
  6. Sutherland's Circular letter to Rajputana States d. 10 March 1847, *loc. cit.*; Sutherland to Currie d. 10 March, Cons. 1 May 1847, No. 34, F&P.



A.G G.<sup>1</sup> These Courts dealt exclusively with the 'international' criminal cases, and the cases of other nature did not come within their purview and jurisdiction.<sup>2</sup> The Courts of *Vakils* derived their authority from the voluntary delegation of powers by the Rajputana rulers.<sup>3</sup> This definitely involved a certain devolution of the rulers' sovereign power which even though voluntary in nature, but nonetheless amounted to a diminution of full sovereignty.

It was the co-operation of the rulers with the Rajputana Agency which made the system of Courts of *Vakils* successful in trying the 'international' offenders in the States of Rajputana. The Contingents proved effective in checking border depredations, while the Courts of *Vakils* under the jurisdiction of the Rajputana Agency, dealt with 'international crimes' of these States. Thus, these Courts became the centres from which benefits of good government radiated to all the States of Rajputana. Sutherland was the author of this interstate judicial machinery in Rajputana.

In 1854, the discredited *Thakurs* of Bhuttana (in Sirohi), who had gone to outlawry on the plea of an unjust demarcation of their boundary by British officers, were captured by the Jodhpur Legion.<sup>4</sup> They were tried by the Court of *Vakils* presided over by Captain J. C. Brooke, the Commander of the Mewar Bhil Corps and the First Assistant to the Mewar Political Agent, and sentenced to different terms of imprisonment. Besides, the estate of Bhuttana was confiscated. It was also decreed that each shareholder of the estate of Bhuttana, on his release, would be provided with a piece of land in some

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1. Thoresby to Secretary to Government d. 21 May, Cons. 6 June 1845, No. 48, F&P.
  2. Sutherland's Circular letter to Rajputana States d. 10 March 1847, *loc. cit.*
  3. Political Letter to COD d. 21 February 1857, No. 15, paras. 26-32.
  4. Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 19 October, Cons. 17 November 1854, Nos. 112-115, F&P.



other parts of Sirohi which would be equal to his share in Bhuttana.<sup>1</sup>

The successful operations of these Courts added to the security and welfare of the people, and showed a decided decline in crimes on the borders of the States of Rajputana.<sup>2</sup> In fact, the 'International Courts of *Vakils*', besides working as the effective agencies for settling interstate disputes, supplemented the efforts of the local contingents in Rajputana. These arrangements helped the Rajputana Agency in supervising the interstate relations and in realizing the objectives with which it was formed in 1832.

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1. Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 19 October, Cons. 17 November 1854, Nos. 112-115, F&P.
  2. D.A. Malcolm, Jodhpur Political Agent to Low d. 1 January, Cons. 14 November 1851, No. 156, F&P.



## CHAPTER IX

### ***British Policy and Social Reforms***

At the time of the conclusion of the treaties between the British Government and various States of Rajputana in 1817-18, many social evils such as female infanticide, child marriage, slave trade, *Samadhi*, *Sati* and persecution of women as witches were prevalent among the people in general, and the Rajput community in particular. A few enthusiastic officers like James Tod and Captain Hall attempted on their own initiative to discourage some of these social evils before 1831. As their attempts were sporadic and isolated, they failed to produce any tangible results in Rajputana.

The main reason for the failure was that the British Government could not formulate any definite policy for the abolition of these social evils in Rajputana till 1832. Of course, it had by this time abolished many of them in its own territories, but for a number of reasons it could not do so in Rajputana. First, the Political officers, during the initial years of the British contact with these States, kept themselves busy in helping the rulers to improve their administrative structures and to retrieve them from the losses suffered during Maratha supremacy. Secondly, without restoring peaceful conditions and consolidating their power in the States, it was not possible for the British politicals to enlist the co-operation of the rulers for the purpose of social reform. Many of the social evils survived due to the conservative attitudes and vested interests of the rulers and those of the influential classes - the *Thakurs* and



the priests.<sup>1</sup> Without the co-operation of the ruling classes it was not possible for the British Government to issue directives for the abolition of these evils as it was forbidden by the treaties to interfere in the internal affairs of the States.<sup>2</sup> Thirdly, the divided nature of British political superintendence over the Rajputana States before 1832 proved an obstacle not only in exercising effective political control over them, but also in implementing a uniform policy for them.<sup>3</sup> Fourthly, there was no person at the central seat of power at Calcutta who, till the appointment of Lord William Bentinck (1828-35), could inspire the Political officers to introduce a programme of social reform in Rajputana.

# I

## Evolution of the British Social Policy in Rajputana

Lord William Bentinck being a protagonist of evangelical, liberal and utilitarian attitudes and a close friend of Bentham and Mill, filled in successfully the role of a social reformer. His abolition of the practice of *Sati* in British India in 1829, marked the beginning of a new social policy in the country. Further, the meeting of the rulers and political officers posted in Rajputana States with Bentinck at the Ajmer Durbar (January 1832) must have inspired them to implement new ideas which had already spread in the British provinces. Subsequently, the establishment of the Rajputana Agency in February 1832 at Ajmer, which became a kind of channel for conducting British relations with all the States of Rajputana, strengthened the hands of the Political officers, as this administrative measure made it possible for them to exercise greater control over these States. Furthermore, the efforts of the British Government since 1826 to introduce the policy of non-interference, according to the treaties, in the internal affairs of these States and the instructions of Bentinck in 1832 to the British

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1. Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 5 February 1856, Cons. 22 April 1859, Nos. 232-33 KWS, F&P.
  2. Thoresby to Ludlow d. 27 November 1844, Cons. 11 July 1845, No. 45, F&P.
  3. Bentinck's Minute d. 30 March, Cons. 16 April 1832, No. 22, F&P.



functionaries for following this policy in Rajputana, ultimately resulted in diverting their energies to the humanitarian causes and placed them in a reformist mood.<sup>1</sup> This became clear soon; when the Maharao of Kota ordered a *Burda Furosh* (slave dealer) under his protection to proceed to Marwar to purchase four female slaves, Captain R. Ross, the Political Agent in Harauti, brought to the notice of his Government, in June 1832, the prevalence of this "detestable traffic" not only in Harauti but also in every part of Rajputana as well as in Malwa.<sup>2</sup> Ross was eager to exercise 'effectual interference' with the sole aim of putting it down,<sup>3</sup> while his superior, Lieutenant Colonel, A. Lockett, the A.G.G. in Rajputana, wanted to abolish it by 'advice and admonition'.<sup>4</sup> The existing treaties prevented the British Government from interfering authoritatively for the discontinuance of the practice.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, it could not take any coercive measure to suppress the practice, as it was liable to disturb the British relations with the States. Therefore, the A.G.G. and his subordinate Political Agents were instructed to seek the co-operation of the rulers "in a friendly and confidential manner" to prohibit slave trade.<sup>6</sup> The Court of Directors went a step further by permitting the Political officers to "remonstrate" against any infringement of the proclamation when once issued, prohibiting slave trade or any laxity on the part of the rulers or their officers in giving effect to its provisions.<sup>7</sup> In their enthusiasm to bring about social reforms, the British functionaries could not confine themselves to this social policy of 1832 alone. Their resolve to bring about reforms became much more pronounced with the extension of the British supremacy over Sindh (1843), Punjab (1849) and

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1. For details see, V. K. Vashishtha, "An Appraisal of British Policy Towards the States of Rajputana, *URS (History)*, 1968, pp. 69-71.
  2. R. Ross to Lockett d. 22 June, Cons. 13 August 1832, No. 25, F&P.
  3. *Ibid.*
  4. Lockett to Macnaghten d. 30 June, Cons. 13 August 1832, No. 25, F&P.
  5. Macnaghten to Lockett d. 9 July, Cons. 13 August 1832, No. 26, F&P.
  6. *Ibid.*
  7. Political letter from COD d. 1 April 1835, No. 5.



Lower Burma (1852) and the consolidation of their power in Rajputana and other parts of the country. They began to consider the abolition of social evils in the Rajput States a primary 'duty' as the representatives of the paramount power in India.<sup>1</sup> Henry Lawrence, the A.G.G. in Rajputana, wrote to the Secretary to Government of India on February 5, 1857 : "It seems to me as incumbent on us to put down Suttee as Thuggee and Dacoity, even if it be done by sword".<sup>2</sup>

## II

### Legislation And Social Reforms

#### Trafficking in Slaves

The British Government found trafficking in slaves rampant in Rajputana. The slave-dealers procured children for supplying them to the rulers, *Thakurs* and other opulent citizens either for their sensual activities or as domestic servants.<sup>3</sup> For the most part, both boys and girls were bought as slaves for life.<sup>4</sup> They formed a class of hereditary bondmen known as the *Golas* or the *Darogas*. They formed an essential part of the domestic economy of all the highest and the richest Rajput families.<sup>5</sup> They themselves, however, did not enjoy any high social position and were on the other hand looked down upon, and even treated with contempt, by people.<sup>6</sup> The head of the household to which they were attached exercised the "right of ownership" over them.<sup>7</sup> It was a custom at marriages to give away the daughter of a *Daroga* or his whole family in dowry to the bride.<sup>8</sup>

1. H. M. Lawrence to Secretary to Government of India d. 5 February 1857, Cons. 22 April 1859, No. 232, F&P.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Ross to Lockett d. 22 June, Cons. 13 August 1832, No. 25, F&P.

4. *Progs.* June 1862, Nos. 54-5, Political-A, Foreign Department.

5. *Ibid.*

6. Note on Darogas by Harbilas Sarda, File No. 158 (3), P-1925, F&P; See also, Thakur Narain Singh Panwar, *Raona Rajput Darshan*, p. 63.

7. File No. 264-P (Secret), 1926, F&P.

8. *Progs.* June 1862, Nos. 54-6, Political-A, Foreign Department.



The sale of women for the purpose of prostitution was also common. Besides, many religious sects in Rajputana like the Naths, the Nagas and the Jutees replenished their numbers by purchasing boys when they could not obtain disciples (*chelas*) by gift. There was also the custom of giving away children in lieu of payment of debt (*sagri*), or at the time of the occurrence of famine to save them from starvation.<sup>1</sup> The slave-dealers were deliberately encouraged and given protection by the rulers as they were giving them a kind of commission on their sales. As the greater number of slaves thus sold were obtained by kidnapping, the practice thus posed a grave threat to the security of the inhabitants in Rajputana and Malwa.<sup>2</sup>

*Abolition of Slave-y* : The British policy towards these evils began to come into effect in 1832 in the Harauti States of Kota and Bundi. Dr. J. Corbet, the officiating Political Agent in Harauti, by a friendly advice, induced the rulers of these States to prohibit the buying and selling of slaves in their respective dominions under the penalty of punishment.<sup>3</sup>

After the establishment of the Regency Council at Jaipur in 1839, slave-dealing was not only abolished but the very term 'slave' (*gola* and *goli*) was forbidden to be used in the State.<sup>4</sup> Further, on February 5, 1847, the Jaipur Regency Council imposed restrictions on the Nagas, Dadupanthis, Sads and others for purchasing children for induction as disciples (*chelas*).<sup>5</sup>

On receiving information of the Banjaras selling eight female children and dancing girls to the *Thakurs* at Pachpadra,

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1. *Progs.* June 1862, Nos. 53-6, Political-A, Foreign Department.
  2. Ross to Lockett d. 22 June, Cons. 13 August 1832, No. 25, F&P.
  3. J. Corbet, offg. Political Agent Harauti d. 17 September, Cons. 22 October 1832, No. 22, F&P; See also, Political letter to COD d. 21 November 1833, No. 11, para. 125.
  4. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 5 March, Cons. 1 May 1847, No. 49, F&P.
  5. *Ibid.*, See also, Tr. of a Proclamation by the Jaipur Government d. 5 February, Cons. 1 May 1847, No. 49 (Encl. 2), F&P.



the salt mart of Marwar,<sup>1</sup> J. Ludlow, the Political Agent at Jodhpur, took up the matter with the Jodhpur Court.<sup>2</sup> Thereupon, on December 1, 1840, the Jodhpur Durbar issued proclamation in all the *parganas* forbidding this abominable trade and imposing suitable fines for the offenders.<sup>3</sup> Despite this, the news of persistence of this trafficking in slavery in the Marwar region continued to reach the Political Agent. Captain P.T. French, the Political Agent at Jodhpur, compelled Maharaja Takht Singh to repeat the prohibitory orders in Marwar on February 7, 1844.<sup>4</sup> In the same year, the Rao of Sirohi also prohibited the slave trade in his State. Thereafter, the induction of girls as slaves into Sirohi began to decline appreciably. In 1855, Major Anderson, the Political Superintendent of Sirohi, noted that because of the prohibitory measures no specific cases of slave transactions were reported by the *Kamdars*, and he believed that the practice was fast on the decline.<sup>5</sup>

Meanwhile, the ruler of Jhalawar proclaimed slave trade illegal in 1846; in the same year he handed over to Capt. C.E. Burton, the Harauti Political Agent, two girls who were sold into his family by a person from Agra. The elder of them was restored to her friends, and the younger, a child of seven years whose family could not be traced was maintained within the premises of the Harauti Political Agency at Kota.<sup>6</sup> As a result of the gradual and persistent efforts of the Political officers, all the rulers of Rajputana interdicted slave trade in their

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1. Capt. G. G. Malet, Superintendent Malani to Sutherland d. 25 September 1841 (Encl. 1), Cons. 26 December 1846, Nos. 376-77, F&P; Sutherland to Ludlow, Jodhpur Political Agent d. 6 October 1841 (Encl. 3), Cons. 26 December 1846, Nos. 376 77, F&P.

2. Ludlow, Jodhpur Political Agent to Sutherland d. 21 October 1841, (Encl.), Cons. 26 December 1846, Nos. 376-77, F&P.

3. *Ibid.*

4. Memorandum of some chief events at Jodhpur since 20 January 1844. P.T. French, Offg. Political Agent Jodhpur to Major C. Thoresby, offg. A. G. G. Rajputana d. 23 September 1844, Cons. 1 February 1845, No. 54, paras 9 and 26, F&P.

5. *Progs.* June 1862, Nos. 54-6, Political-A, Foreign Department.

6. C.E. Burton, Harauti Political Agent to Sutherland d. 9 March, Cons. 14 April 1848, No. 54 (Encl. 3), F&P.



respective States.<sup>1</sup> Thus, the Political officers were certainly instrumental in not only coaxing the rulers of the States to issue prohibitory orders but also in getting them enforced effectively with tangible results.<sup>2</sup>

### Abolition of Female Infanticide

The abominable custom of female infanticide was widely prevalent in Rajputana, Jaunpur, Kutch and Kathiawar.<sup>3</sup> In Rajputana, it was mainly practised by some *Thakur* families, though its occurrence was also found among the lower ranks of the Rajputs,<sup>4</sup> Puryar Minas of Jahazpur and Toukra residing on the frontier tracts of the region between Bundi, Jaipur and Udaipur,<sup>5</sup> and also among the Mers of Merwara in the British territory of Ajmer.<sup>6</sup>

The main reason for its prevalence among the Rajputs, the tribes of Puryar Minas and the Mers was their marriage system. The difficulty experienced by a Rajput in procuring a suitable match for his daughter consistent with his notions of dignity and status, the huge expenditure involved in marriage ceremonies, and the exorbitant demand of *tyag* by the Charans, Bhats, and others at the time of a daughter's marriage, induced him to kill his female child so that he might be able to save himself from economic ruin and the social disgrace of having an unmarried daughter at home.<sup>7</sup> It is interesting to note that

1. File No. 2/1846—Slavery, List No. 1, p. 181. S.No. 10, *RAR*; See also, *Progs* June 1862, Nos. 54-6, Political-A, Foreign Department.
2. Cons. 17 June 1848, Nos. 66-7, F&P; See also, Political letter to COD d. 6 March 1849, No. 3, para. 13; *Progs*. June 1862, Nos. 54-6 Political-A, Foreign Department.
3. *Calcutta Review*, Vol. I, p. 378.
4. John Malcolm, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 208; See also, J. Ludlow, Jodhpur Political Agent to Sutherland d. 29 June, Cons. 28 December 1842, Nos. 242-295, F&P.
5. L. Wilkinson, offg. Harauti Political Agent to A. Lockett d. 26 April 1833, Cons. 23 January 1834, No. 17, F&P.
6. Sketch of Merwara (1818-1834) by Lieutenant Col. Hall, Superintendent Merwara d. 16 December 1834, Cons. 4 May 1835, No. 44, F&P.
7. L. Wilkinson, Political Agent, Bhopal to John Bax, Resident Indore d. 9 June, Cons. 1 August 1836, No. 50, F&P; See also, Ludlow, Jodhpur Political Agent to Sutherland d. 29 June, Cons. 28 December 1842, Nos. 242-295, F&P; *Calcutta Review*, Vol. I, pp. 394ff.



the different custom of offering huge sums to the father of the bride by the male side was responsible for the female infanticide among the Mers.<sup>1</sup> The payment of bride price was considered sacred among the Mers and was obligatory for the rich and poor alike. The sums payable were generally beyond the means of many Mers that they preferred to kill their infant female children rather than keep them unmarried.<sup>2</sup> The prevalence of the female infanticide among the Puryar Minas could be attributed to their affinity with the Rajputs though they pretended to have the sanction of divine authority for the practice.<sup>3</sup>

In 1823, Captain Hall, the Superintendent of Merwara, took the lead in abolishing female infanticide among the Mers of Merwara through their own *panchayats*. In the Princely territories of Rajputana, the credit for taking the initiative in this regard goes to Launcelot Wilkinson of Bombay Civil Service who worked from January 8, 1833 to March 8, 1834 as the Political Agent in Harauti. It was owing to his 'energetic action'<sup>4</sup> and drive that the rulers of Bundi<sup>5</sup> and Kota (in 1833)<sup>6</sup> and the Maharana of Mewar (in 1834)<sup>7</sup> issued prohibitory proclamations regarding female infanticide in their respective territories. Furthermore, by 1844 James Sutherland,<sup>8</sup> the A.G.G. in Rajputana, J. Ludlow,<sup>9</sup> the Political Agent at

1. Sketch of Merwara (1818-1834) by Lieut. - Col. Hall, Superintendent, Merwara d. 16 December 1834, Cons. 4 May 1835, No. 44, F & P.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Progs.* July 1862, No. 14, Judl. - B, Foreign Department; See also, *Calcutta Review*, Vol. I, p. 394.
4. Wilkinson to Lockett d. 26 April 1833, Cons. 23 January 1834, No. 17, F&P.
5. Tr. of the *parwana* issued by the Bundi Minister prohibiting female infanticide among the Minas, Cons. 23 January 1834, No. 17, F&P.
6. Tr. of a *Kharita* received on the 22nd April 1833, from the Rajrana of Kota relative to the custom of female infanticide among the Puryar Minas, Cons. 23 January 1834, No. 17, F&P.
7. Tr. of a *Kharita* from the Maharana of Udaipur to the Governor-General d. 7 April, Cons. 19 July 1834, No. 26, F&P.
8. Sutherland to Maddock d. 3 January, Cons. 15 March 1841, Nos. 35-37, F&P.
9. J. Ludlow to Sutherland d. 17 April, Cons. 17 April 1847, No. 48, F&P.



Jaipur and Lieutenant Colonel T. Robinson,<sup>1</sup> the Political Agent at Neemuch, succeeded in persuading the remaining rulers of Rajputana to declare this abominable custom a penal offence in their respective dominions.<sup>2</sup>

The British officers also realized the necessity of limiting the payment of *tyag* to the Charans and the Bhats for rooting out completely the main cause of female infanticide among the Rajputs. In 1844, Captain J. Ludlow, the head of the Council of Regency and Political Agent at Jaipur, took the initiative in mobilizing the public opinion in Rajputana over this issue through the Political Agents at Kota, Jodhpur and Neemuch.<sup>3</sup> He succeeded in this task to the extent that the payment of *tyag* to the Bhats, Charans and others was prescribed individually by every State. Besides, to prevent excessive expenditure on marriages the Bhats and Charans were also prohibited from going from one State to another on these occasions.<sup>4</sup> In this manner, the British functionaries attempted to remove the main cause for female infanticide.

### Abolition of Samadhi

*Samadhi* (inhumation of a person alive) was practised either out of devotion for one's master or the ruler or the high priest or out of disgust with the world; it was quite loathsome to see any one being buried alive just for propitiating a religious zeal or achieving dubious fame.<sup>5</sup>

Measures had already been taken in the British territories to prevent the inhumation of persons alive by rendering it penal for those who participated in the ritual. No such efforts

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1. T. Robinson, Political Agent in Mewar to Major C Thoresby, Offg. A.G.G. Rajputana d. 4 January, Cons. 2 March 1844, No. 44, F&P.
  2. File No. 279 of 1844, List No. II, p. 37, S. No. 216, RAR.
  3. Ludlow to Thoresby d. 12 April, Cons. 30 November 1844, Nos 152-54, F&P.
  4. Ludlow to Thoresby d. 21 July. Cons 20 November 1844, Nos. 155-57, F&P; See for details, V. K. Vashishtha, "Abolition of Female Infanticide in Rajputana", *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33.
  5. A.H.E. Boileau had witnessed a number of cases of *Samadhi* during his tour of the Western Rajputana States during 1834-35. For details see, Boileau, *op.cit.* p. 18.



had been made in Rajputana till the inhumation of an old female slave on February 7, 1839 at Kota came to the notice of the British Government. The woman was a convert to the Nath sect which regarded self-destruction an act of piety; she had inhumed herself alive mainly out of an excessive devotion and misguided religious zeal. The Governor-General took a serious note of this melancholic event. Although the terms of the treaties with the Rajputana States,<sup>1</sup> did not authorize a Governor-General to ban such practices,<sup>2</sup> he nonetheless instructed the Political Agents to take steps to discourage such "inhuman practices".<sup>3</sup> Capt. Richardes, the Political Agent in Harauti, sent a circular letter on April 28, 1840 to the rulers of Kota, Bundi and Jhalawar conveying the desire of the British Government to exterminate this practice of "burying alive" in their respective States. He further explained why the inhumation practice needed complete abolition:<sup>4</sup>

From the consideration that men are a valuable deposit received in trust from the Almighty, and that every king and chief has been clothed with justice from His hand - for the preservation in peace of all His creatures - it would appear, that to provide for the security of his subjects' lives is a paramount duty in a sovereign. I have therefore, written the above in the hope that you will reflect on the criminality of the practices alluded to, and put them down by an express prohibition and the terror of a penal enactment.

Accordingly, the rulers of Kota, Bundi and Jhalawar<sup>5</sup>

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1. Ludlow, offg Political Agent Harauti to Capt. Ludlow, Assistant Incharge of the Rajputana Agency d. 21 February, Cons. 5 June 1839, No. 38, F&P.
  2. Middock to Sutherland d. 14 March, Cons. 5 June 1839, No. 39, F&P.
  3. *Ibid.*
  4. Copy of a circular letter from Richardes to the Raoraja of Bundi, the Maharao of Kota and the Maharajrana of Jhalawar d. 28 April, Cons. 27 July 1840, Nos. 32-34, F&P.
  5. Copy of a letter from Maharao Ram Singh of Kota, received 9 May 1840, Cons. 27 July 1840, No. 33, F&P; Copy of a letter of the Maharajrana of Jhalawar, received 26 May 1840, Cons. 27 July 1840, No. 33, F&P.



took the necessary steps to root out this evil in their respective dominions.

An instance of *Samadhi* took place in Bundi despite the efforts of the ruler, Maharao Raja Ram Singh, to prevent it. Thoresby, the officiating A.G.G., took a serious note of the incident and suggested to the Maharao that when a person manifested his desire for self-immolation all assistance should be prohibited to him by declaring that those who aided and abetted in such an attempt would be penalized.<sup>1</sup>

C.E. Burton, the Harauti Political Agent, successfully carried out this suggestion at Kota. On his advice, the Maharao of Kota foiled, in May 1845, an attempt at *Samadhi* in his own territory.<sup>2</sup> The Maharao's timely action and faithful execution of the Political Agent's instructions were highly commended by the British Government<sup>3</sup> and the Court of Directors.<sup>4</sup>

In the meanwhile, the Political officers posted in the other States of Rajputana also succeeded in inducing the rulers to abolish *Samadhi* in their respective territories. J. Ludlow's exertions produced desirable results in the State of Jaipur in July 1844; similarly Capt. D.A. Malcolm succeeded in getting *Samadhi* prohibited in Jodhpur State in 1847.<sup>5</sup> Gradually, the other rulers also prohibited it in their respective territories.<sup>6</sup> However, with a view to securing its total extinction, the Political Agents, as a matter of general policy, persuaded the rulers to repeat the prohibitory proclamations against

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1. Thoresby to Burton Cons. 9 May 1845, No. 78, F&P.

2. Burton to Thoresby d. 26 May, Cons. 13 June 1845, No. 62, F&P.

3. Currie to Thoresby d. 13 June, Cons. 13 June 1845, No. 63, F&P; Political despatch to COD d. 6 January 1846, No. 4, para 20.

4. Political despatch from COD No. 25 of 1846, para 16.

5. Tr. of a proclamation issued by the Maharaja of Jodhpur to officers in charge of Districts d. 12 July 1847, File No. 3, 1844, Vol. I, p. 181, S. No. 7 RAR; Malcolm to Low d. 4 September, Cons. 17 September 1849, No. 174, F&P.

6. Progs. December 1861, Nos. 79-83, General-A, Foreign Department.



*Samadhi* whenever such cases recurred in their dominions.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, in 1861, it was decided that the same punishment as was laid down for the discouragement of *Sati* be given to the *jagirdar* of the village in which a *Samadhi* took place.<sup>2</sup>

### Sati

*Sati* was an unusual custom which required the wife of a deceased person to burn herself on the pyre of her husband.<sup>3</sup> The Rajput community accorded the rite of *Sati* much honour and glory and practised it with religious devotion. Instances of its occurrence were also found among others like Charans<sup>4</sup> and Brahmins<sup>5</sup> who were closely associated with the Rajput royalty. However, it was seldom practised by the Jats, the Mahajans<sup>6</sup> and the lower classes of the Hindu society.<sup>7</sup>

By the time the British power had established itself in Rajputana, measures were already being taken in the Company's territories to check *Sati*. Perhaps this anti-*Sati* movement elsewhere inspired James Tod, the Political Agent in

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1. For instance, in 1848, the rulers of Harauti States repeated the anti-*Samadhi* proclamations, on the advice of Capt. C. E. Burton, when some cases of *Samadhi* recurred in their dominions. Cf. Tr. of a notification issued by the Maharao Ram Singh, the chief of Kota, d. 3 March 1848 (Encl.4), Cons. 14 April 1848, No. 54 F & P; C. E. Burton, Political Agent in Harauti to Sutherland d. 9 March, Cons. 14 April 1848, Nos. 54-55, F & P.
  2. *Progs.* December 1861, Nos. 79-83, General-A, Foreign Department.
  3. The Marchioness of Bute, (ed.), *The Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings*, p. 379; See also, Ludlow to Sutherland d. 6 September, Cons. 30 September 1843, No. 54, F&P; Thomas Robinson, Political Agent in Mewar to Ludlow, offg. A.G.G. Rajputana, d. 11 February, Cons. 10 April 1839, No. 88, F&P; Tod, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 1657.
  4. Malcolm to Low d. 4 September, Cons. 17 November 1849, No. 174, F&P; See also, Suryamal Mishran, *Vamsha Bhaskar*, Pt. II, p. 1848 (36).
  5. *Progs.* December 1868, No. 16, General-B, Foreign Department; See also, G.N. Sharma, *op. cit.*, p. 128.
  6. Tr. of a *Kaifiyat* from the Udaipur authorities to G. St. P. Lawrence, Political Agent in Mewar d. 29 September, Cons. 17 November 1854, No. 109, F&P; See also, Sharma, *op. cit.*, p. 128.
  7. *Progs.* June 1862, Nos. 24-26, Political-A, Foreign Department; See also, *RPARS*, 1865-67, Pt. I, p. 16.



Mewar and Harauti (1818-22), to advocate the abolition of *Sati* in Rajputana also. He wielded so much influence on Maharao Raja Bishan Singh (1770-1821 A. D.) of Bundi that the latter, contrary to the tradition of his Hara Rajput family, declared in advance that no female sacrifice should be made on his funeral pyre.<sup>1</sup> When the Maharao Raja died, Tod personally went to Bundi and exceeding the confines of his official duties succeeded in honouring the wishes of the late raja by preventing the Ranis from committing *Sati*.<sup>2</sup> This ultimately proved to be an isolated instance as none of the rulers of Rajputana followed the example set by Bundi. For instance, when Maharana Bhim Singh (1778-1828) of Mewar died in 1828 his four Ranis and four concubines (*paswans*) committed *Sati* in the traditional manner.<sup>3</sup>

Even after declaring the practice of *Sati* illegal (1829-30) in the Presidencies, the British Government was, strangely enough, silent<sup>4</sup> on this subject with regard to the Rajputana States. Perhaps, it hoped that the rulers would themselves endeavour to discourage the practice by setting examples before their subjects.<sup>5</sup> Its hopes, however, remained only hopes for in Mewar, where a decade ago *Sati* had been practised when its ruler died (1828), it was repeated again at the time of Maharana Jawan Singh's demise in 1838.<sup>6</sup>

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1. Tod, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 837-38, Vol. III, p. 1518; See also, Tr. of a note of the Jaipur Council of Regency. d. 23 August 1846, *loc. cit.*
  2. Tod, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 838.
  3. Cobbe, Political Agent in Mewar to Resident at Delhi d. 6 April, Cons. 2 May 1828, Nos. 10-11, F&P. Edward Colebrooke, the Resident at Delhi, was wrongly informed that seven Ranis and one favourite concubine committed *Sati*. Cf. Cons. 2 May 1828, No. 9, F&P.
  4. Sutherland to Richardes d. 23 June, Cons. 27 July 1840, Nos. 32-34, F&P.
  5. Robinson to Ludlow d. 11 February, Cons. 10 April 1839, No. 88, F&P.
  6. A. Speirs, Political Agent in Mewar to Alves d. 27 November 1838, Cons. 13 March 1839, Nos. 35-36, F&P; See also, Shyamaldass, *Vir Vinod*, p.1808.



This made the British Government come out openly on the subject of *Sati*. The Governor-General, Lord Auckland soon conveyed to the new ruler of Mewar, Maharana Sardar Singh (1838-42) his displeasure at the "cruel sacrifices" committed by the Ranis of the late Maharana and impressed upon him the necessity of preventing their recurrence throughout his dominions.<sup>1</sup> Ignoring these remonstrances, Mewar continued to resist the abolition of the rite. Again on the death of Maharana Sardar Singh in 1842, one concubine (*paswan*) offered *Sati* on his funeral pyre<sup>2</sup>, while the Ranis did not follow suit because their relations with the deceased ruler were estranged.

James Sutherland thought of abolishing this inhuman custom in Rajputana by enacting legislation for he believed that *Sati* could be abolished only under the threat of punitive legislative measures.<sup>3</sup> His negotiations in 1839 with Maharaja Man Singh of Jodhpur (1803-43) gave him an opportunity to broach the question of legislation against *Sati* in that State. He encountered no difficulty in getting a law passed against such social evils as female infanticide, mutilation and *Sharana* (*asylum*), but over the question of *Sati*, he found much resistance to any legislative prohibition.<sup>4</sup> The Maharaja and his ministers were no doubt prepared to second Sutherland's proposals against *Sati* but as the *Thakurs*, were reluctant to go all the way with them, the discussion over the subject was dropped.<sup>5</sup>

In the Harauti States too, the periodic efforts of the individual officers to prohibit *Sati* also met the same fate as in Mewar and Jodhpur. In April 1840, Captain Richardes, the officiating Political Agent in Harauti (1839-44), addressed on his own initiative *Kharitas* to the rulers desiring them to do

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1. Macnaghten to Alves d. 8 October, Cons. 26 December 1838, No. 50, F&P.
  2. Letter to COD d. 7 June 1843, No. 15, paras 39-44.
  3. Sutherland to Maddock d. 23 February, Cons. 10 April 1839, No. 88, F&P.
  4. Sutherland to Richardes d. 23 June, Cons. 27 July 1840, No. 32, F & P.
  5. *Ibid.*, Report of Sutherland on the affairs of Jodhpur Cons. 7 August 1847, No. 845, F&P.



their utmost to check *Sati*.<sup>1</sup> This independent official action of Richardes was however, decried by Sutherland,<sup>2</sup> Governor-General<sup>3</sup> and the Court of Directors,<sup>4</sup> as he had no clearance from his superiors to adopt such an approach to the problem in the States enjoying autonomy. Besides, such an open discussion with the Rajput rulers over a delicate and emotional issue like *Sati* was likely to provoke resistance to its abolition in Rajputana. Therefore, Sutherland advised Richardes to prepare the ground for its abolition by discussing the question "personally" with the rulers, as he himself had done at Jodhpur in 1839.<sup>5</sup>

In fact, the rulers of Kota and Jhalawar had agreed to prohibit *Sati* only as a matter of compliance with the official instructions of the Political Agent. Left to themselves, they could not have even broached the question of its abolition in view of the veneration in which it was held in Rajputana. This became evident when on October 21, 1844 the Maharao of Kota openly permitted a widow to perform *Sati* very near his palace, thereby ignoring the advice of the Political Agent. Captain C. E. Burton (1844-1857), who happened to be the Political Agent at this time, could hardly take any action in this episode.<sup>6</sup> Major C. Thoresby who was only officiating as A.G.G. in Rajputana, took no action as Burton had done all that the British functionaries were authorized to do.<sup>7</sup> He

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1. Circular letter from Richardes to Raoraja of Bundi, the Maharao of Kota and Maharajrana of Jhalawar d. 28 April, Cons. 27 June, 1840, No. 33. F&P.
  2. Sutherland to Richardes d. 23 June, Cons. 27 July 1840, No. 32, F&P,
  3. Secretary to Government to Sutherland d. 27 July, Cons. 27 July 1840, No. 34, F&P.
  4. Letter from COD of 1842. Quoted from a letter from Burton to Ludlow d. 18 November 1844, File No. 43, Gen. Vol. I, List No. 1, S.No. 15, *RAR*.
  5. Sutherland to Richardes d. 23 June, Cons. 27 July 1840, No. 32, F & P.
  6. Burton to Thoresby, offg A.G.G. in Rajputana d. 21 October 1844, File No. 43, General, Vol. I, *loc. cit.*
  7. Thoresby to Burton d. 25 October 1844, File No. 43, General, Vol. I, *loc. cit.*



suggested to the Political officers that they were authorized only to advise, and not compel, the rulers to take any action regarding delicate issues like *Sati*. The utmost the British officers could do was only to appeal to the good sense of the rulers to abolish this dreadful custom, they had no authority to bring coercion in this regard.<sup>1</sup>

*Abolition of Sati* : It was, however, left to Major J. Ludlow, the Political Agent and head of the Council of Regency at Jaipur (1844-1848), to prepare the ground for the abolition of *Sati* in Rajputana by adopting an approach which was much bolder than that of the officiating A.G.G., Major C. Thoresby. He was inspired, as he himself admitted in his letter, by the anti-*Sati* movement in Bengal to frame such a programme of action. In 1844-45, he succeeded in convincing Seth Manik Chand, Finance Minister of the State, Bhatt Sukha Ram Pandit, the *Rajguru* and the *Thakurs* of Jaipur State to agree to the abolition of *Sati*. Later, he publicised their views far and wide in Rajputana by sending circulars to his colleagues in Marwar, Harauti, Sirohi and Mewar.<sup>2</sup> This was not very much to the liking of the officiating A.G.G., Thoresby who was for a much more cautious policy all along.<sup>3</sup> However, Ludlow's bolder policy produced desired results and brought about a significant change in the official policy : the Governor-General had to issue finally a clear directive to the rulers to summarily abolish in their territories the inhuman custom of *Sati* which was not sanctioned by ancient Hindu *Shastras* as the *Manu-smriti*, *Yajnavalkya*, etc.<sup>4</sup> On April 26, 1846, the Regency

1. Circular from Thoresby to Political Agents in Mewar, Jodhpur, Harauti, Sirohi and Jaipur d. 21 November 1844, File No. 43, General, Vol. I. *loc. cit.*
2. File No. 43, List No. 1, S.No. 15, General, Vol. I, *RAR*; For details See, V.K. Vashishtha, "Abolition of Sati in the States of Rajputana" *op. cit.*, pp. 133-35.
3. Thoresby to Ludlow d. 27 November 1844, Cons. 11 July 1845, No. 46, F&P; Thoresby to Currie d. 2 December 1844, File No. 43, General, Vol. I, *loc. cit.*
4. Secretary to Government to Thoresby d. 1 July, Cons. 11 July 1845, Nos. 32-50, F & P; Tr. of a *Kharita* addressed by Thoresby, offg. A.G.G. Rajputana to the rulers of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Udaipur, Bikaner, Jaisalmer, Sirohi, Banswara, Partabgarh, Dungarpur, Kota, Jhalawar Cons. 25 April 1846, No. 120, F&P; For details see, V.K. Vashishtha "Abolition of Sati in the States of Rajputana", *op. cit.*, pp. 134-35.



Council of Jaipur abolished *Sati* in the State by issuing a proclamation and declaring *Sati* as a penal offence.<sup>1</sup>

The example set by Jaipur, a State second in status only to Mewar in Rajputana, finally encouraged Sutherland, who had taken over as A. G. G. from Thoresby, to appeal to his officers to exert themselves with greater vigour and enthusiasm for the abolition of *Sati*.<sup>2</sup> The cumulative result was that by 1856 all the States of Rajputana, except Mewar, had completely abolished this social evil.<sup>3</sup>

Mewar stood steadfastly against the abolition of *Sati*. On several occasions between 1854 and 1859, the Mewar Political Agent, as well as the A.G.G. in Rajputana, impressed on the Maharana the expediency of its abolition in the State. Having been an ardent supporter of this custom,<sup>4</sup> the Maharana evaded issuing the order of abolition on one pretext or the other. To please the British Government, he showed his readiness to prohibit it in the State, but pleaded helplessness in enforcing the total prohibition as his *Thakurs* held it sacred and would not allow the prohibitory orders to operate in their *jagir* areas.<sup>5</sup> In November 1859, he showed his willingness to publicise the views of the British Government on *Sati* to his people, but declined to inflict punishment on them for the observance of the rite which had existed for centuries.<sup>6</sup> He even contended that Queen Victoria's proclamation of 1858 distinctly permitted continuance of the religious observances of the 'Natives of

1. Proclamation by the Raja of Jaipur d. 23 August, Cons. 17 October 1846, No. 268, F & P.
2. Sutherland to Currie d. 27 August, Cons. 17 October 1846, No. 266-B, F&P.
3. V. K. Vashishtha, "Abolition of Sati in the States of Rajputana", *op. cit.*, pp. 136-37,
4. George Lawrence to Henry Lawrence d. 5 October, Cons. 17 November 1854, No. 100, F&P.
5. George Lawrence to Henry Lawrence d. 10 March 1855, Cons. 4 January 1856, No. 122, F&P.
6. W. F. Eden, offg. A.G.G. Rajputana to offg. Secretary to Government d. 21 November 1859, *Progs.* 27 January 1860, No. 81, Foreign Department.



India'. This stand forced the A. G. G. to clarify to the Maharana that Queen Victoria's proclamation did not countenance *Sati* as a religious observance and that the British Government viewed this rite as an act of suicide.<sup>1</sup> It was only when he denied Maharana Swarup Singh (1842-61) the privilege of calling on him in 1860 on his arrival at Udaipur that the latter proclaimed the abolition of *Sati* in Mewar.<sup>2</sup> Thus by 1860, *Sati* had become illegal in the Rajputana States in the sense that all the rulers had passed legislation against it.

### Witchcraft

Whilst a superstitious belief in witchcraft existed throughout Rajputana, the inhabitants of the States of Mewar, Banswara, Dungarpur<sup>3</sup> and Kota gave greater credence to its mysteries. Zalim Singh, the Regent of Kota, was so unusually superstitious that he considered the cats and witches equally inauspicious. In this childish superstition, he went to the extent of ordering the *Kotwal*, on September 5, 1819, to seize all the cats in the cantonment and send them to the other side of the river Kali Sindh. Every man who caught and brought a cat was promised the reward of a rupee. A large number of women suspected to be witches were also punished by his order.<sup>4</sup> The Maharana of Mewar too shared this belief in witchcraft and had punished many of the witches by getting them burnt alive at Udaipur.<sup>5</sup>

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1. *Progs.* 27 January 1860, No. 85, Foreign Department.

2. *Progs.* December 1860, No. 297 and 407-11, Foreign Department; See also, Tr. of a *Kharita* from Maharana Swarup Singh to W.F. Eden offg. A. G. G. Rajputana d. 20 November 1860, List No. 1, S.No.20, File No. 43, General 1858-60, Vol. VI, *RAR*; George Lawrence, A.G.G. Rajputana to H.M. Durand offg. Secretary to Government d. 13 February 1862; *Progs.* March 1862, Nos. 62-65, Political-A, Foreign Department.

3. *RPARS*, 1871-72, p. 66; *RPARS*, 1865-66 and 1866-67, Pt. II, p. 319.

4. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 213; See also, Tod, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, Vol. III, p. 1615.

5. Cons. 13 May 1853, No. 56, F&P; See also, Shyamaldass, *op. cit.*, p. 2039,



The persecution of witches was more frequent in the *Magra* (Mewar Bhil Hill Tract) than elsewhere in Rajputana.<sup>1</sup> A woman, generally old or wrinkled, was declared a *Dakan* (witch) in the belief that she was endowed with innate mystical power of inflicting pain, disease or death upon human beings or animals.<sup>2</sup> She was generally believed to devour the viscera of her victims<sup>3</sup> who were mostly children. If a person was taken ill or died of a disease, the wiseman of a village requested a *Bhopa* (witch-finder) to ascertain the cause of illness or death. The *Bhopa* declared any particular woman as witch by the ordeal of water or fire or the test of immersing her hand in boiling oil.<sup>4</sup> On a witch thus being identified by him, all her relatives and neighbours assembled and suspended her from a tree with her head downwards and swung her to and fro till she confessed her guilt or died.<sup>5</sup> When she eventually confessed during this torture, she was taken down and either turned out of the village or killed.<sup>6</sup> Nobody about the place raised a voice when a *Dakan* was tortured or put to death; even the law of the land did not come to her rescue as the torture was done openly and in accordance with the customs.<sup>7</sup> The villagers were in constant alarm about the safety of their children and were glad to hear the death of a witch; even the officials (*Kamdars*) of the State would heave a sigh of relief when

1. J. C. Brooke, Commandant Mewar Bhil Corps to G. St. P. Lawrence d. 27 July 1852, Cons. 16 February 1853, No. 122, F&P.
2. Malcolm, *op. cit.* p. 212.
3. *Ibid.*; See also, Tod, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 1615; Harishankar Sharma, "Witchcraft in Mewar (1800-1900)", *PRHC*, Third Session (1969), p. 147.
4. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, p. 212; Tod, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 1113; Brooke to G. St. P. Lawrence, Political Agent Mewar d. 27 July 1852, Cons. 16 February 1853, No. 122, F & P; Cons. 13 May 1853, No. 58 (Encl. 1); F & P. *Progs.* September 1862, Nos. 19 and 42 Genl.-B, Foreign Department.
5. Cons. 13 May 1853, No. 58, F&P, (Encl. 1); See also, J. C. Brooke to G. St. P. Lawrence, Political Agent Mewar d. 27 July 1852, Cons. 16 February 1852, No. 122, F&P.
6. J. C. Brooke to G. St. P. Lawrence d. 27 July 1852, Cons. 16 February 1853, No. 122, F&P; See also, *Progs.* November 1862, No. 187, Genl.-B, Foreign Department.
7. G. St. P. Lawrence, Political Agent Mewar to H. M. Lawrence d. 18 April, Cons. 13 May 1853, Nos. 57-58, F&P.



they heard about her death.<sup>1</sup> For the Bhils, therefore, it was not just a matter of crime but of absolute necessity.

The *Bhopas* were the real instigators of such murders. They kept the superstitious belief of witchcraft alive among the Bhils because they received fees for identifying any old woman as a *Dakan*<sup>2</sup> or for absolving her of the suspicion.<sup>3</sup> Bhils would not have been able to locate witches, if there were no *Bhopas* among them.<sup>4</sup>

*Prohibition of the persecution of witches* : The credit for persuading the British Government to frame a definite policy for the prohibition of torture of witches in Rajputana goes to the *Bombay Telegraph*. A leading article in its issue of March 24, 1851 drew the attention of J.C. Brooke, the Commandant of the Mewar Bhil Corps and the Assistant Political Agent in Mewar, to a particular instance of the torture of a woman at Kherwara (in Mewar) on the suspicion of her being a witch; she was ultimately saved by Dr. Bow, the Medical officer of the Mewar Bhil Corps. The *Bombay Telegraph* contended that if the Commandant of the Mewar Bhil Corps, holding charge of the Hill Tract, took no cognizance of such a horrible torture it should be considered as a dereliction of duty on his part.<sup>5</sup> The publication of this news opened the eyes of the British functionaries in Rajputana to the evil of torture of innocent women as witches.

In 1851, Sampla, a sepoy of the Mewar Bhil Corps, stoned his grandmother to death at Kherwara, because he and the Bhil community considered her to be a witch. The Political officers<sup>6</sup> and the British Government<sup>7</sup> took keen interest in

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1. Cons. 16 February 1853, No. 122 (Encl. 2), F&P.
  2. *Progs.* May 1876, Nos. 17-19, Polt.-B (Encl. 3), Foreign Department.
  3. Malcolm. *op. cit.*, p 215n.
  4. Cons. 13 May 1853, No. 58 (Encl. 1), F & P.
  5. The *Bombay Telegraph* of 24 March 1851 (Encl.), Cons. 16 February 1853, No. 122, F&P.
  6. J. C. Brooke to G. St. P. Lawrence, Political Agent Mewar d. 27 July 1852, Cons. 16 February 1853, No. 122, F&P; G. St. P. Lawrence, Political Agent Mewar to H.M. Lawrence d. 18 April, Cons. 13 May 1853, Nos. 53-59, F&P.
  7. C. Allen to G. St. P. Lawrence, offg. A.G.G. in Rajputana d. 16 February, Cons. 16 February 1853, No. 123, F&P; Allen to H.M. Lawrence d. 11 May, Cons. 13 May 1853, No. 60, F&P.



this episode. Sampla was dismissed from service but was excused from imprisonment<sup>1</sup> on the ground that he had committed the crime in accordance with the custom of his community, and that it was recognized as a legal act by his own sovereign, the Maharana of Mewar. Besides, neither he nor the Mewar Bhil Corps at large had ever been told that the swinging or murdering of witches amounted to a crime.<sup>2</sup> Lieutenant Colonel G. St. P. Lawrence, the Mewar Political Agent, realized the necessity of making a public proclamation that torturing and murdering of witches was illegal in the Rajputana States. Therefore, on August 5, 1852, he sought the permission of his Government to issue an order to the Mewar Bhil Corps that any person implicated in swinging witches would be dismissed from service, and that if a woman died from such swinging, the person responsible for such a death would be tried before the Court and punished suitably. At the same time, he also requested his Government to advise the rulers of Rajputana to adopt measures for the suppression of this "cruel practice".<sup>3</sup>

Considering the practice barbarous, the British Government unhesitatingly permitted the Political officers to eradicate it throughout Rajputana and coax the rulers into declaring it illegal in their respective States.<sup>4</sup> Accordingly, on April 1, 1853, Captain J. C. Brooke, in a regimental parade of the Mewar Bhil Corps at Kherwara, proclaimed this practice as illegal and also made it clear that any violation of this order was liable to attract severe penalties.<sup>5</sup> On the directives of the A.G.G., all the rulers of Rajputana, except the Maharana of Mewar, proclaimed the practice as unlawful and punishable

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1. Allen to H.M. Lawrence d. 11 May, Cons. 13 May 1853, Nos. 53-60, F&P.
  2. G. St. P. Lawrence, Political Agent Mewar to Low d. 5 August 1852, Cons. 16 February 1853, No. 122, F&P.
  3. *Ibid*
  4. Allen to G. St. P. Lawrence, offg. A. G. G. Rajputana d. 16 February, Cons. 16 February 1853, No. 123, F&P.
  5. Brooke to G. St. P. Lawrence d. 1 April, Cons. 13 May 1853, No. 59, F&P.



in their respective States by October 1853.<sup>1</sup> However, the Maharana, who implicitly believed in witchcraft, toed the line only on the "great persuasion" and "insistence" of G. St. P. Lawrence, the Mewar Political Agent,<sup>2</sup> who later observed that :<sup>3</sup>

nothing but the dread of incurring the displeasure of the British Government; and my reiterated calls upon him to comply has at length led him to meet our wishes, I regret that I cannot say he has done it, at all of his own good-will.

In view of this, Lieut. - Col. Sir H. M. Lawrence, the A.G.G., instructed the Mewar Political Agent to draw the Maharana's attention to his own proclamation in every instance of the ill-treatment of a witch.<sup>4</sup> The Governor-General also took a serious note of the Maharana's hesitant attitude in issuing such a proclamation. In a *Kharita* of January 24, 1854 to the Maharana, he expressed his gratitude for the proclamation and desired him to "protect the weaker among his subjects" from exploitation and to "bestow upon them every comfort and ease" and "blessings of good government."<sup>5</sup>

After issuing these prohibitory measures the Political officers always impressed on the rulers to punish those who aided or abetted in the torture of witches.<sup>6</sup> This policy had a

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1. Henry Lawrence to J.P. Grant, offg. Secretary to Government d. 17 November 1853, Cons. 27 January 1854, No. 157, F&P.
  2. G. St. P. Lawrence to Henry Lawrence d. 8 November 1853, Cons. 27 January 1854, No. 158, F&P; Proclamation issued by the Maharana of Udaipur d. 22 October 1853, Cons. 27 January 1854, No. 158, F&P.
  3. G. St. P. Lawrence, Political Agent Mewar to H.M. Lawrence d. 8 November 1853, Cons. 27 January 1854, No. 158, F&P.
  4. H. M. Lawrence to J.P. Grant d. 17 November 1853, Cons. 27 January 1854, No. 157, F&P.
  5. Abstract translation of a letter from Governor-General to the Maharana of Udaipur d. 21 January, Cons. 27 January 1854, No. 159, F&P.
  6. *Prags.* December 1853, Nos. 76-78, Genl.—A, Foreign Department.



salutary effect throughout Rajputana except in the Magra tracts of Mewar from where the reports of witch-swinging frequently reached the office of the Mewar Political Agency. It was only on the persuasion of C.K.M. Walter, the A.G.G. in Rajputana, that the representatives of the Magra *pals* at a meeting on March 3, 1883 at Rikhabdeo, agreed to put an end to witch-swinging; and commit the offenders to the course of law.<sup>1</sup> In this way, the tribal people were made to mend their ways and give up outmoded superstitious practices.

### Abolition of feudal rights over the mercantile class

The British Government did not recognize those feudal rights which were a hinderance to the progress of civilization. The exercise of feudal rights over the mercantile class was not only an obstacle to the mobility of the *Mahajans* but also in the expansion of their trade. On this account, in 1856, Henry Lawrence exerted his own influence on the rulers besides encouraging his subordinate Political Agents to extend protection to those merchants who desired to leave their *jagirdars* to settle in the neighbouring States. It was in pursuance of this policy that he permitted the *Mahajans* of the Ahwa *jagir* (in Marwar) to settle in Sirohi despite the protest of Thakur Kushal Singh of Ahwa.<sup>2</sup>

## III

### An Appraisal

The British Government and its Political officers were the principal agents in introducing social reforms in Rajputana. They greatly succeeded in freeing the people from the shackles of abominable and heinous practices and the tyranny of nobles and priests. They tried everything - persuasion, ridicule and threats of severing diplomatic relations - with the rulers to

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1. *Progs.* April 1883, Nos. 66-73, A-Political-I, Foreign Department.
  2. Edmonstone to Henry Lawrence d. 31 December 1856, Cons. 2 January 1857, Nos. 62-67, F&P; See also, Iltudus Thomas Prichard, *The Mutinies in Rajpootana*, p. 228; Munshi Jwala Sahai, *Loyal Rajputana*, p. 280; Nirmala M. Upadhyaya, *The Administration of Jodhpur State (1800-1947)*, p. 49.



make them introduce social reforms in their respective States. In a way it may be said that a legislative revolution was ushered in Rajputana as a result of the infringement of the treaties of 1817-18. Moreover, even a recourse to these methods was a flagrant deviation from the British social policy of 1832 which only permitted the Political officers to "advise" and "remonstrate". Therefore, it was only in deference to the wishes of the British Government and its officers, and not on their own initiative that the rulers abolished slavery, female infanticide, *Sati*, *Samadhi*, etc., in their respective dominions. The rulers and their subjects realized at last that it was high time they did away with the time-worn customs and practices. The efforts of the Political officers showed good results by changing the attitudes of the rulers and their subjects. The female infanticide steadily died out by 1865-66 because the Rajputs themselves began to regard it as a reprehensible act without any religious sanction or authority behind it.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, *Sati*,<sup>2</sup> trafficking in slaves,<sup>3</sup> swinging of witches<sup>4</sup> and *Samadhi*<sup>5</sup> which were quite common hitherto gradually diminished in their frequency and by the seventies of the nineteenth century only stray cases came to the notice of the British officers. The punishment meted out to the guilty had struck terror in the minds of people to deter them from committing or abetting any longer these barbarous practices.

Despite considerable success in Rajputana, the social policy of the East India Company suffered from many drawbacks and sometimes placed the British Government in difficulties. The arbitrary decision of the A.G.G. for extending protection to the two *Mahajans* of Ahwa for settling down in Sirohi, led Thakur Kushal Singh of Ahwa to defy<sup>6</sup> the authority of the Jodhpur Maharaja and the British in 1857. The

1. *RPARS*, 1865-66, Pt. I, p. 16; See also, *RPARS*, 1879-80, p. 197, para 56; *RPARS*, 1887-88, p. 9.

2. *RPARS*, 1871-72, pp. 122 and 148; See also, *RPARS*, 1879-80, p. 197.

3. *RPARS*, 1868-69, pp. 23-4; See also, *RPARS*, 1871-72, p. 100.

4. *RPARS*, 1866-67, Pt. II, p. 319; See also, *RPARS*, 1871-72, p. 69.

5. *RPARS*, 1879-80, pp. 197, 285.

6. Prichard, *op. cit.*, p. 228; Jwala Sahai, *op. cit.*, p. 280.



Thakur of Salumber (in Mewar) was unhappy with the British measures against *Sati* in Mewar.<sup>1</sup> He gave vent to his feelings by supporting the insurgents' cause in 1857-58 in Mewar and Marwar and kept his sovereign on his tenterhooks throughout the period of this crisis.<sup>2</sup>

Slavery also could not be abolished completely during the period of the East India Company. In deference to the wishes of the British Government many rulers had issued proclamations prohibiting the barter of children, but none of them had attempted to limit the number of their hereditary domestic slaves (*Darogas*), nor to dispense with their services,<sup>3</sup> though the Jaipur State had forbidden (1847) the use of '*Golas*' as a contemptible term which emphasized low origin and status. It was evident that slavery was widely current, notwithstanding the embargo placed on it.<sup>4</sup>

Besides, the proclamations of the rulers prescribing the distribution of *tyag* to Charans, Bhats and others and their efforts to limit the excessive expenditure on the marriages of daughters had yielded no tangible results. This failure was owing to the fact that each State followed its own policy in the absence of a common procedure for all Rajputana.<sup>5</sup> Further, afraid of being defamed by the Charans, the *thakurs* neither had the courage to restrict distribution of *tyag* to them according to their own means nor had any desire to invoke the assistance of British in this matter. Yet, they had great urge to

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1. Major Whitelock, Political Agent Mahikanta to H. L. Anderson, Secretary to Government of Bombay, d. 22 June 1857, File No. 1, Mutiny, Vol. I (March-June 1857), List No. 1, S. No. 38, File pp. 385-86, *RAR*.

2. *Ibid*; See also, File No. 88—Mewar (Old) 1857, List No. 1, S. No. 325, *RAR*.

3. *Progs.* June 1862, Nos. 54-56, Polt.—A, Foreign Department.

4. *Ibid*.

It was only on the pressure of the Slavery Convention of the League of Nations on the British Government that the custom of hereditary domestic servants was declared illegal in the Rajputana States by 1926.

5. *Progs.* July 1888, Nos. 19-24, Internal-A, Foreign Department.



escape from the bondage of this ruinous system.<sup>1</sup> It was only after 1888, when the Committee of the representatives of the Rajputana rulers under the presidentship of Colonel C.K.M. Walter, the A.G.G., framed uniform rules for regulating *tyag* and expenditure on marriage ceremonies among the Rajputs that the *thakurs* felt relieved.<sup>2</sup> The change which the British social policy underwent in 1888 from pressure tactics to making the rulers themselves a committed party to the programme of social reforms had the salutary effect of making the Maharajas conscious of the urgent need for bringing about social changes in their respective States. This change in their attitude inspired them to intensify their efforts for the abolition of social evils. However, their total abolition could not be achieved during the time of the East India Company.<sup>3</sup>

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1. *RPARS*, 1889-90, p. 2.

2. *Progs.* July 1888, Nos. 19-24, Internal—A, Foreign Department. The Committee was named as the *Walterkrit Rajputra Hitkarni Sabha* (*Sabha* founded by Walter for the well-being of the Rajputs) in 1889 and its branch was opened by every ruler in his State to implement the regulations framed by it.

3. For details See V.K. Vashishtha, "Evolution of the Social Policy of the British Government in the States of Rajputana during the nineteenth century," *PRHC*, Ajmer Session (1975), Vol. VIII, pp. 95-100.



## CHAPTER X

# ***Rajputana Agency and the 1857 Uprising***

The establishment of the Rajputana Agency and the various Contingents as the organs to effectively withstand any situation gave the British Government a feeling of complacency about its strength and position in Rajputana. As a result, it reduced the armed strength in the Neemuch and Nasirabad Cantonments, in 1852, with the consent of Colonel J. Low, the A.G.G. in Rajputana.<sup>1</sup> As a corollary to this, the total British force in Rajputana in 1855 became less than one-third of what it was before 1852.<sup>2</sup> On account of this, the number of guards at the various important British military and civil establishments was reduced considerably.<sup>3</sup>

Henry Lawrence, who succeeded Low at the Rajputana Agency, could sense the danger inherent in this weak military position. The British had an arsenal and a treasury at Ajmer, and another treasury at Neemuch. Lawrence considered these places vulnerable in the event of an attack by a band of 500 or 1,000 robbers. According to him, the danger was further increased by the difficult nature of the terrain, the existence of a number of strong forts and the bold character of the people. In view of this, he informed his Government that if there were

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1. Henry Lawrence to Ceil Beadon, Secretary to Government, d. 4 August, Cons. 28 December 1855, No. 118, F&P.
  2. The whole strength of the regular army in Rajputana was 3,242 in 1855.
  3. Henry Lawrence to Beadon d. 4 August 1855, *loc. cit.*



an 'outbreak' in Rajputana, the British would find themselves 'abnormally unprepared' to meet it. In support of his contention, he cited the example of 1847 when Shekhawat robbers, under Dungar Singh, had plundered the British pay office of Nasirabad. In fact, he believed in the latent hostility of the natives towards the British, and desired to overawe them by the dread of force. He, therefore, demanded from his Government a general increase in the Rajputana Field Force.<sup>1</sup>

The British Government, on the other hand, saw no 'special reason' for any addition to the Rajputana Field Force. The existence of dacoits and desperadoes did not, in its opinion, constitute any new threat to its supremacy in Rajputana, nor was there any great probability of its being called upon 'to contend with the Rajputs'. Far from supposing that there was any cause for anxiety it viewed its relations with the Rajputana States as cordial and peaceful. It was confident that the Rajputana Field Force and the Contingents would effectively cope with any danger. The A.G.G.'s request for an increase in the Field Force was, therefore, turned down; he was, however, advised to take the help of, if necessary, the European Regiment from Deesa (in Bombay Presidency), a place at a distance of 150 miles from Ajmer.<sup>2</sup> Subsequently, this false sense of security and strength induced the British Government to withdraw all its European troops from Rajputana and send them to Persia without the consent of the A.G.G.<sup>3</sup>

### Uprisings at Meerut and Delhi

The gradual reduction of the Rajputana Field Force endangered the existence of the Rajputana Agency on the eve of the outbreak of 1857. George Lawrence, the successor of Henry Lawrence to the post of A.G.G., contemplated with dismay the weak military position of his Government when,

1. Henry Lawrence to Beadon d. 4 August 1855, *loc. cit.*

2. Edmonstone to Henry Lawrence d. 28 December, Cons. 28 December 1855, No. 130, F&P.

3. George Lawrence, offg. A.G.G. to Edmonstone d. 27 July 1858, File No. 37—Mutiny, list No. 1, p. 6, S. No. 68, *RAR*; George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 27 July, Cons. 31 December 1858, Nos. 3146-7, F&P.



on May 19, 1857, he received the news at his headquarters at Mount Abu that the Company's native sepoy had revolted at Meerut and Delhi and massacred their British officers. At this time, the Indian sepoy of the Bengal army happened to garrison the Rajputana region and there was not a single European soldier to uphold the British position there. George Lawrence could not trust the allegiance of these Indian sepoy on account of their affinity with the rebel sepoy. Thus, instead of being a source of strength to the Rajputana Agency, they threatened its very existence.<sup>1</sup>

### **A.G.G. demanded help from the Princes**

Finding the Rajputana Agency ill-prepared to meet the imminent danger, George Lawrence suggested to all the political and military officers in Rajputana to take necessary precautionary measures as the Bengal native troops could not be relied upon.<sup>2</sup> He also reposed faith in the fidelity of the rulers for the maintenance of the British power and for exercising control over their own subjects and troops. In order to win their support, he issued a proclamation on May 23, 1857 repudiating therein the much rumoured intention of the British Government to interfere with the religious proclivities of the Indians. In an effort to prevent them from showing sympathy to any emissaries of the Mughal Emperor, he drew their attention to the emblems of Hindu worship which were mutilated throughout Rajputana by the Mughal Emperor, Aurangzeb. He urged the rulers to concentrate their troops on the frontiers of their respective States so as to be available, whenever called upon, to aid the paramount power. At the same time, he desired them to liquidate the insurgents within their territories.<sup>3</sup>

The proclamation had a salutary effect upon the rulers, who responded to it by deploying their troops on the borders

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1. George Lawrence, *Reminiscences of Forty Three Years in India*, p. 278.
  2. File No. 37, *loc. cit.*
  3. Proclamation from George Lawrence to Rajput States d. 23 May, Cons. 26 June 1857, No. 115, F&Sc.



of their States to intercept the rebels.<sup>1</sup> Besides, they turned a deaf ear to the requisitions of the Mughal Emperor for help against the British,<sup>2</sup> and punished the conspirators<sup>3</sup> who, under the promptings from Delhi, attempted to rouse the Hindus and Muslims by spreading the rumour<sup>4</sup> that the British had offended their religious sentiments by dumping into the market sugar and flour ground with the bones of "obnoxious animals". The State officials also tried to dispel the rumours by using the flour for their own meals in the presence of the people.<sup>5</sup>

## I

## Ajmer and Nasirabad

George Lawrence also felt the urgency of taking precautionary measures for protecting the British province of Ajmer, its arsenal and treasury which were under the charge of a Company of the 15th Regiment of the Bengal Native Infantry. Iltudus Thomas Prichard,<sup>6</sup> Commandant of the 15th Regiment of the Bengal Native Infantry, and George Lawrence<sup>7</sup> were aware of the simmerings of revolt in this

- 
1. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 9 June, Cons. 18 December 1857, No. 204, F&Sc.
  2. At the time of the uprising, the Mughal Emperor had desired the rulers of Jaipur, Alwar, Jodhpur, Bikaner and Jaisalmer to come over to Delhi with their troops, to exterminate the British power from India, but none of them replied to it because they had no inclination to side with him. For details see, *Proceedings on the Trial of Muhammad Bahadur Shah Titular king of Delhi*, pp. 171-72. See also, Charles Theophilus Metcalfe (tr.), *Two Native Narratives of the Mutiny in Delhi*, pp. 99 and 219-20; S.A.A. Rizvi (ed.), *Freedom Movement in Uttar Pradesh*, Vol. V, pp.987-88.
  3. For instance, Nawab Wilayat Ali, an officer of the Jaipur State, and his associates were tried and punished by the State for spreading the rumour of the impure flour among the people. For details see, Batra, *op. cit.*, p. 183.
  4. The rumours of the adulterated flour were spread in Neemuch, Nasirabad, Jaipur, etc.
  5. Arjun Singhji Sahivala, *Jivan Charitra*, pp. 57-8, File No. 37, para 113, *loc.cit*; Shyamaldass, *op. cit.*, p. 1968.
  6. Prichard, *op.cit* , pp. 19-20.
  7. George Lawrence, *op.cit.*, pp. 279-80,



Regiment. George Lawrence, therefore, wanted to replace it by the Kota Contingent.<sup>1</sup> But his measures were frustrated by John Colvin, the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, who was given plenary powers over all the military and political matters in Rajputana during the uprising.<sup>2</sup> Colvin had ordered the Kota Contingent to advance towards Agra.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, George Lawrence had to requisition the Light Field Force from Deesa to overawe the Bengal native troops at Ajmer and Nasirabad.<sup>4</sup>

Before the Light Field Force from Deesa could reach Ajmer and Nasirabad, Lieutenant-Colonel Dixon, the Commandant of the Merwara Battalion and Commissioner of Ajmer, relieved the 15th Regiment of the Bengal Native Infantry of its duty to guard the Ajmer arsenal and treasury by a Company of the Mers of the Merwara Battalion.<sup>5</sup> The Mers were of a different class from the sepoy of the Bengal Native Infantry, and had no sympathy with them.<sup>6</sup> Thus, Dixon's prudence helped to save Ajmer whereas in Nasirabad the situation got worsened.

At Nasirabad the efforts of Brigadier F. Macan, Commandant of the Rajputana Field Force, and those of his associates proved abortive in keeping the Bengal native sepoy loyal to the British Government. The sepoy were filled with awe and suspicion when they learnt that a British force was called secretly from Deesa to relieve them. This inflamed the latent anti-British feelings in them.<sup>7</sup> On May 28, 1857, they vented their pent-up feelings by burning and plundering the

- 
1. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 3 June, Cons. 18 December 1857, No. 204, F&Sc.
  2. G.G. to Colvin (Telegraphic message) d. 25 May, Cons. 18 December 1857, No. 529, F&Sc.
  3. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 9 June 1857, *loc. cit.*
  4. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 21 May, Cons. 25 June 1857, Nos. 110-11, F&Sc.
  5. George Lawrence, *op.cit.*, p. 280; Prichard, *op. cit.*, p. 39.
  6. File No. 37, *loc. cit.*
  7. Prichard, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-36.



Nasirabad Cantonment and by killing a few European officers.<sup>1</sup> On learning that the Deesa Field Force was approaching, they hastily moved out of Nasirabad, gave up their plan to attack Ajmer and, instead, marched for Delhi to join hands with the Mughal Emperor.<sup>2</sup> Brigadier Macan, however, had no difficulty in re-establishing British control over Nasirabad with the help of the Bombay Native Cavalry which had not joined the Bengal Regiments in the Nasirabad revolt.<sup>3</sup>

### Lawrence made Ajmer his headquarters

George Lawrence, who had reached Beawar (in Ajmer) by June 3, 1857, shifted 100 European troops from Nasirabad on June 12, for reinforcing the Mers at Ajmer.<sup>4</sup> Further, his appointment as the Brigadier-General<sup>5</sup> and Commissioner of Ajmer<sup>6</sup> made him the chief military and political authority in Rajputana. With Ajmer as his headquarters, he could keep himself in close contact with the Political Agents, Princes and the Commander of the Rajputana Field Force.<sup>7</sup> Thus, Ajmer became the focal point for guarding the British power in Rajputana during the 1857 uprising.<sup>8</sup>

## II

### Neemuch and the Occupation of Nimbahera

No sooner had George Lawrence recovered from the shock of the uprising at Nasirabad than there occurred

1. Brigadier F. Macan, Commanding Rajputana Field Force to George Lawrence d. 29 May 1857, File No. 1—Mutiny, Vol. I, List No. 1, S.No. 38, p. 4, *RAR*.
2. File No. 37, *loc. cit.*, Charles Theophilus Metcalfe, *op.cit.*, p. 67.
3. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 9 June, Cons. 18 December 1857, No. 204, F&P.
4. *Ibid.*, George Lawrence, *op. cit.*, pp. 284-85.
5. The Lieutenant-Governor of North-Western Provinces had appointed George Lawrence as the Brigadier-General to command all the British troops in Rajputana. C. B. Thornhill, Secretary to Lieutenant-Governor, N.W.P. to George Lawrence d. 9 June 1857, File No. 1—Mutiny, Vol. I, *loc. cit.*
6. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 25 August 1857, Cons. 29 January 1858, No. 242, F&Sc.; Dixon died on June 25, 1857.
7. John Mildmay, Assistant A.G.G. in charge of Rajputana Agency at Abu to Thornhill d. 2 June 1857, File No. 1 Mutiny 1857, Vol. I, *loc. cit.*
8. George Lawrence, *op. cit.*, pp. 284-85; See *supra*, p. 51,



another at Neemuch, about 120 miles from Nasirabad. On receiving intelligence of the uprising at Nasirabad, Colonel P. Abbot, the Commanding officer of the Neemuch Cantonment, and Captain B.P. Lloyd, the Neemuch Superintendent, had taken all precautions to keep the native troops under control.<sup>1</sup> On May 29, 1857, Lloyd requested C.E. Burton, the Political Agent at Kota, to march with the troops of the Harauti States to Jawad in order to maintain peace and order in the Neemuch-Jawad district.<sup>2</sup> The sepoy at Neemuch were also informed about the intended move of the Harauti troops, and were assured that no part of that force was intended to replace them.<sup>3</sup>

### Uprising at Neemuch

The concerted efforts of Abbot and Lloyd to restrain the Indian sepoy could only delay the outbreak at Neemuch. On the night of June 3, 1857, the sepoy rose in revolt, setting fire to the Cantonment, plundering the treasury and killing a number of Europeans.<sup>4</sup> On the same night, Burton who had reached Dekan (24 miles from Neemuch) with the Harauti troops not only helped to save the town of Jawad from being plundered but also hastened the movement of the rebels out of that district.<sup>5</sup>

On June 5, 1857 the rebel sepoy marched from Neemuch for Delhi to join the forces of the Mughal Emperor.<sup>6</sup> They made their first halt at Nimbahera, a town belonging to the Nawab of Tonk and sixteen miles from Neemuch, where they

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1. Report on Mewar during Mutiny by Showers d. 18 August 1860, File No. 17—Mutiny 1859, list No. 1, p. 5, S.No. 57, RAR.
  2. Lloyd to Burton d. 20 July, Cons. 25 September 1857, No. 433, F&Sc.
  3. Lloyd to George Lawrence d. 16 June 1857, *loc. cit.*
  4. Burton to Thornhill d. 10 June, Cons. 25 September 1857, No. 434, F&Sc.
  5. Lloyd to Burton d. 20 July, Cons. 25 September 1857, No. 433, F&Sc.
  6. *Ibid.*

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were entertained by the officers of the Nawab.<sup>1</sup> Showers, the Mewar Political Agent, chased them only up to Jahazpur, as beyond it the troops of the Mewar State refused to march.<sup>2</sup> This led Captain E.I. Hardcastle, the Assistant to the A.G.G., to seek the help of the Jaipur and Jodhpur State troops for chasing the insurgents. He, however, did not succeed in his efforts in view of the anti-British ferment throughout the Jaipur territory and the refusal of the Jaipur State troops and their *sardars* to intercept the rebels. About this hostile attitude of the people of Jaipur, he wrote to Lieutenant T. C. Impey, Assistant to the A.G.G., on July 2, 1857 :<sup>3</sup>

At every town through which we passed the inhabitants cursed and abused us as English and neither gave us supplies, nor allowed our servants to enter the place. In fact, the whole country was against us....On our return (from Hindaun), some forty miles in the rear we had passed through Jeypoor force - we were mobbed, hissed and hooted and I am only surprised we were not shot. The whole of Jeypoor is against us....In every larger town in Jeypoor there are parties of Poorebeahs raising population and from Jeypoor, men are daily leaving for Delhi and Agra.

The presence of the Neemuch mutineers on the periphery of Bharatpur caused disaffection among the troops of that State and compelled Morrieson, the Bharatpur Political Agent, to run away from there.<sup>4</sup> The flight of the Political Agent saved Bharatpur from the attack of the Neemuch mutineers,

1. Lloyd to George Lawrence d. 16 June 1857, *loc. cit.*

2. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 25 August 1857, Cons. 29 January 1858. No. 242, F&Sc.

3. List No. 1, p. 4, S. No. 39, File No. 1—Mutiny, Vol. II, *RAR*.  
The Neemuch mutineers who passed through Doodu and Bagru (in Jaipur) on June 1 and June 2, 1857 respectively, were supplied food and cattle by the people. Cf. C.K.M. Walter, Asstt. Ajmer Commissioner, to George Lawrence d. 20 June 1857, File No. 1—Mutiny, list No. 1, S.No. 38, *RAR*.

4. Morrieson to George Lawrence d. 8 July, Cons. 28 July 1857, No. 44-A, F&P; See *supra*, p. 189.



who were on their way to Agra,<sup>1</sup> where they were joined by the rebel Kota Contingent.<sup>2</sup>

*British authority restored at Neemuch* : After the revolt at Neemuch, Lloyd took shelter at Choti Sadri, ten miles from Neemuch. Showers helped him to strengthen his position in that area by persuading the Maharana of Mewar to lend his active support to the cause of the British.<sup>3</sup> There was thus a marked change in the attitude of the Mewar State officials and the people of Choti Sadri towards Lloyd<sup>4</sup> which facilitated his re-occupying the Neemuch Cantonment on June 6, 1857.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, Burton strengthened the British position in the Neemuch District by posting the Harauti troops at Jawad, Neemuch Cantonment and Neemuch Sadar Bazar.<sup>6</sup> These measures led to the restoration of the British civil authority at Neemuch and helped to boost the confidence of the people in the British power there.<sup>7</sup>

After stabilizing the situation at Neemuch, George Lawrence was not in favour of retaining the troops of the States of Kota, Jhalawar and Bundi as they were not dependable. These troops, according to him, were largely composed of the disaffected and ill-paid 'Hindustanees' whom their masters could keep in check with difficulty. So, George Lawrence sent a detachment of the native and the European troops of Deesa from Nasirabad to relieve the Harauti troops at Neemuch.<sup>8</sup> On its arrival on July 18, 1857,<sup>9</sup> Burton sent back the Harauti troops to their respective States.<sup>10</sup>

1. Morrieson to George Lawrence d. 8 July, Cons. 28 July 1857, No. 44-A, F&P.
2. S.A.A. Rizvi (ed.), *Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh*, Vol. V, p. 725.
3. Report of Showers on Mewar during Mutiny, File No. 17 - Mutiny 1859, *loc. cit.*
4. *Ibid.*
5. Lloyd to George Lawrence d. 16 June 1857, *loc. cit.*
6. Burton to Thornhill d. 10 June, Cons. 25 September 1857, No. 434, F&Sc.
7. File No. 37, *loc. cit.*
8. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 25 August 1857, Cons. 29 January 1858, No. 242, F&Sc.
9. *Ibid.*
10. Burton to George Lawrence d. 21 July, Cons. 25 September 1857, No. 432, F&Sc.



### Occupation of Nimbahera

Further, to maintain the effective influence of the British Government over the powerful Rajput State of Mewar during the crisis, George Lawrence appointed B. P. Lloyd, the Neemuch Superintendent, as his Assistant and requested Showers to keep his headquarters at Udaipur instead of Neemuch.<sup>1</sup> However, Showers declined to obey as he claimed better knowledge of his political charge than any one else. The rumour was already floating around Neemuch that the British officers were preparing to abandon the place and march to Agra.<sup>2</sup> In view of this, Showers considered leaving his headquarters inexpedient and against British interest. The British Government endorsed his view but desired him to obey the orders of the A.G.G.<sup>3</sup>

His Government's support made Showers so over confident of his powers that he planned in his own way to strengthen the British position in his political jurisdiction. On August 26, 1857, he learnt at Neemuch that a Delhi Shahzada<sup>4</sup> had established his authority at Mandsore,<sup>5</sup> and was joined by a large number of Mewatis and 'Wilaytees' (Afghans) from Nimbahera and other places; and that the Shahzada intended to march on Neemuch after *Moharram*, to extirpate the 'Firanghis'.<sup>6</sup> Showers believed that the *Amil* and the *Bakshi* of Nimbahera, who had lately exhibited their hostility towards the British Government by entertaining the Neemuch mutineers,

- 
1. George Lawrence to Showers d. 8 August 1857, File No. 1-Mutiny, Vol. II, *loc. cit.*
  2. Showers to George Lawrence d. 27 August, Cons. 30 October 1857, No. 514, F&Sc.
  3. Edmonstone to George Lawrence d. 2 October, Cons. 30 October 1857, No. 517, F&Sc.
  4. He styled himself as Shahzada Feroz Shah. Cf. R. G. Burton, (Compl.), *The Revolt in Central India*, p. 13.
  5. Showers to George Lawrence d. 27 August, Cons. 30 October 1857, No. 524, F&Sc.
  6. News stated by Nanda Pansari of the Neemuch Sadar Bazar to Showers d. 28 August, Cons. 30 October 1857, No. 515, F&Sc.; Memorandum of *Harkara* to Showers d. 28 August, Cons. 30 October 1857, No. 516, F&Sc.



were in league with the Shahzada.<sup>1</sup> Jackson, the Commandant at Neemuch, lent support to Shower's contention. Both of these officers considered the independent existence of Nimbahera detrimental to the peace and quietude of the Neemuch Cantonment. Showers, therefore, sought George Lawrence's permission to occupy forcibly the town of Nimbahera.<sup>2</sup> But George Lawrence forbade him to occupy Nimbahera as the loyalty of the Nawab of Tonk was unshaken, though some of his disaffected troops had gone as '*Gazees*' to Delhi.<sup>3</sup> Even Lloyd apprehended no danger to the British troops at Neemuch from the small town of Nimbahera.<sup>4</sup> Showers, however, entirely setting aside the A.G.G.'s authority, captured Nimbahera with the assistance of a large portion of the Neemuch and Mewar State troops on September 19, 1857,<sup>5</sup> and transferred it to Mewar. It was not a new and unplanned move : he had been contemplating for a long time to wrest Nimbahera from Tonk and transfer it to Mewar.<sup>6</sup> By restoring Nimbahera to Mewar, he fulfilled the long cherished desire of the Maharana to make this territory a part of his State and thus won his loyalty for the British Government.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, the victory of the British arms over Nimbahera improved their position at Neemuch, Kherwara and Mewar; it also helped to improve the mode of the British communications between Neemuch and Nasirabad, restrained the recusant Mewar *thakurs* from extending military assistance to the Marwar *thakurs* against them and worked, above all, as a counterpoise to their defeat at Ahwa.<sup>8</sup>

1. Showers to George Lawrence d. 27 August, Cons. 30 October 1857, No. 514, F&Sc.; Showers, *op.cit.*, pp. 100-104.
2. *Ibid.*
3. George Lawrence to Showers d. 5 September 1857, File No. 23—Tonk (Old), Vol. I, List No. 1, S. No. 374, p. 41, *RAR*.
4. Lloyd to George Lawrence d. 12 September 1857, File No. 1—Mutiny, Vol. III, S.No. 40, p. 4, *RAR*.
5. Showers to George Lawrence d. 28 September 1857, File No. 23—Tonk (old), Vol. I, *loc. cit.*; Sahivala, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-61.
6. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 1 October 1857, File No. 1—Mutiny, Vol. III, *loc. cit.*
7. *Kharita* from Maharana Swarup Singh of Udaipur to Charles John Viscount Canning, G.G. of India, d. 25 January 1858, File No. 12—Mutiny, 1858, List No. 1, S. No. 56, p. 5, *RAR*.
8. Showers, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-110.



George Lawrence considered the Nimbahera policy of Showers 'highly unjust and impolitic.'<sup>1</sup> According to him, it made the Nawab of Tonk, an aggrieved party and turned the Tonk *Bakshi* into a permanent enemy<sup>2</sup> who later took an active part in November 1857 when the rebels of Mandsore attacked Neemuch.<sup>3</sup> Showers and Captain Bannister, the Commandant of British forces at Neemuch, maintained their position with great difficulty there.<sup>4</sup> However, it was only on receiving the tidings of the march of Brigadier Stuart, Commandant of the Mhow Column, to Neemuch, that the rebels decamped hastily to the district of Mandsore.<sup>5</sup> The fugitive rebels were defeated by the Mhow Column at Corria;<sup>6</sup> many of them were killed, some escaped, and those who passed through the State of Partabgarh were repulsed and dispersed by its ruler.<sup>7</sup>

The British success at Neemuch and the news of the restoration of their power at Delhi, had a salutary effect in the Neemuch district. All rumours of the attack of the

- 
1. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 1 October 1857, File No. 1—Mutiny, *loc. cit.*, The British Government deprecated the act of Showers in attacking Nimbahera and its transfer to Mewar. In 1860, it was restored to Tonk and Showers was removed from the Political Department. Beadon to W.F. Eden, Offg. A.G.G., d. 24 February 1860, File No. 23—Tonk, Vol. I, List No. 1, p. 41, S No. 374, *RAR*; R.L. Taylor, Political Agent Mewar to Eden d. 29 August 1860, File No. 23, Tonk (Old), Vol. I, *loc. cit.*
  2. File No. 37, *loc. cit.*
  3. *Ibid*; Showers to G. Lawrence d. 8 November 1857, File No. 1—Mutiny, Vol. IV, List No. 1, S. No. 41, p. 4, *RAR*.
  4. *Ibid*. Showers to George Lawrence d. 9 November 1857; Showers to George Lawrence d. 11 November 1857; Showers to George Lawrence d. 16 November 1857; File No. 1—Mutiny. Vol. IV, *loc. cit.*
  5. File No. 37, *loc. cit.*
  6. Showers to George Lawrence d. 26 November 1857, File No. 1—Mutiny, Vol. IV, *loc. cit.*, File, pp. 238-39.
  7. *Kharita* from Maharawal Dalpat Singh of Partabgarh to Showers d. 25 November 1857, File No. 1—Mutiny, Vol. IV, *loc. cit.*



Shahzada ceased,<sup>1</sup> the confidence of the people of Neemuch in the British power was restored and normalcy was again established in the region. The British officers now, did not apprehend any possibility of insurrection from their native troops, as the success revived their loyalty.<sup>2</sup> The British Government commended the conduct of the officers and men composing the garrison of the Neemuch Fort.<sup>3</sup>

### III

#### Revolts of the Jodhpur Legion and the Ahwa Thakur

The revolt of the native sepoy at Nasirabad and Neemuch and that of the Kota Contingent at Agra, was followed by the revolts of the Jodhpur Legion at Mount Abu and Erinpura.

During the period of the uprising, some native sepoy of the Jodhpur Legion under their Commandant, Captain Hall, were stationed at Mount Abu and Anadra to give protection to the European families residing there.<sup>4</sup> On the morning of August 21, 1857, the sepoy from Anadra went up to Mount Abu where they joined the other sepoy of the Legion and attacked the European Barracks and the residence of their own Commandant. However, Hall, with the help of some thirty convalescent European soldiers, drove away the rebels down the hill.<sup>5</sup> As a result of this resistance, lives of a number of Europeans were saved.<sup>6</sup> Rao Shiva Singh of Sirohi

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1. Showers to George Lawrence d. 22 January 1858, File No. 1—Mutiny, Vol. VI, List No. 1, S.No. 43, p. 5, *RAR*.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Beadon to the Chief Commissioner N.W.P. d. 8 February 1858, File No. 1, Mutiny, Vol. VI, *loc. cit.*

4. Captain Hall, Commanding on Mount Abu d. 28 August 1857, File No. 1—Mutiny, Vol. II, List No. 1, S.No. 39, p. 4 *RAR*.

5. *Ibid.*

6. George Lawrence, *op. cit.*, p. 291.



rendered all possible assistance for the protection of these Europeans.<sup>1</sup>

Having had little success at Mount Abu, the Legion sepoy joined their comrades at Erinpura,<sup>2</sup> and with their help, plundered and burnt the Erinpura Cantonment. Lieutenant Conolly, the Adjutant of the Jodhpur Legion, failed to keep them in check.<sup>3</sup> He collected the Bhils of the Legion, who had not joined the sepoy in revolt, to restore order in the Cantonment.<sup>4</sup> At the same time, Monck Mason, the Jodhpur Political Agent, persuaded Maharaja Takht Singh to send Anar Singh, the Jodhpur Commander, to intercept the Legion sepoy.<sup>5</sup>

### Revolt of the Ahwa Thakur

Anar Singh failed to intercept the Legion sepoy as, contrary to his expectations, they retired to Ahwa instead of taking the road to Pali.<sup>6</sup> Thakur Kushal Singh of Ahwa, in conjunction with the other disaffected Thakurs of Marwar, was in open rebellion against his own sovereign,<sup>7</sup> and was annoyed with the British Government for protecting the Maharaja and interfering in his feudal rights over the mercantile class.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, in defiance of the remonstrances of Monck Mason,<sup>9</sup> he employed the Legion sepoy in his service

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1. File No. 37, *loc. cit.* ; See also, G. H. Ojha, *Sirohi Rajya ka Itihas*, pp. 311-12.
  2. Hall to George Lawrence d. 28 August 1857, File No. 1—Mutiny, Vol. II, *loc. cit.*
  3. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 28 August 1857, File No. 1—Mutiny, Vol. II, *loc. cit.*
  4. File No. 37, *loc. cit.*
  5. Monck Mason, Jodhpur Political Agent to George Lawrence d. 26 August 1857, File No. 3 of 1857, List No. 10, S.No. 18, p. 116, *RAR*.
  6. Monck Mason to George Lawrence d. 10 September 1857 (Encl.), File No. 1—Mutiny, Vol. III, List No. 1, p. 4, S.No. 40, *RAR*.
  7. *Ibid.*
  8. See *supra*, pp. 253-54.
  9. Tr. of a letter from Monck Mason to Kushal Singh, Chief of Ahwa, in reply d. 2 September 1857, File No. 1, Mutiny—Vol. III, List No. 1, p. 4, S. No. 40, *RAR*.



and thus placed himself in direct opposition to the British Government.<sup>1</sup>

Secure of their position, the Legion sepoy's attacked the camp of Anar Singh at Bara-Bithora on September 9, 1857. During the encounter, Anar Singh was deserted by the Marwar State troops, and he was slain along with his retinue. Lieutenant Heathcote, the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General of the Rajputana Field Force, who was assisting Anar Singh in the operations, escaped to Sojat with great difficulty.<sup>2</sup>

*Lawrence's failure to annihilate Ahwa* : The total defeat of the Marwar State troops at the hands of the rebels created consternation all over Marwar and great fear among the *Mahajans* of Pali.<sup>3</sup> Had George Lawrence decided to remain quiescent, and allowed the rebellion to continue at Ahwa, which lay on the highway between Deesa and Nasirabad, it would have been detrimental to the British power in Rajputana and would have obstructed the march of the Deesa troops there.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, with a force drawn from Nasirabad and Marwar, he attacked Ahwa on September 18, 1857. In the sharp engagement at Ahwa Monck Mason was killed. George Lawrence did not have the adequate military strength to overpower the Ahwa force; he, therefore, had to retreat to Ajmer<sup>5</sup> with a determination to restore British supremacy over Ahwa after receiving further reinforcements from Deesa.<sup>6</sup>

The retreat of the British forces tilted the political balance in Rajputana in favour of the Ahwa Thakur and encouraged the recusant *thakurs* to defy the power of the British and the Maharaja. The Thakur of Bagri refused to

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1. Monck Mason to George Lawrence d. 10 September 1857 (Encl.), *loc. cit.*
  2. Heathcote to Assistant Adjutant General Rajputana Field Force, d. 13 September 1857, File No. 1—Mutiny, Vol. III, *loc. cit.*
  3. Gangadhar, Deputy Post Master, Pali to Captain G. H. Monck Mason d. 9 September 1857, File No. 1—Mutiny, Vol. III, *loc. cit.*
  4. File No. 37, *loc. cit.*
  5. *Ibid.*
  6. George Lawrence to Brigadier Showers d. 24 October, Cons. 18 December 1857, No. 209, F&Sc.; Prichard, *op. cit.*, pp. 245-46.



give provision and shelter to retreating British forces.<sup>1</sup> The Maharaja found his position insecure in the State as the Kuchaman Thakur was the only reliable ally left. The rebellious Thakurs of Ahwa, Asop, Gular, Alniawas and other places considered the present juncture as the most opportune for deposing the Maharaja; they even plundered the *Khalsa* villages to terrorise him.<sup>2</sup> Besides, the tacit support of the Rawat of Salumbar, leader of the Mewar *jagirdars*, to the insurrection of the Marwar *Thakurs* emboldened Kushal Singh to give a broader and more popular base to his struggle against the Maharaja and the British.<sup>3</sup> He had no hope of securing any military assistance from the Mewar *thakurs* since they were restrained at this time by the reviving power of the British arms in Mewar as evidenced by the capture of Nimbahera on the same day when George Lawrence sustained defeat at Ahwa.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, in conjunction with his supporters, he planned to secure military assistance from Delhi to destroy the British stronghold at Ajmer and then to incite rebellion in Marwar and Mewar. To accomplish this objective, Thakur Kushal Singh sent his trusted agent to Delhi on October 10, 1857 along with the rebellious Marwar *thakurs*, the Jodhpur Legion Sepoys and Samrud Singh of Mewar.<sup>5</sup> His utter ignorance about the restoration of the British power at Delhi by this time (September 1857) proved quite disastrous for his mission.<sup>6</sup>

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1. Morrieson, Jodhpur Political Agent to George Lawrence d. 14 February, Cons. 28 May 1858, No. 333, F&Sc.
  2. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 20 October, Cons. 27 November 1857, Nos. 346-47, F&Sc.
  3. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 2 October, Cons. 18 December 1857, No. 213, F&Sc.; See also, Whitelock to H. L. Anderson d. 22 June 1857, File No. 1—Mutiny, Vol. I, List No. 1, S.No. 38, RAR.
  4. Showers, *op. cit*, pp. 107-110.
  5. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 2 October, Cons. 18 December 1857, No. 215 (Encls.), F&Sc.; See also, Tr. of a note from the Mewar *Vakil* d. 10 October 1857, Cons. 27 November 1857, Nos. 346-47, F&Sc; See also, File No. 84—Jodhpur (old), Vol. I, List No. 1, p. 7, S. No. 260, RAR.
  6. George Lawrence to Brigadier Showers, Commanding Movable Column d. 24 October; Cons. 18 December 1857, No. 209, F&Sc.



On receiving message from George Lawrence about the movements of the Jodhpur Legion sepoys, Brigadier Gerrard marched from Delhi and totally defeated them at Narnaul in November 1857.<sup>1</sup> The rebellious *thakurs* however managed to escape alive from the battlefield owing to the clemency shown by the Jodhpur and Jaipur State troops fighting on the British side.<sup>2</sup> This British victory defeated all Kushal Singh's designs to overthrow the British power in Rajputana and ultimately led to his defeat and eclipse.

*Suppression of the Ahwa Revolt* : On the arrival of the Bombay troops George Lawrence ordered them to join the Nasirabad troops in marching against Ahwa. Before the British troops attacked Ahwa, Thakur Kushal Singh retired to the Mewar hills leaving about 700 sepoys to resist the British attack. Thereupon, George Lawrence blocked the passes with British troops on the side of the Mewar territory to prevent his return<sup>3</sup> and deprived him of support from any quarter. He issued a proclamation forbidding the rulers and the people to give refuge or aid to the Thakur since he had challenged the authority of the Jodhpur Maharaja and the British Government by taking the rebellious Jodhpur Legion sepoys into service, and was responsible for the death of Monck Mason and many British sepoys at Ahwa (September 1857).<sup>4</sup> These measures helped Lieutenant-Colonel J. Holmes, the British Commander, to take possession of the Ahwa Fort with little effort on January 24, 1858.<sup>5</sup> The success of the

1. Morrieson to George Lawrence d. 5 December 1857, Cons. 29 January 1858, No. 292, F&Sc.; For details about the battle of Narnaul see, Kripal Chandra Yadav, "Battle of Narnaul (A Forgotten Battle of the Indian Uprising of 1857)", *JIH*, Vol. 43, S.No. 127, April 1965, pp. 657-63.
2. Morrieson to George Lawrence d. 14 February, Cons. 28 May 1858, No. 234, F&Sc.
3. Morrieson to George Lawrence d. 18 January 1858; George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 22 January 1858, File No. 36—Mutiny 1857-58, List No. 1, p. 6, S. No. 36, *RAR*.
4. Proclamation of George Lawrence from Ajmer to the Rajputana States d. 6 January 1858, File No. 84, Jodhpur (old), Vol. I, *loc. cit.*
5. Holmes, Commanding the Forces in Rajputana to George Lawrence d. 25 January 1858, File No. 36—Mutiny 1857-58, *loc. cit.*



British forces deprived Kushal Singh of his ancestral *jagir* and helped Maharaja Takht Singh in breaking the resistance of the other Marwar *thakurs*.<sup>1</sup>

The British Government approved of George Lawrence's action against Ahwa as Thakur Kushal Singh had not only challenged its authority in Rajputana but also obstructed Maharaja Takht Singh from extending full military assistance during the 1857 uprising.<sup>2</sup> In 1860, Kushal Singh who was tried by a Commission and eventually pardoned by Lord Canning, never returned to Ahwa. It was only after his death that his son and successor Devi Singh retook possession of Ahwa in 1868, by overawing a weak Durbar.<sup>3</sup>

#### IV

#### Uprising at Kota

The revolt at Ahwa was followed by that of the discontented sepoys of the Kota State. At this time, Maharao Ram Singh decided to side with the British Government which had liberated him from the galling control of the hereditary *Rajrana* by creating a new State of Jhalawar. Moreover, Captain C. E. Burton, the Harauti Political Agent, had won him over as a British ally by recommending to the Government for remission in the Kota tribute.<sup>4</sup> This explains why the Maharao promptly sent his troops, under the command of C. E. Burton on garrison duty to Neemuch in June 1857.<sup>5</sup> Although the Maharao was well disposed towards the British,

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1. File No. 37, *loc. cit.* For details about punishment to the rebel *thakurs* of Marwar see, R. M. Mathur, "Indian Mutiny and the States of Jodhpur, Bikaner and Jaisalmer," *JIH*, Vol. 48, Pt. II, August 1970, S. No. 143, pp. 367-68.
  2. Edmonstone to George Lawrence d. 24 March, Cons. 28 May 1858, No. 334, F&Sc
  3. File No. 84, Vol. II. List No. 1, p. 27, *RAR*; *Progs.* February 1888, Nos. 307-80, Internal-B, Foreign Department; See also, Vishveshwar Nath Reu, *Marwar ka Itihas*, Vol. II, p. 452.
  4. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 17 April 1858, Cons. 5 August 1859, Nos. 324-27, F&P.
  5. Mildmay to Edmonstone d. 5 June, Cons. 27 November 1857, No. 325, F&Sc.



his troops had come under the spell of the anti-British rising at Neemuch and around.<sup>1</sup> This was clearly reflected by their involvement in a quarrel with the European troops from Deesa at the Neemuch Sadar Bazar; it was only on the intervention of the British officers that the quarrel was averted from taking a virulent turn.<sup>2</sup> However, this event deepened disaffection among the State troops against the British and, they carried along with them on their return to Kota, the sordid and painful memory of it. This ember of anti-British feeling was again kindled when a detachment of the Kota Contingent took to open revolt on hearing of the mutiny of the main body of the Contingent stationed at Agra.<sup>3</sup>

In view of this strong anti-British feeling, the Maharao persuaded Burton to stay on at Neemuch and only to return to Kota after he had regained the confidence of his troops.<sup>4</sup> When Burton reiterated a desire to return to his headquarters,<sup>5</sup> Maharao Ram Singh invited him to Kota only after restoring some order in the State by transporting the most disaffected of his troops to the remote parts, by shifting the Detachment of the Kota Contingent to its headquarters at Deoli and by transferring Lala Jaidayal and Mehrab Khan to Shergarh and Etawah respectively. Above all, he secured an oath on *Quran* from the Chief military officers for the safety of Burton.<sup>6</sup>

1. Showers, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-6.
2. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 25 August 1857, Cons. 29 January 1858, No. 242, F&Sc.
3. Tr. of a letter from the Maharao Raja of Kota to George Lawrence d. 15 October 1857, File No. 2—Mutiny (1857-58), Vol. I, List No. 1 p. 5, S.No. 44, *RAR*; See *supra*, p. 265.
4. Burton to George Lawrence d. 9 August 1857 (Encl. E.), Cons. 5 August 1859, No. 327, F&Sc.
5. George Lawrence had instructed Burton to return to his political jurisdiction after the march of the Harauti State troops from Neemuch. Cf. George Lawrence to Burton d. 27 July, Cons. 25 September 1857, No. 435, F&Sc.
6. Tr. of a letter from the Maharao of Kota to George Lawrence d. 15 October 1857, File No. 2—Mutiny (1857-58), Vol. I, List No. 1, p. 5, S. No. 44, *RAR*; See also, Deposition of the Maharao of Kota before the Commission at the palace d. 8 April 1858, Cons. 5 August 1859, Nos. 324-26, F&P.



## Murder of Burton

Escorted by Nand Kishore, the Kota Agency *Vakil*, C. E. Burton entered the city of Kota on the evening of October 12, 1857. On the evening of October 13, the Maharao paid his usual visit to the Political Agent and about 9 p.m. gun salutes were fired in the city in honour of the restoration of British power at Delhi.<sup>1</sup> On October 14, Burton held a private meeting with the Maharao where no one except the Kota Agency *Vakil* was present.<sup>2</sup> Burton requested the Maharao to dismiss those portions of his troops who were *Poorabias* and Moham-medans, especially the latter. Further, he urged on the Maharao to punish or hang the officers and men who were involved in the disturbances at Neemuch. The Maharao's assent to these measures became the immediate cause of the outbreak.<sup>3</sup> It was through the State *Vakil* that this news passed on to the Kota State troops which, out of fear of the impending punishment, rose in revolt<sup>4</sup> under the leadership of Meharab Khan and Lala Jaidayal.

On the morning of October 15, 1857, the Narain and Bhawani Regiments of the Kota State suddenly attacked the Harauti Residency killing Burton, his two sons,<sup>5</sup> Salder, the

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1. Statement of Mangal Singh Jamadar of the Kota Agency d. 2 November 1857, File No. 2—Mutiny (1857-58). Vol. I, List No. 1, p. 5, S. No. 44, *RAR*.
  2. *Ibid.*; Tr. of a letter from Kota enclosed in a letter from Eden to George Lawrence d. 28 October 1857, File No. 2—Mutiny (1857-58), Vol. I, *loc. cit.*
  3. Abstract translation of a letter from Kota enclosed in a letter from Eden to George Lawrence d. 28 October 1857, File No. 2—Mutiny (1857-58), Vol. I, List No. 1, p. 5, S. No. 44, *RAR*.
  4. Bapu Sreepat Rao of the Kota Contingent to Brigadier General Lawrence d. 16 October 1857, Cons. 27 November 1858, No. 553, F&Sc.

On the eve of the uprising, Lala Jaidayal and Mehrab Khan had returned to Kota from their posts at Shergarh and Etawah respectively. Jaidayal was a Kayastha and hailed from Mathura district. He was in the service of Kota State at the time of the uprising. He was formerly a *Vakil* at the Kota Agency and was removed for being addicted to liquor and other evils. Pathan Mehrab Khan of Karauli was a Risaldar of the Kota State troops.

5. *Ibid.*



Sub-Assistant Surgeon, and Dr. Saviell Cantear, an Indian Christian.<sup>1</sup> The resentment of the Kota sepoys was openly directed against the Political Agent. The Maharao could not prevent the mutineers from killing Burton as there were no Rajput *jagirdars*<sup>2</sup> at hand and as his personal guard was composed of mostly *Poorabia* Hindus and Musalmans who were in secret league with the rebels.<sup>3</sup> It was because of this reason that the native officer on duty at the palace, Nabi Sher Khan, had protested against the Maharao's attempt to rescue Burton. As a last resort, the Maharao sent his Chief military officer Devilal, to negotiate with the mutineers to save the life of Burton but it proved of no avail. The mutineers had blown off Devilal from a gun.<sup>4</sup> In a letter to George Lawrence, the Maharao betrayed his complete ignorance of the plot and expressed his inability to avert the situation.<sup>5</sup> Convinced of the Maharao's innocence and his sincere pleas, Lawrence advised him to recall his *jagirdars* and their dependents to punish the disaffected troops.<sup>6</sup>

The Maharao no doubt made every effort to suppress the revolt but he failed in this task miserably. By January 1858, the rebels became so much insolent and daring that they took possession of the city of Kota and held the Maharao a prisoner in his own palace.<sup>7</sup> Their plundering activities created a sense

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1. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 20 October 1857, Cons. 27 November 1858, No. 337, F&Sc.
  2. The *jagirdars* had returned to their jagirs after attending the function of *Dushehra* at Kota.
  3. Tr. of a *Kharita* from Maharao of Kota to George Lawrence d. 10 November 1857, File No. 2—Mutiny (1857-58), Vol. I, List No. 1, p. 4, S.No. 44, *RAR*.
  4. George Lawrence to Secretary to Government of India d. 17 April, Cons. 5 August 1859, Nos. 324-25, para 12, F&P; Depositions of the Maharao of Kota before the Commission at the Palace d. 8 April 1858, Cons. 5 August 1859, Nos. 324-26, F&P.
  5. Tr. of a letter from the Maharao of Kota to George Lawrence d. 15 October 1857, File No. 2—Mutiny (1857-58), *loc. cit.*
  6. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 20 October 1857, Cons. 27 November 1858, No. 337, F&Sc.
  7. Tr. of a *Kharita* from the Maharao of Kota to George Lawrence d. 27 January 1858, Cons. 30 December 1859, No. 1663, F&P.



of insecurity all over the State. Finding himself helpless to overcome the rebels, the Maharao pretended an alliance with them.<sup>1</sup> By this subtle device, he could prevent the revolt from spreading to other parts of Rajputana.

### Suppression of the Uprising

Considering that the continued insolence of the rebels at Kota endangered the peace of Rajputana and that the murder of Burton and others must be avenged, George Lawrence urgently called for troops from Bombay to attack Kota. Besides, he allowed Maharaja Madan Singh of Karauli, a close relative of Maharao Ram Singh, to send his troops to give protection to the latter who was still beleaguered in his palace. The A.G.G. also requested the rulers of Bundi and Jhalawar to extend military aid to the Maharao, but they declined to do so on account of their deep-rooted animosity against the Kota House.<sup>2</sup>

The Karauli State troops took possession of a portion of Kota city near the palace with the assistance of a few faithful adherents of the Maharao and managed to hold it until the British troops, under the command of Major General H. G. Roberts, attacked Kota in March 1858.<sup>3</sup> Roberts was the Commandant of the Northern Division of the Bombay army and had taken over from George Lawrence, the command of the British troops in Rajputana in February 1858.<sup>4</sup> He succeeded in repelling the rebels and taking possession of the city of Kota by assault on March 30, 1858.<sup>5</sup> A number of the insurgents escaped<sup>6</sup> but those who were caught were either

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1. Tr. of a *Kharita* from the Maharao of Kota to George Lawrence d. 11 February 1858, File No. 2—Mutiny, Vol. I, *loc. cit.*
  2. File No. 37, *loc. cit.*
  3. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 5 March, Cons. 28 May 1858, No. 331, F&Sc. ; George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 24 March, Cons. 28 May 1858, No. 335, F&Sc.
  4. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 1 February, Cons. 28 May 1858, No. 321, F&Sc.
  5. H. G. Roberts, Commanding Rajputana Field Force to Colonel Edward Green, Adjutant of the Army Bombay, d. 7 April, Cons. 28 May 1858, No. 711, F&Sc.
  6. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 1 April, Cons. 5 August 1859, No. 324, F&P.



fined, imprisoned,<sup>1</sup> or blown off<sup>2</sup> and executed.<sup>3</sup> The entire British army was withdrawn from Kota by April 20, 1858.

### **Commission of Enquiry**

George Lawrence, who had also accompanied the British troops with his political staff, constituted a commission at Kota to inquire into the circumstances of the murder of Burton and others, and also the alleged complicity of the Maharao in their murder.<sup>4</sup> Roberts was the President of this Commission; Lieutenant Colonel Holmes of the Bombay Army, Captain R. Morrieson, the officiating Jodhpur Political Agent, Captain W. F. Eden, the Jaipur Political Agent and Lieutenant Impey, the Assistant to the A.G.G., were its members.<sup>5</sup> The Commission commenced its sitting on April 5 and closed on April 12, 1858.<sup>6</sup> After considering carefully the proceedings of the Commission, George Lawrence reported to his Government that the Maharao had no part in the murder of Burton and the other Christians at Kota,<sup>7</sup> that the Maharao was unaware of the intended attack of the disaffected troops on the Residency.<sup>8</sup> The allegation of the rebel leaders<sup>9</sup> that Maharao Ram Singh had instigated them to revolt and murder

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1. For details see, Nathu Ram Khadgawat, *Rajasthan's Role in Struggle of 1857*, pp. 66-67.

2. For instance, Nabi Sher Khan was blown off on the charge of obstructing the Maharao's march from his palace to the Harauti Residency for saving the life of Burton. Cf. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 17 April 1858, Cons. 5 August 1859, Nos. 324-26, F&P.

3. For instance, Lala Jaidayal and Mehrab Khan were executed at Kota in 1860

4. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 17 April 1858, Cons. 5 August 1859, No. 325, F&P.

5. *Ibid.*

6. Proceedings of the Commission at Kota Cons. 5 August 1858, No. 326, F&P.

7. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 17 April 1858, Cons. 5 August 1859, No. 325, F&P.

8. *Ibid.*

9. Tr. of a *Kaifiyat* from the army of Kota to Govind Rao and Maheta Sahib Subhas of the district of Subalgarh in Gwalior (Encl. H), Cons. 5 August 1859, Nos. 324-26, F&P.



Burton for absolving himself of the payment of tribute seemed a flimsy charge to George Lawrence<sup>1</sup> in view of Maharao's proven loyalty to Burton and the British Government throughout the period of the uprising. The British Government accepted the findings but considered the Maharao negligent in protecting Burton's life; it held that the Maharao should have even risked his life for saving him. As a mark of its displeasure, the British Government reduced the salute of the Maharao from 17 to 13 guns.<sup>2</sup> After the murder of Burton, the Harauti Political Agency was revived when R. Morrieson assumed its charge on May 15, 1859.<sup>3</sup>

## V

### Reactions to the 1857 Uprising in Rajputana

The revolts of Meerut and Delhi had encouraged the Indian sepoys at Nasirabad, Neemuch, Mount Abu and Erin-pura to revolt against the British. The Kota State troops did not make a common cause with them although they too carried hatred against the British in their hearts. The rebel Jodhpur Legion sepoys had joined Thakur Kushal Singh as mercenaries in his fight against the British as they had failed to secure pardon from them for their earlier revolts.<sup>4</sup> The absence of any ideological commitment explains why they did not adhere to his cause to the last and later left for Delhi. The Mewar *jagirdars* too did not lend any military assistance to Kushal Singh. Thus, the revolts at Ahwa and Kota were only sporadic uprisings provoked by local factors. The rebels of both the places quenched their lust for money by looting and plundering the people.

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1. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 17 April 1858, Cons. 5 August 1859, Nos. 324-27, F&P.
  2. Edmonstone to Eden, offg. A.G.G., d. 24 June, Cons. 5 August 1859, No. 337, F&P; Officiating Secretary to Government of India to A.G.G. Rajputana d. 4 February 1865, File No. 51—Kota (1859-1866), List No. 1, S. No. 288, p. 24, *RAR*.
  3. Major R. Morrieson, Harauti Political Agent to W.F. Eden, offg. A.G.G., d. 6 June, Cons. 30 December 1859, No. 315, F&P.
  4. Tr. of a letter from Monck Mason to Kushal Singh, Chief of Ahwa, d. 2 September 1857, *loc. cit.*, See also *supra*, pp. 270-71.



### Attitude of the jagirdars

Many of the *jagirdars* sided with the rulers and helped the British officers during the uprising by providing their quota of troops to intercept the rebels, to protect the Europeans and for maintaining peace and order.<sup>1</sup> Rawat Ranjit Singh of Deogarh demonstrated his loyalty to the British to the extent of handing over the intercepted correspondence between the rebellious *thakurs* of Marwar and Mewar, which ultimately led to the easy victory of the British at Narnaul.<sup>2</sup> A few of the *jagirdars* defied the authority of the rulers and the paramount power but did not revolt openly like the *thakurs* of Marwar, Rowa<sup>3</sup> (in Sirohi) and Khetri. They expressed their resentment by giving shelter to the fugitive rebels,<sup>4</sup> by denying provision

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1. The Thakur of Bagu (in Mewar) furnished his troops to B.P. Lloyd, the Neemuch Superintendent, for preserving order at the *thanas* of Jat, Beechrore and Ratangarh and subsequently at Neemuch. Cf. B.P. Lloyd to George Lawrence d. 6 December 1857, File No. 1—Mutiny, Vol. V, List No. 1, p. 4, S.No. 42, *RAR*; See also, Shyamaldas, *op. cit.*, pp. 1967-68; Sahivala, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

Thakur Inder Singh of Dudu, Thakur Shiv Singh of Boraj, Thakur Bukhtawar Singh of Lawa, Thakur Ranjit Singh of Achrol and others with their quota of troops, assisted W. F. Eden, the Jaipur Political Agent, in intercepting the rebels and protecting the lives of Europeans between Rewari, Gurgaon and Palwal during May and July 1857. Cf. *Progs.* April 1860, No. 602, Foreign Department; See also, Anonymous, *Annals of the House of Achrol*, 1910, p. 41.

2. Tr. of a letter from Rawat Ranjit Singh of Deogarh to George Lawrence d. 15 October 1857 (Encls. 1 and 2), Cons. 18 December 1857, No. 215, F&Sc.
3. Thakur of Rowa harassed the Rao of Sirohi during the uprising. Major Raines of Her Majesty's 95th Royal Engineers accompanied by Captain Hall, attacked Rowa and took it by assault on January 5, 1858. Cf. File No. 156—Sirohi, 1857, List Nos. 10-13, p. 116, S. No. 19, paras 67-68, 180, *RAR*.
4. Maji Ranawat, the Regent and mother of the minor chief of Khetri (in Jaipur) was opposed to Maharaja Ram Singh's policy of interfering in the affairs of Khetri. She gave vent to her feelings by refusing (in June 1857) a detachment of the Khetri troops to W.F. Eden for accompanying him into the field and by giving refuge to rebels and mutinous soldiers in Singhana and other places of Khetri district in defiance of the State orders for their apprehension. Cf. List of persons eminent for disloyalty in the State during the Mutiny, Cons. 31 December 1858, No. 4033, F&P.



to the British troops,<sup>1</sup> by inciting the State troops to revolt<sup>2</sup> and by threatening to depose the rulers if they did not fulfil their demands.<sup>3</sup> Rawal Shiva Singh of Samod was the only isolated instance of a noble who encouraged his ruler Maharaja Ram Singh of Jaipur to play a dual role by remaining friendly with both the British and the Mughal Emperor; his efforts were of course finally thwarted owing to the Maharaja's loyalty to the British Government.<sup>4</sup>

### Attitude of State troops, State officials and the people

The people in Rajputana, in general, had all sympathy for the rebels and utter hatred against the British Government as the latter was an alien power; but they did not make a common cause with the mutinous troops, though some of them supplied provisions and cattle to them and hooted and hissed

1. Rawat Kesri Singh of Salumber did not give support to the British Government as a resentment towards its policy of *Sati*, adoption and threat of annexation (Cf. R. Whitelock to H.L. Anderson, d. 22 June 1857, *loc. cit.*). He expressed his resentment by sympathizing with the recusant Marwar *thakurs*, and by supplying provisions to Tantia Tope at Salumber (December 1858). He even refused supplies to Captain Mutter who was pursuing Tantia Tope (29 December 1858) and it was only when Mutter threatened him by sending guns on a high position that he complied with the request. Cf. Cons. December 1860, Part A, Nos 560-63, para 128, F&P; File No. 32—Mutiny 1858, Vol. I, RAR.
2. Rawal Shiva Singh of Samod (in Jaipur) presented *nazar* to the Mughal Emperor at the time of the commencement of the 1857 uprising. On his way from Delhi to Jaipur, he met the Jaipur State troops at Kotputli and infused such a rebellious spirit among them that some sepoys and artillerymen deserted Eden's camp at Palwal and as a result of this Nawab Fyze Mohammad Khan, Eden and the *sardars* returned with the remaining troops to Jaipur in July 1857. Cf. Eden to George Lawrence d. 26 April, Cons. 31 December 1858, No. 4033, F&P.
3. In June 1857, the Rawat of Salumber who was closely in league with the Marwar *thakurs* threatened to attack Udaipur and depose the Maharana if the latter did not comply with his demands. It was believed that the Rawat had the support of the people and the ministers of the State. Cf. Whitelock to H.L. Anderson, d. 22 June 1858, *loc. cit.*
4. Eden to George Lawrence d. 5 November 1857, File No. 1, Mutiny, Vol. IV, List No. 1, p. 4, S. No. 41, RAR.



at the British officers.<sup>1</sup> The State officers, with a few exceptions,<sup>2</sup> assisted the rulers in maintaining internal order and peace and by fulfilling the requisitions of the British Government for military assistance. Besides, they attempted to win the confidence of the people by dispelling rumours that the British wanted to tamper with their religion.<sup>3</sup> On the contrary, the State troops gave only lukewarm support to the British officers in intercepting the rebels<sup>4</sup> and resented their rulers' policy of providing shelter to the Europeans in the royal

1. See *supra*, p. 264. The villagers provided provision and cattle to the Nasirabad mutineers when they passed through the Jaipur portions of Dudu (1 June 1857) and Bagru (2 June 1857). C.K.M. Walter, the Assistant Commissioner of Ajmer, was of the opinion that the mutineers received similar assistance throughout the Jaipur territory. Cf. C.K.M. Walter to George Lawrence d. 20 June 1857, File No. 1—Mutiny, Vol. 1, List No. 1, p. 4, S. No. 38, RAR.

2. Isur Dass, the *zilladar* or *amil* of Hindaun (in Jaipur) had issued orders to his subordinates to supply provisions to the mutinous troops of the Nawab of Tonk when they were on their way to Delhi. The Maharaja of Jaipur set him aside from his post. Cf. List of the persons eminent for disloyalty in the State during the Mutiny of 1857, Cons. 31 December 1858, No. 4033, F&P.

On the directives of Junbez Khan, the *Havildar* of the village of Peeplia (in Jodhpur) an effort was made to render the guns of the Deesa Light Field Force unserviceable by removing the wheels, when it passed on June 8, 1857 through the village. Cf. Capt. H. E. Forbes, Asstt. A.G.G. to George Lawrence File No. 1—Mutiny, Vol. I, List No. 1, p. 4, S.No. 38, RAR.

3. Pandit Sheodeen whole-heartedly served Maharaja Ram Singh by maintaining order in the Jaipur State, by attending to all the requisitions of the British Government for military assistance and by providing carriage and provision to the Kota Contingent when it passed through the Jaipur territory on the way from its headquarters at Deoli to Agra in May 1857. Cf. *Progs.* General-B, September 1868, No. 3, Foreign Department; J. B. Dennys, Commanding the Late Kota Contingent to Eden, d. 28 September, Cons. 18 December 1857, No. 194, F&Sc.

Arjun Singhji Sahivala, the Mewar Agency *Vakil*, assisted C.L. Showers in maintaining order at Neemuch and around and occupying Nimbahera. He also endeavoured to win over the support of the people for the British Government by dispelling the rumour about the impure flour. Cf. Sahivala, *op.cit.*, pp. 56ff; See also, C.L. Showers, *A Missing Chapter of the Indian Mutiny*, p. 84.

4. See *supra*, p. 264.



palaces.<sup>1</sup> However, they did not actively abet the rebels with the sole exception of the *Poorabia* and Muslim troops,<sup>2</sup> in the States of Tonk, Kota, Jaipur, Jhalawar<sup>3</sup> and a few other States. It was because of this reason that Tantia Tope could not secure substantial military assistance against the British during his march through Rajputana between June 1858 and January 1859,<sup>4</sup> and the British pursuing his troops, defeated him at a number of places and finally hunted him out of Rajputana in January 1859;<sup>5</sup> he was seized by a British force

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1. The State troops of Jaipur resented Maharaja Ram Singh's giving shelter to Europeans in his palace. Cf. *Progs. General-B*, September 1868, No. 3, Foreign Department.

2. Pandit Sheodeen of Jaipur and Major Morrieson, the Jodhpur Political Agent had, expected defection of the Mohammedan and *Poorabia* sepoys in Rajputana in view of their sympathy with the Mughal Emperor and the rebel sepoys of the Bengal native army. Major Morrieson observed that : "In every State in Rajputana the Mohammedan and *Poorabia* levies are well known to have been in a state of defection, requiring seemingly nothing but the approach of a few Mutineers to set them in a blaze of revolt. The only wonder is that considering their organization, the Kota troops did not break at Neemuch. Cf. Opinion recorded by Morrieson d. 10 April 1858, Cons. 5 August 1859, Nos. 344-26, F&P; Eden to George Lawrence d. 14 August 1857. File No. 1-Mutiny, Vol. II, List No. 1, S. No. 39, p. 4, *RAR*.

3. See *supra*, pp. 264, 266.

On the approach of Tantia Tope (September 1858) the *Poorabia* troops of the Jhalawar State at Jhalrapatan fraternized with him and as a result of which Maharajrana Prithi Singh had to flee and take refuge in Col. Lockart's camp at Soosneer. Cf. Cons. December 1860, Part A, Nos. 560-63, para 31, F&P.

The Nawab of Tonk remained loyal to the British Government but his troops had given provision to the Neemuch mutineers and marched to Delhi (Cf. File No. 37, *loc. cit.*, para. 131). Besides, on the approach of Tantia Tope, the Tonk State troops welcomed the insurgents and made over their guns to them. Cf. Burton, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

The detachment of the 30th Bengal Native Infantry on escort duty at the Jaipur Political Agency had revolted at Jaipur. Cf. *Progs. General-B*, September 1868, No. 3, Foreign Department.

4. Cons. December 1860, Nos. 560-63. Part-A, F&P. For details about the movements of Tantia Tope in Rajputana see, Burton, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-235.

5. T. Rice Holmes, *A History of the Indian Mutiny*, p. 548.



at Paron<sup>1</sup> and was executed on April 18, 1859 at Sipri for rebellion.<sup>2</sup> However, the confidential report of the Intelligence Department of the Imperial Government bears ample testimony to the fact that the sympathy of the people was on the side of Tantia and his men even in the territories of the pro-British rajahs.<sup>3</sup>

### **Loyalty of the rulers**

The rulers demonstrated their loyalty to the British Government by giving refuge to European officers and their families in their respective territories,<sup>4</sup> by helping the Political officers to maintain a regular system of *dak*,<sup>5</sup> by ignoring the requisitions of the Mughal Emperor for military assistance against the British and by punishing the conspirators who, encouraged by the Moghuls, attempted to rouse the people and create disturbances in their territories.<sup>6</sup> Maharaja Sardar Singh of Bikaner was conspicuous in his loyalty to the British among the Princes of Rajputana. He commanded his troops, in person, at his frontier fortress of Bhadra from where he extended military help to the British officers in suppressing

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1. Major R. Reade, Commander-in-Chief to Machperson, Political Agent Gwalior, d. 8 April, Cons. 22 April 1859, No. 166, F&P.
  2. Telegraphic Message from Captain Helbert, Indore to C. Beadon, Secretary to Government, d. 19 April, Cons. 22 April 1859, No. 167, F&P; See also, Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 551.
  3. Burton, *op. cit.*, p. 235.
  4. The rulers of Sirohi, Mewar, Jaipur, Marwar, Bikaner, etc., gave shelter to the families of Political officers and other Europeans in their palaces. Cf. Eden to George Lawrence d. 26 April, Cons. 31 December 1858, No. 4043, F&P; Hanuman Sharma, *Jaipur ka Itihas*, Vol. I, pp 279-80; Ojha, *Sirohi Rajya ka Itihas*, pp. 311-12; Shyamaldass, *op. cit.*, pp. 1966-67,
  5. For instance, on the suggestion of Monck Mason, Maharaja Takht Singh of Jodhpur had stationed two or four horsemen at every ten miles between Beawar and Pali to receive and convey letters that were received from British authorities at Beawar, Ajmer or Nasirabad and viceversa. (Cf. Monck Mason to George Lawrence d. 27 May, Cons. 18 December 1857, Nos. 202-203, F&Sc). The rulers of Sirohi also made *dak* arrangements for conveying letters of the British authorities from Sirohi to Abu. Ojha, *Sirohi Rajya ka Itihas*, p. 312.
  6. See *surpa*, p. 260n.



the revolt in the neighbouring districts of Sirsa, Hissar and Hansi.<sup>1</sup>

With the single exception of Maharao Raja Ram Singh of Bundi, all the other rulers of Rajputana intercepted the rebels<sup>2</sup> and placed their military resources at the command of the British paramount power, whenever they were requisitioned.<sup>3</sup> Of course, the Maharao Raja was not guilty of any conspicuous disloyalty except that, owing to his private feud with the Kota ruler, he did not extend him any military assistance either to crush the rebellion of sepoys or capture the fugitive rebels from Kota in the Bundi territory.<sup>4</sup> The A.G.G. was annoyed with him because he ignored his continual reminders that Maharao's conduct towards Kota should be governed, not by his personal prejudices, but by his primary obligation to suppress the enemies of the paramount power. This explains why George Lawrence later recommended to his Government that the Maharao Raja be denied the favours that were showered on the other rulers for their services to the British during the uprising. The A.G.G. did not take a similar view of the Jhalawar ruler since there was no complaint against him of giving any shelter to the rebels.<sup>5</sup>

By supporting the Imperial cause during the 1857 uprising the rulers showed that they were quite satisfied with the British policy vis-a-vis the Princely States; had they been dissatisfied, they would have revolted and lent active support to Tantia Tope and the other rebels. Their adherence to the British cause during this crisis showed that they sincerely honoured their commitment to the treaties they had signed

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1. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 25 August 1857, Cons. 29 January 1858, No. 242, F&Sc.; File No. 37, *loc. cit.*, paras 28, 32, 148-41. For details about the services of Maharaja of Bikaner to the British Government during the 1857 uprising see, R. M. Mathur, *op. cit.*, pp. 371-75.
  2. See *supra*, pp. 263-64, 268, 270. The Rawal of Banswara intercepted the rebel fugitives from Mandsore and killed 60 or 70 of them.
  3. Maharaja Madan Pal of Karauli sent his troops to help the British authorities in the districts of Agra and Mathura. Cf. File No. 37, *loc. cit.*, para 116.
  4. See *supra*, p. 278.
  5. File No. 37, *loc. cit.*



with the British. The British Government, in turn, showed gestures of goodwill and friendliness towards them in various ways; it showed its appreciation of the rulers' loyalty during the uprising by issuing *kharitas*,<sup>1</sup> by announcing remissions of debts, commutations of tributes and additions to the number of gun salutes, and by granting lands, *khilats*<sup>2</sup> and adoption *sanads*.<sup>3</sup>

### Political officers and their role

All the Political officers in Rajputana faced difficulties in maintaining the position and prestige of their Government in their respective political jurisdictions. Morrieson failed to maintain his political position at Bharatpur, Monck Mason sacrificed his life at Ahwa and C.E. Burton was killed at Kota; but W.F. Eden, the Political Agent at Jaipur, J. C. Brooke, the Mewar Bhil Corps Commandant at Kherwara, and B. P. Lloyd at Neemuch somehow managed to function effectively at their respective posts.<sup>4</sup> C.L. Showers, the Mewar Political Agent, strengthened the British position by winning over the Maharana not only in his own political jurisdiction but also in the whole of the Rajputana Agency. Thus, the Political officers by timely actions succeeded in securing the help of

1. Cf. Tr. of a *Kharita* from the G. G. to the Maharaja of Jaipur d. 30 November, Cons. 18 December 1857, No. 195, F&Sc.
2. The Sirohi State received concession in tribute and all of its tribute arrears were remitted (See *supra*, p. 200). The Karauli State was granted remission of Rs. 117,000 due to the British Government. The number of the gun salutes of the rulers of Karauli and Tonk was increased from 15 to 17. The rulers of Udaipur and Bikaner were conferred *khilat* of the value of Rs. 20,000 and Rs. 10,000 respectively. For details see, Bhupen Qanungo, "A Study of British Relations with the Native States of India, 1858-62", *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, February 1967, pp. 262-63). In 1862, Maharaja Sardar Singh of Bikaner received forty-one villages in Hissar (Cf. Karni Singh, *The Relations of the House of Bikaner with the Central Powers 1465-1949*, p. 156). Maharaja Ram Singh of Jaipur received the *parganas* of Kot Kasim in perpetuity. Cf. File No. 91-Jaipur (1860-61), List No. 1, S. No. 200, *RAR*.
3. The grant of adoption *sanads* (1862) to all the rulers of Rajputana was in pursuance of the policy of perpetuating their dynasties.
4. File No. 37, *loc. cit.*



the rulers in upholding the paramount authority of the British Government.

George Lawrence, the A.G.G. in Rajputana, dispelled many of the rumours and fears that the sepoy revolt at Meerut and Delhi had created by emphasizing to the rulers that it was the ardent desire of the British Government to adhere to the policy of religious toleration. This proclamation in its effect helped to contain the sphere of unrest and revolt and weakened the cause of the rebels and emissaries of the Mughal Emperor in Rajputana.

The policy adopted by George Lawrence during the uprising was one of non-interference. He himself undertook to maintain peace and order at Ajmer, Nasirabad, Neemuch, Deoli, Erinpura and Mount Abu, while he allowed the rulers to plan, in their own way, for the preservation of peace and security within their respective territories.<sup>1</sup> He interfered only in situations where the rulers faltered and failed; his armed intervention in Ahwa and Kota was necessitated by the failure of the rulers over there to suppress the revolts. This policy proved successful to the extent that it averted collision of the British Government with any of the States. In carrying out this policy, George Lawrence was invariably supported by all the Political Agents with the sole exception of Showers who was subsequently removed from the Political Department in 1860 for overriding his orders. Although differences of opinion existed between Showers and George Lawrence on the occupation of Nimbahera,<sup>2</sup> neither of them deviated from their chief duty of guarding British interests in Rajputana. Besides, George Lawrence managed to retain the confidence of the rulers and their people in the British power by adopting a consistent and resolute policy combined with a conciliatory bearing. Thus, he could successfully safeguard the British power in Rajputana mainly owing to the unflinching support the rajahs and his own officers extended even in trying circumstances which challenged the very base and existence of the Rajputana Agency. His announcement at Mount Abu (on

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1. George Lawrence, *op. cit.*, p. 302.

2. See *supra*, pp. 267-268, 268n.



November 2, 1858), in the Durbar of the Agency *Vakils*, about Queen Victoria's direct assumption of the governance of India from the East India Company was heartily received by the Princes of Rajputana and further fortified their loyalty to the British Crown.<sup>1</sup> One may conclude by saying that the Rajputana Agency under the aegis of the East India Company<sup>2</sup> from 1832 to 1858, successfully handled the Anglo-Rajputana affairs in an atmosphere of amity and harmony and helped to establish the British relations with the Princely States of Rajputana on a firm footing.

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1. George Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 5 November, Cons. 31 December 1858, Nos. 1190-96, F&P; George Lawrence to Edmonstone, d. 21 December 1858, Cons. 25 December 1859, Nos. 617-29, F&P; Shyamaldass, *op. cit.*, pp. 1987-1990.
  2. The Government of India Act of August 1858 declared an end of the paramountcy and Empire of the East India Company. For details see, Qanungo, *op. cit.*, p. 254.



## CHAPTER XI

### *Conclusion*

The British policy towards the internal affairs of the Rajputana States vacillated between interference and non-interference during 1818-25. Political officers like James Tod (1818-22),<sup>1</sup> David Ochterlony (1818-25)<sup>2</sup> and others interfered in the affairs of the States out of an excessive zeal for improving their administrative structures. This was a flagrant violation of the treaties which forbade British interference in the internal affairs of the States. Besides, the Political officers neglected their paramount duty of checking depredations and plundering raids by the subjects of one State on its neighbours. This led to the recrudescence of the predatory system in Rajputana which had obtained there earlier during the Maratha period. The failure of the British functionaries to abide by the general principles of the treaties generated resentment and illwill against them among the rajahs.

Charles Metcalfe, the Resident at Delhi and Agent to the Governor-General for the Rajputana States, decried the British policy of interference in 1826. He no doubt introduced the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs<sup>3</sup> of the States but did not take sufficient precautions to prevent interstate aggression and to persuade the States to submit their mutual disputes for British arbitration. This failure to control interstate frictions<sup>4</sup> continued to be a matter of

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1. See *supra*, pp. 9-14.
  2. See *supra*, pp. 9-24.
  3. See *supra*, pp. 25-28.
  4. See *supra*, pp. 28-31.



complaint on the part of the rulers. Thus up to 1831, the British Government had gained only a partial success in fulfilling its treaty obligations towards the Rajputana States.

The defective *modus operandi* of the British dealings with the Rajputana States was mainly responsible for this failure. The Resident at Delhi had most of these States under his control but, on account of his multifarious duties, could not take proper care of their affairs, especially because of the remoteness and improper location of his headquarters at Delhi. Besides, the Resident in Malwa and the 'Superintendent and Political Agent at Ajmer', shared the political charge of the remaining States of Rajputana. This divided jurisdiction of the British functionaries over the States weakened their authority instead of strengthening it and proved an obstacle in fulfilling their political and diplomatic obligations in accordance with the provisions of the treaties.<sup>1</sup>

The Governor-General Lord William Bentinck and the Delhi Resident Edward Colebrooke in particular, were well aware of these lapses in the British policy towards Rajputana.<sup>2</sup> Edward Colebrooke, who succeeded Metcalfe as the Resident at Delhi, tried to complete the work of his predecessor. He emphasized the need for establishing a separate political agency for these States at the centrally located Ajmer so that the British Government could exercise control over their interstate relations.<sup>3</sup> Lord William Bentinck, after holding consultations with the Rajputana rulers at the Ajmer Durbar, agreed with Colebrooke's proposal. Consequently, in 1832, he placed all the Rajputana States under the charge of one Political authority called the 'Agent to the Governor-General for the States of Rajputana'. This measure, by placing these States out of the orbit of the Malwa Agency and the Delhi Residency, helped to increase the importance of Ajmer, the headquarters of the Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana.<sup>4</sup>

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1. See *supra*, pp. 35-41.

2. See *supra*, pp. 28-29, 33-40,

3. Colebrooke to Swinton d. 26 May, Cons. 12 June 1829, No. 20, F&P; See *supra*, p. 30,

4. Bentinck's Minute d. 30 March, Cons. 16 April 1832, No. 22, F&P.



The A.G.G. represented the British Government in Rajputana and supervised the overall affairs of the Rajputana Agency. As the head of the Agency he was mainly responsible for conducting the political and diplomatic affairs of the British Government with the Princely States; he discharged these functions directly with some of the States under his immediate jurisdiction. The dealings with the remaining States were, however, conducted by his subordinate officers, called Political Agents, each one of them having one to five States under his control. Thus, the A.G.G. functioned like a Political Agent with regard to the States under his direct control while he was the chief coordinator of the other Political Agents. The news-writers who functioned like officers of the intelligence department kept the Political officers posted with the developments in the States whereas the Agency *Vakils* acted as liaison officers between their States and the Political Agents.<sup>1</sup>

The Political officers wielded the sceptre of power over the Rajputana States through the troops placed at their disposal. The regular troops of the British army were stationed permanently at Nasirabad and Neemuch Cantonments to suppress any disturbance in Rajputana. Besides, the Merwara Battalion, the Jodhpur Legion, the Mewar Bhil Corps and the Kota Contingent, were placed under the command of British officers to maintain peace and order in the tribal belts and on the borders of the States. These forces, with the exception of the Merwara Battalion and the Company's regular sepoy at Neemuch and Nasirabad, were organized between 1836 and 1841. The military strength was the manifestation of British power in Rajputana and was sufficient to overawe the rulers and their subjects into submission. Any attempt on the part of the rulers to defy or ignore the British authority was fraught with palpable risks.<sup>2</sup>

The formation of the Rajputana Agency in 1832 marked the beginning of a process of stabilization of British relations with the Rajputana States. During the intervening period of

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1. See *supra*, pp. 52-56, 61-62.

2. See *supra*, Chapter VII.



more than two decades preceding the Mutiny, the British policy towards the Rajputana States was influenced by the following considerations : to abstain from interfering in their internal affairs; to prevent them from committing aggressions on their neighbours, and to realize tribute regularly from the States.<sup>1</sup> Even if there were certain deviations from this policy from time to time, it was uniformly followed towards all the States. During the minority of a rajah, the British Government generally established a Council of Regency comprising local persons of the State (*jagirdars*), State officers and the like) and sometime a Political Agent, if it feared that the person of the young rajah was in danger owing to factional disputes in the States.<sup>2</sup> Whenever maladministration, succession disputes, existence of predatory tribesmen in some tracts of the States or differences between the rajah and his *jagirdars*, showed any signs of endangering the peace and tranquillity of the other States, the British Government invariably interfered to control the situation.<sup>3</sup> The British officers also intervened sometimes to exterminate social evils such as slave trade, *Sati*, *Samadhi*, torturing of witches, female infanticide, etc.<sup>4</sup> Besides, the British Government meddled in the administration of a State when the latter defaulted in the payment of tribute and generally commuted the tribute, if it was convinced that the irregular payment of tribute was due to the financial incapacity of the State. Thus, the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Rajputana States, was meant not only to relax British control over them, but also to awaken them to a

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1. W. H. Macnaghten, Secretary to Governor-General to Lockett d. 17 December 1832, Cons. 7 January 1833, No. 32, F&P; Political letter to COD d. 30 August 1833. No. 6, paras 36-40; Macnaghten to Alves d. 5 October, Cons. 5 October 1835, No. 76, F&P; Secretary to Government to Sutherland d. 16 December, Cons. 20 December 1841, No. 41, F&Sc.; Sutherland to Secretary to Government d. 14 January, Cons. 5 April 1843. No. 29, F&P; Herbert B. Edwards and Herman Merivale, *Life of Sir Henry Lawrence*, p. 507; George Lawrence, *op. cit.*, pp. 302ff.
  2. See *supra*, pp. 152, 161, 201-202.
  3. See *supra*, pp. 25-26, 109-120, 125-139, 201.
  4. Henry Lawrence to Secretary to Government d. 5 February 1857, Cons. 22 April 1859, No. 232, F&P; See also *supra*, Chapter IX.



sense of their obligations towards the neighbours and the paramount power in accordance with the treaties of 1817-18.

The Political officers played a conspicuous role in shaping and implementing the various principles underlying this British policy. Charles Metcalfe, in the case of Bharatpur State in 1826, enunciated that a Political Agent should take over as the head of the Council of Regency if the ruler happened to be a minor.<sup>1</sup> Sutherland followed the same practice in a similar situation at Jaipur in 1839.<sup>2</sup> Subsequently, this principle became part and parcel of the British policy in general towards the Rajputana States.

The policy of abolishing social evils was introduced in the States in 1832, when R. Ross, the Harauti Political Agent, brought to the notice of his Government the prevalence of slave trade in the Kota State.<sup>3</sup> The British Government later instructed the Political officers to impress upon the rulers that the slave trade was an inhuman practice and was regarded with much abhorrence by the paramount power. This made the Political officers work with vigour and enthusiasm for the abolition of social evils in Rajputana. They succeeded in making the rulers to proclaim *Sati*, *Samadhi*, female infanticide, trafficking in slaves, torturing of witches, etc., as unlawful customs in their respective States. It may be observed here that the British were very guarded in initiating social reform measures in the Rajputana States; they did not issue any forthright order but persuaded the rulers, by appealing to their reason, to abolish the inhuman customs in the interest of humanity and general welfare.<sup>4</sup>

In 1838, Nathaniel Alves, the A.G.G., enunciated the

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1. Memorandum of Metcalfe d. 29 August, Cons. 16 September 1825, No. 22, F&Sc.; Metcalfe to Swinton d. 10 February, Cons. 24 February 1826, No. 16, F&P; Metcalfe to Lockett d. 18 September, Cons. 7 July 1826, No. 19, F&P.
  2. Sutherland to Maddock d. 12 March, Cons. 26 June 1839, No. 29, F&P.
  3. R. Ross to Lockett d. 22 June, Cons. 13 August 1832, No. 25, F&P; See *supra*, p. 233.
  4. See *supra*, Chapter IX.



principle of British interference in a State when maladministration<sup>1</sup> necessitated it; it was only his successor, James Sutherland who implemented this policy with considerable success in the Jodhpur State in 1839. The suppression of the bandits and the dacoits in the Malani tract of Jodhpur State in 1832, on the initiative of Lockett, led to the formulation of the principle that the British Government, as a part of its obligation towards the States failed to restrain its subjects from committing depredations in the neighbouring States. Alves pursued the same policy towards the Shekhawati tract of Jaipur in 1834-35.

Occasionally, interference in the internal affairs was justified to compel the States to pay their tributes regularly. David Ochterlony chose to interfere in the administration of Jaipur, in 1821, because of its non-payment of tribute; Alves adopted the same policy there in 1838. In 1842, however, his successor, James Sutherland, requested the British Government to commute the Jaipur tribute, as he was convinced that the original demand of tribute fixed by Charles Metcalfe, in 1818, was too high and burdensome in relation to the resources of the State.<sup>2</sup> Besides, on the repeated requests of the Mewar Political Agent Robinson, the demand of tribute from Mewar was commuted in 1846.<sup>3</sup> It was in pursuance of this liberal policy that half of the Sirohi tribute was also commuted on a permanent basis in 1858. This liberal approach in matters of payment of tribute went a long way in strengthening the ties between the British Government and the Rajputana States. This policy was in direct contrast to that of the Marathas who used to grab portions of a State territory or commit plundering raids on it whenever the payment of tribute was either delayed or defaulted.

Charles Metcalfe, erred in recognizing, according to the supplementary article of the Treaty of 1818, the Rajrana as the

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1. Alves to Prinsep d. 29 January, Cons. 21 March 1838, No. 112, F&P.
  2. Maddock to Sutherland d. 8 July, Cons. 31 August 1842, No. 52, F&P.
  3. Robinson to Sutherland d. 1 March, Cons. 5 April 1841, No. 17, F&P; Currie to Sutherland d. 25 June, Cons. 18 July 1846, No. 159, F&P.



hereditary premier of the Kota State. The arrangement had proved a constant irritant to the British Government.<sup>1</sup> Later on, Rajrana Madan Singh had become unpopular because of his failures as an administrator. Since the people were in favour of the Maharao's rule in the State, on the suggestions of Alves and J. Ludlow, the Harauti Political Agent, the British Government created a new State of Jhalawar in 1838 from one-third territory of Kota and installed Madan Singh as its ruler.<sup>2</sup> In spite of this settlement, the rulers of Kota and Jhalawar eyed each other with suspicion. The animosity between these two States was so deep-rooted that the ruler of Jhalawar, despite the request of the A.G.G., did not help the Maharao to suppress the revolt at Kota in 1857.<sup>3</sup> This would go down in history as an instance of the British failure to devise a proper arrangement for ending discord between the two neighbouring States.

After the establishment of Rajputana Agency in 1832, the British Government took special measures to check the system of *thugi* and banditry in Rajputana. The area of operations of the Thugi Department with its headquarters at Saugar was extended to this region for the apprehension of the thugs.<sup>4</sup> Besides, during the period 1832-58, the Rajputana Agency also evolved an effective machinery to exercise control over the interstate relations in Rajputana. A number of Contingents and Corps were posted under the charge of British officers either on the State borders or in the disturbed tracts. The rulers of the concerned States paid for the maintenance of these Contingents. The purpose of this arrangement was to apprehend the dacoits and bandits and to tame the Bhils, Minas, Mers and Grassias into good citizens. The British control over the Rajputana States was further strengthened by the establishment, for the trial of interstate criminals, of 'International Courts of *Vakils*', both at the headquarters

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1. See *supra*, pp. 11, 70-82.

2. Alves to Macnaghten d. 17 May, Cons. 18 July 1838, No. 80, F&P.

3. File No. 37, *loc. cit.*

4. *Kaifiyat* transmitted to A.G.G. Rajputana and by him forwarded to the rulers of Rajputana d. 6 July, Cons. 31 October 1833, No. 42, F&P.



of Rajputana Agency (1842) and of the permanent Political Agencies, like Mewar Political Agency (1842), Jaipur Political Agency (1847), Harauti Political Agency (1847) and Jodhpur Political Agency (1847).<sup>1</sup>

The formation of the Contingents and the Courts of *Vakils* was an additional financial liability to some States, but it was negligible in view of their usefulness. The former made the travel and movement of merchandise through the States considerably safer and checkmated the border depredations; the latter became an effective instrument for punishing the interstate criminals. Thus, both these bodies supplemented the work of each other. The successful operations of the Courts of *Vakils* and the Contingents added to the security and welfare of the people, and contributed to the decline of crime rate on the borders of the States. These arrangements strengthened the hands of the Rajputana Agency in supervising the interstate relations and in realizing the objectives for which the Rajputana Agency was formed in 1832.<sup>2</sup>

The Rajputana Agency had also played a notable role in shaping this interstate policy. It was on Lockett's suggestion made in 1833 that the Jodhpur Legion was formed in 1836. It was in pursuance of this policy that, on the suggestion of Alves, the British Government permitted the formation of the Shekhawati Corps (later called as the Shekhawati Brigade) for maintaining peace and order in the Shekhawati tract of Jaipur. The British Government expressed its appreciation of this policy by taking initiative in the formation of the Kota Contingent. Moreover, in continuation of Wilder's policy of forming the Merwara Battalion (in 1824), for placating the Mers in Merwara, that the Mewar Bhil Corps was raised and posted in the Mewar Hill tract for reclaiming the tribes of the Bhils, Minas and Grassias by recruiting them as soldiers. The Mewar Bhil Corps was organized as a result of the efforts of Sutherland. He also gave shape to the system of the 'International Courts of *Vakils*' in Rajputana.<sup>3</sup>

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1. See *supra*, pp. 209-230.

2. See *supra*, Chapter VII.

3. *Ibid.*



The A.G.G. endeavoured to maintain the traditional administrative fabric of the States and permitted a Political Agent, even during the minority of a ruler, to initiate only such changes as were essential for the efficient working of the State. The Englishmen who held the high office of Agents to the Governor-General in Rajputana were generally conservative in their outlook and, therefore, never desired to introduce any drastic and immediate changes. However, some of their inexperienced subordinates like P. T. French and Robert Morrieson considered the Rajput rulers backward. They were over-enthusiastic to reorient the local patterns of administration of the States. They had their own notions of a good government and had no regard for age-old traditions and values which were deep-rooted in the indigenous systems. But they were not allowed to execute their ideas. P.T. French, the Jodhpur Political Agent, was snubbed by the British Government for pleading with it to allow the Political Agents to interfere in the detailed arrangements of the States.<sup>1</sup> Henry Lawrence sought the removal of Morrieson from Bharatpur when he found that, despite his warning to him on several occasions, he wanted to go ahead with his own plans of administration.<sup>2</sup>

The British Government took special care to maintain the status and authority of the A.G.G., who also did the same in regard to his subordinates. The British Government usually accepted the suggestions and proposals of the A.G.G. It reposed great confidence in him for maintaining its position and conducting relations with the Rajputana States but did not permit him to take rash and untimely measures. The turning down of the proposal of Henry Lawrence for deposing the Maharana of Mewar and expatriating his recusant *jagirdars* is an example of the kind of control that the British Government exercised over the A.G.G.<sup>3</sup> With its timely actions, the

- 
1. Currie to Thoresy d. 1 February, Cons. 1 February 1845, No. 55, F&P.
  2. Henry Lawrence to Edmonstone d. 15 March. Cons. 12 June 1857, No. 187, F&P.
  3. Edmonstone to George Lawrence d. 28 January, Cons. 9 April 1858, No. 271-KW, F&P.



British Government could prevent the premier State of Mewar, and with it the other Rajputana States, from going against the British during the 1857 uprising. In the same manner, the A.G.G. opposed those measures of his Government which were liable to offend the sentiments and customs of the ancient Rajput principalities and create resentment among them against his Government. For instance, Henry Lawrence supported the old convention of a Rajput ruler adopting an heir for the purpose of succession as against the Governor-General Dalhousie's attempt to annex a State<sup>1</sup> on the ground that there was no lineal descendant. Lawrence<sup>2</sup> finally secured recognition, in 1854, of the Court of Directors<sup>3</sup> for Madan Pal as the adopted successor of the deceased Maharaja Narsing Pal of Karauli. The respect shown by Henry Lawrence for the Rajput customs not only won the confidence of the rulers for the paramount power but also prevented the occurrence of a situation in which the Rajput Princes would have, in all probability, turned against the British.

The removal of Captain C.L. Showers from the political department, in 1860, is another instance of how the A.G.G.'s authority was scrupulously guarded. During the 1857 revolt Captain Showers had occupied Nimbahera and transferred it to Mewar against the wishes and advice of the A.G.G., George Lawrence. Such a flagrant defiance of his superior could only invite the kind of punishment Showers ultimately received. Similarly, Henry Lawrence asserted his authority by seeking removal of the Jaipur Political Agent, Captain W.H. Rickards for indulging in corrupt practices, quite unbecoming of a Political officer.<sup>4</sup> The cumulative result of A.G.G.'s supervision over the Political Agents, and that of the British Government over him was that the British relations with the Rajputana States were established on such a sound and cordial footing that the latter not only stood loyal but also remained

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1. Political letter to COD d. 7 September 1852, No. 56.

2. Political letter to COD d. 4 February 1854, No. 12.

3. Despatch from COD d. 26 February 1853, No. 1; Despatch from COD d. 5 July 1854, No. 30, paras 9-11.

4. See *supra*, p. 178.



a bulwark of the British power in Rajputana during the 1857 uprising.

The Rajputana Agency, thus, realized the main objectives of the treaties of 1817-18 that Rajputana States should work in subordination to the British Government and give due recognition to the latter as the paramount power in India. Further, it justified the plan of Edward Colebrooke and William Bentinck that the Anglo-Rajputana relations would be better regulated from the headquarters of Ajmer than from the remotely situated Delhi.



# Appendix I

## List of the Agents to the Governor - General in Rajputana (1832-1858)

S.No.	Name	Date of assumption of office	Remarks
1	2	3	4
1.	Lieutenant Colonel A. Lockett	1832	Proceeded on leave 29 November 1833, making over charge to his First Assistant Major A. Spiers.
2.	Major Nathaniel Alves	18 April, 1834	Proceeded on leave 1 February, 1839, making over charge to Captain John Ludlow, Assistant to the Agent to the Governor - General and Officiating Political Agent, Haroti.
3.	Lieutenant Colonel John Sutherland	12 February, 1839	Officiating, Confirmed February 15, 1841. Major C. Thoresby offici- ated as Agent to the Governor-General during Lt. Col. Sutherland's absence on leave from 26 February, 1844 to 2 March, 1846. Lt. Col. Sutherland died at Bharatpur on 24 June, 1848. Lt. Col. C. L. Showers, Assistant to the Agent to Governor - General was in charge of the office until the arrival of Lt. Col. Sutherland's successor.



1	2	3	4
4.	Colonel John Low	20 November, 1848	<p>Afterwards General Sir John Low. Subsequently Resident at Hyderabad and Member of the Council of the Governor General.</p> <p>Major D. A. Malcolm officiated as agent to the Governor General during Col. Low's absence on short leave in Simla from 8 September, 1851 to 1 December, 1851,</p> <p>Lt. Col. G. St. P. Lawrence officiated as Agent to the Governor General on Col. Low's transfer to Hyderabad on 25 December, 1852 until the arrival of his successor.</p>
5.	Lieutenant Colonel Sir Henry Montgomery Lawrence	5 March, 1853	Transferred to Lucknow as Chief Commissioner, Oude, March, 1857.
6.	Colonel George St. Pierre Lawrence	15 March, 1857	<p>Afterwards Lt. General Sir George Lawrence.</p> <p>Major W. F. Eden officiated as Agent to the Governor General during Col. Low's furlough in England from 10 April, 1859 to 24 November, 1860.</p>

1. *List of the Agents to the Governor General in Rajputana (1832-1937).*



# Appendix II

Political diary of the...from Monday, the...to Sunday, the...inclusive.<sup>1</sup>

English Department				Native Department			
Date	Letters received	Letters issued	Letters or notes received <sup>1</sup>	Letters or notes issued	Audiences received and given, visits, etc.	Trials investigations, etc.	Occupation of the native princes and occurrences worthy of notice at their courts and in their dominions.

1. Cons. 3 September 1832, No. 5, F&P.



## **Glossary**

<i>Bolavi</i>	Bolavi was levied on the passage of merchandise and travellers for whose safe transit Bhils became thereby responsible
<i>Jagirdar</i>	Chief
<i>Diwan</i>	Finance Minister
<i>Durbar</i>	Royal Court
<i>Firanghis</i>	Englishmen
<i>Gaddi</i>	Throne
<i>Guru</i>	Spiritual preceptor
<i>Jagir</i>	Assignment of land
<i>Khalsa lands</i>	Crown lands
<i>Kharita</i>	Special letter
<i>Khilat</i>	Dress of honour; any article of costume presented by ruling or superior authority to an inferior as a mark of distinction
<i>Maharaja</i>	A ruler of a State
<i>Mukhtiar</i>	Chief Minister of a Princely State
<i>Pargana</i>	District
<i>Pujari</i>	Priest
<i>Rakhwali</i>	<i>Rakhwali</i> was paid by villagers to neighbouring Bhil communities as a protection against plunder
<i>Thakur</i>	A Rajput noble
<i>Vakil</i>	A diplomatic agent of the ruler at the Political Agency



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